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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the implications of reforming the tax system of a developing 
country, using Malaysia as the case study. It examines two main issues. First is to 
analyse the macroeconomic effects of reforming the tax system, and second is to estimate 
the l. abour supply functions with taxation at the microeconomic level. 
The thesis reviews the literature on the experiences of other countries in tax 
reform. It examines in detail the Malaysian macroeconomy and tax system to gain an 
insight into the processes and interactions between economic performance, fiscal policy, 
and tax structure for the last twenty five years. 
In examining the first main issue, the computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model is used to perform counterfactual analysis of tax reforms on the Malaysian 
economy. From the simulations on revenue-enhancing tax reform, we found that 
corporate tax would be the best instrument to raise revenue without hurting households 
or negatively affecting GDP aggregates. The simulations on revenue-neutral tax reform 
showed that the current tax system could be made more efficient by changing the 
structure of direct taxes and adopting VAT. 
On the second issue, we adopt the instrumental variable approach with selectivity 
adjustment to estimate the parameters of labour supply with taxation for Malaysia. The 
modelling procedure estimates the equations for participation, wage, and hours of work. 
The results show that the effect of taxes on the Malaysian labour supply response is 
weak. In addition, the labour supply curve is backward bending starting from the lowest 
wage level. Without the welfare and benefit system found in Western societies, workers 
with low wages increase their hours of work in order to reach an income level that could 
meet their household consumption needs. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
1. BACKGROUND 
Although some developing countries have made various attempts at reforming their tax 
systems after the Second World War, tax reforms in the eighties and nineties have 
become for many a matter of urgency. Many countries faced widening fiscal deficits and 
high debt burden. Reducing fiscal deficits requires some combination of lower public 
spending and higher public revenue. Given their heavy public expenditure commitments, 
many governments are reluctant to make a drastic cut into their spending since this 
would place their development aspirations in jeopardy. Money creation in excess of real 
economic growth is, at best, a temporary source of finance since it can cause inflation. 
Many developing countries have limited amount of resources available for debt service 
and their governments do not wish to increase their debt burdens that are already high. 
Ultimately, the level of public spending that can be committed by a country is 
determined by the amount of taxes and revenue it can raise as well as the public debt it 
can commit on the basis of future taxes. Taxes remain the principal income source for the 
central government. Therefore, improving the tax system is a necessary and sustainable 
way to raise government resources. However, the attempt to raise tax revenue does not 
necessarily imply increasing tax rates, since this can potentially distort the incentive 
mechanisms of private agents and encourage them to evade tax (Hamada, 1994). Many 
countries turn to tax reforms as a way of raising revenue and increasing the efficiency 
and equity of their tax systems. Indeed, when planning a tax reform the government will 
need to explore ways of raising tax revenue without creating a burden for the tax payers 
and distortions in the economy. 
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTIONAND SCOPE OF STUDY 
The major purpose of this thesis is to examine the implications of reforming the 
tax system of a developing country. We briefly assess the experiences of other 
developing countries in terms of their efforts in tax reforms with the view of drawing 
some lessons from them. For the rest of the thesis, we use the case of Malaysia for our 
study. We examine the transformation in Malaysia's fiscal and tax policies during the 
last 25 years, perform simulations of tax reforms on its macroeconomy, as well as 
estimate the parameters of its labour supply with taxation. 
2. ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 
The last two and a half decades brought significant changes to the Malaysian economy. 
From a largely agrarian economy, it is now transformed into a rapidly industrialising 
economy that has successfully pursued growth with distributional objectives. Its 
economy grew rapidly in the seventies as a result of buoyant commodity prices and 
favourable external conditions. The rapid growth provided the country with the resources 
necessary for its ambitious socio-economic development programmes aimed at 
eradicating poverty and restructuring society. Public development programmes as well as 
the non-financial public enterprises grew rapidly during the seventies. 
At the start of the eighties, prolonged world recession and poor export 
performance prompted the government to adopt counter-cyclical programmes. While 
these programmes boosted the economy in the short-term, they soon resulted in growing 
deficits on the government budget and the current account of the balance of payments. 
Foreign loans grew sharply to finance the deficits and public debts rose to an 
unprecedented level. The government acted quickly to deal with the situation. Since 1984 
it adopted wide-ranging adjustment measures that had a profound effect on the direction 
of fiscal policies and economic management for the country. The measures include 
consolidation of the public sector, arresting the rapid expansion of public expenditure to 
reduce budgetary deficits, privatisation of public enterprises, relaxing certain guidelines 
and legislative measures that constrain public enterprise, and providing liberal 
investment incentives to investors. 
These policy measures, coupled with improved external conditions, helped the 
economy to turn around in 1987 and make rapid recovery. Since then the Malaysian 
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economy has consistently registered growth rates above 8 percent per annum. The 
country's commitment to implement programmes under the New Economic policy 
brought significant improvements in income distribution, poverty reduction, and 
increased participation of Malays and other indigenous groups in modern economic 
activities. The quality of life, literacy, longevity and health of the population have 
improved markedly. 
As part of the efforts to re-orientate Malaysia's development strategies in the 
mid-1980sl, the government took steps to improve the tax system to stimulate private 
sector investment and economic growth. By 1986, several tax reforms were underway. 
The corporate income tax rate was reduced in stages to stimulate investment and keep 
abreast with the tax regimes of neighbouring countries. The investment incentives and 
tax allowances for the manufacturing sector were expanded, especially with the adoption 
of the Promotion of Investment Act, 1986. The marginal personal income tax rates were 
brought down to encourage work and savings. Following the decline in oil prices and 
exploration activities in the early eighties, the Second Generation Production Sharing 
Contracts were adopted to improve the terms and incentives to the contractor. Export 
duties on most primary commodities were reduced and later eliminated. Excise and 
import duties were gradually reduced as a means of keeping consumer prices down and 
relieving the tax burden on the poor. 
At the beginning of the nineties, the Malaysian goverm-nent adopted the Second 
Outline Perspective Plan that builds on the experiences and lessons from the past two 
decades of development. The plan aims at creating an environment of sustained 
economic growth, with manufacturing and modern services performing the role of 
growth sectors. There are several fiscal policy implications under this plan. They include 
the adoption of fiscal policies that help Malaysian businesses to be more efficient and 
competitive, concentrating public expenditure in areas with the highest economic and 
social payoffs, and reforming the tax system so that it could generate revenue to meet 
public expenditure requirements without distorting the incentives to work and invest. 
CHAPTER I INTROD UCTIO. VAA'D SCOPE OF STUDY 
3. TAX ISSUES IN MALAYSIA 
Although tax rates were reduced after 1986, tax collection efforts were able to keep 
abreast with economic growth and public expenditure. In fact, tax revenue as a 
percentage of total expenditure grew from 49 percent in 1986 to 80 percent in 1995. This 
was partly due to the rapid economic growth that increased revenue collection from 
income and commodity taxes, as well as the restrained growth of public expenditure 
through greater fiscal discipline and privatisation public enterprises. However, there are 
problems with the current tax system, which can benefit from reform to increase 
efficiency and equity. 
Petroleum had been an important source of revenue in the eighties. Since oil 
prices are volatile and petroleum production in Malaysia has reached a plateau, the tax 
burden in the nineties would increasingly have to be shouldered by income and 
consumption taxes. While Malaysia appears to be fairly successful in mobilising income 
tax revenue, the tax payers are predominantly employees and more effort would have to 
be made to reach the 'hard-to-tax' groups. The tax system has become complex as a 
result of amendments adopted during successive annual budgets and the wide range of 
tax holidays, tax exemptions and allowances used to promote investments. When the 
benefits from different tax incentives occur simultaneously, not only are some of the 
incentives made redundant but they also erode Malaysia's tax base. 
Indirect taxes contribute a declining share of tax revenue, partly as a result of the 
revision in tax rates. The reduction in import duties and particularly export duties had 
resulted in a decline in revenue from trade taxes. The current sales and services taxes 
recorded a sharp decline in the share of tax revenue despite dynamism in business 
activities and private consumption because of the narrow base of these two taxes. In 
addition, sales tax is complex, expensive to administer, and provides a wide scope for tax 
evasion. The adoption of value added tax to replace the sales and service taxes seems to 
be a logical step to raise the revenue of indirect tax on consumption and increase fiscal 
neutrality. 
The tax system is deficient in many ways despite attempts to improve it since the 
late eighties. Although the Malaysian tax system exhibits a relatively high degree of 
revenue productivity, a tax reform will be needed to address these deficiencies and set in 
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place a broad-based, more equitable and neutral system of taxes that would be easier to 
administer and comply with. According to Ahmad and Stern (1991: 2), tax reform 
concerns the search for, and analysis of, systems which are improvements on the existing 
state of affairs, while tax design is concerned more with the specification of an 
appropriate tax structure. The analysis of tax reform would involve examining the initial 
position of the tax system and the impact of tax changes on the economy and households. 
In this thesis,, we will be asking the following questions: 
1. What are the goals and approaches to tax reform? What are the experiences of 
developing countries in tax reforms in terms of the scope, context, substance, 
and timing? Are there lessons and trends from the variety of reforms adopted 
in developing countries that we can draw upon? 
2. How had Malaysia's economy and fiscal policies evolved during the last 
twenty five years? What are the implications of Malaysia's development 
policy on the direction of future fiscal and tax policies? 
3. What are the characteristics and trend of the tax system? How responsive are 
the different tax instruments to income growth? What are the strengths and 
weaknesses of the tax system? 
4. What are the effects of raising each category of taxes on the economy, such as 
macroeconomic aggregates, prices, real wages and real household income, 
consumption and savings? If the government wishes to raise tax revenue, 
which category of taxes would be the best instruments to achieve this, at least 
cost to the macroeconomy and households? Can the tax system be reformed 
in a way that improves efficiency and equity while maintaining or increasing 
tax revenue? 
5. What are the functional parameters of labour supply with taxation for a 
developing country with socio-economic and institutional characteristics that 
differ from developed countries? Would an increase in tax bring about a 
reduction in participation and labour supply? Since most of the studies on 
labour supply with taxation are conducted in developed countries, are there 
any notable differences in the results obtained from this empirical analysis? 
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4. STUDY FocuS AND METHODOLOGY 
In addressing the questions above, the thesis takes up the question of reforming the 
Malaysian tax system in three stages. In the first stage. we perform a detailed 
examination of the characteristics and trends of the Malaysian macro economy and tax 
system, and trace the factors shaping the evolution of economic, fiscal and tax policies. 
The purpose of this examination is to gain an insight into the processes and interactions 
between economic performance, fiscal policy, and tax structure in Malaysia during the 
last twenty five years. 
The issue of how much tax revenue to raise is very much tied up with the issue of 
the growth of public expenditure and how public resources are utilised. In Malaysia, it is 
necessary to examine the economic transformation and the establishment of development 
priorities since 1970. As we shall see later in Chapter 3, public expenditure grew rapidly 
during the seventies and early eighties not only because of socioeconomic development 
priorities, but also as a result and in anticipation of rapid growth in tax revenue that 
benefited from the boom in commodity prices. Faced with growing budgetary deficit and 
the onset of a recession in the first half of the eighties, the Malaysian government 
adopted a series of radical measures to improve economic management, control public 
expenditure, and alter the nature of fiscal and tax policies. With fiscal prudence and 
better management of public resource utilisation, the tax system was able to generate the 
revenue required to fund public expenditure programmes despite tax rate reductions. In 
this stage of the analysis, we also examine how the tax structure had evolved from being 
dependent on taxes on foreign trade and natural resources to one which generates more 
revenue from direct taxation. The analysis highlights the inherent weaknesses in the tax 
system despite being relatively productive in revenue generation. As a diagnostic tool, 
buoyancy coefficients are estimated for each major category of taxes to provide an 
indication on the trend of tax revenue generation and the directions for future tax reform. 
The question of tax reform is examined against the background of the experiences 
of other countries. During the eighties, a large number of countries had chosen to reform 
their tax system, either through the pressure of fiscal difficulties or to seek new ways to 
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update their taxes. I In addition, substantial progress was made towards broadening the 
base of income tax and rate reduction, which brought about horizontal gains in equity 
and efficiency in countries throughout the world (Musgrave cited in Khalilzadeh-Shirezi 
and Shah, 1991: 247). There is also a new approach adopted in the more recent reforms 
which de-emphasises tax as a means for achieving vertical equity, which is a far cry from 
the highly progressive tax regimes advocated by Kaldor and Kalecki for developing 
countries in the 1950s. Among the more significant development in tax reform is the 
widespread adoption of value added tax (VAT) among countries. The World Bank (1988: 
88) noted that most successful tax reforms in developing countries have introduced some 
form of VAT,, both to reduce distortions in production and trade as well as to generate 
adequate revenues to compensate for revenues lost through rationalising other tax 
instruments. 
The second stage of our analysis on tax reform is simulate the economic effects of 
varying each category of taxes within a general equilibrium framework. The traditional 
way of using the partial equilibrium approach for tax policy evaluation has its limitations 
since it relies on ceteris paribus assumptions. This approach is unable to address the 
interlocking general equilibrium effects arising from the tax change. In a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, both quantities and relative prices are determined 
endogenously, and numerical solutions for market clearing prices are found on all 
product and factor markets. Many studies on taxation, including those using the CGE 
approach, look at tax incidence on sectors and households. In our analysis, we take 
account of initial positions and use the CGE model to trace the effects of the tax reform 
along various dimensions of the macro economy, such as GDP, consumption, 
investment, consumer prices, exchange rates, real wages, and household aggregates. The 
thesis explores into the categories of taxes that could be raised to generate a certain level 
of government revenue, with minimal negative effects for the households and the 
economy. The thesis also investigates whether there could be some efficiency gains from 
reforming the structure of direct and indirect taxes in a revenue-neutral context. One of 
I The countries include Austria, Australia, Barbados, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, El Salvador, 
Finland, Guatemala, Germany (F. R. ), Grenada, Greece, Huntc: yary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mexico, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, and Zimbabwe 
(Gillis, 1989b; Thirsk, 1991; Bardai, 1993). 
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the policy experiments involve the adoption of value added tax in place of the existing 
sales and services taxes. 
In the third stage of our analysis, we adopt a micro econometric approach of 
estimating the parameters of labour supply with taxation using the combined data from 
the Labour Force Survey and Household Income Survey. A fundamental question is 
whether changes in taxes have an impact, if at all, on the response of individuals towards 
participation and hours of work. Most of the estimations on post-tax labour supply 
function parameters are derived from studies conducted in developed countries, while 
hardly any empirical work have been done in developing countries, with a few notable 
exceptions. In Rochjadi and Leuthold (1994), the CES direct utility function was used in 
their estimation of the labour supply function parameters for Indonesia. Since this 
functional form constrains the income effect to be negative, they produce positive 
compensated wage elasticity estimates that are generally in conformity with the results 
obtained from studies in developed countries. Although the methodology produces non- 
controversial elasticity estimates for Indonesia, there are no additional insights to be 
gained from their estimation with regards to the labour supply response of a developing 
country. To avoid any preconceived notions on the shape of the labour supply curve, we 
use the two stage least square instrumental variable approach with selectivity 
adjustments. In this approach, we estimate the participation equation, wage equation, and 
hours of work equation for male and female heads of households. 
There is no reason why the labour supply response of a developing country, with 
their own set of socio-economic and institutional characteristics, should correspond with 
the general findings of empirical studies conducted in developed countries. Many 
developing countries, such as Malaysia, do not have an equivalent welfare and benefit 
system found in developed countries. Without unemployment benefits and income 
support programmes, there is a stronger motivation for a person without a job to get back 
to work or perform some part-time work. There is no financial benefit for remaining 
unemployed or limiting his hours of work as might be the case if he stands to benefit 
from welfare transfer payments. In addition, at low levels of wages, members of poor 
households in developing countries have to increase their hours of work in order to meet 
the income and consumption requirements. 
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5. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The structure of the thesis follows from the questions raised in Section 3 and the three 
stages of analysis discussed above. Chapter 2 contains a review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature of tax reform in developing countries. On the theoretical aspect, it 
discusses some principal goals of a tax reform and the approaches to development 
taxation. From the empirical literature, we learn about the experiences of many 
developing countries that have adopted tax reforms in recent years. This chapter 
examines the approaches to tax reform, citing examples and lessons from developing 
countries. Finally, it discusses some common themes that emerge from the experiences 
of countries that embark on tax reforms,, and which point towards the direction of future 
tax reforms. 
Chapter 3 examines the last twenty five years of economic transformation and 
policy reform in Malaysia. The issues on tax reform should not be examined in isolation, 
but considered in relation to the overall economic and fiscal policies of the country. This 
chapter provides a historical review of the country's economic development, public 
revenue and expenditure patterns, and the underlying reasons for policy reforms. Many 
of the radical policies adopted after 1984 have fundamentally altered and transformed 
Malaysia's economic management, the size and role of its public sector, as well as its 
fiscal and tax policies. We consider the policy framework of Malaysia's Second Outline 
Perspective Plan and the implications it has for fiscal policies in the nineties and beyond. 
In Chapter 4, we analyse the Malaysian tax structure and trend since 1970. We 
consider changes in the structure of taxes and the contribution of direct and indirect taxes 
and their components to government revenue. Upon examination, some taxes are found 
to be saddled with inherent problems. As a diagnosis of the prospects for future revenue, 
we estimate the tax buoyancy coefficients and identify areas of weaknesses that should 
be addressed in a tax reform. 
After the discussion on the structure, trend and characteristics of various 
categories of taxes, Chapter 5 uses a micro-macro applied general equilibrium model for 
Malaysia to examine the effects of tax reform simulations on the economy. The chapter 
provides an overview of CGE models that have been developed since 1960 for policy 
evaluation, as well as some economic models developed for Malaysia. After calibrating 
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the Malaysian Micro-Macro Model, we perform nine tax reform simulations and 
compare the results with the baseline simulations in terms of four sets of indicators, 
namely, real GDP aggregates, price movements, wage movements by skills and 
occupational groups, and household aggregates. The chapter examines the category of 
taxes that could raise 10 percent of government revenue for 1990-99 with minimal 
negative effects for households and the economy. In addition, it also investigates if a 
reform in the structure of direct and indirect taxes within a revenue-neutral context could 
result in some efficiency gains. 
The next two chapters take up the question of the effect of taxation on labour 
supply. Given the large volume of literature on this topic, as well as a wide variety of 
estimation techniques and model specifications used in previous studies, Chapter 6 
performs a literature review on the theoretical and empirical aspects of estimating the 
parameters of labour supply with taxation. In Chapter 7, we draw from the 
methodological experience of second generation work on labour supply estimation and 
use the instrumental variable approach for Malaysia. Using micro econometric 
techniques, we estimate the participation equation, wage equation, and hours of work 
equation for male and female heads of households in 1984 and 1992. The chapter 
discusses the findings in the light of the results from other studies, and put forward some 
reasons why the estimation results seem reasonable in the Malaysian context. 
In the final chapter of the thesis, we assemble the findings and results of our 
research. We draw together the lessons gained from the analysis of reforming Malaysia's 
tax system, and propose some areas for future research. 
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TAX REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Taxes are used by governments for a variety of purposes. They are raised to meet public 
expenditure for the provision of goods and services and transfer payments. They are used 
in fiscal policy to regulate aggregate demand in the economy, as well as bring about 
greater equity in the distribution of income and welfare in the country. Furthermore, 
taxes are imposed to control the volume of inports into the country in order to achieve 
balance of payment equilibrium. In a tax reform, goverm-nents are generally concerned 
that their tax system facilitates the attainment of several public policy objectives. Besides 
raising adequate revenue for the government, the tax system must spread its burden 
equitably and avoid the misallocation of resources. The tax reform should not disrupt the 
pattern of production, trade, consumption, saving, and investment. In addition, the tax 
system should also be administratively feasible to facilitate compliance and collection. 
Clearly, it is difficult to satisfy all these objectives simultaneously. As noted by the 
World Bank (1988), tax reform is a matter of trade-offs. 
In this chapter, we undertake a review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
of tax reform in developing countries. First, we review some of the goals of a tax reform: 
revenue generation, promotion of growth, savings and investment, promotion of equity 
and efficiency, and simplicity of administration and compliance. Next we discuss the 
approaches to development taxation, namely, optimal tax reform and market-oriented tax 
reform. This is followed by an examination of the experience of developing countries in 
tax reform. Finally, we draw some lessons from the experience of developing countries 
in tax reforms and the emerging themes that point towards the future direction of reform 
issues. 
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2. GOALS OF TAx REFORM 
This section discusses some of the goals of tax reform: revenue generation, promotion of 
growth, saving and investment, achievement of equity and efficiency, and simplicity in 
administration and compliance. 
1 Revenue Generation 
The most important reason why taxes are levied is to raise revenue for the 
government. Governments require resources to meet a wide variety of expenditures, 
ranging from public administration and defence to the provision of social services and 
infrastructure. In developing countries, raising the level of government expenditure, 
particularly public investment in key areas of the economy, has often been regarded as a 
necessary element of the development process (Ahmad and Stern 1989). 
Over the long term, revenue generation must keep pace with the expansion of 
expenditure. The government should ideally choose a tax base that will expand in 
relation with spending so that a few changes in tax rates can meet the revenue 
requirement of public expenditure groWth. The importance of tax revenue generation in 
developing countries cannot be overstated. Total central government expenditure as a 
percentage of GNP for middle income countries was 21.7 per cent in 1972 and 27.5 per 
cent in 1986, while the percentage for total tax revenue to GNP was 14.8 per cent in 1972 
and 17.6 per cent in 1986 (World Bank 1988: Tables 23 and 24). The shortfall in tax 
revenue in 1986 was substantial, amounting to over 10 per cent of GNP. 
The revenue requirement of a country is closely related to the efficiency of 
revenue utilisation. The additional revenue raised could either be used to improve the 
quality of life and lay the foundation for growth or be wasted on inefficient projects not 
linked to development. While growth in public expenditure would need to be matched by 
revenue expansion, the relationship can also operate the other way. As noted by Please 
(1971), the rapid growth in revenue can sometimes stimulate the rapid expansion of the 
expenditure pattern that would call for further revenue growth. When these effects work 
quickly, the rapid growth in expenditure can give rise to public finance difficulties, as 
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was experienced by countries such as Mexico and Nigeria after receiving revenue 
windfalls from the oil price increases of the 1970s. 
2.1.1 Tax revenue and level of development 
In a study of the tax structure of 86 countries around 1981, Tanzi (1987) finds 
that on average, the ratios of taxes to GDP collected by developing countries amounted 
to 13 per cent for countries with per capita income below $849 and 18 per cent for 
countries with per capita income between $850-$1,699. Ten low-income countries had 
tax ratios of less than 10 per cent, while eleven medium income countries had tax ratios 
exceeding 25 per cent. Variations in tax ratios to GDP could only be expected because of 
differences in the levels public spending, tax base and structure, administrative capacity, 
as well as historical and cultural factors. 
Tax revenue differences between groups of countries are also partly a matter of 
different stages of development. The capacity of countries to raise taxes increases with 
the size of their per capita incomes, as revealed in studies relating the level of 
development and the structure of taxation (Hinrichs 1966; Musgrave 1969). As incomes 
grow and countries become more urbanised, there will be greater demand for public 
services and higher level of tax revenue. This is shown by the growth in the share of 
central government revenue to GDP that rose from 14 per cent in 1960 to 18 per cent in 
1970 and 24 per cent in 1980 for middle income countries (Newbery and Stern 1987). 
Studies undertaken in the 1970s have shown that there are many factors that influence the 
level of taxation. They include urbanisation, monetisation, the relative importance of the 
mining and agricultural sectors, and the importance of foreign trade. 
Countries in the early stages of development lack 'tax handles' or simple ways of 
collecting revenue. Hinrichs (1966: 106-108) relates the pattern of change in tax structure 
with level of development with a fourfold classification: traditional, transitional (which 
include 'breakaway' from old and 'adoption' of new), and modem. Traditional societies 
rely on direct taxes on agriculture, poll taxes and non-tax revenue. As the society 
becomes more developed, indirect taxation becomes more important, particularly trade 
taxes if it is an open economy. Indirect and direct taxation gain in importance as 
domestic production capability, monetisation and transactions increase within the 
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society. This is only a stylised characterisation and does not suggest a deterministic 
pattern that all countries will follow. The averaging of the tax structures of low-income 
countries used in the study may be misleading since the trends of direct and indirect taxes 
of individual countries may be different. 
The Fiscal Affairs Department of IMF had undertaken studies that explore the 
cross-country relationship between identifiable tax handles and tax ratio. These 'handles' 
are taken to be a proxy for taxable capacity. ' Studies on tax elastiCitY2 and buoyancy 3 
carried out for various individual countries 4 have found that general sales taxes, excises 
and consumption taxes have elasticities in excess of unity. Income taxes are found to be 
an elastic source of revenue in some studies but not in others. Custom duties and stamp 
duties are relatively inelastic (Ahmad and Stern 1989). While these studies are 
interesting, they do not provide direct guidance for policy since the estimated elasticity 
of a particular tax relates only to the actual revenue collections during the period under 
consideration. 
Although many tax reforms are intended to enhance revenue, in some cases they 
are designed to be revenue neutral, at least in the short term. The revenue neutral tax 
reforms merely seek to replace the revenues the tax system would have generated had the 
reforms not taken place. Gillis (1989) cites some examples of tax reform packages where 
immediate enhancement of revenue was not the priority. These include the tax-reform 
initiative for Japan in 1949-50, Brazil in 1965, Liberia in 1969, Bolivia in 1976-77, and 
Colombia in 1986. The Indonesian reform of 1983-84 was intended to be revenue neutral 
over the short run, although the system would be capable of revenue enhancement should 
the need arise over the longer term. 
Goode (1984) defines 'taxable capacity' as the ability of people to pay and the ability of the government to collect. 
The 'tax effort' reflects the degree to which taxable capacity is used. The tax ratio i. e. the ratio of total tax revenue 
to GNP, reflects both tax capacity and tax effort. 
Tax elasticity shows the ability of the tax structure to generate revenue growth arising from changes in gross income 
or output levels. 
I ' Tax buoyancy is the relationship of total revenue to income or output. 
4 In Latin America countries the study for Paraguay was undertaken by Mansfield (1972), Colombia by Levin (1968), 
and Central America by Wilford and Wilford (1978). The revenue elasticity and buoyancy in the Indian tax system 
were examined by Purohit (1981) and Bagchi and Govinda Rao (1982). 
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2.2 Promotion of Growth, Saving and Investment 
2.2.1 Growth 
In examining the relation between the level of taxation and the rate of economic 
growth for twenty countries, Marsden (1983) concludes that countries with lower taxes 
experienced higher rates of growth. In the countries studied, lower taxes are associated 
with higher real returns to savings, investment, work, and irinovation, as well as 
increasing the supply of factors of production and raising total output. The fiscal 
incentives provided by low-tax countries appear to have shifted resources from less 
productive to more productive sectors and activities, thereby increasing the overall 
efficiency of resource utilisation. The reverse appears to be true for some high-tax 
countries. While this finding is illuminating and points towards 'supply side' economics, 
there are problems of comparability and interpretation at the level of aggregation 
adopted. In the World Development Report 1988 (World Bank 1988), tax levels are 
shown to be rising in all countries in recent years regardless of income levels, economic 
structures, or growth rates. 
In designing a growth-promoting tax system, Carl Shoup (1966) emphasises the 
need to exempt the poor from taxation and to keep taxes on profits low or non-existent in 
order to stimulate entrepreneurship, and especially risk taking. By explicitly exempting 
capital income, it is possible to achieve economically neutral taxation of new investment 
(Harberger 198 1; Meade et al. 1978; Bradford 1986). Shoup (1966) notes the importance 
of the administrative and political factors in a growth-promoting tax system. Favourable 
administrative and political factors are important because private capital investment and 
private savings are strongly encouraged by a stable and predictable fiscal system. As 
Pigou (1947) argues the accumulation of capital is discouraged in a system that has 
unequal treatment of different people without a good cause since this leaves a sense of 
insecurity as to who may be the next victim. 
2.2.2 Savings and investment 
There is a the large body of studies examining the economic effects of taxes on 
savings and investment in the developed countries, most notably in the United States (see 
Summers 1981; Sandmo 1985; Bosworth 1984). However, no clear conclusions have 
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emerged on the key issues. Aggregate level of savings is not particularly sensitive to tax- 
induced changes in the rate of return, although tax factors may alter the composition of 
financial savings (Bird and Oldman, 1990). Total national saving consists of domestic 
private saving, public saving and foreign saving. As argued in Musgrave (196-33), the 
effect of taxes in discouraging private savings can be offset by the resulting increase in 
public savings. 
Many developing countries use incentives to encourage investments. Shah and 
Toye (1978) perform a survey of the range and type of incentives commonly employed in 
developing countries and their effect on investment. There are essentially three 
approaches that researchers have used to examine the relationship. One method used to 
measure the impact of fiscal incentive schemes is to look for changes in the share of 
investment in gross national product after the incentives have been introduced. This 
approach was adopted by Katz (1972) for Mexico and Tanzi (1969) for Ecuador. The 
second approach is to interview a representative sample of businessmen who have 
benefited from the schemes on how much their investment decisions were influenced by 
the incentives. This approach was used in case studies of Mexico (Ross and Christensen 
1959), Jamaica (Chen-Young 1967), Pakistan (Azhar and Sharif 1974), Brazil (Goodman 
1972), and Nigeria (Olaloku 1976). The third method is to make inferences from the 
published profit levels of tax exempt firms by calculating the net present value of the 
firm's profits with and without tax exemptions. Azhar and Sharif (1974) and Kemal 
(1975) used this approach for Pakistan and Bilsborrow and Porter (1972) for Colombia. 
Shah and Toye (1978) argue that there are conceptual difficulties and data inadequacies 
that handicap attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the investment incentives. Despite 
these problems, the studies seem to point towards little or no effect of the investment 
schemes in inducing new investment. Usher (1977) asserts that the interaction of tax 
systems in host and home countries is important in examining the economics of tax 
incentives. He argues that the incentives granted by host investors to foreign investors 
will be ineffective unless the home country of the investors allows them to claim a credit 
against taxes owed to the residence countries for the tax incentives enjoyed in the host 
country. 
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2.3 Promotion of Equity 
2.3.1 Bene t Principle 
Equity concern has always been at the core of tax policy. There are two 
interpretations regarding equality or equity. First, contributions should match benefits 
received or the 'benefit principle'. Second, contributions should reflect ability to pay or 
the 'ability to pay principle'. 
The benefit criterion links expenditure with tax and where each taxpayer would 
be taxed in line with his or her demand for public services. While the general benefit tax 
may be of theoretical interest, this principle is applied to the provision of particular 
services through the charging of fees, user charges, or tolls. The World Development 
Report 1988 argues that user charge are efficient in funding public expenditure and 
should be used wherever a publicly produced good or service can be sold. Tax financing 
should be reserved for cases where user charges are not appropriate, such as where the 
costs or benefits of public goods cannot be assigned to individuals, or taxes are used to 
compensate for market failures, or to achieve a distributional goal (World Bank 1988: 
79). 
Benefit theorists differ in opinion whether burden distribution should be 
proportional or progressive. In interpreting the benefit principle, the issue is whether to 
focus on the cost of the service rendered to a particular person, or whether it is on what a 
person would be willing to pay (Musgrave 1985). In the first approach, the optimal 
5 
quantity to produce and cost a public good is where the marginal benefits of individuals 
equal the marginal costs of production, and each individual is taxed according to the 
marginal benefit derived from the public good (Cullis and Jones 1992). In the latter 
approach,, the benefit tax becomes a Lindahl price. 6 
Samuelson (1954: 387) defines a public good as one 'which all eRjoy in common in the sense that each individual's 
consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good. ' 
If there are two consumers who must share in the cost of a public good, the more A pays, the less B will have to 
pay. Given the cost schedule for the product, A's offer curve can be translated into a supply curve from B's point of 
view, and vice versa. The intersection of the two curves determines the quantity to be supplied. At this solution 
each pays the Lindahl tax price which is equal to the value of the marginal utility he derives. The sum of the two tax 
prices adds up to the cost of the product. Lindahl notes that the intersection is reached only on the assumption of 
equal bargaining power (Musgrave and Peacock, 1958: 89). 
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The ability to pay principle has a long history as well, dating from Mill's 
7 formulation in the 1840s. Under this principle people with equal capacity should pay 
the same (horizontal equity), and people with greater ability should pay more (vertical 
equity). It will be necessary to define how the ability to pay is measured. Ideally, this 
measure should reflect all the factors contributing to a person's entire welfare, including 
consumption, wealth holding, and enjoyment of leisure. Since the value of leisure cannot 
be measured, the second best approach is using an index such as income, consumption, 
or wealth. 
2.3.2 Taxing consumption 
Income has been widely used as the tax base. However, there has been support for 
consumption as the better choice for a more equitable tax base. The consumption tax 
approach differs from the income tax approach by excluding savings and places the same 
burden on people with equal potential consumption (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). As 
Kay wrote in the Telegraph on 3 April 1995, the share of general consumption tax in tax 
revenue for the OECD countries increased from 1.7 per cent in 1965 to 17.1 per cent in 
1992,, while corporate income tax, specific taxes on goods, and property taxes declined 
during the period. The trend has been movement away from taxes that require the excise 
of judgement to taxes that are based simply on transactions. In developing countries, the 
burden of income tax is predominantly shouldered by workers in the formal sectors. The 
difficulties in implementing income taxes in developing countries as well as under 
inflationary conditions have led a growing number of tax economists in recent years to 
advocate shifting from income tax to consumption tax (Bird and Oldman 1990). 
Experience with the direct consumption taxes in both developed and developing 
countries has been limited. Kaldor proposed the direct consumption tax for India (1956) 
and Ceylon (1960), but it was not successfully adopted. Direct consumption tax still has 
its merits for developing countries. Compared with the income tax, it is easier to 
7 Gillis (1989) notes that virtually all tax reform initiatives in developing countries have specific equity ob ' 
jectives in 
rnind. Tax reforms are redistributive in nature when they seek to enhance vertical equity through reduction of after- 
tax income inequality. However, tax reforms can also be distributionally neutral when they are intended to 
leave 
the distribution of income essentially unchanged. This option is sometimes chosen to prevent the triggering of 
distributional battles that could side-track the adoption of the tax reform. 
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administer, more equitable, gets around issues such as timing for depreciation and 
income adjustment for inflation, economically neutral, and consistent with economic 
growth (McLure, 1989). 
2.4 Promotion of Efficiency 
2.4.1 Minimising excess burden 
Efficiency is an important requirement of a good taxation system. The operation 
of the tax system is costly not only because of the costs of tax administration and 
compliance, but also for the excess burden it creates. Excess burden is also known as 
dead-weight loss or efficiency cost, which is a loss of welfare above and beyond the 
revenues collected. Taxes change the economic environment in which a consumer may 
be made better off or worse off. Some levels of utility should be used as reference for the 
compensated demand function arising from price changes as a result of taxation. 
Following Hicks (1942), the two commonly used measures of the welfare effect 
of a price change are equivalent variation (EV) and compensating variation (CV). 
r- 
Lquivalent variation uses the current prices as the base and asks what income change at 
the current prices would be equivalent to the proposed change in terms of its impact on 
utility. Compensating variation uses the new prices as the base and asks what income 
change would be necessary to compensate the consumer for the price change (Varian 
1992: 161). 
An important way of assessing the efficiency of a tax system is to measure the 
excess burden, which is the loss of welfare in excess of the tax revenues collected. Using 
the simple Marshallian approach, when the consumer price is raised from po to the post- 
tax price (po + t) and demand changed from xO to xj, the excess burden as suggested by 
Dupuit is approximately 
W='12t(xo-xl)= 1/2tAx 
If il is the price elasticity of demand, the excess burden is given by 
8 
I/ 21, t2 
ýP( 
For derivation, see Cullis and Jones (1992: 185). 
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When considering the effects of several taxes at once, the HIckslan varlations are used as 
measures. Mohring (1971) uses the equivalent variation and suggests that the excess 
burden of taxation is how much more taxes could be collected from the consumer than is 
currently collected, with no loss in utility, if the collection method were lump sum 
taxation. 9 On the other hand, Diamond and McFadden (1974) suggest the use of the 
compensating variation by defining excess burden to be that amount, in addition to 
revenues collected, that the government must supply to the consumer to allow him to 
maintain the initial utility level. 
Harberger has pioneered the measurement of excess burden in a series of papers. 
By using the excess burden formulae, he examines the non-tax distortions caused by 
monopolistic pricing (Harberger 1954). He also considers the welfare cost of a 
progressive tax on labour income by individual income classes (Harberger 1964) and the 
dead-weight loss from the production distortion caused by differential taxation of the 
return to capital in the corporate and non-corporate sectors (Harberger 1966). The 
weakness of the earlier studies is the assumption of fixed producer prices. Chamley 
(1981) has shown the sensitivity of this assumption in his study of the welfare cost of 
capital income taxation. 
2.4.2 Optimal commodity taxation 
Since the application of the lump sum tax is limited, 10a normative question in 
taxation is how to design a tax system that will yield efficient and fair outcomes. The 
trade-off between equity and efficiency loss is central to the concept of optimal taxation. 
In the case of optimal commodity taxation, the 'first best' solution is to tax all goods, 
including leisure, at the same rate since this would be equivalent to a lump sum tax that 
has no excess burden. Since it is impossible to place a tax on leisure, neutral taxation is 
not efficient. Some excess burden is inevitable when taxes are imposed on goods other 
than leisure. It will be necessary to choose a 'second best' solution to minimise the 
9A lump sum tax has no excess burden. It causes a parallel shift In the budget line and does not change the relative 
prices of goods. If a lump sum tax is used to raise the same revenue as a commodity tax, the lump sum will leave 
the consumer on a higher indifference curve. 
10 Although lump sum tax is efficient, It Is not widely used because of the difficult), In establishing a tax that has no 
effect on individual behaviour. If it is to be truly non-distortionary, the tax must be based on potential income rather 
than actual income which is very difficult to assess. 
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overall excess burden of collecting tax revenues. According to the Ramsey rule (Ramsey 






where x and y refers to two categories of goods, il, and TI, are the price elasticity of 
demand for goods x and y, t., and ý, are the rate of tax on goods x and y. Dividing both 
sides of the equation by t,, ij, would yield the inverse elasticity rule: 
tx- III, 
tY lix 
As long as there are no cross effects between goods, tax rates on commodities are set 
inversely proportional to price elasticities of the goods. Taxes on goods should not be set 
uniformly in an efficient tax system. Higher taxes are levied on relatively inelastic goods 
where the potential for distortion is much lower than goods with higher elasticity of 
demand. 
Building on the implications of the Ramsey Rule, Corlett and Hague (1953) 
suggest that revenue can be increased efficiently by taxing more heavily the goods that 
are complementary to leisure. The intuitive reasoning is that if it is possible to tax 
leisure, then the 'first best' result would be obtained without excess burden. Since the 
authorities cannot tax leisure, taxing goods that are complementary with leisure can 
indirectly lower the demand for leisure. 
In practice, it is necessary to depart from efficient taxation rules to meet 
distributional goals. The strict adherence to the Ramsey Rule can be highly regressive 
since this involves imposing higher taxes on necessities which will place greater burden 
on the poor. For greater vertical equity, society may be prepared to tolerate a higher level 
of excess burden in return for more equitable income distribution. 
2.4.3 Optimal income taxation 
The government would also be interested to design an optimal income tax to raise 
revenue. The optimal income tax system should maximise 
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W=UI+U7+--- +Un 
where U, is the utility of the ,h individual, W is social welfare, and n is the number of 
people in the society. The model assumes that the total income available is fixed and 
individuals have identical utility functions that depend only on income and exhibit 
diminishing marginal utility functions. For maximisation of social welfare, each person's 
marginal utility of income should be equal, implying that income levels should be equal. 
In policy terms, the government should impose income taxes such that the after-tax 
distribution of income should be as equal as possible. This model implies a highly 
progressive tax structure where the rich are taxed heavily up to 100 per cent marginal tax 
rate, until complete equality is reached. 
One way of accomplishing this is for the governinent to make income transfers 
from the rich to the poor by means of a negative income tax which consists of a lump- 
sum payment made to everybody, and thereafter a tax is levied on all other income. II 
Figure 2.1 shows a linear income tax schedule where OA is the lump-sum payment (or 
negative tax handout) and a constant rate of tax t is levied on income. The linear income 
tax schedule is given by: 
Tax revenue = -oc + tY 
where -(x corresponds to the lump-sum payment, t is the marginal tax rate and Y is 
income. The issue is to set the values for t and (x that would minimise the excess burden 
associated with income redistribution. Higher value of t is associated with greater tax 
progressiveness and larger excess burdens. The optimal linear income tax will be the 
'best' combination of a and t that maximises social welfare subject to the constraint of 
the required revenue to be raised. In his -discussion of models of optimum income 
taxation, Stem (1976) suggests that social welfare is maximised when t= 19 per cent, 
assuming that the elasticity of substitution between leisure and income is 0.6 and the 
required government revenue is 20 per cent of income. He shows that a more elastic 
labour supply is associated with a higher cost of redistribution, and hence the optimal 
value of t is lower. In a society with extremely egalitarian objectives, where weights are 
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FIGURE 2.2 OPTIMAL NON-LINEAR INCOME TAX 
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only assigned to the social welfare function of persons with minimum utility, Stern finds 
that the maximum criterion for the marginal tax rate is about 80 per cent. 
In the progressive income tax system, the marginal rate of tax varies with income. 
From an 'ability to pay' argument, the highest income earners pay the highest rates of 
taxation for the system to be 'fair'. However,, there are some disagreement with this 
policy emerging from the literature on optimal non-linear taxation. Instead of taxing the 
highest marginal rate on the highest income earner, Seade (1977) argues that social 
welfare is maximised when individuals at the very top of the income scale pay marginal 
tax rate of zero. Commenting on the UK income tax, Kay and King (1986: 214) note that 
the marginal tax rates are high at the top as well as bottom levels of income, that is a U- 
shaped schedule. Contrary to previously held belief, the principle that emerges is that 
marginal tax rates should be low at both the highest and the lowest levels of income. 
High marginal tax rates on the largest incomes bring in very little revenue and are not 
worth pursuing if they have adverse consequences. On the other hand, the welfare 
support for low income families comes to nothing if their receipts are taken away by high 
marginal rates of tax. 
It can be shown that even if the marginal tax rate of the higher income-earner is 
brought to zero, this would not bring a loss of tax revenue for redistribution to the poor. 
Figure 2.2 shows the optimal non-linear income tax. The budget line AB is the trade-off 
between leisure and income before tax for the individual with the highest income. After 
income tax, the budget line is a curvilinear AC. The individual maximises his income at 
El where his indifference curve 11 touches the budget line. His after-tax income is AT, 
and the tax revenue is (BTI-ATI). If the marginal tax rate is set to zero for income 
earned above BT1, the budget line for this segment is given by EID, which is parallel to 
AB. The budget line for the individual is now AEID. The new equilibrium for the 
individual is E2, as he increases his work effort and earns up to BT2. The total tax paid 
remains the same, i. e. (BT2-AT2) ý (BTI-ATI) but the individual is better off since he 
has a higher after tax income of AT2and is on a higher indifference curve12. This implies 
that the welfare of the top income-earner can either increase or be held constant without 
the corresponding loss of welfare to others. 
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2.5 Simplicity ofAdministration and Compliance 
An important aspect often overlooked during attempts in reforming taxes is the 
improvement of the institutions governing tax administration and tax compliance. 12 
According to Gillis (1989), most of the early post-war reforms focused primarily upon 
changing the tax structure alone,, which would be a sufficient condition for the failure of 
comprehensive, if not partial reforms. In reforming the tax system, it is necessary to keep 
the system as simple as possible for effective implementation. This is especially the case 
in developing countries given a lack of trained administrative personnel, resource 
limitations,, and a lack of accounting sophistication amongst taxpayers. 
Voluntary compliance is central to taxation where the large mass of taxpayers 
submit accurate reports of income and make timely payments of tax. Without voluntary 
compliance, the scale and scope of problems may be more than what any tax agency can 
handle (Radian 1980). A complicated reform can generate serious implications on tax 
administrators and taxpayers. The tax administration that requires high level of expertise 
to absorb the new procedures would be depleted of its personnel. As the public demand 
for more tax expertise to cope with the new procedures, the former tax administration 
employees would sell their skills as private tax advisers (Radian and Sharkansky 1979). 
In the case of Indonesia, the two proximate objectives of its tax reform which are 
considered essential for obtaining the other tax goals are the drastic simplification of the 
tax structure and the depersonalisation of tax administration. Before the reform, the 
criteria for exemptions for small firms were complicated and tax officials had many 
discretionary authorities to grant them. Hundreds of ad hoc amendments had been 
adopted, which created a law that was incomprehensible to tax payers and tax collectors 
alike. The tax system, which was used to serve numerous non-revenue goals, became 
excessively complicated, replete with anomalies and vulnerable to corruption. The 
adoption of transparent criteria and the reduction of frequent contact between tax 
officials and tax payers reduce the scope of corruption in tax compliance and collection 
(Gillis 1985). The tax simplification in Indonesia does not only mean having lower and 
12 For an excellent and provocative discussion of the administrative dimension of taxation in developing countries. 
see Radian (1980). 
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more unified tax rates, it also involves dismantling all kinds of tax incentives and 
broadening of the tax base. 
According to the World Bank (1988), some approaches that can be adopted for 
simplifying commodity taxes are: (a) shifting from the taxation of production to the 
taxation of consumption and (b) shifting from the taxation of international trade to the 
taxation of domestic transactions. Income taxes can be simplified by: (a) restructuring 
company taxes so that average effective rates are high for revenue purposes and marginal 
effective rate low for investment purposes, and (b) restructuring of personal taxes to 
include all sources of income,, with lower maximum rates, fewer brackets, higher 
exemptions, and the elimination of most existing special allowances. 
3. APPROACHES To DEVELOPMENT TAXATION 
After the Second World War, there are essentially two traditions influencing the design 
to development tax policies. First is the interventionist tradition that believes that the 
government could and should influence the achievement of a variety of policy objectives 
through the tax system. Prominent analysts using this approach include Heller (1954), 
Kaldor (1965), and Lewis (1966). The second is the reductionist tradition that argues the 
government cannot achieve many of the intended policy goals and it should not try to do 
so. The second approach, first advocated by Bauer (1957), is very much in the mould of 
the classical economics tradition and is now gathering a wider appeal (Bird and Oldman 
1990). 
1 Optimal Tax Reform 
Optimal taxation, which has been the subject of theoretical research in recent 
decades , is very much 
linked with interventionism. Newbery and Stem (1987) explore 
into the application and implications of the optimal tax approach for developing 
countries. The optimal tax theory provides the foundation for sound empirical work by 
sorting out 'the grammar of the argument' (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) and increasing 
rigour and formalisation of the analysis (Bird and Oldman 1990). Ahmad and Stern 
(1984,1986,1987) have examined questions such as the design and reform of indirect 
taxation in terms of optimal taxation for India and Pakistan. 
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The central question in reforming a tax system is how best to raise additional 
revenue, since the extra taxation would affect the pattern of incentives and costs for 
different households and the productive system. The government has to consider how the 
tax changes are to be enforced and at what cost. The goal of optimal commodity taxation 
is to raise revenue from taxes on goods with as little loss of household welfare as 
possible. 
The usefulness of the optimal approach to tax reform should be weighed against 
the reservations expressed on some of the policy recommendations of the optimal tax 
theory (Lindbeck 1987), the demands it makes on data requirements (Deaton 1987) and 
its insufficient recognition of the administrative dimension of tax reform (Bird 1989). 
Lindbeck provides three arguments against using optimum taxation as a basis for actual 
policy advice both in developing as well as developed countries. Firstly, optimum 
taxation formula captures very few types of mechanisms for adjustment by the individual 
agents (such as a shift between leisure and work or the consumption of different 
commodities), while in reality there are many other adjustment mechanisms for taxes. 
Secondly, even to calculate a single type of adjustment mechanism would require the 
optimum tax formula that relies on extremely special assumptions, such as identical 
preferences of all individuals, and special forms of the production function, such as the 
Cobb-Douglas functions. Thirdly, the calculations are very sensitive to alternative 
specifications of the various functions and the statistical parameterisation and are, 
therefore,, subject to arbitrary decisions. 
In contrast to Ahmad and Stern, Lindbeck (1987) recommends the adoption of 
uniform commodity taxes as the basis for the tax system, although selective taxes on 
goods can be used where the supply and demand elasticities are very low and the goods 
are consumed more by the rich than the poor (see also Cnossen 1978). The adoption of 
uniform indirect taxes differs from the optimum tax theory in that the adjustment of tax 
rates to differences in demand and supply elasticities would be an exception rather than 
the rule, and the functioning of the political process is an essential consideration. 
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3.2 Market-Oriented Reform 
Lindbeck (1987) suggests that tax reform forms part of the overall effort of 
adopting liberalisation policies and 'getting the prices right' so that the market (rather 
than the government) is left to play the role of allocating resources. In many countries, 
this would imply the reversal of existing policies such as reducing protectionism, freeing 
interest rates, and removing tax disincentives to save, invest, and work. It is not clear 
whether liberalisation would result in higher or lower levels of taxation. The reduction in 
tariffs may call for new sources of tax revenue, while the uneven distribution of income 
that arises from reliance on the market may require higher public budgets and taxes for 
redistribution. On the other hand, liberalisation could lead to lower taxes with the 
reduction of subsidies to enterprises, greater reliance on users' fees for various types of 
public services, a reduction of public bureaucracy and higher efficiency in the public 
sector. There could be increased incentive for private saving, thereby reducing the need 
for public savings and substantial tax reduction. 
3.2.1 Supply Side Economics 
The adoption of liberalisation and market-oriented policies has now more or less 
become the accepted conventional wisdom for economists. In the 1980s some 
economists advocate market reforms under the guise of 'supply-side economics' which 
was considered by some as the remedy for the economic problems of the eighties. 
Supply-side economists believe that free markets, with few exceptions, allocate resources 
most efficiently. While they accept the existence of pure public goods and some merit 
goods, they argue that policy makers would not necessarily provide even these goods in 
the optimum quantity or at the lowest possible costs. 
The political philosophy underlying supply-side economics comes from the 
writings of Downs (1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1969), Niskanen (1971), and 
Breton 
(1974). These writers regard governments as essentially inefficient because of their lack 
of market discipline, and the agents of government have personal objectives that 
differ 
from the goals of society. Supply-side economists maintain those government regulations 
that are aimed at protecting consumers and workers 
distort relative prices and should be 
eliminated to improve resource allocation 
in the economy. Most welfare and entitlement 
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programmes as well as high personal income tax discourage work effort. The reduction 
of these distortions would encourage savings and production by allowing the economic 
incentives of a free market to work. 
The basic propositions of supply-side economics are not new. In a sense, supply- 
side economics that emphasises the objective of efficient allocation of resources and the 
importance of negative substitution effects of government economic policies are beliefs 
held in mainstream classical and neo-classical economics. The merits of adopting the 
supply-side approach in development economics are discussed by Peter Bauer (Bauer 
1957; Bauer and Yamey 1957) even before this approach was 'popularised' in the 1970s. 
Gandhi (1987) notes that the difference of this 'new' approach is the conviction 
13 by popular supply-side economists that a substantial reduction of tax burdens , in 
general, and the rates of income tax, in particular, will have significant effects on 
stimulating output and growth rates. The great importance placed on nominal marginal 
income tax rates by supply-siders is a reaction to the traditional literature on taxation that 
gives an overwhelming bias towards equity and the accentuation of the progressive 
income tax systems in recent years. Popular supply-side economists claim that the 
negative substitution effects of income taxes are extremely high. As summarised by 
Feldstein (1986: 27) 14 a reduction in marginal income tax rates is believed to result in 
'rapid growth, dramatic increases in tax revenue, a sharp rise in saving, and a relatively 
painless reduction in inflation. ' The reduction in marginal income tax rates will lead to a 
change in the economic behaviour of households and businesses in favour of work, 
savings, and productive investments and against leisure, consumption, and unproductive 
investment. 
An excellent assessment of the relevance of the popular supply-side economics to 
developing countries is given in Gandhi (1987). Generally, it was found that the tax 
structures of most developing countries depend more on commodity taxes than on 
13 Popular supply-side economics have caught the public attention since the mid-1970s and been the subject of major 
debate in the United States and other developed countries. Unlike the basic supply-side position of the classical and 
neo-classical economists, proponents of popular supply-side economics made wide-ranging claims on the efficacy 
of efficiency-enhancing government economic policies and income tax policies. The writers on popular supply-side 
economics include Laffer and Seymour (1979), Meyer (1981), Bartlett (1982), 
Fink (1982). Hailstones (1982), 
Roberts (1982,1984). Guilder (198 1), and Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1983). 
14 He does not believe in what is perceived as rather extravagent claims of the popular supply-siders. 
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income taxes. Very generous tax incentives and tax reliefs are given to encourage savings 
and investment. The income taxes rates in these countries are much too low for the Laffer 
curve to be relevant. For developing countries to reach their full growth potential, they 
would need to go beyond the issues of marginal rates of income taxes, which are 
maintained by popular supply-siders as being of key importance. They need to reform 
their entire tax system to increase efficiency. 
4. EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN TAX REFORMS 
In recent years, many developing countries have undertaken tax reforms that vary in 
scope, context, substance, and timing. For some countries, the reforms set in place 
effective and viable tax systems that survive for many years. A notable example is the 
Japanese tax reform packages of 1949-50 that were based on the recommendations of a 
team led by Carl Shoup. 15 For some other countries, the reforms were short-lived or 
efforts had not proceeded beyond the proposal stage. The comprehensive reform effort in 
Bolivia was aborted in 1976-77, while the expenditure taxes proposed for India and Sri 
Lanka were discarded because of unsatisfactory performance. 
4.1 Scope 
Tax reforms can vary in breadth and scope. Many tax reforms, especially the early 
post war reforms, are concerned with changes in tax structure, but this is not a sufficient 
condition for successful reform in developing countries. There is a need to introduce 
changes to the tax system to address problems with tax administration and tax 
compliance. As noted by Gillis (1989), tax reform can be comprehensive in 
encompassing most or all important revenue sources, or efforts can be partial by being 
confined to one or two tax sources. 
' 6 
Among the very first countries to adopt a comprehensive post-war tax reform was 
Japan (1949-5 0) which tried to rebuilt itself after the war (Shoup et al., 1949). The reform 
package involved improving the entire tax system to make income taxation as the basic 
15 Shoup had teamed up with Musgrave and organised innovative reform packages for Liberia, Venezuela (Shoup). 
Colombia, Korea, Taiwan, and Bolivia (Musgrave). 
16 Gillis ( 1989: 11) considers a tax reform to be partial if it involves one or two tax sources affecting less than maybe 
a third of collections. 
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source of revenue in Japan, raising the level of tax sophistication, and improving tax 
administration (Pechman and Kaizuka 1976: 321). Indonesia enacted comprehensive tax 
reforms in the mid- I 980s to the entire tax system that had become inordinately complex. 
Jamaica reformed its taxes to simplify the tax system and minimises the adverse effects 
of incentives. Its complicated, narrowly based income tax was replaced with a broadly 
based, single-rate tax (Bahl 1989). Several countries in Latin America drew up proposals 
for major tax reforms as well. They include Columbia, which was based on the proposals 
of the classic Musgrave Report (Musgrave and Gillis 1971), Venezuela (Shoup 1959), 
Chile (Harberger 1989), and Bolivia (Musgrave et al. 1981; Gillis, 1989). Other 
countries that have attempted comprehensive tax reforms are Liberia (Shoup 1970). and 
Pakistan (National Tax Reform Commission, 1986). 
Instead of adopting comprehensive reform, countries may undertake tax 
adjustments or reform their tax system partially by introducing one or two taxes to 
replace the existing ones. India (Kaldor 1956) and Sri Lanka (Kaldor 1960; Jenkins 
1989) attempted to introduce a direct tax on expenditure but the proposal was later 
abandoned. Brazil (Shoup 1965) and Uruguay (Harberger 1989) were among the first to 
introduce value-added taxes (VAT) extending through the retail level which was later 
adopted in twenty other developing countries during 1970-86 (Casanegra 1986). Gillis 
(1989) notes that virtually every developing country that has enacted sales tax reform 
17 18 
since 1965 has chosen either the retail type form of VAT or the manufacturer's VAT. 
4.2 Context, Substance and Timing 
Countries have adopted a variety of reforms to rectify weaknesses in the tax 
system and meet certain goals, such as revenue, equity and resource allocation. Tax 
reforms are often motivated by the need to raise revenue in order to meet increasing 
public sector expenditure commitment or overcome a financial crisis. The partial reforms 
in Colombia in 1965-66 and Peru in 1968 were motivated by a financial crisis, while 
17 Used in practically all Western European nations. According to Gillis (1989), twenty countries switched 
from 
cruder forms of sales tax to value-added taxes extending through the retail stage. 
These include Ecuador (1970), 
Bolivia (1973); Chile, Costa Rica, and Argentina (1975); Honduras (1976). Korea and Panama (1977). Mexico 
(1980)-, Peru, Nicaragua, and Haiti (1982). Guatemala (1983). Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Madagascar 
(1984), Turkey (1985); Niger. Portugal, and Taiwan (1986). 
18 Enacted in Colombia in 1966, Indonesia in 1984. and proposed for Pakistan in 1987 (Gillis, 1989). 
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those adopted for Venezuela in 1958-59 and Colombia in 1968-70 were meant to raise 
revenue to finance new expenditure on education and health (Gillis, 1989). However. 
revenue enhancement was not always the primary consideration. For instance, the post- 
war reform programmes for Japan did not place revenue enhancement high on the 
agenda. Japan was in a state of near ruin and the priority was the creation and operation 
of a sound tax system (Shoup 1949; 1989). The Indonesian reform was motivated by the 
need to enhance the size and 'elasticity' of non-oil revenue. The policies are intended to 
be revenue neutral in the short run, although the simplification of the tax system is 
expected to increase the effectiveness of tax administration'and compliance and generate 
increased revenue in the long run (Gillis 1989). The Indonesian experience has shown 
that the circumstances of the country should be central in organising and carrying out the 
tax reform. As a strategy for improving the acceptability and success of the tax reform, 
foreign consultants kept a low profile while domestic expertise and policy makers were 
involved from the beginning in the formulation of the reform package. 
The earlier post war efforts at tax reforms in developing countries place great 
emphasis on income distribution and progressivity of the tax system (see Kaldor 1956, 
1960; Shoup, 195%, 1970; Musgrave and Gillis 1971). By mid-1970s there was growing 
scepticism on the efficacy of taxes to bring about income redistribution. According to the 
World Bank (1988) taxes in developing countries often fail badly in terms of horizontal 
equity because of poor tax coverage and arbitrary enforcement. Some formal activities 
may be captured by the tax net, but not the informal or hard-to-tax formal activities, 
thereby undermining the system's credibility and the willingness of the taxpayer to 
comply. The tax systems are also not successful in vertical equity despite the highly 
progressive rate structures. The World Bank asserts that the role of taxes in promoting 
equity lies more in the revenue that is raised for distributive spending, especially for 
poverty alleviation, rather than the structure of taxation per se. 
Tax provisions have traditionally been used by governments to guide private 
firms and individuals either towards or away from particular investments and activities. 
19 
Among some of the countries that relied heavily upon tax incentives to promote growth 
and development through the 1960s into the 1980s are Bolivia,, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, 
19 For surveys of tax incentives, see Shah and Toye (1978); Heller and Kauffman (1963), Lent ( 1967). 
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Indonesia, Liberia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Venezuela, and Turkey (Gillis, 1989; Shah and Toye, 1978). There are at least four 
strategies that can be used in subsidising investments through the granting of investment 
incentives: (a) subsidise all new firms or all new investments; (b) limit subsidies to all 
firms within a well-defined set of industries; (c) subsidise firms which meet a set of 
criteria; and (d) restrict subsidies to firms that would not invest without a subsidy (Usher 
1977). 
Despite the pervasive use of tax incentives, there have been few attempts to 
evaluate the effectiveness of these incentives (Bird and Oldman 1990). The evidence of 
the effectiveness of incentives on investments in developing countries remains unclear. 
Shah and Toye (1978) conclude that 'their impact is either slight or unknown' and the 
persistence of their use is influenced by political economy. According to Gillis (1989), 
later reforms in the 1970s and 1980s have moved towards tax neutrality in view of the 
scepticism of the efficacy of tax incentives. For instance, the Indonesian reform of 1983- 
84 abolished all special tax incentive provisions, while the Bolivian reforms of 1986 and 
the Jamaican reforms of 1986-87 were addressed toward 'getting prices right'. The 
Bolivian reform shifted away from incentives and adopted a uniform rate of VAT with 
no exemptions, while the Jamaican reform abolished 16 special purpose tax credits in the 
personal income tax and curtailed company tax incentives for agricultural and industrial 
firms (Gillis 1989; Bahl 1989). 
Timing for the adoption of tax reforms can be contemporaneous, phased or 
successive. Governments that attempt to adopt all the reform provisions at once, in stages 
or enact reform measures on a tax-by-tax basis over a period of time. For instance, the 
tax reform in Colombia, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey was a long drawn out period, 
while major changes in the tax system for Indonesia and Malawi were implemented 
quickly. Gillis (1989) argues that there is an advantage of implementing comprehensive 
tax reform contemporaneously since this reduces the danger of revenue dislocation and 
neutralises the opposition from interest groups who might lose in one element of the tax 
reform but gain in another. The disadvantage of contemporaneous reform is the short 
time available to the tax administration to deal with the changes in tax laws and 
administrative procedures. 
33 
CHA P TER 2 T-ix REFOJU f lxDE rEL OPING COUNTRIES 
Colombia has had major tax reforms in 1953.1961,1974 and 1986, which 
suggest that tax reform is inherently neither a continuous nor a once for all process, but a 
periodic one. Tax systems must change to accommodate fundamental changes in 
economic and political environment of developing countries (World Bank 1988: Box 
4.7). 
5. LESSONS AND TRENDS 
Despite the variety of reforms adopted in developing countries, some coherent themes 
emerge about the current status of tax reforms and point to wards the future directions in 
the coming years. A comprehensive discussion on the experiences of developing 
countries at tax reform transpired at the Conference of Tax Policy in Developing 
Countries organised by the World Bank. 20 Some common themes and important lessons 
that emerged may be summarised as follows: 
1. Using the VAT The VAT is the preferred instrument for most developing 
countries because of its strengths in revenue enhancement, tax neutrality, 
vertical equity and improving the collection of other taxes. From the 
experiences of countries with VAT, the following points should be noted: (a) 
pre-retail VATs are not worth adopting because of distortion and 
administrative complexities; (b) all services, except health care, education, 
social welfare, banking, and insurance, should be included in the base; (c) 
rate differentiation should be minimised, although the poor should be 
protected; (d) VAT is an ideal tax for large, integrated economies with 
sophisticated production and distribution channels and is less suitable for 
small, island-type economies with narrow manufacturing base and large 
cross-border trade. 
2. Broadening tax bases. The base of existing taxes should be broadened to 
enhance revenue and improve the simplicity, neutrality, and equity of the tax 
system. The lack of success in implementing tax reforms is due to selective 
20 World Bank Conference on Tax policY in Developing Countries, held in Washington, D. C. . 
in March 1990. The 
papers from this conference are published in the 
World Bank Econotnic Review, Volume 5 September 1991, 
Number I 
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and lax enforcement, ineffective tax administration, institutional and political 
difficulties in taxing agricultural incomes, and an overall disenchantment 
with income taxes as revenue instruments in an evasion-prone environment. 
Limiting special tax preference. The provision of special tax preferences 
often drains the national treasury. The potential gains of these preferences 
should be weighted against the potential losses in efficiency and revenue. 
While there is a role for investment incentives that can offset the corporate 
tax distortion,, attract foreign investment, create employment, promote risk 
sharing, and correct information asymmetries, the granting of some of these 
incentives often depends on administrative discretion that discourages 
potential investors, especially non-residents. 
4. Taxation offinancial assets. Contrary to belief, Chamley (199 1) found that 
the financial sector in many developing countries is heavily taxed if one 
considers both explicit and implicit taxes. Implicit taxes include seigniorage, 
reserve requirements, lending targets at non-market rates, interest ceilings 
combined with inflation. Using a partial equilibrium framework, Chamley 
argues that most of the incidence of the effective taxation of financial 
institutions falls on deposits. 
5. Distributional impact of taxation. Shah and Whalley (1991) argues that 
developing countries have very different non-tax policies and regulatory 
environments from industrial countries. When these features are taken into 
account, they can yield significantly different tax incidence estimates 
calculated on the assumptions about tax shifting that are used in studies of 
developed countries. 
6. Taxing multinationals. The design of tax reform must reflect initial conditions 
at home and abroad since developing countries are not only constrained by 
their own institutional settings but also by the tax structure in capital- 
exporting countries. The taxation of multinationals by a developing country 
should be examined in terms of the tax regime of the home country, tax 
havens and conduit countries, and transfer pricing practices. Home country 
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taxes influence the user cost of capital, while foreign f irms in a typical host 
country face substantial variations in the user cost of capital. The incentive to 
invest depends upon the effective marginal tax rate, which can differ from an 
average tax rate concept. In their study of Mexico, Shah and Slemrod (1991) 
conclude that foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico is sensitive to tax 
regimes in Mexico and in the United States, to the credit status of 
multinationals, to country credit ratings, and to the regulatory environment. 
7. Iniproving credibility. The success of any tax reform depends on the 
credibility of the tax regime. Establishing business confidence in the 
credibility of the tax regime requires greater attention to preparation, analysis 
of reforms, advance consultation, and provision of a reasonable period of 
adjustment before implementation. 
8. Co-ordinating tax reform. A co-ordinated reform ensures consistency of 
individual tax changes with the overall objectives, including revenue 
enhancement, protection (through custom duties) and economic performance. 
A reform on reducing tariffs should be accompanied by reform of other 
indirect taxes to offset potential losses and public revenue. 
9. Considering the political economy. Tax reform proposals must carefully 
consider the institutional features and tax administration of each country. 
When it is difficult to get politicians to commit to comprehensive reforms 
with medium to long term benefits, having periodic, incremental reforms 
may be a pragmatic strategy. Where tax evasion is pervasive and the earlier 
tax preferences are restored after the initial tax reform as a result of political 
pressure, broadening bases and lowering rates can lead to a tax 'deform'. 
10. Quantitative tools for tax policy analysis. There is a scope for a quantitative 
evaluation of the impact of changes in tax structures for economic and 
political economic analysis. As illustration, Dahl and Mitra (1991) use the 
applied general equilibrium analysis to address questions in tax policy for 
Bangladesh, India, and China. They argue that the costliest element of 
modelling is establishing a consistent data set and the cost should be weighed 
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against the gains from modelling in producing consistent recommendations 
for sound policy formulation. 
11. Optimal Taxation. There is limited scope of adopting the optimal tax theory 
for developing countries because the optimal commodity tax rule assumes 
global knowledge of preferences both in the present period and 
intertemporally, the absence of other tax instruments, and the representative 
consumer. Once these assumptions are relaxed, the usefulness of the Ramsey 
Rule is less clear cut. The optimal tax theory can serve as a guide to designing 
(optimal tax systems' only if it considers the technology of tax collection, 
such as the feasibility of tax instruments and the cost of tax administration 
and compliance (Slemrod, 1990). 
12. Taxation of agricultural land. Skinner (1991) examines the possibility of 
replacing distorting taxes on agriculture with land tax. He concludes that a 
land tax is not necessarily a superior alternative to export taxes for raising 
federal government revenue, while progressive tax rates on land holdings are 
nearly impossible to administer. A land tax may be suitable for local 
government financing though. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In discussing tax reform in developing countries, this chapter considers the taxation 
theory, empirical evidence, and political and administrative realities that are required for 
producing reform proposals that can be implemented successfully. Since the post-war 
and especially during the 1980s, many developing countries have embarked on tax 
reforms, which range from comprehensive to partial reforms. The accumulated 
experience garnered from the reform efforts of a wide range of countries is instructive 
and has shaped the way development taxation is now approached. This review provides 
the context and sets the stage for discussions in the later chapters on reforming the 
Malaysian tax system and its implications on the economy. 
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ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND FISCAL 
REFORM 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last twenty five years, Malaysia enjoyed rapid economic growth and high 
standard of living despite experiencing two recessions in the last two decades. Its per 
capita income rose faster than that of the developed countries and most resource-rich 
Latin American countries which shared similar economic structures. The country has a 
good track record of sound economic management, high savings and investment, and low 
inflation. It has successfully reduced poverty and made notable progress in restructuring 
the society. 
Although growth was rapid during the last twenty five years, the economy 
experienced sharp fluctuations. In addition, it faced problems of poverty and disparities 
among ethnic groups and regions. In response to changing domestic needs and external 
circumstances, the Malaysian development policies during the last twenty five years had 
shifted from one of fiscal activism to fiscal restraint, from an expansionary to a much 
trimmer public sector, from the government acting as the 'spearhead' of development to 
the private sector as the engine of growth. Despite the policy shifts, the country 
maintained a high degree of consistency and effectiveness in policy formulation and 
implementation. This had enabled Malaysia to overcome its problems and move ahead to 
its next stage of development in a relatively short time. 
This chapter provides an overview of Malaysia's economic performance as well 
as economic management and fiscal policies since 1970. It gives a historical review of 
the country's economic development and analyses the underlying reasons for embarking 
on policy reforms. This discussion is aimed at providing the background and socio- 
CHAPTER 3 Eco, %, oAilc TRANSFORAMTIONAND Fisc. 4L REFORAI 
economic context for our analysis on the tax system, which will be pursued in the later 
chapters. In the next section, we discuss the four phases in Malaysia's economic 
transformation and accompanying development policies. The third section examines 
public expenditure and revenue for the last twenty five years, while the fourth section 
discusses the policies for the nineties and their implications on fiscal policies. 
2. ECONomic TRANSFORMATION 
For analytical purpose, it may be useful to examine the Malaysian economy in terms of 
four phases of business cycle and economic management policies. The first phase (1970 
to 1979) is a period of high growth accompanied with the adoption of the New Economic 
Policy. The second phase (1980 to 1984) saw economic boom amidst the spiralling of 
public expenditure and debts that made it necessary for the country to re-orientate its 
programmes and fiscal policies. In the third phase (1985 to 1986), the country 
experienced the worst recession since independence. The fourth phase (1987 onwards) 
marked the rapid turnaround in the economy that placed it on a path of high economic 
growth. 
2.1 Phase I High Growth With Equity (19 70- 79) 
2.1.1 Adoption of the New Economic Policy 
It would be useful to provide a brief background to the formulation of the New 
Economic Policy that was to become the watershed in Malaysia's socioeconomic 
policies. In the 1960s, Malaysia was one of the most prosperous Southeast Asian 
countries, with an economic growth rate averaging 6 percent per year. It had just attained 
independence and was resource rich, being the world's leading exporter of rubber and tin. 
Despite economic success at the aggregate level, poverty was prevalent and disparities 
among different segments of society were widening. The incidence of poverty was 
disproportionately high among the Malays, whose per capita income was only half that 
of the Chinese and two-thirds of the national average. Clearly, the benefits of economic 
growth had not 'trickled down' as was believed by the fashionable 
development theories 
at that time, and dissatisfaction of the people was lurking 
beneath the calm surface of 
fragile communal stability. The inter-ethnic dissatisfaction was heightened by pre- 
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election political campaigns of 1969 that touched on the raw nerves of racial sensitivities. 
These culminated in the outbreaks of racial conflicts in major towns of the peninsula 
during the aftermath of the national elections, a traumatic event known as 'May 13'. 
This inter-ethnic violence sent shock waves down the country. Parliament was 
suspended and a state of emergency was declared. The National Operations Council was 
formed to govern the country. In 1971 the New Economic Policy (NEP) was formulated 
and pronounced in the Second Malaysia Plan. I Since background papers on the 
formulation of NEP are not available in the public domain, it is probably fair to say that 
the policy makers realised that the communal riots represented an alarming fissure in the 
Malaysian society, which was composed of three major races, each with its own 
language and dialects, customs and traditions, religious beliefs, dietary preferences and 
habits. Even occupations and locations were identified with race. There are ample 
examples of societies with more homogenous characteristics which were torn apart by 
years of political tension and conflict. For a society that was so differently constituted, it 
became even more crucial for the situation to be handled with great care and foresight. If 
handled well, the country could be on the road of national reconciliation. Even more, it 
had every potential of becoming a vibrant, dynamic society, combining the strengths of 
different ethnic groups and where the inter-ethnic differences could even become a 
source of creative stimulation and enterprise. However, if handled badly, this would 
result in a volatile cocktail that could lead to the disruption and eventual break-up of the 
Malaysian nation. 
Accordingly, national unity was elevated into the over-riding objective of 
national development efforts. The strategies to achieve this national objective were two 
pronged: poverty eradication and restructuring of society. This pronouncement was an 
acknowledgement that certain affirmative actions were needed to redress the 
imbalances 
in society. It was also a recognition that the pursuit of economic growth 
by itself was no 
I The Malaysia Plans are medium-term five year development plans encompassing all aspects of 
socioeconomic development of the country. Development expenditure allocations made at 
the start of 
the plan are revised in the midterm review. Malaysia's development in the 
1970s was covered by the 
Second Malaysia Plan (1971-75) and the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80), while developments in the 
1980s was under the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85) and the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan (1986-90). These four 
plans were guided by the long term First 
Outline Perspective Plan (1971-90). The Sixth Malaysia Plan 
(1991-95) and the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) contain policies, strategies and programmes 
for 
the nineties and are directed towards achieving the overall objectives of the 
Second Outline Perspective 
Plan (1990-2000). 
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longer considered to be adequate or sufficient in developmental terms. In 1971 Malaysia 
decided that its economic growth must be coupled with equity. This was a substantial 
advance of the policies of many developing countries where discussions were about 
'trade-offs' between growth and equity (see Killick, 1983: 151-153). Later, the influential 
World Bank's study Redistribution With Growth (Chenery et al., 1974) called for a 
paradigm shift in the approach to development. In the introduction of the book, Chenery 
noted that despite a decade of rapid growth in underdeveloped countries during the 
sixties, this growth had been very unequally distributed, thereby calling into question the 
very idea of aggregate growth as a social objective. 
Given the set of circumstances the policy was conceived and formulated, there 
was a single-minded commitment at all levels of government in implementing the NEP 
strategies, which was itself a basic ingredient for the policy's success. Many policies and 
targets were set for this purpose, while special entries for poverty and restructuring 
programmes were made for the allocation of public ftinds. The NEP also called for a 
bigger pro-active role of government to rectify what might seem to be 'market failures'. 
In the implementation of this policy, however, two provisos were made clear: 1) that no 
segment of society should feel deprived in pursuit of distributional goals; and 2) that the 
policies were to be implemented within the context of rapid economic growth. 
The net result of NEP was a major improvement in the transformation of 
Malaysian society. There was greater equality among different communities than ever 
before and incidence of poverty was reduced to a low level. The wide ranging support by 
voters from all communities for the ruling coalition party after two decades of NEP 
implementation might be taken to be an indication of the support by the general 
population for these policies. However, these policies also brought about the rapid 
growth of the public sector, not only in general administration but also in commercial 
and other activities. The issues of the inefficiency and poor performance of public 
enterprises in most countries are well known since they had to fulfil a multiplicity of 
potentially conflicting objectives (see Killick, 1983: 277-301). The problem of the rapid 
growth of Malaysia's public sector was brought to a head barely one 
decade later when 
the deterioration of budgetary deficits and recession necessitated a policy reversal to this 
trend. 
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2.1.2 Economic Performance 
The Malaysian economy performed well during the seventies, with the exception 
of the recession in 1975. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a sustained average rate 
of 7.8 percent per annum, while per capital income rose to RM3,738 in 1980.2 Despite 
experiencing economic fluctuations, the country registered rapid growth given its wealth 
in natural resources, especially large reserves of arable land, as well as its successful 
adoption of the export-oriented growth strategy, prudent economic and financial 
management, and stable social and political institutions. During the seventies, the rubber 
sector recorded sharp productivity increases, which cushioned the effects of steep price 
declines. As part of diversifying the economy, palm oil production and the extraction of 
timber expanded, while the country promoted the rapidly growing manufacturing sector 
that was increasingly export-oriented. 
As an open economy in which imports and exports each constituted about 50 
percent of the GDP in 1971-80, the Malaysian economic performance faced the vagaries 
of the world growth trend. The peaks and troughs in economic growth generally 
correspond to movements in the terms of trade (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). This pattern is 
particularly apparent during the recessions in 1975 and 1985-86 as well as growth since 
1976. There was a sharp increase in the terms of trade between 1975-79 when the prices 
of crude oil, tin, palm oil, rubber, and sawlogs all rose simultaneously (Figures 3.3-3.5). 
The past investments in oil palm cultivation in estates and land development schemes 
contributed to the increased production and export of the crop. In value terms, the export 
share of petroleum grew dramatically, up from 9 percent in 1975 to 17 percent in 1979. 
During this period, the manufacturing sector grew at 11.3 percent per annum, while 
manufactured exports rose by 25 percent per annum. 
2 RM is 'Rinogit Malaysia', the Malaysian currency. As an indication, the exchange rate for fl. 00 was 
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2.2 Phase H Boom With Growing Macro Imbalances (1980-84) 
After the economic upswing in the late seventies, the Malaysian economy entered 
a new phase of its development in the 1980s. Its terms of trade 3 peaked towards the 
middle of 1980 and then took a sharp decline that continued until 1986, with a brief 
respite in 1984. The decline in the terms of trade was around 20 percent, while the slow- 
down in the international economic activities as a result of the recession in OECD 
countries reduced the demand for Malaysian exports. On the supply side, the real growth 
of important agricultural commodities, especially rubber and timber, had reached a 
plateau, although this was compensated by increased exploitation of petroleum and 
natural gas (Figure 3-6). 
The declining terms of trade reduced the scope of private investment. The slow- 
down in demand, coupled with the decline in commodity prices, gave rise to a 
deterioration in the merchandise account and the current account of the balance of 
payments (Figures 3.7-3.8). In response to the depressed external sector, the government 
adopted an accelerated public investment and expenditure programme in 1980 and 1981 
to boost economic activity and sustain real growth at a high level (Figure 3.9). While 
some sectors were in the doldrums, employment in government services expanded 
rapidly during 1980-82 (Figure 3.10). The counter-cyclical fiscal policy was in 
anticipation of a rebound in petroleum prices and a quick recovery of OECD growth. 
Although this sheltered the economy against the international recession, the temporary 
relief was at a cost of an inflated current account deficit. 
The strong growth in the domestic economy as a result of expansionary fiscal 
policy and the tight labour market imposed pressure on the domestic price level. From an 
inflation rate of 3.6 percent in 1979, consumer prices shot up and peaked at 9.7 percent in 
1981 before falling rapidly to 0.4 percent in 1985 (Figure 3.11). The anti-inflation 
measures include promotion of domestic savings and tightening conditions on 
consumption credit. In addition, the government continued with the tight monetary 
I Terms of trade index is calculated by dividing the export price index with the import price index. 
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stance adopted in the last few years to contain the inflationary effects from the second 
wave of oil price hike (Figure 3.12). Coupled with the expansion of aggregate demand, 
the tight monetary policy had the effect of pushing up interest rates with negative 
implications on investment and profitability in the tradable sectors. As shown in Figure 
3.11 the base lending rate rose by 4.5 percentage points, from around 7.5 percent in 1979 
to 12 percent in 1981 and again to 12.5 percent in 1984. 
Already the processes of destabilisation were apparent when high growth rates 
were sustained at the cost of inflation and growing current account deficit in the balance 
of payments. The rapid expansion of the development expenditure by both the 
government and non-financial public enterprises (NFPEs) during 1980-82 deepened the 
overall budgetary deficit in the consolidated public sector financial accounts (Figures 
3.13-3.14). 
Demery and Demery (1992: 36-39) noted that the three main factors responsible 
for Malaysia's external imbalances over the period 1979-84 were the OECD recession 
and the associated deterioration in the country's terms of trade, an expansionary fiscal 
policy which caused a debt-induced interest rate shock, and an appreciation in the 
nominal and real exchange rate. The income loss arising from the decline in the terms of 
trade was considerable. As a percentage of GDP, the real income loss amounted to 7 
percent in 1981 and 3 percent in 1982. However, the external imbalances could have 
been avoided if this situation was accompanied by significant cuts in real expenditure 
rather than the 'expenditure smoothing' behaviour on the part of the public and private 
sectors. While pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy, there was monetary restraint 
where lending to the public and private sector was curbed as part of the explicit anti- 
inflationary policy. In Gan's study (1988) of exchange rates during the period of 
destabilisation, he found that the inflow of external capital to finance the budget deficit 
causes the appreciation of the nominal and real effective exchange rates (Table 3.1 and 
Figure 3.15). This seriously eroded Malaysia's competitiveness in the world market, 
dampened its exports of major commodities, and soon brought the country to a deep 
recession. 
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TABLE 3.1 MALAYSIA'S FISCAL DEFICITý TERMS OF TRADE, 





















1979 7.5 14.3) 122.6 99.6 104.7 7.25-7.50 
1980 13.6 18.8 119.8 100.1 100.1 8.5-9.5 
1981 19.7 26.4 101.9 105.3 3 104.8 12.00 
1982 18.0 25.9 95.5 112.9 110.4 8.50 
1983 15.9 24.5 95.3 120.0 115.8 10.75 
1984 3 12. ) 21.3 102.9 127.8 122.1 12.25 
1985 7.2 17.5 94.3 125.1 115.2 10.75 
1986 13.1 17.1 79.4 103.3 3 93.8 10.00 
1987 9.7 15.4 82.8 97.1 86.8 7.50 
Sources: Ministry of Finance Economic Reports, various years; Gan (1988) 
1 As percentage of GDP. 
2 Nominal effective exchange rates using reported trading partner weights. 
Real effective exchange rates using CPI deflator. An increase in the value of the index indicates an 
appreciation. 
1976-80 average. 
2.3 Phase III Policy Reorientation and Recession (1985-86) 
Even in 1983 it became clear to the Malaysian government that the public 
expenditure pattern was not sustainable and major adjustment policies had to be quickly 
adopted to reverse the alarming trend in the balance of payments current account deficit 
and growing public indebtedness. Serious concerns were expressed in the Mid-Term 
Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan and the government took the bold step in cutting its 
operating and development expenditures in order to bring public sector expenditure in 
line with revenue. Malaysia's foreign debt was growing at an alarming level and had to 
be controlled, especially after witnessing the financial debacle in the Latin American and 
African countries as a consequence of unbridled borrowing. As will be discussed later in 
the next section, the government resorted to heavy foreign borrowing to fund the 
expansionary fiscal programmes in the early eighties. There does not appear to 
be many 
policy options available to the government given the fact that it wanted to 
keep a tight 
rein on money supply to control inflation. In addition, it did not increase taxes or wish to 
crowd the private sector out from the domestic 
loans market by increasing further the 
already high domestic borrowing. 
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A reversal in the development approach was clearly needed to reduce the high 
fiscal deficit and related external borrowing requirement. The previous policy of fiscal 
expansion and monetary restraint gave way to a policy of fiscal restraint and monetary 
expansion. In addition, the real exchange rate was allowed to depreciate to restore the 
competitiveness and profitability of the tradable sector. Wide ranging measures were 
adopted in the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan to re-orientate public 
policies and set the stage for a reduced role of government in development after the mid- 
eighties. This proved to be the next milestone in Malaysia's development thrust after the 
adoption of NEP in 1971. These policies were adopted in 1984 and continued to be 
implemented even during the recession period in 1985-86. The budget restraint was 
applied without resorting to counter-cyclical policies that could stimulate the economy 
from the demand side. While limiting the expansion of the public sector, the government 
sought to revitalise the economy from the supply side by removing what were perceived 
as the factors constraining economic growth. 
From the national accounts identity, Demery and Demery (1991: 53) examined 
the overall pattern of expenditure changes which brought about the initial destabilisation 
and the subsequent adjustment in Malaysia. The decomposition of the observed changes 
in the trade balance into the various expenditure components are shown in Table 3.2. 
During the phase of rapid fiscal expansion in 1979-82, public consumption and 
particularly public investment contributed the main bulk of the expansion in absorption 
and accounted for 98 percent of the change in the trade balance as a ratio of GDP. The 
situation was different during 1982-87 when the trade deficit was narrowing. During this 
period, the burden of expenditure change was more evenly spread, with private 
consumption being most important component. As noted by Demery and Demery, 
reductions in expenditure during the adjustment phase were principally borne by the 
private sector (66 percent), in direct contrast to the expansionary and destabilisation 
phase. 
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TABLE 3.2 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL CHANGES IN MALAYSIA'S 
TRADE BALANCE, 1979-87 - 
Year (X-Al)/Y CI/Y Cý, /y ip/y I, /Y 
1979-80 -0.079 0.025 0.025 0.003 0.026 
1980-81 -0.030 -0.010 0.010 0.008 0.038 
1981-82 -0.018 -0.014 0.005 0.005 0.022 
1982-83 0.013 -0.015 -0.003 -0.002 0.007 
1983) -84 0.036 -0.006 -0.022 0.013) -0.021 1984-85 0.060 0.008 0.000 -0.072 0.004 1985-86 0.111 -0.057 0.000 -0.038 -0.016 1986-87 0.028 -0.015 -0.003 0.022 "' 2 -0.01 
Percentage share 
1979-82 100.00 1.84 31.27 0.03 66.86 
1982-87 100.00 34.43 11.15 31.13 23.29 
Source: Demery and Demery (199 1) 
From the national income identity: (X - M) 1Y =I- CP 1Y - Cýý 1Y - IP 1Y - Iýý 1Y, 
where X-M is the trade surplus, Y is gross domestic product, C is consumption, 
I is investment, and p and g are subscripts for private and public sectors. 
The increased government interventions in the market to overcome the problem 
of market failure, especially pertaining to distribution, had already produced some trends 
that merited concern. According to Kasper (1974), the Malaysian economy in the 1960s 
and early 1970s could be characterised as a very open, very adaptable economy with a 
relatively small government that kept out of production, with a large primary sector and a 
potential for fast industrial growth. When he re-examined in the Malaysian economy in 
early 1987, he argued that the Malaysian economy had become less competitive as 
4 suggested by its low third factor share of growth . In 
decomposing the growth in the 
Malaysian economy from 1969 to 1986, Kasper (1987) found that the contribution of 
third-factor share was estimated around 12 percent and 23 percent, implying that growth 
arose largely from a combination of labour and capital inputs. He noted that studies of 
post-war Europe and Japan showed that the third factor accounted between 40-60 percent 
of total growth in these economies during their phase of rapid growth. In addition, 
estimations of third factor in the dynamic Newly Industrialising Economies are 45 
percent for South Korea (1955-73), 60 percent for Taiwan (1955-60) and 47 percent for 
This analysis follows Denison's approach which decomposes the output growth rate according to the 
Cobb-Douglas-type aggregate production function. After taking the first order condition and estimatina 2-=) 1_-:, 'In 
the coefficients for labour and capital, it is then possible to calculate the contribution of "third factor 
inputs", such as technology, knowledge, institutions, scale economies, etc., to economic growth (see 
Denison, 1967; 1985). 
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Hong Kong (1960-70) (Chenery, 1986: 21-22). The low third factor estimate for Malaysia 
implied low growth of labour and capital productivity and high incremental capital- 
output ratio (ICOR), raising questions about the quality of technology and innovation, 
entrepreneurship, as well as policy and institutional framework. He argued that when 
governments intervene in markets, entrepreneurial energies are directed away from 
genuine economic enterprise towards rentier profiteering that could cause the markets to 
lose structural flexibility. Kasper's study, which was undertaken just after the period of 
macro destabilisation and adjustment, painted a rather dismal picture of the Malaysian 
political economy. His estimate of the third factor share in Malaysia's economic growth 
is biased downwards because it included the cost of large investment projects made in 
the early eighties but not their forthcoming benefits in contributing to economic growth 
after the gestation period. Investment projects, such as the Heavy Industries Corporation 
of Malaysia (HICOM), the liquefaction plant in Bintulu, purchase of LNG tankers, and 
expansion of port facilities in Labuan, initiated in the early eighties had long gestation 
periods and the benefits of which would only arise after the period of his study. While 
one can dispute over the quantitative aspects of his estimates, the general tenor of his 
arguments on the dangers of too much government intervention in the economy would 
still be relevant. 
To redress the structural problems, the government introduced economic 
liberalisation and deregulation which improved the investment policies and incentives to 
promote private sector participation. This appeared to be an important change from the 
previous policy stance of increased public sector intervention which led to 'big 
government'. Real public sector consumption and investments generally grew faster than 
that for the private sector throughout the seventies to the early eighties. The exception 
was during 1978-79 when private sector consumption and investment were buoyant with 
the high prices of primary produce, the windfall earnings from petroleum and gas, and a 
robust expansion of money supply. The Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan 
(Malaysia, 1984) and the Fifth Malaysia Plan (Malaysia, 1986) expressed the Malaysian 
government's intention to make every effort in ensuring that growth was private sector 
led, while the role of the public sector was to facilitate and promote a conducive 
environment for economic growth and efficiency. Instead of competing with the private 
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sector, the public sector was to complement private sector efforts. To quote the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan (Malaysia, 1986: 4), 'The public sector will no longer play an 
expansionary role in spearheading economic growth. It will, however, continue to 
provide leadership through its efforts in creating a more suitable environment and 
climate in which the private sector can play an enhanced role of generating growth ... 
Among some of the policy measures to redress the structural economic problems 
include: 
1) Greater emphasis on management and financial prudence in the public sector 
to reduce wastage and improve efficiency; 
2) Privatisation programme of public enterprises such as Telekom, Malaysian 
Shipping Corporation and the Kelang Container Terminal, and the 
programme of Build-Operate-Transfer for highways and water supply; and 
3) Relaxation of several NEP guidelines and legislative measures, such as the 
Industrial Coordination Act of 1975 and the Companies Amendments Bill, 
1984, which were earlier adopted to facilitate the restructuring process but 
were later regarded as constraining private sector investment. 
Some other important policy measures adopted to release the supply side potential of the 
economy were: 
1) Industrial Master Plan (IMP) in 1985 which provided the strategies for the 
rapid expansion of industries; 
2) National Agricultural Policy (NAP) in 1984 aimed at income maximisation 
and increasing greater productivity, efficiency and competitiveness in the 
sector; 
3) 'Look East' policy, for Malaysians to emulate the work ethics, attitudes and 
management practices of successful Far East nations; and 
4) 'Malaysia Incorporated' concept to forge a working partnership between the 
public and private sector in promoting a dynamic and prosperous business 
environment. 
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The restraint placed on public expenditure helped to narrow Federal government 
deficit to 7.4 percent of nominal GDP in 1985 from a high 19.1 percent in 198 1. In 
addition, the overall expenditures of the NFPEs were brought below their revenue. 
Monetary supply was increased and interest rates were reduced to provide liquidity for 
private investment. Despite these policies, the Malaysian economy sank into a recession 
in 1985 and 1986. A negative GDP growth rate recorded in 1985, and a growth rate 
barely above I percent the year after. The recession was precipitated by the simultaneous 
Coll apse in the prices of Malaysia's major exports of petroleum, palm oil, rubber, saw 
logs, tin and cocoa. Since half of Malaysia's manufactured exports were concentrated in 
electronics and electrical machinery subsector, the depressed global demand for 
semiconductors in 1985-86 hit the sector badly. As a result of the poor economic 
performance, the unemployment rate, which was 5-6 percent during the seventies and the 
first half of the eighties, shot up to 8.3 percent in 1986. 
Internally, Malaysia's adjustment programme coincided with the collapse of the 
property market and the slump in the business cycle. The fiscal austerity brought a 
decline in civil work projects. Property development which picked up in the late 
seventies, facilitated by easy credit and boosted by speculative demand, came to a halt 
when global commodity prices fell. Since property was used for mortgage to secure 
business loans, the collapse of the property market sent shock waves and accelerated the 
pace of business failures throughout the country. As a result, the real value-added of the 
construction industry in 1986 fell by 20 percent of the 1984 construction output. In 1986, 
the real effective exchange rate of the Malaysian ringgit depreciated rapidly by 7 percent 
against the US dollar that itself was depreciating against the other major currencies 
(World Bank, 1989: 19). With the depreciation of the exchange rate, real private 
consumption and real private investment in 1986 declined by 9.5 percent and 23.4 
percent, respectively, over the 1984 level. 
2.4 Phase IV Recovery and Rapid Growth (198 7-1995) 
After the bottoming out of the recession in 1986, the economy made a spectacular 
recovery. It grew at 5.4 percent in 1987, followed by rapid growth rates above 
9 percent 
during 1988 to 1990, the highest rates recorded since independence. From 1990-95, the 
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economy was growing around 8 percent per year. Per capita income, which declined 
during the recession years, grew at an average rate of 10.1 percent in nominal terms from 
RM4,520 in 1987 to reach RM9,786 in 1995. Real private investment rebounded and 
grew at 18.5 percent during 1987-95, about 4 percentage points more than public 
investment. It appeared that the Malaysian government's intention to transform the 
economy into private sector-led was fulfilled by the end of the eighties. The 
unemployment rate which peaked in 1986 fell from 8.8 percent to 5.6 percent in 1990 
and further to 2.7 percent in 1995 (Figure 3.16). This was achieved despite very little 
growth in government employment. Since 1984 government employment was kept trim 
and grew by less than 0.5 percent per annum. 
There were several factors accounting for the rapid turnaround. The terms of trade 
for major non-oil commodities improved in unison and the demand for manufactured 
products, especially semi-conductors and textiles, surged forward. The entry of India into 
the palm oil market pushed up demand and prices, while the construction and housing 
boom in Japan following the yen appreciation increased the demand for log and timber. 
Recovery was also assisted by the depreciation of the ringgit and the low interest rates. 
Exports of manufactured goods were particularly strong for 1989 and 1990 that 
amounted to RN436.5 billion and RM46.8, respectively. Compared to the recession 
period, the export of manufactured goods for 1989 was three times larger than it was in 
1985, while the export for 1990 was about four times larger. The share of manufactured 
exports to total exports exceeded 50 percent in 1988, recording an increase of 20 
percentage points above 1985 (Figure 3.17). 
Private investment for 1988-90 grew very rapidly by 27.5 percent per annum in 
real terms, led by foreign investment responding to the improved business environment 
and excellent growth prospects. The implementation of the Industrial Master Plan had 
established a system of creating closer collaboration between the private and public 
sectors in various dialogues and sectoral task forces. Policies affecting the manufacturing 
sector were improved, procedures simplified and administrative bottlenecks minimised. 
The Promotion of Investments Act (PIA), 1986 and the amended Income Tax Act, 1967 
gave liberal investment incentives to investors. The exemption order under the Industrial 
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owners equity of less than RM2.5 million or 75 workers from being licensed. The equity 
guidelines for foreign investment were liberalised. The cost of energy was reduced since 
March 1989 while the government introduced special rebate schemes for rubber and 
textiles subsectors and additional incentives for the wood-based industries (Malaysia, 
1991: 126-7). 
There was a remarkable growth in proposed foreign capital investment from RM I 
billion in 1985 to RM18 billion in 1992. As shown in Figure 3.18, growth of foreign 
investment after 1987 is nothing short of spectacular, especially for 1990-92 when 
Malaysia enjoyed an exceptionally favourable set of conditions for incoming 
investments. During the late 1980s, Malaysia benefited from the relocation of industries 
from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in response to rising costs of production and 
currency appreciation in those countries (Malaysia, 1991b: 134). Foreign investment in 
approved projects from Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States, 
Indonesia and Hong Kong accounted for 78 per cent of the total proposed investments. 
Goverm-nent operating expenditure which started to decline in 1983 rose again in 1987 
(as a result of the backlog of expenditure deferred during the recession years) before 
declining again towards the tail end of the eighties. Government development 
expenditure as a share of GDP was brought to the levels of early seventies (Figure 3.19). 
In the next section that follows, we consider public expenditure and revenue 
during 1970-95 in greater detail, before proceeding to the third section on the policies for 
1990s and their implications for fiscal policies. 
3. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE, 1970-95 
3.1 Public Expenditure, 1970-80 
Even at the start of the decade, Malaysia had a substantially larger government presence 
in the economy compared with its Asian neighbours. In 1971 central government 
expenditure as a share of GNP was 27.7 percent in Malaysia compared with 13-18 
percent for Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. The increased public sector 
role in the financing and implementation of programmes under the Second and 
Third 
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TABLE 3.3 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AS A SHARE OF 
GNP AMONG SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES 
(In Percentage) 
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 
Malaysia 27.7 32.6 41.0 37.8 34.5 26.4 
Singapore 18.3 18.0 20.8 26.2 21.5 17.6 
Thailand 15.9 14.6 19.1 21.8 15.1 18.5 
Indonesia 13.0 21.4 24.9 22.3 18.8 17.0 
South Korea 16.0 15.9 17.9 18.4 15.6 18.9 
Source: IMF, International Finance Statistics; World Bank, World Development 
Malaysia Plans contributed to an even larger total public expenditure. By 1980 the share 
of central government expenditure to GNP for Malaysia had risen to 41 percent, 
compared with 25 percent for Indonesia, 21 percent for Singapore, 19 percent for 
Thailand and 18 percent for Korea (see Table 3.3). 
During 1976-80 consolidated public operating expenditure amounted to RM49.7 
billion, which was more than double what it was 5 years ago. A large part of the increase 
going to the expansion of the personnel strength of the security forces, debt-service 
payments and supplies. In terms of sectoral expenditure, education and health absorbed 
about one-third of total operating expenditure. 
The public sector development programme under the Third Malaysia Plan 
continued the government's commitment to implement the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
The plan was an ambitious one. The total allocation of public sector development 
expenditure for 1976-80 was RM24.9 billion, about two and a half times higher than the 
amount spent under the Second Malaysia Plan (RM9.8 billion). The Third Malaysia Plan 
undertook many new projects and consolidated efforts initiated under the earlier plan. 
The programmes include expanding the opportunities and improving the productivity and 
income of the poor, increasing the pace of restructuring the Malaysian society, and 
stimulating rapid development in the less developed regions of the country. The share of 
the development expenditure to GNP rose from 15.1 percent in 1975 to 19.5 percent in 
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In 1971 the ratio of total expenditure of the consolidated public finance 5 to GNP 
was 29.2 percent (Table 3.4). It rose to 40.8 percent in 1975 and 49.7 percent in 1980, 
with the largest expenditure going to education, defence, infrastructure, agriculture and 
rural development. In mid-1970s education received close to one-fifth of total public 
expenditure, while infrastructure accounted for over 12 percent and agriculture and rural 
development 9 percent. Programmes to improve the physical and social infrastructure 
were considered important in improving the life of the people, besides creating a 
conducive environment for economic growth and employment generation. Although 
there was a current operating surplus during the seventies, the large development 
expenditure for the Second Malaysia Plan and Third Malaysia Plan programmes resulted 
in an overall deficit of RM7.6 billion in 1971-75 and RM12.3 billion in 1976-80. 
3.2 Public Expenditure, 1981-95 
In the early 1980s, public expenditure on economic services, such as agriculture 
and rural development, commerce and industry, expanded rapidly. Health and education 
programmes received more resources as well. The government embarked on a major 
recruitment exercise to fill up existing vacancies under Operasi Isi Penuh. 6 This was in 
response to the general perception that shortage of manpower in the public sector was a 
major factor accounting for the large shortfalls in the implementation of the Third 
Malaysia Plan programmes. The expansion of the civil service and the salary revisions 
pushed up general administration expenditure from RM752 million in 1979 to RM2.1 
billion in 1982. Given the increasing size of loans taken by the public sector, the interest 
payments for debt servicing doubled from RMI. 3 billion in 1979 to RM2.7 billion in 
1982. Expenditure on transfer and subsidies by the Federal government increased 
substantially too, from RM2.3 billion in 1979 to RM5.2 billion at the end of 1982. 
The sum of operating and development expenditure. 
6 Translated literally as 'Operation Fill Up'. In fact, about 180,000 new jobs in government services were 
initially planned under the Fourth Malaysia Plan (Malaysia, 1981: 228), but this target was substantially t) 
revised during the recession as part of fiscal prudence and consolidation in the public sector. 
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During this period the Federal government increased transfers for pensions and to the 
state governrnents, as well as subsidies for agriculture, scholarships, textbook loans 
programmes, and milk and food programmes. Together, these factors contributed to the 
rapid increase in the current expenditure of the government that rose from 26 percent of 
GNP in 1979 to 31 percent in 1982. 
Among the four Malaysia plans during 1970-90, the Fourth Malaysia Plan had 
the largest development expenditure. In terms of Federal Government expenditure, it was 
more than twice the size of the Third Malaysia Plan and about one-third larger than the 
Fifth Malaysia Plan (Table 3.5). The scale of fiscal expansion in 1981 and 1982 was 
unprecedented as the government increased the development budget, as shown in Figure 
3.19. Government development expenditure alone for 1981 and 1982 was over 23 
percent of GNP, compared to the average of 14.3 percent in 1976-80. The largest 
category of development expenditure was for defence and internal security. A large part 
of the expenditure went to infrastructure, in which the allocation for transport, education 
and irrigation doubled between 1980 and 1982. 
Commerce and industry was the other area which received increased allocation of 
funds in the Fourth Malaysia Plan. Although part of the expenditure was financed from 
profits generated by the National Petroleum Corporation (PETRONAS) and its 
subsidiaries, the consolidated public sector deficit increased from 8 percent of GNP in 
1979 to 22 percent and 19 percent in 1981 and 1982, respectively (World Bank, 1989: 6). 
When financial resources turned out to be lower than expectations, it became clear that 
this expenditure pattern was not sustainable. Expenditure cutbacks and rescheduling of 
projects were initiated with the launching of the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth 
Malaysia Plan. The task of reducing the original allocations in midstream could not have 
been an easy one since most of the projects were in different stages of implementation, 
with contractual obligations for the government. The larger projects that were started 
in 
one plan period would continue into another and require public resources 
for their 
successful completion and operation. In addition, the programmes 
for the eradication of 
poverty and restructuring of society were not to 
be affected by the cutbacks. The 
consolidation of public sector expenditure that ensued set the stage 
for the approach that 
was to be applied throughout the 
decade and into the nineties. This is illustrated by the 
62 
CHAPTER EcONOA, fIc TRANSFORMA TION. -iND FISCAL REFORAI 
fact that the public sector development allocation in the Fifth Malaysia Plan was RM 10 
billion smaller than the Fourth Malaysia Plan allocation. 
Recession years: The operating expenditure during the recession years was kept 
within one-quarter the size of GNP. The debt service charges for 1985-86 had risen quite 
dramatically. About one-fourth of the total operating expenditure of the Federal 
government (or over RM5 billion) were allocated to pay interest on outstanding loans 
and make contributions to the sinking fund. By comparison, the amount allocated for this 
purpose in 1980 was only 11 percent of total operating expenditure. The rapid 
appreciation of the Yen by 34.7 percent during 1985-86 increased Malaysia's debt service 
obligations substantially since loans from Japan constituted 20 percent of Federal 
government outstanding foreign debt in 1985. The other major expenditure was for social 
services so that the quality of essential social infrastructure, such as education and health, 
was maintained even during the recession. About two-thirds of the expenditure for social 
services went to education and another one-fifth to health services. 
In the development expenditure of the Federal government, spending for security 
registered negative growth of around 38 percent for both 1985 and 1986. Allocation for 
social services increased by 12 percent in 1986 as a result of increased spending for 
education and housing. For the economic services, the expenditure for agriculture and 
rural development, public utilities and commerce and industry in 1986 fell below the 
1985 level. This was partly due to planning and implementation problems arising from 
the reordering of programme priorities as well as from contractors who were unable to 
complete projects on time. However, the expenditure for transport and communications 
increased by 32 percent to provide for greater private sector expansion. 
The consolidated public sector deficit fell to 7.2 percent of nominal GDP in 1985, 
but rose again to 13.1 percent a year later. It is generally difficult to cut budget deficits 
during recession when revenues are low. Revenue derived from direct taxes declined by 
6 percent in 1985-86 as the income of companies, individuals and petroleum operations 
fell as a result of the recession. In 1986 very little revenue was collected from the export 
of rubber and palm oil which were facing depressed prices. 
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The narrowing public sector deficit in 1985 was attributed to the increased profits 
from the NFPEs, especially from the petroleum and gas operations. When the price of 
crude petroleum fell by 47 percent from US$27.60 per barrel in 1985 to US$14.80 per 
barrel in 1986, this drastically cut into PETRONAS' profits and reduced expected Federal 
goverm, nent revenue since petroleum and gas contributed 22 percent of the total revenue. 
The NFPE accounts went into deficit again, thereby exacerbating the fiscal deficit. 
To stimulate growth without fiscal expansion, the Anti-Recession Committee was 
formed to draw up short-term programmes to generate growth in employment and output. 
Growth in money supply (Ml) increased from 2.8 percent in 1986 to 13.0 percent in 
1987, while nominal interest rate declined. The average rate of discount for three month 
treasury bills declined from 4.12 percent (1985) to 3.22 percent (1987) and the base 
lending rates from 10.75 percent (1985) to 7.50 percent (1987). The New Investment 
Fund (NIF) and a small industries development fund was established to increase the 
credit supply in the economy. 
Expenditure, 1986-95. Operating expenditure during this period was kept within 
manageable limits and grew at 6.3 percent per year. This comparatively slower growth 
was in keeping with the fiscal discipline following the 1985-86 recession. The 
expenditure on emoluments, which accounted for 36 percent of total current expenditure, 
increased by 5.8 percent per annum due to annual salary increments and salary 
adjustments for civil servants. In line with financial prudence, spending on supplies and 
services as well as transfers to government agencies were curtailed selectively. 
With economic recovery, public sector development programmes that facilitate 
growth were reinstated and the total development expenditure for the Fifth Malaysia 
Plan, 1986-90, was RM35.3 billion. Programmes on agriculture and rural development 
were aimed at poverty eradication and restructuring of society. Public investment grew 
by 15 percent per annum during 1988-90, particularly for upgrading and expanding the 
infrastructure facilities to ease constraints and bottlenecks to growth and cope with the 
demands of the expanding trade and industry. The government placed emphasis on social 
and physical infrastructural development to improve the quality of 
life as well as to 
provide the country with a broad-based foundation to facilitate investments and growth. 
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Improvements in the financial position of the public sector enabled additional 
resources to be allocated for the Sixth Malaysia Plan, 1991-95. Although its total public 
sector development allocation (RM104 billion) was much higher than that for the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan (RM61.8 billion), the ratio of development expenditure to GNP was 
maintained at 14 percent. This reflects the government's on-going efforts at fiscal 
prudence and more efficient management of public sector programmes and finances, 
following the directions established since 1983. The bulk of the increase in expenditure 
was directed towards facilitating economic growth and the provision of infrastructure to 
facilitate expansion of the private sector. In addition, the'social sector was given one 
quarter of the Federal government development allocations to improve services in 
education and training, health, and housing. The poverty eradication programmes were 
directed towards the hard-core poverty groups, while the programmes for restructuring 
society were devoted to education and training, as well as the development of 
Bumiputera commercial enterprises. 
3.3 Public Revenue and Finance, 19 70-80 
As the range and complexity of government operations increased during the 
1970s,, the country adopted prudent fiscal and monetary policies to have low price 
inflation and high credit worthiness. The general government revenue rose from RM2.9 
billion in 1970 to RM16.4 billion in 1980. The average growth rate of total revenue was 
15.7 percent per year during the first half of the decade and accelerated to 22.5 percent 
per year in the second half of the decade. For the five-year periods corresponding to the 
Malaysian development plans, the total government revenue for 1971-75 was RM22.0 
billion and it increased to RM54.7 billion in 1976-80 (Malaysia, 1981: Table 6-6). As a 
share of GNP, this corresponds to 34.1 percent for 1971-75 and 58.6 percent for 1976-80. 
The rapid growth of public revenue in the late seventies was fuelled by 
exceptional set of favourable conditions. Rubber and tin prices reached their peak for the 
decade with their 1980 prices more than triple the 1970 prices (see Figure 3.5). The rapid 
growth in export volume for oil palm arising from the expansion in oil palm cultivation 
in the 1960s and early 1970s as well as the increased production capacity of petroleum 
from new oil fields off shore coincided with the buoyant commodity prices. The good 
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TABLE 3.6 SOURCES OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE, 
1970-1995 
(In Percentage) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Direct Taxes 29.21 39.50 40.67 43.85 35.24 42.37 
Income Taxes 27.38 37.65 37.63 41.67 32.68 37.42 
Companies 20.3'8 22.79 18.10 18.57 15.23 2 2.2 3 
Individuals 7.00 8.56 7.06 8.28 8.49 11.00 
Petroleum 0.00 6.29 12.47 14.82 8.96 4.19 
Other Direct Taxes 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.18 2.56 4.96 
Indirect Taxes 54.13 49.92 51.21 35.24 36.73 37.14 
Export duties 10.75 12.22 18.43 8.71 6.67 2.08 
Rubber 3.33 2.37 7.88 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Petroleum 0.00 0.00 4.86 7.76 6.47 1.97 
Tin 5.42 3.81 4.13 0.18 0.00 0.00 
Palm Oil 0.75 5.51 1.16 0.44 0.01 0.03 
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.19 0.07 
Import Duties and Surtax 23.21 15.66 14.80 11.93 11.58 12.62 
Excise Duties 10.38 8.80 6.99 6.52 7.68 9.61 
Sales Tax 0.00 5.32 5.00 5.84 8.27 8.64 
Service tax 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.41 1.59 
Other Indirect Tax 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.74 2.11 2.60 
Tax Revenue 83.34 89.43 91.88 79.09 71.96 79.51 
Non-tax Revenue 16.67 10.57 8.12 0.21 28.04 20.49 
Total Revenue 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Figures may not add up to exactly 100.00 because of rounding up errors. Z-: ) t: ) 
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export performance for the commodities coupled with the booming business conditions 
contributed to a marked increase in revenue from direct and indirect taxes in the country. 
Direct taxes, which contributed 29.2 percent of the total Federal government 
revenue in 1970,, increased to 40.7 percent in 1980 (Table 3.6). Following the growth of 
income and improvement in the tax collection machinery, revenue from this source was 
growing at 23.2 percent per year during the seventies. Income tax on petroleum 
production began to increase in importance in the second half of the decade. Taxes on 
foreign trade and domestic indirect taxes grew at an average rate of 18.5 percent per year 
as a result of increased volume of foreign trade, increased prices of both export and 
import commodities, as well as accelerated growth of domestic production. To expand 
the tax base, sales tax was introduced in 1972 and service tax in 1975. The sales tax is an 
ad valorem single stage tax imposed at the import and the manufacturing levels. 
Exemptions were given to smaller manufacturers, certain food stuffs, building materials 
and books, as well as to exports. The service tax was imposed on large hotels and 
restaurants. 
In view of the large development expenditure of the Second and Third Malaysia 
Plans, the overall deficit grew from RM7.6 billion in 1971-75 to RM12.3 billion in 1976- 
80. The larger deficit in the Third Malaysia Plan called for higher level of borrowing 
without creating inflationary pressure on the economy. Domestic borrowing provided 
between half to two-thirds of the fund requirements during the decade (see Table 3-7). 
The bulk of this source was derived from the non-bank private sector, such as the 
national social security organisation, National Savings Bank and insurance companies. 
As a result of higher revenue base, the amount of domestic borrowing during 1976-80 
was much lower than the amount targeted in the Third Malaysia Plan, that is, RM7.8 
billion of actual borrowing as against the target of RM1 I billion. At this level of resource 
mobilisation, the monetary expansion was consistent with the growth in nominal GNP. 
The public sector programmes under the Third Malaysia Plan was undertaken within an 
environment of financial and price stability as is evident from the consumer price index 
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TABLE 3.7 SOURCES OF FINANCING 
(M$ million) 
Public Sector 
Sources of Financing 1970 1975 1980 1982 1985 1990 1995 
Net Foreign Borrowing 1,012 1,590 4,948 1,667 -712 1,172 
Net Domestic Borrowing 308 1,209 3,650 6,046 3,872 5,3 75 -33 83 
Change in Assets 121 2-33 8 2,872 1,134 -2,131 -3 ), 788 2,743 
Federal Government 
Sources o Financing )f 1970 1975 1980 1982 1985 1990 1995 
Net Foreign Borrowing I - 912 302 4,773 3,591 3,793 1,751 
Net Domestic Borrowinc, 306 1,209 2,311 5,909 956 -815 -2.073 
Interest Payments 262 642 1,444 2,614 5,032 6,816 7,125 
I Project loans and market loans 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various issues 
(CPI). The CPI rose at an average of 4 percent per year during 1976-79 compared with 
7 
7.3 percent per year during 1971-75 . 
3.4 Public Revenue and Finance, 1981-95 
For most of the 1970s, growth in public revenue kept pace with public 
expenditure. This position was reversed during and after 1980 when the growth of pubic 
expenditure outstripped revenue growth. Between 1979 and 1982 public expenditure 
increased by 113 percent in nominal terms compared to revenue growth of 50 percent in 
nominal terms. Allocations were quickly spent during the 1980s. By 1983,93 percent of 
the development allocation for the Fourth Malaysia Plan had already been spent 
(Malaysia, 1984). 
To deal with the growing budget deficit, the government avoided resorting to 
monetary financing through seigniorage since this would lead to inflation. A tight 
monetary policy was adopted during this period instead. Hence, while the fiscal policy 
was expansionary during 1979-83, monetary policy remained tight, with adverse 
7 The rapid increase in the earlier part of the decade was due to the precipitous rise 
in oil prices and 
international inflation that led to the sharp increase in input prices. The price increase was particularly 
high for 1973 and 1974 which were 10.5 per cent and 17.4 per cent, respectively. 
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implications for interest rates and depressed private investment. Monetary growth in the 
first half of the 1980s decelerated not only because of the decline in the net foreign 
reserves but also due to the fall in net lending to the public and private sectors. In fact, 
the growth rate of MI (which consists of currency and demand deposits of the private 
sector) declined in 1983 and 1984, even before the contraction of economic activity in 
1985 (Ariff, 1991: 33). The annual rate of growth of money supply and private sector 
liquidity declined every year during 1980-84, while inflation was relatively low at an 
average rate of 4.7 percent. 
The deficit was financed from both domestic and foreign borrowings. Domestic 
borrowing by the Federal Government rose in the early eighties and peaked in 1982 at 
two and the half times the level of the domestic loans made in 1980. The more important 
source of financing the deficit was borrowing from external sources, rose from RM302 
billion in 1980 to RM4.8 billion in 1982. As a result of the large financial resource 
requirement in the early 1980s, borrowing from foreign sources increased sharply and 
closely matched the amount borrowed from domestic sources (Figure 3.20). As a result 
the Federal government outstanding foreign debt as a ratio of GNP rose from 9 percent in 
1980 to an unprecedented level of 32 percent in 1985. 
During 1980-85, the tax revenue was around 23-25 percent of GNP and registered 
a growth rate of 5.5 percent per annum. This was a considerable achievement since this 
period also coincided with tax cuts as well as the fall in export tax receipts. With the 
decline of commodity prices, the collection from export duties for 1985 was RMI. 8 
billion or 30 percent lower than the RM2.6 billion collected in 1980. This decline was 
more than compensated by the revenue from direct and indirect taxes on petroleum 
which doubled from RM2.4 billion in 1980 to RM4.8 billion in 1985. In 1981 for the 
first time PETRONAS remitted dividends on its earnings to the goverm-nent and emerged 
as a major financier of government deficits through purchases of the government debt 
(World Bank, 1983: 49). 
Budget deficit. The consolidated public sector budget deficit 
8 to GDP increased 
markedly from 7.5 percent in 1979 to a peak of 19.7 percent in 1981. Deficits of this 
8 The consolidated public sector account refers to the combined revenue and expenditure of the 
Federal 
government, state government and non-financial public enterprises. 
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magnitude were unparalleled given that the level reached in the previous decade was no 
higher than II percent of GDP. The widening deficit of the public sector was not only 
attributed to the counter-cyclical policies, but also the reduction in tax revenue as a result 
of poor commodity prices and expenditure growth of the expanding public sector. 
In 1983, the government adopted measures to consolidate and rationalise the 
public sector to control the large public sector deficit. The Federal government 
development expenditure fell from RMII. 5 billion in 1982 to RM8.4 billion in 1984, 
representing a reduction of 14.4 percent per annum. Uncommitted projects were 
suspended, while projects in their initial stages that did not have high social or economic 
costs were terminated or rescheduled. The government instituted a wage freeze in the 
public sector and adopted cost saving measures at all levels of government. These 
measures brought immediate results since the expenditure on wages and salaries as well 
as purchases of goods and services came to a standstill in 1983. Transfers and subsidies, 
the second largest category of expenditures, grew by less than 3 percent in nominal 
terms, compared with an average of 36 percent two years before. As a result of increasing 
debt commitments, the interest payment was the only item showing a rapid increase of 40 
percent over the 1982 position. The effectiveness of the fiscal rationalisation on the 
government budgetary position were reinforced by a healthy operating surplus arising 
from PETRONAS petroleum operations and the sharp reduction in the development 
budget. Despite the fiscal austerity adopted by the Federal government, the non-financial 
public enterprises were not affected by these measures. They continued to increase their 
own investment programmes from domestic and foreign sources of funding. This 
situation was brought under control in 1984 when they were made accountable to the 
Treasury with regards to their investment and financing programmes. 
Revenue, 1986-95. The general government revenue grew by 8 percent per annum 
during 1986-90, but as a percentage of GNP it declined from 36.5 percent in 1985 to 29.7 
percent in 1995. The decline had been attributed to the deterioration of the overall tax 
buoyancy which fell from 1 .0 
during the Fourth Plan period to 0.6 during the Fifth Plan 
period (Malaysia, 1991b: 67). During the 1980s, there was increased tax exemptions, 
allowances and incentives given to the private sector to promote investment as well as 
lower petroleum and commodity prices. 
70 
CHAPTER EcONomic TRANSFORAIA TION, A., ND FisCAL REFORAf 
During 1987-95, the period of recovery and rapid economic growth, company 
income tax and individual income tax grew at 18.2 percent per annum and 14.2 percent, 
respectively, as profits and personal income increased during the economic upswing. 
Income tax derived from petroleum companies increased to RM2.6 billion in 1990 but 
declined thereafter as production and oil price declined in the early nineties. Indirect 
taxes also recorded a rapid growth of 21.7 percent per annum and accounted for 37 
percent of total federal government revenue by 1995. The main sources of revenue were 
from import duties, surtax, excise duties and sales tax which arose from higher imports, 
stronger consumer spending, and improvements in the tax administration. 
The overall deficit narrowed,, brought about by prudent public sector spending, 
increased revenue accruing from rapid economic recovery, as well as the operating 
surplus of NFPEs. The overall deficit in the consolidated public sector finance from 4.9 
percent of GNP in 1987 to around zero in 1989-90, before rising to 1.8 percent of GNP in 
1995. Public sector borrowing to finance the deficit declined rather spectacularly from 
RM7.0 billion in 1987 to RM789 million in 1995. With the exception of 1995, the source 
of financing for 1987-94 came from non-inflationary domestic sources. 
4. POLICIES FOR THE NINETIES AND BEYOND 
4.1 Vision 2020 and National Development Plan 
The year 1990 marked the end of the First Outline Perspective Plan (OPP I). During the 
20 years of its implementation, Malaysia had come a long way in socio-economic 
development. Its economy grew at an average rate of 6.7 percent per annum, while its per 
capita income doubled. Exports of goods and services grew by 9.2 percent per annum 
accompanied by the expansion of manufactured exports that contributed 60 percent of 
total exports in 1990. 
Much progress had been achieved in addressing the problems of poverty and 
socio-economic inequality among ethnic groups. Poverty among all ethnic groups was 
significantly reduced. The proportion of poor households in Peninsular Malaysia 
declined from 49.3 percent in 1970 to around 15 percent in 1990 (Malaysia, 1991 a: 9). 
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During the same period, the proportion of Bumiputera employed in the manufacturing 
sector increased from 28.9 percent to 49.1 percent, while their employment in agriculture 
fell from 50.3 percent to 22.2 percent. More Bumiputera were also engaged in 
professional, managerial and technical occupations, while their share ownership9 grew 
from RM125.6 million in 1970 to RM22,298 million in 1990, accounting for 20.3) 
percent of total share ownership. Although Bumiputera share ownership fell short of the 
NEP target of 30 percent, the growth had been remarkable. Bumiputera share ownership 
registered an average annual growth of 30 percent (as against 16 percent for overall 
growth) during the OPP1 period and was 177 times larger in 1990 than it was twenty 
years ago. 
After the end of the OPPI period, the direction for the country's development 
efforts for the next thirty years will be guided by the policy pronouncement of Vision 
10 2020 . Under this vision, Malaysia strives to be a united, fully developed nation by the 
year 2020. The development approach spans several dimensions, encompassing not only 
economic growth, but also other aspects of development, such as the achievement of 
national pride and confidence, political maturity, spiritual values, liberal and tolerant 
society, scientific and technological progress, as well as a caring, economically just, 
competitive and prosperous society. 
The first decade within this thirty years development perspective is addressed by 
the Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2) which sets out policies, strategies and 
targets for 1991-2000. As in the First Outline Perspective Plan, national unity will 
remain the over-riding goal of socio-economic development. The basic strategies of NEP 
are given a new focus: (a) eradicating hard-core poverty; (b) developing an active 
Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community; (c) greater involvement of the 
private sector in restructuring society; and (d) greater emphasis on human resource 
development. Poverty eradication programmes will target on the hard-core poor and the 
poverty rate is projected to decline from 17.1 percent in 1990 to 7.2 percent by the year 
2000. The restructuring strategy will focus on developing a Bumiputera Commercial and 
9 This include the share holdings of Bumiputera individuals and trust agencies. 
10 In the inaugural meeting of the Malaysian Business Council in February 28,1991, the Prime Minister 
presented a paper entitled, "Malaysia: The Way Forward", which charted out the vision of Malaysia as a 
fully developed nation by the year 2020. 
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Industrial Community to increase the participation of this community in the corporate 
and non-corporate sectors. The growth target for the next 30 years will require the 
doubling of GDP every 10 years or achieving a sustained average growth of 7 percent per 
annum throughout the period. By the year 2000 the share of manufacturing in GDP is 
projected to increase to 37 percent and manufacturing exports will account for 81 percent 
of total exports. 
4.2 Frameworkfor Future Policies 
The government aims at maintaining economic stability and growth by 
formulating policies that improve efficiency, productivity and macro policy management. 
It will seek an appropriate balance of fiscal, monetary and trade policies, help revitalise 
the primary sector, improve physical and social infrastructure, and enhance the business 
environment. In particular, the Second Outline Perspective Plan enumerates four policy 
areas that will be given attention (Malaysia, 1991 a: 8 8-93): 
(1) Improvement of economic efficiency. Policies will be formulated to increase 
the competitiveness of the industrial sector and promote greater neutrality in 
the use of labour and capital. Tariff protection will be reduced or removed and 
the tax and incentive systems will be reformed. The privatisation programme 
will continue, while public-private sector co-operation and R&D efforts will 
be intensified. The tax and incentive systems will be reformed such that they 
will promote reinvestment, strengthen government revenue as well as achieve 
the distributional objectives in a more efficient manner. 
(2) Policies to support private investment. Wage increases should correspond to 
productivity growth. The regulated prices of industrial raw materials will be 
reduced to lower the cost of production. The public sector will play a 
supportive role by improving the physical and social infrastructure as well as 
the administrative procedures to strengthen business confidence. The financial 
and capital markets will be strengthened to mobilise funds for private 
investments. 
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(3) Human resource development. Priority will be given to develop a large pool 
of skilled manpower for modern services and industry. Training programmes 
will be market oriented and the education and training systems will be 
monitored more closely so that there is better matching of the demand and 
supply of skills in the labour market. 
(4) Policies to stabilise public debt, deficits and spending. Consistent with its 
policy to develop a private sector-led export-oriented economy, the 
government will refrain from an expansionary fiscal stance and involvement 
in commercial activities. To consolidate public sector finances, the 
government will reduce subsidies, strengthen the revenue base, and increase 
the effectiveness of tax administration. It will also encourage greater use of 
user-charges and self-financing in the funding of specific programmes. There 
will also be less reliance on external market borrowing to reduce the country's 
exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. 
4.3 Implications for Fiscal Policy 
There are several fiscal policy implications from the four policy areas of the 
Second Outline Perspective Plan. First, the objectives and targets of the National 
Development Policy are to be pursued in the environment of sustained economic growth, 
where the leading growth sectors will be manufacturing and services-related activities. 
Accordingly it is reasonable to expect that the government will adopt fiscal policies that 
would help the manufacturing sector to be efficient, competitive and broad-based. Some 
of the measures would include reviewing the fiscal and tariff-related policies and 
removing factor price distortions. In view of the focus of the National Development 
Policy towards eradicating poverty, the government would be concerned that changes in 
the fiscal policy should have minimal negative impact on poor households. In addition, 
taxes that affect the income of poor households are also candidates for review, such as 
taxation on agriculture. In this regard, most export taxes on primary commodities, such 
as rubber, tin, and palm oil, have already been reduced or completely removed 
because of 
their regressive effect on poor households. There would also be continuing 
investment to 
raise the quality of human resource through improvements in 
health and education. It is 
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possible that further tax incentives would be offered to institutions and employers that 
contribute to increasing the quality of human resources in the country. 
Second, -the maintenance of macroeconomic stability is crucial to safeguard the 
excellent growth record of the country, especially that achieved during the last few years. 
Any adverse fiscal developments would have to be closely monitored such that public 
spending would be matched with the revenue base. The restraint on public spending 
would continue, while public expenditure would be in the areas with the highest payoffs, 
such as enhancing the country's economic growth potential and productivity, stimulating 
private sector investment, improving the quality of life of the people, and upgrading 
human capital. In addition, to keep public expenditure on social services small, there 
would probably be a more pervasive adoption of user-charges on public services and 
amenities. On the revenue side, some taxes would have to be reduced. This is to ensure 
that that these taxes are not too out of line with the tax regimes of neighbouring countries 
or in fulfilment of Malaysia's obligations with regards to international agreements on 
free trade. To compensate for the revenue loss, the government would probably be 
looking for tax handles that can increase revenue with minimal distortions on the 
economy. This would imply the move to broaden the tax base and increase the tax 
buoyancy so that tax revenue would keep pace with or grow faster than the rate of 
economic growth. It could also involve tapping into potential sources of revenue and 
eliminating unnecessary business tax incentives and subsidies. 
Third, the public sector would focus on providing public goods characterised by 
market failure such as primary education and preventive health, while reducing activities 
that compete with the private sector. On the other hand, there has been increasing private 
sector participation in the provision of infrastructure, which in the past was considered 
the preserve of the public sector. The provision of social services, health and education 
have traditionally accounted for the largest single category in the budget. The 
privatisation of non-financial public enterprises during the Fifth Malaysia Plan was found 
to be effective in raising the efficiency of providing of infrastructure, reducing the burden 
on public finance, and expanding equity ownership for the Bumiputera. With greater 
involvement of the private sector in providing physical infrastructure, health and 
educational services, the focus for the government in the future would move from direct 
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provision of services to the monitoring of standards and regulating the delivery of social 
services by the private sector. 
Fourth, an important consideration for the government is to reform the tax system 
so that it could meet expenditure requirements without distorting incentives to work and 
invest. The wide range of fiscal incentives that are currently offered to the corporate 
sector are associated with revenue loss and social and economic costs of inefficient 
industrialisation. When the effective rates of protection vary across industries and 
categories of operations, the allocation of investment across sectors tend to be distorted, 
since business decisions are based on subsidies and exemptions rather competitive 
market rates of return. The complex system of sales, excise and service taxes cause 
variations in tax rates as well as exemptions that are inefficient and complicated to 
administer. Furthermore, the service and sales taxes also caused distortions by tax 
cascading on the agents based on their position on the production process. It is probably 
timely for Malaysia to put in place a broad-based, more equitable and neutral system of 
taxes that would be easier to administer and comply with. It would appear that the value- 
added tax or its variant can comply with many of these requirements and merit strong 
consideration by the government for adoption. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed the transformation of Malaysia's economy and the corresponding 
changes in its fiscal policies during the last 25 years. For analytical clarity, the evolution 
of the Malaysian economy was examined in terins of four phases: (1) High economic 
growth and adoption of the New Economic Policy (1970-79); (2) Economic boom with 
growing macro imbalances (1980-84); (3) Policy reorientation and recession (1985-86); 
and (4) Recovery and rapid growth (1987-95). The first phase started with the adoption 
of the New Economic Policy aimed at eradicating poverty and redressing socioeconomic 
disparities among ethnic groups. This policy, which has a far reaching effect on the 
Malaysian way of life, ushered in a larger, pro-active government role in development 
during the seventies and the early eighties. The Malaysian economy grew at an average 
rate of 7.8 percent per annum, as a result of the successful adoption of the export- 
oriented growth strategy, favourable prices and productivity growth of primary 
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commodities, prudent economic and financial management, and stable social and 
political institutions. 
During the second phase, Malaysia's terms of trade declined by 20 percent, which 
was accompanied by the deterioration in the merchandise account and the current 
account of the balance of payments. The government adopted anti-inflation measures, 
such as tight monetary policy, and embarked on a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Following further deterioration in commodity prices, this policy stance worsened the 
overall budgetary deficit in the public accounts and foreign debt increased to an 
unprecedented level. At this juncture, the government took the bold step of reducing 
public expenditure and initiated wide ranging re-orientation of policy measures. 
In the third phase, the cut in public expenditure coincided with the price collapse 
of Malaysia's major exports, such as petroleum, Palm oil, rubber, saw logs, tin and 
cocoa. The economy sank into recession in 1985-86. Along with anti-recession measures, 
the government adopted further policy measures to redress structural Problems. These 
include reducing the size and role of the public sector, giving greater emphasis on the 
management and utilisation of public resources, introducing policies for economic 
liberalisation and deregulation, widening investment incentives to promote private sector 
participation, and embarking on the privatisation of public enterprises, utilities and 
infrastructure. 
The period after 1987 is the phase of recovery of the Malaysian economy, with 
rapid growth and low inflation. The terms of trade for major non-oil commodities 
improved. Assisted by the depreciation of the ringgit and low interest rates, export 
demand for manufactured goods was strong and private investment grew rapidly. During 
1987-95, the economy was growing at an average rate of 8-9 percent per annum in real 
terms and real private investment expanded at an annual average rate of 18.5 percent, 
about 4 percentage points higher than public investment. The unemployment rate, which 
peaked in 1986, declined to 5.6 percent in 1990. The country reached full employment in 
the early nineties. 
The chapter analysed public expenditure and revenue during 1970-95. Even at the 
start of the seventies, the presence of government in the Malaysian economy was larger 
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than its neighbours. However, with the ambitious development programmes in the 
seventies, the share of public expenditure to GNP rose from 29 percent in 1970 to 50 
percent in 1980. Until the fiscal cutback after 1984, public expenditure on economic 
services, health, and education expanded rapidly in the early eighties. Besides giving 
significant allocation of funds to the non-financial public enterprises, the government 
invested in heavy industries, purchased LNG tankers and foreign-held plantation 
companies, and expanded port facilities. During 1985-95, operating expenditure was kept 
within manageable limits, while public development programmes were reinstated 
following economic recovery. Public investment was directed towards upgrading and 
expanding the infrastructure facilities, as well as poverty and restructuring programmes. 
Although the allocation for the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-95) was larger than the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan (1986-90), the ratio of development expenditure to GNP was maintained 
at 14 percent. The share of public expenditure to GNP was 37 percent in 1995, or 13 
percentage points lower than it was in 1980. 
For most of the 1970s,, growth in public revenue kept pace with public 
expenditure, which was undertaken within an environment of financial and price 
stability. However, between 1979 and 1982, public expenditure increased by 113 percent 
in nominal terms compared to revenue growth of 50 percent in nominal terms. Fiscal 
policy was expansionary, while the government kept a tight monetary policy, which 
resulted in high interest rates and depressed private investment. The deficit was financed 
from domestic and foreign borrowing, both of which increased rapidly. The Federal 
government outstanding foreign debt as a ratio of GNP rose from 9 percent in 1980 to an 
unprecedented level of 32 percent in 1985. 
In the face of growing deficit and public debt, the government adopted measures 
in 1983 to rationalise activities of the public sector. Fiscal austerity was extended to the 
non-financial public enterprises in 1984 to control their high levels of borrowing from 
domestic and foreign sources. During the 1980s, increased tax exemptions, allowances 
and incentives were given to the private sector to promote investment. Although 
government revenue grew by 8 percent per annum during 1986-95, its percentage to GNP 
declined from 36 percent in 1985 to 30 percent in 1995. During 1987-95, the overall 
public sector deficit narrowed as a result of the combination of prudent spending by the 
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public sector, increased revenue derived from better economic performance, and the 
operating surplus from the non-financial public enterprises. 
The Second Outline Perspective Plan, which contained the policies, strategies and 
targets for 1991-2000, was adopted at the start of the nineties. The four policy areas that 
would be given attention are: (1) improvement of economic efficiency, (2) increased 
support for private investment, (3) enhanced human resource development, and (4) 
stabilisation of public debt, deficits and spending. These policy areas have some 
implications on fiscal policy. First, there would be the need to adopt fiscal policies that 
promote efficiency, reduce price distortions, and lessen the negative impact on the poor. 
Second, public expenditure would have to be closely monitored and the government 
would need to broaden the tax base and increase the tax handles so that revenue can be 
raised with minimal costs to the economy. Third, with privatisation and greater 
involvement of the private sector in the provision of physical infrastructure, health and 
education,, the government would need to shift emphasis from providing these services to 
monitoring standards and regulating the delivery of these services. Finally, there would 
be a greater need to reform the taxes in order to set in place a broad-based, equitable and 
neutral tax system that could fulfil the expenditure requirements in a manner consistent 
with work incentives and private investment. 
Malaysia's recent economic experience as well as changing revenue and 
expenditure patterns help to establish the ground rules for the new directions in fiscal 
policy. Many of the features of the reformed fiscal policy were in place since 1983 as 
part of the fiscal austerity and policy adjustment measures adopted by the government. 
Future public spending would be kept be in line with revenue and the government would 
limit its activities to areas characterised by market failure. Privatisation of public 
enterprises and services would continue, implying a larger role for private sector 
involvement in the provision of services. Changes in the tax system is necessary for the 
government to raise more revenue without distorting incentives for work and investment. 
The next two chapters will consider the Malaysian tax structure and the issue of 





After independence in 1957, Malaya (now, Malaysia) I inherited the tax system 
introduced during the British colonial era. Although profit and income tax was collected 
by the colonial government, the first comprehensive tax system was introduced in 1947. 
The main objective of the tax system was to achieve more equitable distribution of the 
tax burden as well as generate revenue for the government. 2 Under the Federal 
Constitution, the federal government is empowered to raise revenue from a variety of 
important sources such as income tax, trade taxes and sales taxes. Except for the states 
with oil fields,, the sources of revenue for the other states are less lucrative, being limited 
to land taxes, mining royalties, entertainment duties, license fees and several minor 
revenue sources. In 1990, the federal government accounted for 77 percent of the total 
government revenue (RM38.4 billion) in the consolidated public sector finance, while 
state governments and local governments accounted for 17 percent and 5 percent of total 
government revenue, respectively. Over 70 percent of federal government revenues were 
derived from taxes. 
The Malaysian tax system shows a relatively high degree of revenue productivity. 
For most years, tax collection efforts kept up with growth in the economy and public 
expenditure. Nevertheless, some of features of the tax system can still benefit from 
reform to increase efficiency and equity. The tax system has become complex as a result 
of amendments adopted during successive annual budgets that were aimed at changing 
I Malaysia was formed in 1963 comprising a federation of II states in Malaya, two states in North Borneo 
(Sabah and Sarawak) and Singapore. Two years later, Singapore left the federation. 
For historical details on the development of the tax system in the peninsula, see Edwards (1970). The 
post- independence tax structure for 1960-73 is discussed at some length in Salleh (1977). 
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business and trade conditions. As a result, the tax system has become more difficult to 
administer and provides opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance. 
In keeping with the practice of countries within the Asia Pacific region, Malaysia 
reduced its income tax and tariff rates in the latter part of the eighties and early nineties. 
Although the potential tax revenue that could be collected by the government was 
affected by the rates reduction, it did not lead to public finance difficulties. The rapid 
economic growth after 1988 generated the required tax revenue, while the policy of 
public expenditure consolidation adopted during this period reduced the pressure for 
rapid expansion of tax revenue. The current Malaysian tax system can benefit from a 
reform that sets in place a broad-based, equitable and neutral tax system, facilitates 
administration and tax compliance, as well as generates revenue without distorting work 
and investment incentives. 
This chapter examines the Malaysian tax structure since 1970 and how the 
composition of tax revenue has changed across time. Next, it considers the trend and 
characteristics of each of the major taxes during the last 25 years, and considers 
proposals to improve them. The weaknesses and drawbacks of the current sales tax and 
service tax have been long recognised. One proposal under consideration is to replace 
them with the value added tax (VAT). A useful indicator of the revenue generating 
capacity of the tax system is tax buoyancy. In the final section, we estimate the buoyancy 
coefficients of some taxes and consider some implications of the tax buoyancy estimates 
in terms of future tax policy directions. 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE TAX STRUCTURE 
Table 4.1 shows the share of revenue to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in current prices. 
The share of revenue to GDP rose steadily from 1970 to a peak of around 25 percent in 
1980-81. Revenue growth was particularly rapid during the second half of the seventies, 
registering an average growth rate of 19.5 percent per annum during 1976-81. This 
exceptional growth rate was the result of extremely buoyant commodity prices and 
increased petroleum production from new oil fields off shore. With the economic 
slowdown, tax revenue collections for 1982-86 was lower, around 21 percent of 
GDP. 
There was a distinct break in the pattern in 1987 when the tax revenue share 
dipped to 
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TABLE 4.1 TOTAL TAX To GDP RATIO, 1970-95 
(In RAII Million) 
Year GDP at Total Tax Tax RevenuelGDP 
Market Price Revenue (0/0) 
1970 12,541 2,000 15.95 
1971 12ý955 2,081 16.06 
1972 14ý220 2,394 16.84 
1973 18,723 3,046 16.27 
1974 22,858 4ý31 1 18.86 
1975 22,332 4,576 20.49 
1976 281085 5 ý491 19.55 
1977 32,340 7ý070 21.86 
1978 36,272 8,007 22.07 
1979 45,083 9ý508 21.09 
1980 51ý838 12ý795 24.68 
1981 565064 13 ý419 
23.94 
1982 62,579 12ý590 20.12 
1983 69,941 15ý263 21.82 
1984 791550 16,474 20.71 
1985 77,547 165700 21.54 
1986 71 ý729 
l4ffl2 20.47 
1987 79,625 12,473 15.66 
1988 90,861 14,708 16.19 
1989 102,587 16ý674 16.25 
1990 115ý828 211)244 18.34 
1991 1291559 25ý831 19.94 
1992 147ý784 28ý772 19.47 
1993 163,039 31,900 19.57 
1994 1819668 345639 19.07 
1995 203ý428 37,880 18.62 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various years 
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15 percent of GDP as a result of tax reforms undertaken to stimulate investment and the 
low taxes collected during the recession years. With the resumption of growth, however. 
revenue yields rose again to around 19 percent of GDP, but not to the levels achieved 
during 1976-1986. 
The indicators of tax revenue to GDP and government expenditure are shown in 
Table 4.2. Column A refers to the tax revenue collected by the Federal Government. 
while Column B refers to the tax revenue without the contribution of petroleum taxes. 
Petroleum-based taxes were particularly important during 1980-86 when their 
contribution to government revenue amounted to around 5-6 percent of GDP. Total tax 
revenue amounted to around 60-80 percent of total expenditure during the seventies. 
However,, the proportion fell below 50 percent of total expenditure on two occasions in 
the 1980s. The decline in the ratio of revenue to total expenditure during 1980-81 was 
brought about by the rapid expansion of public expenditure, while the decline during 
1986-88 was largely due to reduced tax revenue collection as a result of the recession. 
Starting from 1990, tax revenue expanded rapidly at an average rate of 12.3 percent per 
year, which brought an improvement in the proportion of tax revenue to expenditure. 
There are two major components of tax revenue, namely, revenue derived from 
direct taxes and indirect taxes. Revenue from direct taxes are derived from taxes on the 
income of companies, individuals, petroleum and co-operatives, as well as taxes on share 
transfer, film rental, estate and stamp duty, property gain duty. The major components of 
direct taxes are company and personal income taxes and petroleum tax, which grew in 
importance after 1975. As shown in Table 4.3, revenue from direct taxes amounted to 
around 10-12 percent during 1980-95, with a slight decline during 1987-90 following the 
reform in tax and incentive rates. The contribution of direct tax to total tax revenue 
increased from 35 percent in 1970 to 53 percent in 1995 (see Charts 4.1-4.3). 
Before 1982, indirect taxes contributed a larger share to federal government 
revenue than direct taxes. Trade taxes (comprising export and import duties) were the 
principal sources of revenue. Export duties on primary commodities, such as rubber, tin, 
and palm oil, were substantial since Malaysia was the world's leading exporter of these 
commodities. By contrast, the direct income tax base was small as the country was still 
in the initial stage of its industrialisation process. However, with rapid economic growth 
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TABLE 4.2 SELECTED REVENUE INDICATORS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Year Tax Revenue as 
% of GDP 
AB 
Tax Revenue as 
% of Operating 
Expenditure 
AB 
Tay Revenue as % 
of Total Expenditure 
AB 
Total Revenue 
as % of Total 
Expenditure 
1970 15.9 15.9 92.5 92.5 69.5 69.5 83.4 
1971 16.1 16.0 86.8 86.6 60.0 59.9 69.7 
1972 16.8 16.8 78.0 78.0 55.8 55.8 68.0 
1973 16.3 16.1 91.2 90.4 68.5 67.9 76.5 
1974 18.9 18.2 115.3 111.5 81.6 78.8 90.6 
1975 20.5 19.0 93.4 86.8 65.3 60.7 73.0 
1976 19.6 18.4 94.2 88.7 67.3 63.3 75.4 
1977 21.9 19.5 95.6 85.1 67.1 59.7 73.7 
1978 22.1 19.9 99.6 90.0 68.2 61.6 75.3 
1979 21.1 19.3 94.7 86.4 67.0 61.2 74.0 
1980 24.7 20.0 94.0 76.2 61.1 49.6 66.5 
1981 23.9 18.2 85.5 65.0 50.0 38.0 58.9 
1982 20.1 14.6 75.5 54.9 45.2 32.9 59.9 
1983 21.8 16.9 83.1 64.2 54.9 42.4 67.0 
1984 20.7 15.4 75.2 56.0 54.9 40.9 69.4 
1985 21.5 15.4 75.2 53.7 57.6 41.2 72.9 
1986 20.5 14.7 63.1 45.3 48.6 34.9 64.6 
1987 15.7 12.3 53.6 42.0 45.5 35.7 66.2 
1988 16.2 12.5 57.8 44.6 49.9 38.5 74.5 
1989 16.3 13.1 72.6 58.3 58.1 46.7 88.1 
1990 18.3 14.4 84.9 66.7 64.5 50.6 89.6 
1991 19.9 15.3 91.3 70.0 70.4 54.0 92.8 
1992 19.5 16.0 89.7 73.9 71.1 58.6 96.9 
1993 19.6 16.9 99.0 85.7 77.2 66.8 100.9 
1994 19.1 17.3 102.6 93.1 76.9 69.8 101.4 
1995 18.6 17.2 110.1 101.6 80.4 74.2 101.2 
Notes: 1. Column A is total tax revenue collected by the Federal Government. 
2. Column B is total tax revenue less petroleum income tax and export duties on petroleum. 
3. Total Expenditure = Operating Expenditure + Development Expenditure. The expenditure 
fiaUres refer to the expenditure of the Federal Government. t: ) 
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various years. 
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TABLE 4.3 DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXES To GDP, 1970-95 
(In RM Million) 
Year Direct Tax Direct TaxlGDP Indirect Tax Indirect TaxlGDP 
Revenue (0/0) Revenue (0/0) 
1970 701 5.59 1,299 10.36 
1971 713 5.50 1,368 10.56 
1972 801 5.63 1,593 11.20 
1973 890 4.75 2,156 11.52 
1974 1,384 6.05 2,927 12.81 
1975 2,021 9.05 2,555 11.44 
1976 2,167 7.72 3,324 11.84 
1977 2ý946 9.11 4,124 12.75 
1978 3,323 9.16 4,684 12.91 
1979 31888 8.62 51620 12.47 
1980 5ý664 10.93 75131 13.76 
1981 6ý328 11.29 75091 12.65 
1982 65405 10.24 6,185 9.88 
1983 7,712 11.03 7,551 10.80 
1984 8,445 10.62 85029 10.09 
1985 9,259 11.94 7ý441 9.60 
1986 8,653 12.06 6,029 8.41 
1987 6,467 8.12 6ý006 7.54 
1988 7ý509 8.26 7,199 7.92 
1989 7,793 7.60 85881 8.66 
1990 1 Oý402 8.98 10,842 9.36 
1991 13,251 10.23 12,580 9.71 
1992 15,403 10.42 13,369 9.05 
1993 175070 10.47 14,830 9.10 
1994 181533 10.20 16ý 106 8.87 
1995 205186 9.92 l7fi94 8.70 
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various years 
85 
CHAP TER STRUCTUkE. 4. A, TD TREND OF THE T4-VS)STE, ll 





56% Tax Revenue RM 12,795 
million 




47% Tax Revenue RM37,880 
86 
CHAPTER 4 STRUCTURE AND TREND OF THE T-ix S)'STE. ý f 
and modernisation during the seventies and eighties, the contribution of indirect taxes to 
total revenue shrank in importance relative to the contribution of direct taxes. Trade taxes 
as a proportion of total tax revenue declined from 41 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 
1995. This shows the declining importance of primary commodities in total economic 
activity as well as the effects of the reduction in tariff rates and export duties on 
commodities. Furthermore, despite the rapid growth of commercial activities and private 
consumption, the contribution of sales, service and excise taxes to total revenue has not 
moved in the same direction, but declined in recent years, suggesting the need for a tax 
reform. 
2.1 Incidence of Taxation 
The earlier studies on taxation in Malaysia focused on the incidence of taxation 
on households, which is examining the way in which the burden of tax eventually falls. 
The first study on the distribution of tax burden in 1957-58 for Peninsular Malaysia was 
done by Charles E. McLure J. R. Subsequently, D. R. Snodgrass undertook some 
estimations for 1968 and Ismail Muhd. Salleh for 1973. The three studies showed that the 
overall tax structure in Peninsular Malaysia exhibited the U-shaped pattern of effective 
tax rates, with greater burden falling on the lower as well as the upper income 
households. The tax burden on middle income group was relatively lower. 
The estimates of tax incidents were based on some assumptions of who would 
bear the tax burden and by how much for each of the taxes. The income distribution 
among households for a particular year was obtained from income and expenditure 
surveys. The existing taxes were allocated among the income brackets in order to 
calculate the pattern of effective tax burden. In the allocation of taxes, some assumptions 
were made about the shifting of the tax burden on the income groups. Since these 
assumptions were not based on empirical findings of the tax burden but on a priori 
assumptions, incidence estimates of various taxes between the three studies could vary 
fairly widely. 
For instance, Salleh (1980) shows greater regressivity of the tax rates on poor 
households than the other two studies. The estimate of the effective tax rate for 
households with annual income below RMI, 800 is at a high 47.8 percent in Salleh, 
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compared with 19.9 percent in McLure (1972) and 31.2 percent in Snodgrass (1974). On 
the other hand, Snodgrass finds that tax progression appears to be most pronounced for 
households in the higher income brackets. His estimate of the effective tax rate for 
households with annual income above RM12,000 is 50.8 percent, compared with 40.0 
percent in Salleh and 26.3 percent in McLure. The wide difference in the estimations 
could only be partly attributed to changes in the estimates of income distribution and tax 
structures between the years 1957-73. The other reason is the difference in assumptions 
adopted in the studies regarding the shifting of the tax burden between 
consumers/producers, exporters/importers, producers/distributors, as well as the income 
groups adopted in each of the studies. The burden of taxes calculated should, therefore, 
be taken as rough indications of the true patterns and be interpreted with some caution. 
2.2 Tax Revenue in an International Context 
Table 4.4 shows the contribution of various categories of taxes to total tax 
revenue for groups of developing countries ranked by per capita GDP, as presented in 
Tanzi (1987), which are compared with Malaysia's tax structure in 1980. With per capita 
income of US$1,563, Malaysia falls within the US$850-1699 category of countries, 
which acts as its reference group. The proportion of tax collection in GDP for Malaysia 
(at 22.3 percent) was one and a half times higher than for the reference group. This was 
because Malaysia derived a higher proportion of its taxes from foreign trade and income 
and corporate taxes. As the world's leading exporter of rubber, tin, palm oil, and tropical 
hardwoods, as well as petroleum, Malaysia received 20 percent of its tax revenues from 
export duties and 16 percent from import duties in 1980. By comparison, the countries in 
the reference group appear to be collecting a higher proportion of their tax revenues in 
sales tax/VAT and excise duties. 
Malaysia's revenue yield compares favourably with other middle-income East 
Asian countries (Table 4.5). In terms of the ratio of tax revenue to GNP, Malaysia 
collects more taxes than the other countries in the region. However, in 1989 the 
difference in the ratio of tax revenue to GNP between Malaysia and countries such as 
Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea is small, within the range of 0.3-1.3, percentage 
points. In 1989, Malaysia's ratio of direct taxes to total revenue (at 30.8 percent) is 
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TABLE 4.4 MALAYSIA'S TAX COLLECTION IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Malaysia All countries Per Capita Income (USS) 
1980 in sample 0-349 350-849 850-1699 1700+ 
% of GDP 
Foreign Trade 9.0 5.02 4.94 6.62 5.31 3.19 
General Sales, VAT 1.3 2.07 1.87 1.4 3 1.89 3.10 
Excises 1.9 1.97 1.64 2.24 1.91 2.16 
Income and Corporate 10.1 5.60 2.66 5.50 5.75 8.08 
Total Tax 22.3 14.66 11.11 15.79 14.86 16-53 3 
of Total Taxes 
Foreign Trade 36.2 30.63 39.25 38.06 29.47 15.40 
General Sales, VAT 5.4 11.66 14.98 8.63 10.11 12.57 
Excises 7.6 12.23 12.86 15.73 11.54 9.95 
Income and Corporate 41.0 28.70 19.68 29.55 30.29 35.63 
Note: The international data are for early 1980s. 
Source: Tanzi (1987), international comparisons; Malaysia's data are calculated from Table 4.6. 
higher than Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, but lower than South Korea and, 
particularly, Indonesia, which derived more than half of its total revenue from direct 
taxes. This is due to the high tax revenue that Indonesia derived from its substantial 
petroleum industry. Malaysia derived 34 percent of its total revenue from non-tax 
sources, which is higher than the other countries in the region, except Singapore. 
Although all countries in the region experienced a decline in the share of taxes 
derived from trade, the most dramatic decline of 17.2 percentage points was recorded in 
Malaysia, which resulted from substantial changes in its tax rates on exported and 
imported goods. The ratio of goods and service tax to total revenue in Malaysia was 
lower than the other countries in the region. The fact that Malaysia has a lower ratio of 
goods and service tax to total revenue compared with other countries within a similar 
income band as well as other countries in the region suggests that this could be a 
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TABLE 4.7 ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH FOR DIRECT TAXES, 1970-95 
(In Percentages) 
Year Total Direct Total Income Companies Individuals Petroleum Others 
Taxes Tax 
1971-75 23.6 24.0 19.0 21.1 16.6 
1976-80 22.9 22.2 16.7 17.5 40.1 34.9 
1981-85 10.3 10.9 9.2 12.2 12.5 1.6 
1986-90 2.4 1.9 2.8 7.5 -3.3 10.4 
1991-95 14.2 13.1 18.7 15.9 -5.5 25.6 
Source: Calculated from Economic Report, various issues 
3. CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF TAXES, 1970-95 
Over the last two and a half decade, the Malaysian tax structure had undergone changes 
as a result of economic transformation as well as tax rate revisions. To get a better 
understanding of the Malaysian tax system, in this section we shall examine the past 
trends for each category of taxes. Under direct taxes, we examine (a) personal income 
tax, (b) corporate tax, and (c) petroleum income tax. As for indirect taxes, we discuss the 
following: (a) export tax, (b) import tax, (c) excise duties, (d) sales tax, and (e) service 
tax. Details on the sources of tax revenue for 1970-95 are shown in Table 4.6. 
3.1 Direct Taxes 
Revenue from total direct taxes recorded rapid growth during the seventies, with 
growth rates averaging 23 percent per annum. In the eighties, average annual growth of 
revenue from this source slowed down to 10.3 percent during 1980-85 and 2.4 percent in 
1986-90, before picking up again at 14.2 percent in 1991-95 (see Table 4.7). In 1990, 
income taxes constitute 93 percent of direct taxes and 45 percent of total tax revenue 
(Table 4.8). These taxes are levied on individuals as well as corporations. Under the 
Income Tax Act, 1967, personal income tax is levied on the taxable income from all 
sources accrued in or derived from Malaysia and external income sources received in 
Malaysia by a resident. These sources include gains or profits from any profession, 
vocation, or employment, pensions, or annuities, and rents. The residence status of an 
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3 individual determines claims for personal relief and benefits of graduated rates . 
Company income tax is levied on the taxable income from all sources in Malaysia and 
income received from outside Malaysia for a resident company, and on income derived 
from Malaysia in the case of non-resident companies. Tax is levied for the preceding 
Year of Assessment (Y/A) ending on December 31.4 
3. LI Personal Income Tax 
The schedule of income tax rates for resident individuals is shown in Table 4.9. 
Individuals face progressive rates of taxes based on thirteen taxable income bands,, which 
were reduced to nine following the 1995 Budget. Starting from the lowest chargeable 
income category, there are four bands of RM2,500 up to the chargeable income of 
RMIO, 000 and three bands of RM5,, 000 up to the chargeable income of RM25,000, 
before larger increases in the chargeable income bands for individuals in the higher tax 
categories. 
Since the mid-1980s, the marginal tax rates for the highest and lowest taxable categories 
have been reduced in stages. In 1985 the top marginal tax rate was reduced from 55 
percent to 40 percent, and subsequent reduction brought the top marginal tax rate to 32 
percent in 1995. At the lowest taxable category, the marginal tax rate was brought down 
from 6 percent to 5 percent in 1985 and subsequently to 3 percent in 1995, with the first 
RM2,500 category of chargeable income exempted from tax. This cut in rates was meant 
to encourage savings, although its effectiveness on savings has yet to be evaluated. The 
effect of adjusting the top personal income tax rate on government revenue is minor, 
notwithstanding the large reduction of marginal tax rate by 15 percentage points for the 
top taxable income bracket. The share of personal income tax to tax revenue was 
sustained at around 11-12 percent from 1982-92, before rising to 13.8 percent in 1995. 
There is only a little fall in the share of personal income tax to tax revenue by 1.5 
Non-resident employees are charged a flat income tax rate of 35 percent, subject to double tax treaty 
provisions. No personal reliefs are available to non-resident individuals. 
4 Taxes for any Year of Assessment will be charged on the income of the preceding year. 
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1970 35.1 32.9 24.5 8.4 0.0 2.2 
1971 34.3 33.0 24.7 8.1 0.2 1.2 
1972 33.5 31.0 23.4 7.6 0.0 2.5 
1973 29.2 27.5 19.5 7.2 0.9 1.7 
1974 32.1 30.3 18.7 8.2 3.3 1.8 
1975 44.2 42.1 25.5 9.6 7.0 2.1 
1976 39.5 37.6 21.3 10.5 5.9 1.8 
1977 41.7 39.5 18.9 9.6 11.0 2.2 
1978 41.5 39.5 20.2 9.6 9.6 2.0 
1979 40.9 38.6 18.1 11.9 8.7 2.3 
1980 44.3 41.0 19.7 7.7 13.6 3.3 
1981 47.2 43.4 20.5 8.1 14.7 3.8 
1982 50.9 48.0 20.8 10.8 16.5 2.8 
1983 50.5 47.6 22.6 11.9 13.1 2.9 
1984 51.3 48.4 20.8 12.0 15.6 2.8 
1985 55.4 52.7 23.5 10.5 18.7 2.8 
1986 58.9 56.4 23.5 12.0 20.9 2.5 
1987 51.8 49.1 22.3 14.5 12.3 2.7 
1988 51.1 48.5 21.4 12.1 15.0 2.6 
1989 46.7 43.7 20.4 12.3 11.1 3.0 
1990 49.0 45.4 21.2 11.8 12.4 3.6 
1991 51.3 48.0 20.7 11.6 15.7 3.3 
1992 53.5 50.0 26.2 12.0 11.9 3.5 
1993 53.5 49.1 26.8 13.3 9.0 4.4 
1994 53.5 47.3 27.5 13.6 6.2 6.2 
1995 53.3 47.1 28.0 13.8 5.3 6.2 
Source: Calculated from Economic Report, various issues 
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TABLE 4.9 INCOME TAx RATES FOR RESIDENT INDIVIDUALS, 1980-95 
YIA 1980 to YIA 1985 to YIA 1991 to YIA 1993 to YIA 1995 
YIA 1984 YIA 1990 YIA 1992 YIA 1994 
C hargeable I ax I ax I ax I ax I ax Tax Tax Tax TCLT Tax 
Income Rate Payable Rate Payable Rate Payable Rate Payable Rate Pq: vable 
M RM C/o) R A/I (0/0) RM (0/0) RAf (0/0) RAI 






On RAIII 0,000 
Next RM5,000 





Next RM 10,000 
On RM35,000 











On RAIII 50,000 
Exceeding 
RM 150,000 
9 225 8 
375 
12 300 12 
675 
15 375 12 
1,050 
20 1,000 15 
2,050 
25 1,250 15 
3,300 
30 1,500 20 
4,800 
35 3,500 20 
8,300 
40 6,000 25 
14,300 
45 9,000 30 
23,300 
45 2,250 35 
25,550 























































































Notes: 1. In 1995 the top tax bracket was extended to RM 150,000 while the categories of tax brackets 
were reduced from 13 to 9. 
2. Taxes for a Year of Assessment (Y/A) are based on the income of the preceding year. 
For 
instance, taxes for Y/A 1995 is assessed on the income accrued 
in 1994. 
Sources: 1. The Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants, 1994 Budget Commentary 
& 
Ready Reckoner 
2. Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 1995 Tax & Business Information Budget News 
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TABLE 4.10 PERSONAL INCOME TAX FOR THE YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 1991 
Chargeable Income No. of Chargeable Income Tax Develo inent Tax p 
Group Persons Income Charged Charged 
I-7,500 612,206 2,476,113,542 140,664,569 23,619,744 
7,501 - 10,000 130,822 1,1 369723ý968 85,427,971 6,974,509 
10,001 - 151,000 150,840 1,833,93 1,791 158ý 195,703 11,060,493 
15,001 - 20ý000 71,829 1ý23%586,974 120,03 1 ý534 8,467,197 
20,001 -30,000 73,672 1,794,2125973 202,770,433 11,764,762 
30,001 -50,000 49,648 1,879,313,147 261,865,355 12,592,459 
50ý00 1- 100,000 27,254 1,842,882,398 353,092,063 12,197,456 
100,001 - 200,000 7,630 1,021,134,900 266ý2181638 5,851,485 
Over 200,000 21564 87058555439 274,422ý777 4,090,920 
Total 1,126,465 14,094,755,132 1,862,689,043 96,619,025 
Source: Department of inland Revenue, Annual Report 1991 
percentage points in 1985, though this also partly contributed by reduced earnings with 
the onset of a recession. 
Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 show the personal income tax by categories of 
income and tax payers for the Year of Assessment 1991. These tables are useful in 
providing a snapshot of the personal income tax structure at the start of the nineties, 
which was in the middle of the series of marginal tax rate revisions starting from 1986. 
Fifty four percent of the personal income tax payers came from the lowest 
chargeableincome group butthey only contribute 8.3 percent of income and development 
By comparison, 0.9 percent of the tax payers were from the two highest tax tax., 
categories and contribute 28 percent of income and development tax. There could 
possibly be efficiency gains by exempting those from the lowest tax brackets in order to 
free up the over-strained tax administrative and collection capacity of the Department of 
5 Development Tax is levied on income derived from any trade, business, profession, vocation, and the 
leasing of property situated in Malaysia. Individuals and members of partnerships who derived a 
development source of income not exceeding RM5,000 are exempted from this tax. 
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TABLE4.11 PERSONAL INCOME TAX BY CATEGORIES OF TAXPAYERS, 
YEAR OF AsSESSMENT 1991 
No. of Persons 
Assessed 
Total Income Tax Charged 
1. Employees 817,598 151973ý412ý486 1,226,496,691 
(i) Government 345,453 5,770,445,750 305,290,339 
(ii) Non-Government 472ý 145 101202,966ý736 921,206,352 
2. Sole Proprietors and Partners 3965644 7,643,9329269 636,190,719 
Total 1,214,242 23,617,344,755 1,862,687,410 
Source: Department of Inland Revenue, Annual Report 1991 
Inland Revenue, coupled by increased efforts to improve the assessment and collection of 
the 'hard to tax' groups. This could be the underlying motive for exempting the lowest 
tax category in the revision of income tax rates for Y/A 1995. 
Table 4.11 shows that there were 1 214,000 taxpayers in 1990 (or Y/A 199 1) who 
constituted about 18 percent of those employed. About two-thirds of the taxpayers were 
employees and one-third while sole-proprietors and partners. The salaried employees are 
the 'easy-to-tax' group since their earnings are reported by the employer to the 
Department of Inland Revenue (DIR). There is a high representation of government 
employees who are taxpayers (28 percent) as against their share in total employment (13 
percent). As is commonly experienced in every country, the 'hard-to-tax' group is the 
self-employed who comprise 33 percent of the taxpayers in 1990. Not very much is 
known about the extent of tax compliance among the 'hard-to-tax' group and further 
research could possibly be done in this area. 
In examining income tax structure among countries, analysts have traditionally 
used the share of total tax revenue to GDP. As a refinement to the methodology, the total 
tax revenue accrued from households at different income levels could 
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problem of focusing on the highest marginal rate is that it can give a misleading picture 
of the overall disincentives created by the tax system in a country. In this section, we 
adopt the approach introduced by Sicat and Virmani (1988) to compare the income tax 
base and the incentive effects of marginal tax rates among selected countries. We then 
apply the same methodology to examine Malaysia's changing income tax rates over the 
past 10 years. 
For an average household, the method assumes a married couple with one income 
earner and three children. To obtain the taxable income, we subtract from gross income 
the standardised deductions and credits related to the family or linked to wage and salary 
income. The country's 'one household GDP' (FGDP) is defined as five times per capita 
GDP. 6 The tax threshold index is calculated by taking the ratio of the threshold income 
level over the one household GDP, i. e. Y*/FGDP. The numerator, Y* , is the income 
threshold that is free from tax. It is equal to the income bracket that is free from tax plus 
the basic exemptions. 7A zero tax threshold index means that all families, regardless of 
their income level, will be taxed. If the value is 0.5, families with an income of less than 
half FGDP are not subject to tax, while families with income equal to FGDP pay a tax 
assessed on half their income. In other words, the greater the value of the index (arising 
from larger deductions, credits, and zero bracket), the smaller would be the income tax 
base. 
Table 4.12 presents Malaysia's marginal tax rates (MTR) together with those of 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Japan. The 
figures for Malaysia are our own estimates, while the figures for the other countries are 
based on Sicat and Virmani. In 1984-85, Indonesia had an exceptionally high index 
value,, where families having income equal to 1.3 times the FGDP were not taxed. 
Indonesia's low tax base is consistent with the high administrative costs of collecting 
taxes from a large, populous country comprising thousands of islands. Malaysia had the 
next highest tax threshold index in view of the large tax relief given to income earners. 
6 It is useful to note that this methodology tends to overestimate the average and marginal tax rates of 
developed countries since they typically have families of less than five. Although FGDP may 
overestimate mean family income, this bias is not likely to distort the overall inter-country comparison. 
7 For Malaysia, the tax free income bracket is RM2,500 before 1994 and RM5,000 after 1994. The 
estimated personal relief of a family of 
five with a working husband, a non-working wife and three 
children are RM 12,900 for 1984 and 1990, RM 13,900 
for 1991 and 1993, and RM 15,400 for 1995. 
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On the other hand, the threshold index for Singapore was very low, which was even 
lower than Japan. Its wide income tax base reflects the relative higher efficiency in 
collecting taxes in an integrated city-state, island economy. 
In the discussions on comparative tax rates among countries, analysts often focus 
on the highest marginal tax rate since very high marginal tax rates are linked with the 
disincentives to work and save. Before drawing conclusions about the disincentive 
effects on the basis of the highest tax rate among countries, it will be useful to ascertain 
the size of the target group that falls within this tax bracket. In Table 4.12, the highest tax 
brackets for Thailand (65 percent) and Indonesia (35 percent) only apply to families with 
income at more than 20 times the size of their FGDP. One can safely conclude that only 
a tiny fraction of individuals fall within this tax category and even less would pay taxes 
at this rate because of tax evasion. Another set of indicators is to examine the marginal 
tax rate for those up to three times the size of FGDP. Families belonging to this income 
bracket are in the upper middle class or the high income bracket. The table shows that the 
Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia had the lowest marginal tax rates for households in 
this category. 
Among the neighbouring developing countries, Malaysian tax payers face the 
highest marginal tax rates in 1984. Although the tax threshold index was high in 
Malaysia, the highest tax brackets were reached very quickly. Individuals with family 
income three-quarters the national average for one household GDP paid 20 percent taxes, 
while those with three times FGDP paid 45 percent taxes. The highest tax bracket was 
applied to those with income of more than 4.2 times FGDP. This bracket was reached 
faster than the other developing countries in the table. 
After comparing the tax structure of selected countries, we now examine the 
progressivity of Malaysia's personal income tax. Table 4.13 presents the indicators of 
progressivity calculated for 1984,1990,1991,1993 and 1995 using the methodology by 
Sicat and Virmani (1988). The table shows that there had been considerable reform of 
personal income tax in Malaysia during the last decade or so. The declining tax threshold 
index shows that the tax base had been expanding over the years. In 1984 families with 
incomes less than 65 percent of FGPD did not pay taxes. The tax net was wider a decade 
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One reason for this is that the rapid rise in average family GDP that brought many 
families into the taxable income brackets or the problem of 'bracket creep'. 
Second, the personal relief schedule had changed very little since 1980 despite 
the increase of around 40 percent in the price level between 1980-90. For instance, a 
working individual with four dependants and who earned RM12,900 in 1980 would not 
be paying any tax. However, if he was to earn the same amount of real income in Y/A 
1984, he would fall into the 6 percent tax bracket. The same real income would bring 
him into the 8 percent bracket in Y/A 1990 and the 10 percent bracket in Y/A 1991. In 
other words, he would indeed be worse off since the rising nominal income would move 
him into successively higher tax brackets. However, the situation is reversed with the 
latest tax rate revisions. The increase in personal relief and reduction of tax rates in the 
nineties would bring him down the 8 percent bracket in Y/A 1993 and the 0 percent 
bracket in Y/A 1995. 
There is also a substantial compression of marginal tax rates. The ratio of the 
highest bracket to FGDP falls from 4.2 in 1984 to 3.2 in 1995. This implies that 
individuals reach the highest tax bracket earlier in 1995 than a decade before. However, 
this trend is also accompanied with falling marginal tax rates, including the highest tax 
bracket, over time. This is shown by the declining marginal tax rates at each multiple of 
FGDP in Table 4.13. Marginal tax rates fell between 12 to 17 percentage points for the 
first three multiples of FGDP. 
The Progressivity Index shows the effective progressivity between multiples of 
FGDP. The progressivity for tax payers in the middle income and medium-high income 
category had increased from 1.5 ten years before to 2.0 in 1995. By contrast the 
progressivity index of those in the medium-high and high income category had remained 
relatively unchanged. The Elasticity Index shows the relationship between marginal and 
average tax rates. The index shows that the Malaysia's tax rates are structured such that 
the elasticities remained fairly constant between 1.2-1.4 for the first three multiples of 
average family income between Y/A 1984-1995. 
Horizontal equity is violated when similar taxpayers are not treated in a like 
fashion as a result of uneven enforcement of tax compliance across different classes of 
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taxpayers and types of income. From the Household Income Survey 1989, the number of 
households that are estimated to pay taxes are between 1.2 and 1.3 million although 
about 1.0 million households are assessed for income tax, implying a participation rate of 
78 percent to 85 percent. The majority of those who pay taxes are on employment rolls. 
However, there are under-reporting of income among those who are not on these rolls, 
which suggests that there is uneven coverage of the personal income tax. It has yet to be 
established whether different segments of society bear a disproportionately high or low 
share of the burden. 
3.1.2 Corporate Income Tax 
Corporations are levied a flat tax rate on their undistributed profits. There is some 
degree of integration between personal and corporation taxes, where dividends are taxed 
once and individuals are allowed credit for taxes paid by the corporation on their behalf 
Corporate taxation has long been an important source of government revenue. It 
contributed about 25 percent of tax revenue in 1970, but its share dropped to around 20 
percent from 1973 through 1991, before rising to above 26 percent in the early 1990s. To 
increase govermnent revenue during economic recession in the mid-seventies, the 
corporate and development tax rates were adjusted upwards from 45 percent to 50 
percent in 1975. The 5 percent increase was because of the imposition of the excess 
profit tax, which was abolished in Y/A 1988. The 50 percent tax rate was maintained for 
a decade before the downward rate revisions, starting from Y/A 1986 to reach 30 percent 
in Y/A 1995 (see Table 4.14). This process of lowering the corporate tax rate was to 
bring it more in line with the taxes of neighbouring countries. 
8 Despite the rate 
adjustments, the contribution of corporate tax to the Malaysian government tax revenue 
rose from 23 percent in 1986 to 28 percent in 1995. Clearly, the tax revenue accrued 
from the rapid rise in business activities and corporate profits had more than 
compensated for the revenue loss from the tax rate adjustments. 
8 The corresponding corporate tax rates in the ASEAN countries are 27 percent for Singapore, 
30 percent Z: 5 
for Thailand, Brunei, and Indonesia, and 35 percent for the Philippines. 
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TABLE 4.14 CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES 
(In Percentages) 
Year of Income Tax Development Excess Total 
Assessment Rate Tax Rate Profit Rate 
1985 and before 40 5 5 50 
1986-1987 40 5 3 48 
1988 40 5 - 45 
1989 35 5 - 40 
1990 35 4 - 39 
1991 35 3 - 38 
1992 35 2 - 37 
1993 34 0 34 
1994 32 0 32 
1995 30 0 30 
Note: During Y/A 1975 to Y/A 1985 excess profit tax of 5 per cent was charged on income in 
excess of (i) 25 per cent of shareholders funds at the beginning of the basis period or (ii) 
RM200,000, depending on which is greater. For Y/A 1986 and Y/A 1987, a3 per cent excess 
profit tax was imposed on chargeable income in excess of RM2 million. This tax was 
abolished from Y/A 1988. 
The structure of the corporate tax for Y/A 1991 by income groups is shown in 
Table 4.15. A total of 30,400 companies were levied income tax amounting to RM5.2 
billion. Most of the companies were resident in Malaysia, and slightly over I percent 
were non- resident. Over half of the companies had chargeable incomes of RM30,000 
and below and they contributed about I percent of the corporate tax revenue. By contrast, 
close to four-fifths of the corporate tax revenue were derived from companies with 
chargeable income of RM2,000,000 and above. The companies constituted less than 3 
percent of the total number of total number of companies. The non-resident companies 
contributed 7 percent of the corporate tax revenue. 
As part of the overall strategy to generate increased industrial activities and 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI), Malaysia expanded its income tax incentives in 
1986. Awarded on a discretionary basis, these incentives reduce the corporate taxes paid 
through tax holidays, allowances, abatements and special deductions. While the 
corporate tax system in Malaysia is relatively straight forward, various complications can 
arise from the elaborate tax incentive system. The principal incentives for the 
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manufacturing sector are contained in the Promotion of Investments Act (PIA), 1986 and 
the Income Tax Act, 1967. Among some of the most important forms of tax incentives 
available are the following: 9 
(a) Pioneer Status for investments in agriculture, industrial and hotel; 
(b) Investment Tax Allowance for companies producing 'promoted products'; 
(c) Industrial Adjustment Allowance which allow specific manufacturing 
companies in textile, wood, motor cars, shipbuilding, oil palm and bar and rod 
rollings; 
(d) Abatements to companies which are not claiming the ITA or pioneer status; 
(e) Reinvestment Allowance for manufacturing companies which incur 
qualifying capital expenditure for the purpose of an approved expansion; and 
(f) Specific export and other incentives. 
One can reasonably raise questions on the extent to which Malaysia's tax 
incentives have helped either to increase inward FDI or give domestic firms an edge in 
world trade competition. It is, however, difficult to attribute or measure the contribution 
of particular incentives to increase foreign direct investment. Most developing countries 
prefer to have high nominal rates of corporation tax and then grant exemptions 
selectively which erode the marginal effective tax rate. In surveying tax incentives across 
twenty-eight developing countries, Shah and Toye (1978) note that as opposed to theory, 
tax holidays and tax credits, subsidies to earnings and subsidies to investment are not 
alternatives , in practice. 
Firms could be allowed to opt and benefit under one scheme or 
the other, according to which would provide the greater subsidy. To gain maximum 
benefit from the tax and incentive schemes, firms would take advantage of their tax 
holidays until their expiry, and then enjoy the different kinds of depreciation allowance 
and tax credit available. The most popular incentive scheme is the tax holiday which 
provides the largest element of subsidy to firms which earn profits (Heller and Kauffman, 
9 The full range of investments available are listed and described in the 'Investors' 
Guide' of the 
Economic Report. 
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1963: 85; Usher, 1977,131-32). The basic tax holiday is extended and supplemented by 
other types of tax concessions. 
It is important to consider the interaction of incentives since some incentives can 
render others ineffective. In examining the incremental effects of incentives, Pellechio, 
Sicat and Dunn (I 987a) found that five-year tax holiday and import tax exemption 
eliminated the beneficial effect of an investment deduction. When the benefits of tax 
incentives occur at the same time some of them become redundant. The problem of 
indiscriminate granting of tax incentives is that they erode the tax base and may not 
promote the desired mix of investments. For policy making, it is important to know 
about the exact impact of tax incentives on the effective tax rates faced by investors, on 
the composition of overall investment, and on the substitution of the factors of 
production. The lack of knowledge in these areas, as is often the case, can lead to the 
creation of an excessive number of incentive instruments. 
In their study on the taxation of investment in East Asian countries, Pellechio, 
Sicat and Dunn (1987a) show that the statutory (or nominal) corporate income tax rate 
gives a misleading picture of the true effective tax rate, which is modified by significant 
deductions allowed for depreciation, investment allowances, and income abatement. The 
tax rate is further reduced by a five-year tax holiday applicable to companies with 
pioneer status. In addition, favourable treatment of capital gains and an offset against 
personal income taxes of corporate taxes paid on dividend receipts act to lower the tax 
burden. One way of assessing the impact of corporate taxes is through the use of a 
simulation model developed in the World Bank. 10 By using purely hypothetical data 
based on actual parameters of the tax system and the average capital composition of 
investment projects, this model computes a cash-flow stream before taxes and after taxes. 
Allowances are made for depreciation, interest deductions, loss offsets, capital gains') 
personal income tax credits against dividend payouts and other features. The percentage 
10 See A. Pellechio, G. Sicat and D. Dunn, 'Taxation of Investment in East Asian Countries, ' DRD 
Discussion Paper No. 26 1, World Bank, March 1987. 
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TABLE 4.16 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAx RATES IN 
SELECTED EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 
(In Percentages) 
Marginal jýffective Tax Rate 
Country Statutory Rate All equity 50% Debt 
Malaysia 40.0 32.0 20.5 
Singapore 40.0 28.4 15.2 
Philippines 35.0 40.4 31.9 
Indonesia 35.0 41.6 34.1 
Thailand 35.0 24.9 18.6 
Japan 33.3 39.2 29.4 
Korea 30.0 33.1 24.6 
Taiwan 25.0 31.9 28.2 
Hong Kong 18.5 17.3 9.6 
Source: Pellechio, Sicat and Dunn, 'Taxation of Investment in East Asian Countries' DRD 
Discussion Paper No. 26 1, World Bank, March 1987. 
TABLE 4.17 TAx REVENUE FROM PETROLEUM, 1987-1989 
(In RM Millions) 
1988 % 1989 % 1990 % 
Petroleum Income Tax 2ý208 30.08 19847 24.11 29884 32.3 
Export Duty 1ý149 15.65 11432 18.69 1,910 21.4 
Royalty 499 6.80 509 6.64 627 7.0 
Petroleum Dividend 21000 27.25 21300 30.03 2,300 25.8 
Petroleum Import & Excise Duties 1,458 19.86 1 ý548 20.22 IJ83 13.2 
Share of Petroleum Revenue 27 0.36 24 0.31 27 0.30 
Revenue Derived From Petroleum 7,341 100.00 7,660 100.00 8ý931 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estimates of Malaysia's Federal Revenue, various years. 
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difference in the rate of return generated by the before-tax and after-tax streams is 
designated the marginal effective tax rate (METR). 
The simulation results of the METR of Malaysia and the other Asian countries are 
shown in Table 4.16. Malaysia's METR IS significantly lower than its statutory rates, 
especially if debt financing is used. These calculations only consider the minimum 
allowances accorded to companies. If other deductions and exemptions are included, the 
rate can decline further. For instance, a pioneer company with a 5-year exemption using 
50 percent debt financing would face a METR of only 15 percent. If losses from a project 
can be used to offset income earned elsewhere in the corporation, then the METR falls to 
10 percent. If the pioneer status is extended from 5 to 10 years, the METR falls to a 
minimal of 4 percent. On this basis, one can conclude that Malaysia's effective tax rate is 
low enough not to discourage new investments, a statement that is supported by Tahir 
(1984). 
For many new companies that qualify for pioneer status, the tax burden has been 
so much reduced by major incentives that they could afford to overlook minor credits and 
deductions, such as the Labour Utilisation Relief (now abolished) and the Double 
Deduction for Training. Besides the pioneer status, companies can also opt for the 
Investment Tax Allowance (ITA), which tends to be favoured by large, capital -intensive 
projects, or the Reinvestment Allowances and accelerated depreciation allowances under 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act. The low effective tax rate on capital as the result of 
the incentives may have contributed to an erosion of the tax base as well as the 
unintended consequence of biasing projects towards more capital-intensive techniques 
(World Bank, 1989). A tax structure with fewer exemptions would permit more effective, 
selective tax incentives than the present system. 
II In addition, the lowering of the 
statutory tax rate from 45 percent to 30 percent would need to be accompanied with the 
I One of the most dramatic reform of investment incentives in the eighties occurred in Indonesia. Before 
1983 its tax structure was inordinately complex as a result of hundreds of ad hoc amendments such that 
they were incomprehensible to taxpayers and tax collectors alike. The massive range of contradictory 
investment incentives resulted in a complicated system that was ineffective 
in raising revenue. In 
reforming its taxes, Indonesia abolished all special tax incentives, 
including tax holidays, investment 
allowances, and accelerated depreciation. This reform resulted 
in administrative simplicity, 
transparency, and minimum distortion of economic behaviour. The expected revenue gains arising 
from 
the elimination of incentives allowed the tax rate to 
be reduced (World Bank, 1988; Gillis, 1989). 
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removal of exemptions and investment allowances, without which the METR would fall 
below zero (World Bank, 1989: 7 1). 
3.1.3 Petroleum Income Tax 
Oil production in Malaysia started in 1911, but only grew in importance in the 
early 1970s. Since the mid-seventies, the contribution of petroleum production to 
government finance grew in importance. The share of petroleum income tax to total tax 
revenue rose from 7 percent in 1975 to 21 percent in 1986, before declining to 5 percent 
in 1995. Besides petroleum income tax, there are other sources of tax revenue derived 
from petroleum, such as export duty, petroleum royalty and dividend, as well as import 
and excise duties. In 1990 taxes and duties on petroleum contributed RM8.9 billion to 
Federal Government revenue (Table 4.17). Petroleum income tax accounted for 9.9 
percent of government revenue, followed by petroleum dividend (7.9 percent), the export 
duty on petroleum (6.6 percent) and the petroleum royalty (2.2 percent). 
Petroleum exploitation in the seventies influenced developments in the Malaysian 
economy in a number of ways. Firstly, the share of the mining sector to GDP in 1990 is 
far more important than anticipated in the Outline Perspective Plan, with the petroleum 
sector emerging as the main contributor to the sector. The share of petroleum to the 
mining sector increased from 16.5 percent in 1970 to 82.6 percent in 1990 export 
commodity in the early 1980s, although its position and export value deteriorate relative 
to palm oil exports in the early 1990s. Thirdly, the buoyant petroleum prices in the late 
seventies and early eighties provided the government with revenue to finance ambitious 
public sector programmes. However, the sudden fall in oil prices in 1986 caused a decline 
in federal revenue and a cutback in public expenditure, which accentuated the recession 
in the mid-eighties. 
Malaysia abandoned the concessions system in favour of a system of production- 
sharing contracts with foreign oil companies as specified in the Petroleum Development 
Act 1974. Petronas, which was established under this Act, is vested the ownership of all 
petroleum resources as well as the exclusive rights for exploration and production. The 
production- sharing contracts specify the details with regard to the sharing of risks, 
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extraction. The contracts are supplemented by the Petroleum Income Tax under which 
the contractor and Petronas are subject to 45 percent income tax on revenues. After using 
the First Generation Production Sharing Contracts for one decade, the Second Generation 
Production Sharing Contracts, which offered more favourable terms to the contractor, 
were adopted in 1985. The contractor's cost oil share is increased from 20 Percent of 
annual gross production of crude oil (25 percent of natural gas) to 50 percent for crude 
oil (60 percent for natural gas). A higher profit oil for the contractor was adopted, while 
all bonuses were eliminated. 
Malaysia adopted the Petroleum Income Tax Act in 1967 which dealt specifically 
with the taxation of income from crude oil and gas production. The amount of tax 
collected in a particular year depends on the prices, production levels and expenses of the 
preceding year. The tax rate was initially set at 50 percent, but later reduced to 45 percent 
in 1976. Development tax is not charged under this Act. The petroleum income tax is 
levied on income in the upstream sector, while downstream income is taxed under the 
corporate income tax. 
Chart 4.4 gives a graphical presentation of the importance of petroleum income 
tax as a share of tax revenue. The contribution of petroleum income tax started growing 
in importance in the late seventies to reach a peak in 1986 when its contribution to tax 
revenue amounted to 21 percent. With the adoption of the second generation production 
sharing contract scheme, the contribution of petroleum income tax declined markedly to 
12 percent in 1987. The share later tapered off to 5 percent in 1995 as the result of the 
declining value of crude petroleum export in the early nineties. 
3.2 Indirect Taxes 
Indirect taxes consist of export duties, import duties, excise duties, sales tax, 
service tax and other indirect taxes. As shown in Table 4.18, revenue 
from total indirect 
taxes grew rapidly in the seventies, especially with the buoyant export prices 
during 
1976-80. In the eighties, average annual growth of revenue from this source 
fell 
dramatically to only 0.9 percent during 1980-85 as a result of the collapse of commodity 
prices. After 1986, growth of indirect taxes was restored, averaging 
7.8 percent per 
annum in 1986-90 and 10.3 percent per annum in 
1991-95. In 1970, indirect taxes 
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contributed close to two thirds of the total tax revenue. The contribution fell to 47 
percent in 1995 as a result of the declining importance of export duties and import duties 
(Table 4.19 and Chart 4.5). 
3.2.1 Export Duties 
Until the mid-eighties, Malaysia was essentially a producer and exporter of 
primary commodities. Primary exports accounted for almost 80 percent of the total 
exports in 1970. Although the share had fallen over time, the contribution of primary 
exports was still high at 54 percent in 1988. By 1995, the contribution of primary exports 
had shrunk to II percent. There was less concentration in the export of four commodities 
(rubber, saw logs, crude palm oil and tin) over the years. The four commodities 
accounted for 56 percent of the total primary exports in 1995, compared with 96 percent 
in 1970. 
Export duties in Malaysia are principally levied on primary commodities. These 
taxes are favoured by countries in the early stages of development because they are cheap 
to collect and easy to administer. Some arguments against export duties are: (a) they are 
regressive and fall disproportionately on the producers and smallholder agricultural 
producers (see Lipton, 1977), and (b) they distort the efficient allocation of domestic 
resources by causing resources to shift out of export activities into import activities or the 
production of non-tradable goods and services. Booth (1980: 57) found that export duties 
in Malaysia could only tap a small proportion of the increment in export earnings, and 
they are inequitable in the burden they impose on producers. 
The rates on export duties are largely on ad valorem basis which vary 
across commodities and are progressive in relation to their export prices. The export 
duties of rubber and palm oil are collected when the market prices for exports exceed the 
notional cost of production. The export duties on crude palm oil and processed palm oil 
are based on their value published in the govermnent Gazette. For instance, duty is 
charged on the export of palm oil when the price level exceed RM650 per tonne, which is 
estimated to be the cost of production. The export duty on petroleum was introduced 
since April 1980. Export duty on crude petroleum is based on the gazetted value and 
charged at 25 percent ad valorem (20 percent in the 1994 Budget). In addition to export 
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TABLE 4.20 STRUCTURE OF EXPORT DUTIES, 1989 AND 1993 
(In RM '000) 
1989 % 1993 % 
Rubber 58,223 3.67 0 0.00 
Tin and Tin Ore 21,128 0.13 0 0.00 
Bauxite 45 0.00 0 0.00 
Iron Ore 36 0.00 0 0.00 
11menite 6,166 0.39 0 0.00 
Zircon 2,607 0.16 0 0.00 
Other Minerals 960 0.06 0 0.00 
White Pepper 881 0.06 0 0.00 
Black Pepper 15872 0.12 0 0.00 
Timber 544 0.03 106 0.01 
Crude Palm Oil 1,650 0.10 5,435 0.37 
Processed Palm Oil 12ý416 0.78 1,237 0.08 
Building Materials 315 0.02 290 0.02 
Crude Petroleum 15431,610 90.14 1 ý428,812 97.61 
Food Items 516 0.03 74 0.01 
Palm Kernel 21415 0.15 11002 0.07 
Other Duties on Exports 65,735 4.14 26ý837 1.83 
Total 15588,121 100.00 15463,793 100-00 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estimates of Malaysia's Federal Revenue, 1991 
and Federal Budget 1995 
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duties, rubber export is also levied research and replanting cess, while tin export is 
subject to research and development cess. 
The changing composition of primary exports is reflected in the export duties 
collected. The tax revenue is highly cyclical, being determined by fluctuating world 
market prices. Export duties as a percentage of tax revenue peaked in 1974 (22 percent) 
as well as 1979-80 (20 percent), before declining throughout the eighties and into the 
nineties to reach 2 percent in 1995 (Table 4.19). The export duties for palm oil recorded 
negative growth rates during the mid-seventies, while the duties for rubber and tin started 
falling in the 1980s. The peaks corresponded with the buoyant prices of primary 
commodities (see Table 4.6). 
In the 1991 Budget, the government abolished the export duties on rubber, pepper 
and all minerals. A comparison of the structure of export duties for 1989 and 1993 
wouldhighlight the effect of this abolition on the revenue accrued from this source (see 
Table 4.20). Since 70 percent of rubber and all the pepper produced in the country are 
grown by smallholders, the abolition of the export duties was expected to help improve 
their income. As for tin, the revenue collected from export duty on tin has anyway been 
insignificant since 1985. The fall in the collection of export duties from the traditional 
commodities was only partially offset by petroleum export duty. But even then, the 
collection of petroleum export duty started to decline after 1985. With less number of 
goods subject to export duties, the amount of export duties collected has also fallen over 
the years and is largely derived from petroleum export. 
3.2.2 Im ort Duties 
Since the colonial period, import duties were imposed to raise revenue, and in 
some cases, to control the domestic supply of certain goods. In the 1960s, the strategy to 
promote import substitution had led to a series of tariff increases in order to protect 
domestic industry from foreign competition. The government had successively raised 
tariffs on motor vehicles, consumer durables, tobacco products and alcoholic liquor. The 
oil price hike in 1974 had pushed inflation into the double digits. To keep inflation down 
and reduce the price burden on the poor, some 'essential commodities', such as sugar, 
diesel oil, kerosene, wheat flour, condensed milk, fertilisers, and plywood were exempt 
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from import duties (Ministry of Finance, Economic Report 1974175: 35; Asher and 
Booth, 1983: 88). The revenue foregone was approximately RM162 million or 12 
percent of the estimated total import and excise duties in 1974. 
Import duties are levied on a wide range of imports into Malaysia. The rates 
generally vary from 0 to 100 percent, although CBU motorcars imports can be as high as 
300 percent. Custom duty is mostly ad valorem although some specific taxes are charged 
on a number of commodities. 12 The majority of imports are taxed between 10 and 35 
percent. An import surcharge of 2 percent is levied on raw materials and some 
machinery, while the rate of 5 percent is charged on other goods. 
Malaysia has signed bilateral trade agreements with many countries 13 
specifying the maximum rates of import duties and preference margins for particular 
products. For ASEAN, the minimum Margin of Preference (MOP) is 25 percent. Various 
exemptions are given when imports are used by government and public enterprises. In 
addition, import duty exemptions are used in accordance with the industrial incentives 
policies to promote certain types of investments and exports. The granting of tax 
exemption on raw materials and machinery for the manufacturing sector depends on 
whether the finished products are sold in the domestic market or exported. Imported raw 
materials and components can qualify for full exemptions for the manufacturers who 
produce finished products for export markets. A manufacturing company producing for 
domestic market can qualify for import duty exemption as well if it complies with the 
12 There generally are two main types of tariffs: (a) ad valorem duty which is levied as a fixed percentage 
of the value of the good; (b) specific duty which is levied as a fixed sum of money per physical unit of 
the good (Pass and Lowes, 1993). t: ' 
13 The countries that had signed trade agreements with Malaysia are Australia (1968), New Zealand 
(1961), United Arab Emirates (1962), South Korea (1962), Russia (1967), Bulgaria (1968), Rumania 
(1969), Yugoslavia (1969), Hungary (1970), Poland (1972), Czechoslovakia (1972), Indonesia (1973), 
Libya (1977), Turkey (1977), Bangladesh (1977), Democratic Republic of Korea (1979), German 
Democratic Republic (1980), Italy, Mali and ASEAN countries. 
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TABLE 4.21 STRUCTURE OF IMPORT DUTIES, 1989 AND 1993 
(In RM '0 0 0) 
1989 1993 % 
Petrol 614,362 21.19 1155294 25.14 
Lubricants and Grease 6,087 0.21 23929 0.52 
Fuel Oils 35,735 1.23 44658 0.97 
Kerosene 3,945 0.14 4000 0.09 
Aviation Fuel 1,240 0.04 1219 0.03 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas 44,877 1.55 3224 0.07 
Diesel 43,868 1.51 206456 4.49 
Other Petroleum and Fuel Products 2,459 0.08 2988 0.07 
CBU Cars 108,896 3.76 348636 7.59 
CKD Cars 203,995 7.04 288320 6.27 
Other Motor Vehicles 775050 2.66 94060 2.05 
Motor Spare Parts 101,020 3.48 143111 3.11 
Liquor 73,572 2.54 104207 2.27 
Malt Liquor 31538 0.12 1758 0.04 
Fresh Fruits 48,087 1.66 44964 0.98 
Dried and Preserved Fruits 3,043 0.10 4558 0.10 
Canned Food 145805 0.51 17765 0.39 
Animal Feeds 10,622 0.37 8125 0.18 
Tobacco, Cigarettes and Cigars 192ý917 6.65 189032 4.11 
Textiles and Apparels 106,591 3.68 144085 3.14 
Television 7,952 0.27 9744 0.21 
Video Recorder 6,743 0.23 4216 0.09 
Refrigerators 9,269 0.32 11589 0.2-5 
Audio Electronic Appliances 15,822 0.55 34828 0.76 
Other Household Equipment 23,295 0.80 19879 0.43 
Musical Instruments 95078 0.31 4634 0.10 
Machines and Spare Parts 909107 3.11 164302 3.57 
Furniture 4,539 0.16 11272 0.25 
Glass and Glassware 16ý, 034 0.55 18967 0.41 
Steel 42,938 1.48 88734 1.93 
Ceramic 41430 0.15 6960 0.15 
Other Building Materials 10,970 0.38 15631 0.34 
Lock and Key 2,291 0.08 4881 0.11 
Chemical Detergents 2!, 867 0.10 2049 0.04 
Fertilisers 11ý187 0.39 6733 0.15 
Resins and Plastic Materials 36,572 1.26 70870 1.54 
Medicine 15999 0.07 2565 0.06 
Duties Collected from Passengers 149970 0.52 12707 0.28 
Other import Duties 794,015 27.39 1274967 27-74 
Surtax 97,133 3.35 5 0.00 
Total import Duties and Surtax 2,898,920 100.00 45595,922 100-00 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estimates of Malaysia's Federal Revenue for the Year 
1991 and Federal Budget 1995. 
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equity condition of the New Economic Policy as stipulated in the manufacturing 
licence 14 
. Exemptions will only be considered for raw materials and components that are 
not available locally. 
During the last twenty five years, import duties have grown by almost elevenfold, 
from RM557 million in 1970 to RM6.0 billion 1995, and contribute between 3-4 percent 
of GDP to government revenue. The contribution of import duties to tax revenue has 
been fairly consistent since 1975 despite the reduction in import duties since the mid- 
1980s. In the 1986 Budget the import duty on certain equipment used by fisheries and 
agriculture was abolished, while import duty on a variety of raw materials were reduced 
to a uniform rate of 2 percent. The structure of imported duties for 1989 and 1993 is 
shown in Table 4.21. The largest items are petroleum products and motor vehicles. 
In the 1989 Budget, tariff protection for infant industries was reviewed, while import 
duties for consumer products were reduced between 20-87 percent. In the 1990 Budget 
the import duties and excise duties of food items, inputs for the agriculture sector and 
household items were reduced to moderate price increases. The government abolished 
import duties on rubber, tin and pepper in the 1991 Budget in order to encourage the free 
flow of primary commodities into Malaysia. This measure was aimed at developing 
Malaysia into the region's main centre for processing and manufacturing of agro-based 
products and enhance the growth of the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange. In the 
later budgets, the government continued to reduce or abolish import taxes for 600 items 
in the 1993 Budget, 500 items in the 1994 Budget, and over 26,000 items in the 1995 
Budget. 
3.2.3 Excise Duties 
Excise duties are the oldest form of indirect taxes in Malaysia. They are levied on 
imports as well as locally manufactured goods. The tax base for excise duties Malaysia 
was extended in 1968, but this did not have a significant impact on revenue until an 
excise tax on motor vehicles was introduced in 1970. In 1982 budget the government 
abolished excises on some products, such as gas stoves, fans, electric 
irons, ovens, and 
14 This is in relation to equity participation, management and employment structure. 
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TABLE 4.22 ExciSE DUTY By PRODUCTION TYPE, 1989-95 
(In RM '0 0 0) 
1989 % 1993 % 














795,090 41.15 1ý423,556 38.34 
6615261 34.22 1,326,367 35.72 
266ý753 13.80 411,328 11.08 
154,300 7.99 476,079 12.82 
10,491 0.54 9,594 0.26 
6,695 0.35 10,280 0.28 
10,316 0.53 18,637 0.50 
9,319 0.48 13,550 0.36 
6,155 0.32 11,385 0.31 
59593 0.29 7,948 0.21 
3,318 0.17 3,744 0.10 
1,822 0.09 0 0.00 
1,189 0.06 661 0.02 
1ý932,302 100.00 31713,129 100-00 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estimates of Malaysia's Federal Revenue, 1991 
and Federal Budget 1995 
cement, as an anti-inflationary measure. The revenue impact of this was fairly small 
(Asher and Booth, 1983: 50-5 1). 
Table 4.22 shows the structure of excise duty by production type. In 1993, excise 
duties account for 11.6 percent of total tax revenue. They are levied on petroleum 
products, liquor, cigarettes, tyres and tubes, flashlight batteries, soft drinks, motor 
vehicles, television sets, refrigerators, and air conditioners. The main contributors to 
revenue from excise in 1993 were fuel oil and petroleum products (38 percent), 
motorised vehicles (3 5 percent), locally manufactured cigarettes (13 percent), and locally 
produced liquor (I I percent). To discourage smoking and the consumption of liquor, the 
excise duties on cigarettes, beer and stout were increased in the 1991 and 1992 budgets. 
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Excisable products are traditionally selected for their high yield at low 
administrative costs. These are products with low price elasticities, such as necessities, 
and high income elasticity, in the case of luxury goods. Excise duties (Exemption) Order 
1977 lists out the group of people and goods exempted from excise duties. Partial 
exemption of excise duty is also given for petroleum and petroleum products 
manufactured in Sabah and Sarawak. Taxis, hire-cars and buses are given full exemption. 
There is also no excise duty on exports. 
3.2.4 Sales Tax 
This tax was first introduced under the Sales Tax Act of 1972 as a means for 
raising revenue and closing the budget deficit. This act superseded the series of taxes 
introduced during 1964-67. First was the turnover tax of 0.5 percent on gross sales of all 
trades, businesses, and professions introduced in the 1965 budget. In the following year, 
this tax was replaced by a flat rate of 2 percent single stage levy on domestic sales of 
certain imports. This was repealed again and replaced by a two percent surtax on imports 
from I January 1967. 
The current sales tax is an ad valorem single stage tax imposed at the import and 
manufacturing levels. The tax is levied on domestically manufactured goods, on imports 
and on a few selected servicesFor domestic goods, it is at the level of the manufacturer, 
while for imported goods the importer is charged the tax based on the value of cost- 
insurance-freight (CIF) plus import duties. A manufacturer is defined rather broadly 
under the Sales Tax Act to include one who converts by manual or mechanical means 
organic or inorganic materials into a new product by changing the size, shape, or nature 
of such materials and include the assembly of parts into a piece of machinery or other 
product, but does not include the installation of machinery or equipment for the purpose 
of construction. Three tax rates are applied: (a) the general rate is 10 percent, (b) a rate of 
5 percent is imposed on certain non-essential foodstuff and building materials, and (c) 
Cigarettes and liquor are taxed at 15 percent. 
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TABLE 4.23 SALEs TAX COLLECTED ON LOCAL AND IMPORTED GOODS, 1985-89 














1985 767,344 -2.5 4691693 -11.5 1,237,037 -62 
1986 6291107 -18 358,600 -23.6 987,707 -20.2 
1987 721,546 14.7 369,064 2.9 1,090,610 10.4 
1988 942,194 30.6 512ý284 38 
.8 
1,454,478 33.4 
1989 1,2521245 32.9 659,350 28.7 1,911 
ý595 31.4 
Source: Royal Customs and Excise Department (1990), Annual Report 
One of the problem associated with the sales tax is the multiple taxation of raw 
materials, capital goods and other intermediate inputs. This cascading of taxes' 5 would 
cause variations in the effective sales tax rate of goods and non-neutrality in business 
decisions. In addition, there is also the problem of tax pyramiding. 16 In an attempt to 
circumvent the problems of tax cascading and pyramiding of the manufacturer's sales 
tax, Malaysia adopted the 'ring system'. The sales tax system allows the licensed firms to 
purchase and import tax-free all the inputs, components, intermediate goods, and capital 
goods they require. Exporters are also allowed to purchase and import tax-free material 
inputs for their production process. Sales tax is levied only when an unlicensed firm 
purchases inputs from a licensed firm. 
15 Tax cascading can occur with both the sales tax as well as the service tax. The imposition of a tax at 
various stages of production or distribution process compounds the effects of multi-stage taxation of the 
same item on its final price. 
16 The pyramiding effect results from profit mark-ups by wholesalers and retailers that are based on the 
tax-inclusIve prices charged by manufacturers. Tax pyramiding causes the consumer to pay higher 
prices than the amount of the sales tax collected by the government. 
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TABLE 4.24 SALES TAX ON DOMESTIC GOODS BY INDUSTRY 
(In RM '0 0 0) 
Industry 1988 % 1989 % 
Confectionery 
Spirit, malt & liquors 
Aerated water 
Tobacco, cigars & cigarettes 
Textiles 
Footwear 
Garment making, other than tailoring 
Furniture, other than wood prod. 
Paper & paper products 
Rubber products other than footwear 
Paints, varnishes & lacquer 
Soap washing & cleaning compound 
Perfume, cosmetic and toiletries 
Base metal 







11,513 1.22 20,902 1.67 
74,334 7.89 79,564 6.35 
26,747 2.84 31ý553 2.52 
155,305 16.48 159,179 12.71 
12,517 1.33 14,018 1.12 
13,026 1.38 15,768 1.26 
221833 2.42 28,548 2.28 
22,889 2.43 271987 2.23 
39,067 4.15 439575 3.48 
42,988 4.56 48,027 3.84 
21,667 2.30 27,423 2.19 
18,949 2.01 22e817 1.82 
10,800 1.15 123574 1.00 
54,472 5.78 69,571 5.56 
213 0.02 0 0.00 
171,865 18.24 325,914 26.03 
12,263 1.30 139820 1.10 
39,413 4.18 453595 3.64 
70,365 7.47 91,712 7.32 
120,967 12.84 1731697 13.87 
9421193 100.00 1 e252e244 100.00 
Source: Royal Customs and Excise Department (1990), Annual Report 
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Manufacturers whose sale value of taxable goods do not exceed RM100,000 per 
annum are exempted from sales tax to keep the tax administration manageable. To 
promote vertical equity tax and not overburden the poor households, the sales tax 
exempts primary commodities, basic foodstuffs, basic building materials, and certain 
agricultural implements and machinery. Luxury goods are subject to higher taxes. 
However, the net effect of the sales tax is not really progressive throughout the income 
scale. According to Salleh (1988), the distribution of sales tax burden of locally 
manufactured and imported goods is regressive for the lower income bracket but 
progressive at the upper income bracket. In addition, certain tourist and sports goods, 
books, newspapers and other reading materials and all exports are exempted from sales 
tax. Certain privileged persons, diplomats and government agencies are not required to 
pay the tax. 
During the last twenty years, the contribution of sales tax to total tax revenue 
grew from 6 percent in 1975 to II percent in 1995. This is a modest growth considering 
the rapid expansion of consumption of II percent per annum during 1975-95. The 
government had taken steps to improve the sales tax and the service tax. In 1983, the 
sales tax rate was increased from 5 to 10 percent and tobacco and liquor products were 
taxed at 15 percent. The base of sales tax was expanded with the removal of a few 
exemptions in 1988. In the 1989 Budget, the sales tax was re-imposed on certain 
foodstuffs, building materials, semi-processed and non-essential goods. Table 4.23 shows 
the revenue collected from sales tax on local and imported goods, while Table 4.24 
presents the structure of sales tax on domestic goods by industry for 1988 and 1989. 
Despite these adjustments, the narrow base and problems associated with the sales tax 
remain because the system is basically flawed. 
3.2.5 Service Tax 
This tax was introduced under the Service Tax Act, 1975. A service tax of 
5 percent is 
imposed on certain goods and services provided in certain prescribed establishments. 
The 
goods are food, drinks and tobacco, while the main services include rooms 
for lodging, 
nightclubs, dance halls, cabarets, health centres and massage parlours. 
Generally, all 
large hotels and their restaurants are subject to the tax. A limited range of restaurants 
located outside hotels are also subjected to the tax provided their annual turnover exceed 
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TABLE 4.25 SERVICE TAX By TYPES OF BUSINESS, 1988 AND 1989 
(In RM '0 0 0) 
1988 %' 1989 % 
Hotel 39,668 54.31 505931 54.79 
Restaurant 19,040 26.07 23,769 25.57 
Bar 729 1.00 675 0.73 
Snack Bar 10 0.01 191 0.21 
Coffee House 210 0.29 239 0.26 
Night Club 21862 3.92 21989 3.22 
Dance Hall 1,874 2.57 2,655 2.86 
Cabaret 54 0.07 80 0.09 
Health Centre 666 0.91 833 0.90 
Massage Parlour 526 0.72 623 0.67 
Private Club 1 ý494 
2.05 1 fi19 1.74 
Public House License 51707 7.81 8ý093 8.71 
Beer House License 193 0.26 234 0.25 
Miscellaneous 5 0.01 25 0.03 
Total 73,038 100-00 921,956 100.00 
Source: Royal Customs and Excise Department, Annual 
Report 1990. 
127 
CHAPTER 4 STRUCTURE AND TREND OF THE T-I-VSYSTEll 
RM500ý000. All places in possession of first class liquor licenses have also been brought 
within the ambit of this tax. However, the tax does not apply to hotels having less than 
25 rooms, hostels for students or those maintained by religious institutions, as well as 
restaurants with less than RM500,000 annual turnover and located outside hotels. As 
shown in Table 4.25, about 80 percent of the service tax revenue for 1988 and 1989 were 
derived from hotels and restaurants. 
The service tax has subsequently been widened in recent budgets. In the 1992 
Budget, the tax covers professional and consultancy services provided at private 
hospitals and by legal, engineering, surveyor, architectural, accounting and other 
consultancy firms having an annual sales turnover of RM300,000 and above. In addition, 
services provided by advertising firms, insurance companies and motor vehicles service 
and repair centres, and forwarding agents are subject to service tax. In the 1994 Budget, 
the tax was further widened to include courier, parking bay, dental and veterinary 
services. Despite the extension of the service tax, its contribution to total tax revenue is 
small, at only 2 percent in 1995. 
3.3 Weaknesses ofSales and Service Taxes 
The sales tax as it stands provides tremendous scope for tax evasion. The task of 
administering the sales tax is complex and intractable both for the manufacturers as well 
as the Royal Customs and Excise Department that collects the taxes. Over 3,000 items 
and 100 categories of manufacturers are exempted from the tax. Since the tax is levied at 
the manufacturer/import level, manufacturers are encouraged to reduce tax liabilities 
through transfer pricing by shifting the tax base to the wholesale and retail arm. Taxing 
at the pre-retail level causes problems because of the difficulty in distinguishing final 
goods from intermediate goods. As an indicator of tax evasion among manufacturers, an 
increase of 100 percent in sales tax in 1983 from 5 percent to 10 percent had resulted in 
only an increase of 63 percent in tax revenue. 
In addition, tax officials face problems assessing the amount of tax due from 
manufacturers that produce a wide variety of products, some of which are tax exempted 
and others may be taxed at different rates. There is no mechanism in the sales and service 
taxes to remove tax cascading from exports, which places Malaysian exports at a 
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disadvantage. For Malaysian exports to be competitive at the international market, 
merchandise exports should not be taxed either explicitly or implicitly. The pyramiding 
and cascading of taxes affects prices of goods differently and in a manner unintended by 
policy makers, besides raising the cost of living. 
3.3.1 Rationale For Adopting VAT 
To overcome some of the weaknesses of the current sales and service taxes, the 
Malaysian Government is currently considering the adoption of a version of the value 
added tax (VAT). This intention was expressed in the 1989 Budget Speech and again in 
the 1993 Budget Speech. When Malaysia adopts the value added tax, it will join the 
ranks of over fifty-five industrial and developing countries that have implemented this 
system since the 1960s. According to Cnossen (1991: 72), VAT can generate revenues of 
around 0.4 percent of GDP for every percentage point of the rate, which might be useful 
in providing the government with an indirect tax handle to raise revenue. The advantage 
of VAT over the existing sales and service taxes is its neutrality. The tax does not 
interfere with production or trade, and does not distort the economic costs of doing 
business. Malaysian exports can be tax exempted and become more competitive 
internationally. It also reduces tax evasion with its self-policing feature of using a system 
of credits. 
There are other advantages for Malaysia in adopting the VAT system. VAT will 
extend the tax base and generate more revenue to counteract the fall in the rates of many 
of the taxes. The removal of tax cascading and tax pyramiding is expected to improve the 
investment climate for local and foreign businesses, as well as free business from the 
burden of applying for tax exemptions from the Royal Customs and Excise Department. 
One area of concern is that the adoption of VAT may lead to increased price level. 
Narayanan (1991: 85) argues that the price level will rise if VAT brings in more revenue 
than sales tax, and if traders widen the profit margin to protect themselves against 
uncertainty. However, Tait (1990: 18) found that among 36 countries that adopted VAT, 
22 countries had a negligible price effect, eight countries experienced a one-time price 
increase, and six countries experienced an increase in their inflation rates. Gillis, Shoup 
and Sicat (1990: 22 1) conclude that other factors may lead to inflation, but not VAT. 
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4. TAx BUOYANCY AND PROSPECTs FOR FUTURE REVENUE 
Tax buoyancy is often used in tax literature as a method of relating future revenue 
possibilities in to past trends of tax revenue and GDP growth. The buoyancy of a tax 
depicts the relationship between percentage change in tax collection and percentage 
change in income. In other words, it shows the responsiveness of the yields of different 
tax instruments to income growth. A tax with buoyancy greater than one means that its 
revenue rises faster than income growth. A high degree of buoyancy or 'revenue 
productivity' is generally associated with a good tax system. While this approach of 
relating tax revenue with income growth can be rather simplistic, it does provide some 
useful summary statistics. A more sophisticated approach is to examine the prospects for 
future revenue growth with the general equilibrium model, an approach which we will 
use for tax simulations in Chapter 5. 
The tax buoyancy coefficient is calculated as follows: 
log T, = PO + p1log Yt + F, 
where T, is the tax revenue variable, Y, is GDP or any other measure of income, and E, a 
random term. The parameter P, represents the tax buoyancy coefficient. A variety of 
factors can affect changes in tax revenues, besides changes in income. They include 
discretionary changes in the tax rates or tax base, tax avoidance and evasion, changes in 
the efficiency of tax administration, and so on. These factors can be particularly 
important following a tax reform. Hence, the measure of tax buoyancy is used to measure 
changes in tax revenues not only as a response to income changes, but discretionary 
changes as well. In other words, the tax buoyancy indicator measures income elasticity 
after controlling for discretionary tax changes. The regression equation for estimating 
buoyancy with significant discretionary effect is as follows: 
109 Tt = PO +P1 109 yt + P2 DUM + P3DUM*y + Et 
where T, is the tax revenue, Y, is GDP or any other income measure, DUM is a dummy 
variable, DUM*y is the interaction term, and E;, is the random error term. The dummy 
variable represents a discretionary change that affects tax revenue at a particular point in 
time. A positive coefficient for the dummy term, P2, means that there is an upward shift 
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TABLE 4.26 BUOYANCY OF DIRECT TAXES, 1970-95 
Revenue (Ln Td Constant Ln GDP Ln T, 
-, 
DUM DLGDP Adj. R2D. W. 






-0.303 0.992 1.992- 
(-5.106) 
Direct Taxes -5.592 1.307 -0.232 
t-ratio (-10.182) (25.306) (-3.320) 
Total Income Tax -5.503 1.292 -0.234 
t-ratio (-9.383) (23.517) (-3.352) 
Company Tax -3.686 1.028 0.048 -5.531 0.466 
t-ratio (-5.351) (6.645) (0.356) (4.660) (4.558) 
Personal Income Tax -6.054 1.209 
t-ratio (-10.794) (23.364) 
Petroleum Tax a -7.740 1.211 0.276 10.766 -0.989 






Total Tax Revenue Test P, =I t stat = 5.255; F stat = 27.618; Wald chi-sq. = 27.618 
Direct Taxes Test P1=1 t stat = 9.584; F stat = 91.863; Wald chi-sq. = 91.863 
Total Income Tax Test P, =l t stat = 9.069; F stat = 82.255; Wald chi-sq. = 82.256 
Company Tax Test P1=1 t stat 0.185; F stat 0.343; Wald chi-sq. = 0.034; Durbin h=0.390 
Personal Income Tax Test P, =] t stat 5.306; F stat 28.154; Wald chi-sq. = 28.154 
Petroleum Tax Test P1=1 t stat 0.611; F stat = 0.374; Wald chi-sq. = 0.374; Durbin h=0.646 
Revenue Long-Run Elasticity 
Company Tax 1.080 
Petroleum Tax 1.672 
Notes: 
Dummy variable is DUM =0 before 1987; DUM =I from 1987 and after. 
Interaction term is DLGDP = DUMGDP 
T-statistics are in brackets. 
1974-95 
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TABLE 4.27 BUOYANCY OF INDIRECT TAXES, 1970-95 
Revenue (Ln Td Constant Ln GDP Ln T, 
-, 
DUM DLGDP Adj. R2 D. 14'. 
Indirect Taxes -1.771 0.951 0.987 1.7233 
t-ratio (-2.533) (14.921) 
Export Taxes 1.614 -0.053 0.861 0.819 - t-ratio (2.012) (-0.487) (6.975) 
Import Taxes -0.185 0.856 -1.162 0.015 0.991 1.690 
t-ratio (-3.060) (14.846) (-2.728) (2.644) 
Excise Duties -1.113 0.590 0.237 -5.311 0.467 0.988 - t-ratio (-1.062) (2.846) (1.199) (-3.900) (3.955) 
Sales Tax a -7.702 1.316 0.987 1.818 
t-ratio (-14.918) (28.628) 
Service Tax 
b 
-15.026 1.501 0.534 0.952 - 
t-ratio (-3-935) (3.927) (3.328) 
Indirect Taxes Test P1=1 t stat = -4.119; F stat = 16.973; Wald chi-sq. = 16-973 
Export Taxes Test P1=1 t stat = -9.573; F stat = 91.643; Wald chi-sq. = 91.64; Durbin h =0.058 
Import Taxes Test P1=1 t stat = -3.44; F stat = 11.83; Wald chi-sq. = 11.83 
Excise Duties Test P, =I t stat = -1.976; F stat = 3.908; Wald chi-sq. = 3.908; Durbin h= 0.567 
Sales Tax Test Pj=I t stat = 0.918; F stat = 0.844; Wald chi-sq. = 0.844 
Service Tax Test P, =1 t stat = 1.312; F stat = 1.721; Wald chi-sq. = 1.721; Durbin h= -0.08 
Revenue Long-Run Elasticity 
Export Taxes -0.381 
Excise Duties 0.773 
Service Tax 3.221 
Notes: Dummy variable for import duties and excise duties is DUM =0 before 1987; DUM =I from 
1987 and after. 
Dummy variable for export duties is DUM =0 before 1980; DUM =I from 1980 and after. 
Interaction terin is DLGDP = DUM*GDP 
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TABLE 4.28 FIRST DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES OF TAXES, 1970-95 
A/ Ln T, Constant A, Ln GDP, DUM Adj. R2D. W. 
Company Tax -0.058 1.493 0.041 0.595 2.718 
t-ratio (-1.449) (5.688) 1.000 
Petroleum -0.211 4.410 -0.253 0.662 1.384 
Tax (-1.527) (5.236) (-1.883) 
t-ratio 
Export Taxes -0.305 3.191 0.660 1.308 
t-ratio (-4.755) (6.686) 
Excise Duties 0.039 0.688 0.199 2.039 
t-ratio (0.961) (2.210) 
Sales Tax a -0.013 1.355 0.391 2.321 
t-ratio (-0.272) (3.405) 
Service Tax b -0.153 3.808 0.509 1.422 
t-ratio (-1.134) (3.052) 
Note: A, is the first difference operator. 
Dummy variable for import duties and excise duties is DUM =0 before 1987; 
DUM =I from 1987 and after. Dummy variable for export duties is DUM =0 
before 1980; DUM =I from 1980 and after. 




in the tax yield. In graphical terms, this is a shift in the intercept. On the other hand, a 
positive coefficient for the interaction term, P3, implies a faster growth of tax yield after 
the introduction of a discretionary tax change. This is shown by a steeper gradient in the 
trend line. 
For our Malaysian tax buoyancy estimations, we use selected tax revenue and 
GDP data for 1970-95 derived from the Economic Report. In the regressions, we 
introduce a dummy variable to account for discretionary tax policy changes that took 
effect in 1987 and after. In Table 4.26 we present buoyancy estimates for the period 
1970-95 for direct taxes, while the buoyancy estimates for indirect taxes are shown in 
Table 4.27. The regression estimates are evaluated at the 5 percent level of significance. 
The ordinary least square (OLS) method was used for the first round estimations 
of tax buoyancy. The OLS estimates confirm the problem of positive autocorrelation 
for 
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The ordinary least square (OLS) method was used for the first round estimations 
of tax buoyancy. The OLS estimates confirm the problem of positive autocorrelation for 
many of the regression equations, as indicated by their Durbin-Watson d statistics falling 
below the lower critical limit 1.302 at 5 percent level of significance. 17 To correct for 
autocorrelation, we used two approaches: (a) the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative method with 
convergence at 0.001, and (b) auto regressive lagged dependent variable approach. This 
process brought an improvement to the Durbin-Watson statistics for all the estimations 
using the Cochrane-Orcutt method, although some of the regression models had DW 
statistics falling within the region of indecision. For the taxes modelled on the auto 
regressive approach, we have also estimated the coefficients using the first difference 
approach and presented the Durbin h statistics, as shown in Table 4.28. 
In our buoyancy estimations for direct income taxes, the tax revenue for any 
particular year is regressed against the GDP figures for the previous year in order to take 
into account Malaysia's prior-year assessment system. In other words, current year tax 
collection is based on last year's income assessment. In the case of indirect taxes, tax 
revenues are regressed against the GDP figures of corresponding years. The estimation 
used data from 1970-95, except for those taxes with shorter data series. 
4.1 Tax Buo ancy Estimates y 
The results of the tax buoyancy estimations are shown in Table 4.26 and Table 
4.27. The buoyancy coefficient for total tax revenue is 1.1, which means that the increase 
in tax revenue is a little greater in proportionate terms than the increase in income. Direct 
taxes are more buoyant than indirect taxes, a factor which accounts for the growing share 
of direct taxes in government revenue. After controlling for discretionary tax changes 
with the dummy variable, an increase in GDP by I percent would be accompanied with a 
corresponding increase of 1.3 percent for direct taxes and 0.9 percent for indirect taxes. 
Among the components of direct taxes, personal income tax and petroleum tax 
have buoyancy coefficients of 1.2, while corporate tax has a unitary buoyancy 
17 In the presence of autocorrelation, the OLS estimators remain unbiased and consistent, but they are no 
longer efficient. This means that the usual standard error, t and F tests of significance are not 
dependable. 
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coefficient. However, the test for the hypothesis PI=I shows that the buoyancy for 
petroleum and corporate taxes are no different from one. The absence of a dummy 
variable in the personal income tax model suggests that the revisions in the marginal 
personal income tax rates during the late eighties and early nineties have had negligible 
effect on the overall revenue productivity of this tax. The relatively low buoyancy of 
company tax may come as a surprise in view of Malaysia's rapidly growing economy 
and corporate sector. This could only imply that the wide range of tax exemption and 
incentives for the manufacturing sector had a more important role in dampening tax 
revenue expansion than was generally realised. 
Table 4.27 shows that the buoyancy coefficient for indirect taxes is less than one. 
In other words, if the trend continues into the future, indirect taxes will not be very 
productive in revenue generation, unlike direct taxes. An examination of the component 
taxes reveals why this is the case. The buoyancy coefficient of export tax is practically 
zero, as shown by the insignificant coefficient for LNGDP at the 5 percent level. This 
comes as no surprise since export tax revenue for 1986-95 were fluctuating around the 
1976-79 levels. Both import tax and excise duties have buoyancy coefficients of less than 
unitary. Among the indirect taxes, only the sales tax and service tax, which underwent 
expansion in their tax bases, had buoyancy coefficients of 1.3 and 1.5, respectively. The 
regression shows that service tax has a relatively high long-run elasticity of 3.2, but the 
period is too short for it to be really meaningful. Since sales and service taxes contribute 
slightly over a quarter of the indirect tax revenue, their higher buoyancy coefficients are 
not large enough to influence the low buoyancy for indirect taxes. 
4.2 Issues on Tax Reform 
Despite their limitations and the caveats on using them as guidance for policy, 18 
tax buoyancy comparisons can be revealing in a number of ways. First, they provide 
some idea about the tax revenue trajectories. In raising revenue, the government could 
either focus on the taxes that are more responsive to GDP growth or, alternatively, 
18 Buoyancy estimates are based on past behaviour. They would not necessarily be good indicators of 
future revenue if the tax rates and structure are modified. 
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examine the areas of weakness in the tax structure. The latter would imply taking steps to 
reform the tax structure. 
Second, in some of the regressions, the introduction of dummy variables helps to 
explain the role of discretionary tax changes that influence the revenue trend of revenue 
collected from these taxes since 1987, which are related to several tax reforms adopted in 
Malaysia. The corporate income rate was reduced in stages starting from 1986 as a 
means to stimulate investment and keep abreast with the corporate tax regimes of 
neighbouring countries. With the adoption of the Promotion of Investment Act (PIA) 
1986,, investment incentives and tax allowances for the manufacturing sector were 
expanded. For the petroleum industry, the Second Generation Production Sharing 
Contracts were adopted to provide more favourable terms and greater incentives to the 
contractor. The government also started to reduce gradually excise and import duties as a 
means of keeping consumer prices down and relieving the tax burden on the poor. 
Among one of the most comprehensive and influential non-governmental proposals for 
tax reform in Malaysia are contained in a report entitled, 'A Tax Reform Package for 
Malaysia' (MIER, 1988). This report presents the recommendations of the Colloquium 
on Tax Reform organised by the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, which was 
attended by representatives from professional associations and business organisations, 
tax consultants, consumer groups, trade unions and academicians. Many of the proposals 
from the colloquium. have been adopted by the Malaysian government. 
Third, the estimates show that the petroleum buoyancy coefficient is slightly 
above unitary. Petroleum has provided the tax base for the eighties and early nineties. 
Since the tax revenue derived from petroleum is determined by fluctuating world oil 
prices as well as production quotas laid out in the National Depletion Policy, much less 
reliance should be placed on this natural resource sector to provide the impetus for public 
revenue growth, at least not on the scale that it had demonstrated in the past. Therefore, 
one of the themes for tax reform in Malaysia is the distribution of the tax burden, which 
increasingly have to be shouldered by income and consumption taxes. 
Fourth, the buoyancy coefficient for personal income tax shows that it is fairly 
productive in revenue. Although Malaysia seems to perform favourably in comparison 
with its neighbours in mobilising income tax revenue, its performance is still 
lower than 
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the OECD countries. An avenue to increase personal income tax revenue is establishing a 
modem and efficient tax administration that increases the tax base through more effective 
assessment and collection mechanisms. 
Fifth, the performance of corporate taxation, as reflected by the unitary buoyancy 
coefficient, is not in keeping with the rapid expansion of the corporate sector. As an 
indication of the dynamic corporate sector, private capital expenditure rose from 
RML, 720 in 1988 to an estimated RM10,162 in 1994 (Ministry of Finance, 1994), 
recording an average annual growth of 34 percent. Although corporate tax contributed a 
growing share of the tax revenue, this relatively lacklustre performance of corporate tax 
can be traced to the income tax revenue loss from the numerous business incentives to 
attract foreign direct investments. 
Finally, it highlights the fact that direct taxes are more productive in revenue 
generation than indirect taxes. It does appear that in a tax reform, much more attention 
should be given to redress the weaknesses of indirect taxes. The decline in trade taxes in 
Malaysia is dictated by policy and is consistent with the trend shown in Singapore, 
Thailand and Indonesia. Relative to the tax structures of Singapore, Indonesia and 
Thailand discussed earlier in the chapter, Malaysia recorded a sharp decline in the share 
of goods and services tax revenue despite the dynamism in business activities and private 
consumption. In view of these patterns, we propose that the scope for increasing the 
productivity of indirect taxes is to improve the current sales and service taxes by way of 
adopting the value added tax (VAT), which would increase revenue and raise the 
efficiency and equity of the tax system. 
We take up some of these issues in the next chapter. By using the computable 
general equilibrium model, we examine the macroeconomic effects of raising revenue 
from personal income tax and corporate tax, compared to using the other indirect taxes to 
raise the same amount of revenue. In addition, we measure the macroeconomic impact of 
adopting VAT both as a revenue-neutral tax reform to replace the current sales and 
service taxes, as well as a revenue-enhancing measure. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
During the last 25 years, the structure of the Malaysian tax system has changed quite 
dramatically. As shown by the tax buoyancy estimates., the tax reforms adopted after 
1986 have had an impact on the revenue trends for some of the taxes. Although indirect 
taxes contributed 65 percent to government tax revenue at the start of the seventies, by 
1982 it was overtaken by direct taxes, whose contribution to tax revenue recorded an 
increase of 18 percentage points during 1970-95. The low tax buoyancy coefficient for 
indirect taxes suggests that attention should be given to improve the tax base for this 
group of taxes. Since 1980, export duties rapidly dwindled, from a contribution of 20 
percent to tax revenue to a mere 2 percent in 1995 following the abolition of duties on 
primary exports. Duties on many of the imports have also been reduced or removed. 
After declining by 10 percentage points from 1970, the contribution of import tax to 
government revenue since 1975 has been fairly constant. 
The current sales tax is fundamentally problematic. It is complex, expensive to 
administer, faces the problem of tax cascading and tax pyramiding, and offers a wide 
scope for tax evasion. The adoption of VAT to replace the sales and services taxes will 
be able to redress many of the current weaknesses of these two taxes. In addition, VAT 
will modernise the tax system, broaden the tax base, and provide the government with an 
indirect tax handle to raise revenue with more fiscal neutrality and less economic 
distortions. 
The main components for direct taxes are personal income tax, corporate tax, and 
petroleum income tax. Since 1984, Malaysia's personal income tax base have been 
expanding. Compared with neighbouring countries, Malaysian income tax payers face 
the highest marginal tax rates and arrive earlier at the highest tax bracket. The 
progressivity index shows that personal income tax has become more progressive for 
households in the middle income categories, but remains unchanged for those in the 
higher income categories. In terms of horizontal equity, only 18 percent of the employed 
in 1990 paid income tax and they were predominantly salaried employees and civil 
servants. To increase income tax yields, more effort should be made to reach the 'hard- 
to-tax' group of self employed and improve tax administration, rather than increasing 
income tax rates. 
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The taxes on the corporate sector were reduced in phases from a high level of 50 
percent in 1985 to 30 percent in 1995. When coupled with deductions and exemptions 
from industrial incentives and tax holidays, Malaysia's marginal effective tax rate for the 
corporate sector becomes very much lower than the statutory level of corporate marginal 
tax rate. In addition, the buoyancy estimate for corporate tax shows that the tax yield of 
this sector is rather disappointing despite its rapid growth. There is potential for reducing 
or removing of some of the incentives to make the tax system more efficient and less 
distortionary. 
At the height of buoyant oil prices, petroleum taxes accounted for about one-third 
of income tax revenue, two-fifths of excise duties, one-sixth of import duties, and over 
four-fifths of export duties. Government revenue became overly dependent on an income 
source faced with sharp price fluctuations. However, with the decline in oil prices and the 
adoption of the Second Generation Production Sharing Contracts, the contribution of 
petroleum taxes to tax revenue declined, making it necessary for the government to 
expand the tax base. 
The tax buoyancy estimates highlight various tax revenue trajectories and the role 
of discretionary tax changes in influencing tax revenue trends. One area of tax reform is 
the distribution of the tax burden from petroleum taxes to income and consumption taxes. 
Personal income tax is fairly productive in revenue, but there is scope for increasing the 
tax base by establishing a modem and efficient tax administration. The performance of 
corporate tax is relatively lacklustre as a result of revenue loss from the numerous 
industrial incentives to attract foreign investments. The tax buoyancy estimates point 
towards the need to redress the weaknesses of indirect taxes. The reform of the sales and 
service taxes through the adoption of VAT merits serious consideration. In the next 
chapter, we will explore the macro economic effects of raising revenue from each major 
category of taxes as well as the adoption of VAT in the place of sales and service taxes. 
139 
Chapter 5 
TAX REFORM SIMULATIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 4, we examined how the structure of Malaysian taxes has changed since 1970. 
Beyond looking at structural changes, it would be useful to examine the effect of tax 
changes on various aspects of the macro economy. This chapter applies a micro-macro 
applied general equilibrium model for Malaysia to examine the counterfactual effects of 
tax reforms. 
One of the most difficult task of public economics is identifying the true effects 
and incidence of a tax or a public project (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980: 160). Taxes have 
wide ranging effects and implications on the macro economy and households, and the 
one who effectively pays a tax is not necessarily the person upon whom the tax is levied. 
An increase in the income tax rate reduces disposable income and, correspondingly, 
consumption. A tax levied on a particular good affects the profits of the producer, the 
incomes derived from supplying the factors of production, the demand by consumers,, as 
well as the relative demand for and prices of labour and capital. A tax is also related to 
the other variables in the fiscal policy package. Typically, when the government chooses 
to raise one tax, this is usually accompanied by some other measures such as decreasing 
another tax, increasing public expenditure or adjusting public debt. 
In view of the complexity of tax policy evaluation, the traditional way of using 
the partial equilibrium approach, which relies on ceteris paribus assumptions, has its 
limitations. A general equilibrium approach allows one to assess the interactions among 
different sectors and agents, thereby enabling a more comprehensive evaluation of policy 
options. The most significant step in applying a general equilibrium approach in tax 
analysis was fostered by the pioneering work of Harberger (1959,1962,1964). One 
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decade later, a fully disaggregated computable general equilibrium (CGE) model' was 
put into operation by Shoven and Whalley (1972) who evaluated the effects of 
differential taxation of income from capital in the United States. The breakthrough in 
computing the equilibria for disaggregated CGE models was made possible by Scarf s 
algorithm (1967,1973) which was refined by Olin Merril (1972). 
Alongside CGE models that were used for developed countries to examine 
efficiency questions in neo-classical welfare analysis, there was another strand of work 
which focused on structural issues in developing countries. The neo-classical CGE model 
has limited application in developing countries because the simplifications are 
considered too confining for applied work (Robinson, 1989: 912). The earliest of CGE 
models for developing countries were the Adelman-Robinson (1978) model of South 
Korea and Taylor-Lysy (1980) model of Brazil. These general equilibrium models 
examined structural issues and the impact of alternative policy choices on poverty and 
income distribution. 
There are over 200 books and journal articles on multisectoral applied general 
equilibrium model listed in the EconLit data base which shows that the literature is large 
and expanding. CGE modelling techniques have been used in a variety of developing 
countries such as India, Brazil, Korea, Kenya, Cameroon, Mexico, Yugoslavia, Turkey, 
Malaysia, Egypt, Indonesia and many other developing countries. 2 The popularity of the 
CGE approach is hardly surprising given its advantages over other methods such the 
partial equilibrium analysis, the input-output model and the linear programming models 
used in earlier analyses. As Robinson (1989: 906) observes, all linear input-output and 
social accounting matrix-based models are limited by their assumptions about fixed 
coefficients and cost prices. Unlike CGE models, they would not capture price 
adjustments, substitution possibilities in both production and demand, as well as supply 
and demand interactions. 
I It is sometimes referred to as the Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) model. 
2 See de Janvry and Sadoulet (1985) for a survey of macro structuralist CGE models for India, Peru, Mexico, 
Egypt, 
Korea, and Sri Lanka. In Bourguignon, De Melo and Suwa (1991), CGE models are used to 
draw lessons from the 
OECD PrQject of aqjustment policies on the distribution of income in Chile, C6te d'lvoire, Ecuador, Malaysia, 
Morocco, and Indonesia. 
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The first comprehensive examination of the Malaysian tax system using an 
applied general equilibrium approach was undertaken by Bardai (1993). He drew data 
from various sources, such as the Malaysian Input Output Model 1983, and adjusted 
them to reflect the Malaysian economic structure in 1988. He first examined the effect of 
raising each category of taxes by one percent on tax revenue generation, as well as on 
market prices, real income and tax burden. Using the lump-sum tax as a yardstick, he 
also examined the incidence of taxes on firms and households. This approach was 
extended to examine the possible effects of adopting value added tax for Malaysia and 
reducing its corporate tax rate by 10 percent. 
In this chapter, we seek to examine changes in the Malaysian tax system within a 
dynamic setting. A tax increase has far reaching effects on household disposable income, 
consumption, savings, aggregate prices, real wages, and GDP aggregates. It influences 
production, consumption, allocation of resources, as well as international trade. The 
effects are not only relevant to the time when the tax change is introduced but have also 
intertemporal implications. While Bardai's insightful study examines the effects of a 
marginal revision in tax rates in terms of revenue generation, efficiency and incidence on 
firms and households for 1988, this chapter looks at the effects of a significant revision 
in tax rates on a set of macroeconomic variables within a dynamic setting for the 1990s. 
To evaluate reforms in the Malaysian tax system, we use the micro-macro general 
equilibrium model developed by Demery, Harrigan and McGregor (1992) for Malaysia. 
This model incorporates a blend of micro and macro elements which makes it suitable 
for analysing a wide range of economic issues. Unlike the genre of CGE models on 
taxation and international trade surveyed in Shoven and Whalley (1984), this model is 
designed as a multipurpose model that could be used to examine a wide range of 
economic issues, including providing analytical insights into the Malaysian tax policy. 
In the next section, we provide an overview of CGE models that were developed 
and used for policy analysis in the developed and developing countries. Next we consider 
the economic models of Malaysia, including the development of the Malaysian Micro- 
Macro Model (M4) that we use for tax reform simulations. In Sections 4 and 5, we 
describe the model structure as well as explain our data assumptions and model 
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calibration. We then discuss the main results of ten tax reform simulations before finally 
considering some of the policy issues in the conclusion. 
2 OVERVIEW OF CGE MODELS 
Before the advent of CGE models, multisectoral economy-wide analysis was performed 
using the linear input-output model in the 1950s. The input-output model emanated from 
the pioneering work of W. Leontief who incorporated intermediate goods as part of the 
accounting system that allowed analysis of both the structure of gross production and 
interindustry linkages. A decade later, the linear programming (LP) models gained wide 
3 acceptance in the 1960s. In the LP models, the analyst is able to introduce choice, 
constraints and optimisation into policy models which could be solved by computer. 
Dynamic input-output models 4 continue to be used today in development planning. The 
extended input-output model based on a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)5 came into 
vogue for development planning in the 1970s. The SAM provides an accounting 
framework for income and expenditure for each actor in the model and furnishes a 
consistent data framework for more complex models, such as CGE models. 
One important feature of CGE models is that both quantities and relative prices 
are determined endogenously within the models, unlike input-output and planning 
models used for development planning purposes. CGE models can find numerical 
solutions for market clearing prices on all product and factor markets and tend to focus 
on the real side of the economy. According to Bergman (1990: 4), CGE models are 
generally aimed at clarifying equilibrium resource allocation patterns and the 
mechanisms by which policy measures affect the economy. They are less well adapted to 
examining business cycles phenomena or forecasting the exact outcome of specific 
government interventions. 
3 For a useful discussion on linear models, such as the input output analysis and linear programming models, see 
Robinson (1989) and Dervis, De Melo and Robinson (1982). More details on LP models can be obtained from 
Taylor (1975). 
4 The dynamic 1-0 model links changes in investment by sector of destination, which is treated as an endogenous 
variable, to changes in sectoral output and demands for investment goods by sector of origin. 
The model has also 
been extended in many ways in applied work, such as taking into account macro constraints 
in a non-linear 
framework. Clark (1975) provides a survey of the extended 1-0 models that were applied to developing countries. 
5 More in-depth discussion on the SAM can be obtained from Pyatt and Round, eds. (1985), and Ginsburgh and 
Robinson (1984). 
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The CGE model has its roots in the Walrasian general - equi I ibrium structure. It is 
converted into an applied analogue where an explicit numerical solution is computed 
from a model based on the parameters, exogenous variables, and equations which 
describe the economy. The model simulates the interaction of various economic actors 
across markets and assumes optimising behaviour on the part of these actors. The 
framework requires complete specification of the demand and supply sides of all markets 
which clear in equilibrium. The number of consumers are specified in the model. Each 
consumer has an initial endowment and a set of preferences, and is assumed to maximise 
his or her utility. The summation of each consumer's demands constitute market 
demands which depend on prices, are non-negative, continuous, and homogeneous of 
degree zero. In production, technology is associated with either constant or non- 
increasing returns to scale and producers are assumed to maximise profits. 
In his pioneering work on CGE modelling, Johansen (1960) uses the 
multisectoral growth model to examine the sectoral aspects of economic growth in 
Norway. The model assumes a closed economy, and relative product and factor prices are 
determined by domestic conditions in the model. Foreign trade, public consumption and 
net investment, as well as aggregate supply of capital and labour and the rate of technical 
change are exogenously determined. Hence, Johansen treats household consumption as 
the only truly endogenous final demand component in the model. The interindustry 
linkages are in accordance with Leontief input-output model, while value-added 
deliveries are determined using Cobb-Douglas production functions which allow for 
input substitution possibilities at the sectoral level. The multisectoral growth model 
shares a common feature with other CGE models in that the household demand functions 
are derived on the assumption of utility maximisation under a budget constraint. 
There are four essential ingredients in the specification of general equilibrium 
models, namely, the endowments of consumers, their preferences, the production 
technology, and the conditions of equilibrium (Shoven, 1983). Without going into 
details,, it is useful to consider a stylised version of the CGE model in the Harberger- 
Scarf-Shoven-Whalley tradition. The exposition is based on the simplified model used 
by Shoven and Whalley (1984). In this model, there are two final goods (manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing), two factors of production (capital and labour), and two classes 
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of consumers who have initial endowments of factors but no initial endowments of 
goods. The production function is characterised by constant returns to scale and constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES). Consumer demand function is generated by maximising 
the CES utility function subject to its budget constraint. 
The production functions are given by 
(cr 
Qj ai Li + (I - a, )K, 
where Qj is the output of the ith industry, ýj is the scale or units parameter, 6i is the 
distribution parameter, Ki and Li are the capital and labour factor inputs, and Gi is the 
elasticity of factor substitution. It should be noted that most Harberger-Scarf-Shoven- 
Whalley CGE models adopt the CES specification. With the CES specification of the 
production functions, there are only three parameters to the factor demand functions: the 
scale factor, the distribution parameter, and the elasticity of factor substitution. After 
determining the value of one of these parameters from extraneous information, it is 
possible to identify the two other parameters based on one single observation on 
equilibrium prices and quantities. Hence, these models typically adopt a priori restrictive 
assumptions about factor substitution possibilities. 
The factor demand functions derived from cost minimisation by differentiating 
the production function (1) with respect to the factor prices PL and PK, the per-unit cost 
of labour and capital for the industry. The demand functions for labour and capital are: 
(Yj 










Ki = ýi-'Qj ai 
(I - ai)PI, ai) 
(1-aj I 
ai PK 
The factor prices are assumed to be equal across sectors. 
145 
CHAP TER TIV REFOR. 1 f SIA f UL4 TIOAS 




uc (cc c) crc (XI C+x'. )" 122 
where Xj' is the quantity of good i demanded by the c"' consumer, occ are share 
parameters, and cyc is the substitution elasticIty in consumer c's utility functlon. The 
consumer c's budget constraint is 
-cc PIXI +P2X2 "'PLWLC+PKWKC---ý-Ic (5) 
where P, and P2 are the consumer prices for the two output commodities, WL' and WK' 
are consumer c's endowment of labour and capital, and Ic is the income of consumer c. If 
consumers maximise their utility functions (4) subject to the budget constraint that 
expenditures do not exceed the income derived from the sale of endowments which they 
possess, the demand functions are 
a( c xi. - crc( cp(]-a, y cp (1 -CF,. ) lý 2, c=1,2 pi (X ,, +(X2 2 
In this model, the values of ten parameters relating to the production and utility functions 
need to be specified. The six production function parameters affecting the supply of the 
two products are ýj, 8j, and cyi for i=1,2, and the four utility function parameters 
determining the demand for the two products by each of the two consumers are ot, I, (XI 
2, 
cy 1 and C72. There is also the need to specify the endowment of labour (WL) and capital 
(WK) for the two consumers. 
The equilibrium conditions in the model are given by equating market demand 
with market supply for all inputs and outputs, and zero profits in each industry. From (2) 
and (3), the equality of demand and supply for factors are given by 
KIWLý PKý Ql) + KAPLý PKý Q2) =K 
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Maximising the CES utility function in equation (4) subject to consumer budget 
constraints and given Q, and Q2 from equation (1), the equality of the demand and 
supply for goods are as follows 
X, (PI P2, PLý PK) + XI 2 (PI3 P2-) PL, PK): '-- Ql (9) 
+X 2(pl, X2 (p I P21 Pb PK) 2 P21 PL, PK): -- Q2 (10) 
The zero profit conditions in both industries are given by 
PKKI (PL5 PKý Ql) + PLL I (PL, Pký Ql): -- PI Q1 (11) 
PKK2(Pb PK!, Q2) + PLL2(Pb PK1, Q2) = P2Q2 
According to Walras' Law, if the zero profit condition in equation (11) is fulfilled, then 
the profit in equation (12) must necessarily be zero. The equilibrium of the model is 
given by the solution of equations (7)-(12) at prices PL, PKý P, 5 P2 . Since the prices of 
all supply and demand are homogeneous of degree zero, relative prices can be 
determined. The model adopts the condition that the sum of product and factor prices 
should add up to unity in order to normalise the level of prices. 
The general equilibrium model above can be adapted for tax policy evaluation. 
The difficulty of incorporating taxes in the model is the interdependence between tax 
revenues and demand and supply. Tax revenues depend on the amount of demand, 
production, and factors employed. Demand, on the other hand, is a function of tax 
revenue which provide income to some agents in the economy. The approach used by 
Shoven and Whalley (1973) is not only to solve for equilibrium prices but also for 
equilibrium tax revenues. In the simple case where all government revenues are 
redistributed to consumers, the equilibrium condition is determined by equating the 
transfer payments made to consumers by government from the taxes collected, thereby 
imposing a balanced budget. 
In pioneering the application of the general equilibrium model, Harberger (1962, 
1966) introduced a general equilibrium model to examine the inter-industry distortion 
from corporate income tax. He had two industrial sectors in his model. The non- 
corporate sector included agriculture, housing, and crude oil and gas, while the other 
sectors fell into his corporate sector. The model assumed perfect competition and each 
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sector produced a single output using homogeneous, perfectly mobile labour and capital 
which were fixed in supply in the aggregate. The model was simulated under a variety of 
assumptions on the elasticity of substitution in each sector. On the basis of the 
calculations, Harberger (1962: 234-5) concluded that capital bore close to 100 percent of 
the tax burden. In addition, he estimated that the dead-weight cost of corporate taxation 
in the USA between 1953 and 1959 to be between 2.4 and 7.0 percent of corporate tax 
revenues. About one decade later, Shoven and Whalley (1972,1973) and Shoven (1976) 
used the Scarf algorithm to solve disaggregated versions of the Harberger model. Shoven 
(1976) corrected for the conceptual errors in Harberger's model and re-estimated the 
efficiency cost which was found to be between 6 percent and 15 percent of the revenue 
generated. 
A useful comparison of methodologies in empirical general equilibrium models 
of taxation that had built on Harberger's model is provided in Fullerton, Henderson, and 
Shoven (1984). 6 These models include large, general-purpose models for different 
countries and designed to study a variety of taxes, transfers, and subsidies, as well as 
corporate income tax. In examining the economic efficiency impact of a tax reform on 
the U. S. economy, Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) found that the marginal welfare 
costs of the existing taxes range from 17 to 56 percent of the tax collected. They argued 
that a modest reduction in tax rates would give rise to significant welfare gains. 
Fullerton, Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) estimated the effect of integrating 
corporate taxation with personal taxation in the U. S. which was found to be beneficial. In 
his study of the 1973 U. K. tax reform, Whalley (1973) found that the distributional effect 
of the reform is small. 
As Bergman (1990: 4-5) notes, there are many varieties of CGE models within 
the broad modelling framework. Some are single-country models intended for analysis of 
resource allocation and income distribution issues. Others are multicountry models which 
examine issues from a regional or global perspective. CGE models can be large 
multipurpose models, or specifically designed and used to address a particular problem. 
They can also differ in their level of disaggregation. Some provide elaborate treatment to 
The models used in the comparison are: Piggott-Whalley (1976,1982), Fullerton-Henderson-Shoven-Whalleý, 
(1978,1983), Ballentine-Thirsk (1979), Keller (1980), Serra-Puche (1979), Slemrod (1980,1983), Fullerton- 
Gordon (1983) and Auerbach -Kotl i koff (1983). 
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the issues of production and technical change, while others focus on a disaggregated 
household sector or give detailed treatment on tax and transfer system. 
Another branch of modelling work is the application of CGE models for 
developing countries. 7 These models which were initiated under the auspi of the 
World Bank in the early 1970s. Although Johansen's multisectoral model of Norway 
formed the basis of these work, it was felt that the simplifications of neo-classical CGE 
models, which include Johansen's model, were too confining and have limited 
application in developing countries. The earliest CGE models of developing countries 
were the Adelman-Robinson model of South Korea and the Taylor-Lysy model of Brazil. 
Both were designed to examine the impact of policy alternatives on poverty and income 
distribution. However, the literature on CGE models of developing countries fell into two 
categories. 
One area of work is the 'neo-classical structuralists' CGE models which started 
from the World Bank studies on structural adjustment issues in the medium term. An 
early example of these studies is the modelling work of Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson 
(1982) which were based on neo-classical real trade theory and had strong roots in 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory. Although these models incorporate some 
adjustment rigidities, such as import rationing and rent seeking, they do not include 
macro variables such as interest rates or inflation. In their book Income Distribution 
Policy in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Korea, Irma Adelman and Sherman 
Robinson (1978) use the CGE model to examine income distribution policy within a 
reformist setting in the short to medium run. There are 29 producing sectors and in each 
sector are four firm size categories. There are also six labour skill categories and 15 
household types. The modelling approach incorporates all the mechanisms through 
which the distribution of income would be affected within a ten year period. 
The 
Adelman-Robinson model incorporates both Walrasian and 'structuralist' features, such 
as inflation and rationing as well as rigidities in the functioning of product and 
factor 
markets. 
7 For a survey of work on CGE models of 
developing countries, see Robinson (1989). 
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The second area of work is the 'structuralist' macro models, which are articulated 
by Taylor and have their roots in Marx, Kalecki, Kaldor, and Keynes (Taylor, 1983). The 
'structuralist' CGE models incorporate features of macro models. For instance, Lysy and 
Taylor's (1980) CGE model of Brazil uses the 'Keynesian closure' where the nominal 
wage is assumed to be fixed and the aggregate price level is the macro equilibrating 
variable. An increase in exogenous investment raises income and real output through the 
Keynesian multiplier process and generate increased savings to match the higher level of 
investment. Firms, which are assumed to be on their demand curves for labour, are 
induced to hire more labour brought about by a rise in the price level which depresses 
real wage. If the aggregate price level is chosen as the numeraire, then the nominal wage 
serves as the equilibrating variable to achieve balance between aggregate savings and 
investment. Much of the controversy on CGE models for developing countries is about 
the macro 'closure' of the economy-wide models. 
8 Both the Adelman-Robinson model 
and the Taylor-Lysy model contain a number of macro variables and endogenised the 
aggregate price level. 
More recently, with the interest on the impact of macro stabilisation and 
structural adjustment packages proposed by the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank for many developing countries, there has been some effort to integrate macro 
models with neo-classical, trade-focused CGE models. The novel feature of these models 
is the combination of macro and micro elements in general equilibrium. The paper 
by 
Bourguignon, de Melo and Suwa (1991) introduces the general structure of the 'micro- 
macro 5 economy-wide simulation model used in several case studies to assess the 
impact 
of adjustment policies on income distribution in a number of countries, such as 
COte 
d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia and Morocco. The study for Malaysia was 
undertaken by Demery and Demery (1991), who used the CGE model to examine 
poverty and macroeconomic policy issues. 
8 See Robinson ( 199 1) for a good discussion of macro closure opt, ons In 
CGE models. 
150 
CHAPTER 5 TixREFORM SIAIULATIONS 
3 EcONOMIC MODELS OF MALAYSIA 
3.1 EPUModels 
There are three category of economic models in used at the Economic Planning Unit 
(EPU) of the Prime Minister's Department in Malaysia. Among the earliest economic 
models developed at EPU was the Gulbranson econometric model in 1982 to assist in 
forecasting activities. This model was highly aggregated and parameterised on annual 
time series data for Malaysia. It was built around a set of macroeconomic income- 
expenditure identities and specified along standard Keynesian lines with exogenous 
demands acting as the principal forcing variables in the model. 
The second modelling approach is the input-output and related modelling, which 
includes social accounting matrices. The Malaysian input-output accounts for 1972, 
1978,5 1983 and 1987 were prepared by the Department of Statistics. Using the available 
input-output accounts, Pyatt and Round (1978) and Demery and Harrigan (1985a) 
prepared the SAMs for 1972, while Demery and Harrigan (1990) prepared the SAM for 
1983. The most sophisticated and best documented input-output planning model for 
Malaysia was developed as part of the technical input for the Malaysian Industrial Master 
Plan (UNIDO, 1985). The model is a dynamic input-output model which links capital 
investment endogenously to output through 'accelerator' relationships where net 
investment is related to the anticipated or current change in the level of output. This 
model was subsequently updated using the 1983 input-output accounts to produce 
projections for the revised Industrial Master Plan (UNIDO, 1992). 
Regarding the third modelling approach, several CGE models have been 
developed for Malaysia at EPU. The earliest CGE model was by Bakar Karim and Frank 
Lysy in 1980 that was parameterised on the Pyatt and Round (1978) SAM for 1972. This 
model is highly aggregated in both the goods and factor markets and provides a set of 
closure options, where the analyst is able to choose alternative macroeconomic 
identification restrictions. This model has not been revised, updated or used for planning 
work but it does represent an important milestone in modelling at EPU. In the mid- 
EPU has been involved in modelling activity for over fifteen years. Many of the models have been developed 
independently to serve a variety of purpose and some are no longer in use. Harrigan (1993) provides a survey of the 
EPU models on which this section is based. 
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1980s, EPU commissioned a few more CGE models. The Malaysian One Sector System 
(MOSS), a macroeconomic model with CGE-type characteristics, was developed and 
described in Demery and Harrigan (1985b). MOSS contained only an aggregated 
production sector and commodity and one category of labour. It was based on the 1978 
SAM (Demery and Harrigan, 1985a) and used principally for training purposes within 
EPU. 
After MOSS, the General Equilibrium Model of Malaysia (GEMM) was 
developed as the main component of the Malaysian economic-demo graphic modelling 
system at EPU. It was developed as an extension and modification of an earlier model 
SCORE (Demery and Harrigan, 1987) which was used to analyse the implications of 
long-run population growth and demographic change in Malaysia. GEMM identified five 
commodities/activities and used the classical macroeconomic closure. It was calibrated 
on the 1978 SAM information although other relationships, such as those pertaining to 
labour supply and fertility, were econometrically estimated using micro cross-section 
data. The model assumed multi-level technologies and utilities. In production there are 
separate levels for intermediate goods and value-added. At all levels in the production 
hierarchy, the model assumed CES technologies. At the intermediate goods level, cost 
minimisation problems were specified and solved for both domestic and imported 
intermediate commodity demands. At the value-added level of production, again CES 
cost minimisation was assumed, and for given levels of physical capital stock, the model 
solves for labour demand. For consumption demands, a similar approach was used in the 
determination of intermediate goods demands, using a mix of Stone-Geary and CES 
functional forms. GEMM was subsequently extended to respond to the planning 
concerns of the Unit, such as the relationship between income distribution and structural 
economic adjustment. 
Demery and Demery (1991) used an extended version of GEMM to assess three 
counterfactual policy packages against the package chosen by the Malaysian government 
in dealing with recession in the 1980s. Faced with growing fiscal deficit and widening 
external debt, the government cut public expenditure, reduced interest rate, and allowed 
the real exchange rate to depreciate. The simulations address the following questions: 
What would have been the effect on poor households had the government gone 
for (a) 
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pre-emptive adjustment and acted earlier than was actually the case; (b) milder fiscal 
restraint but a bolder devaluation of the ringgit; and (c) stiffer taxes to raise revenue and 
correct fiscal deficits. Demery and Demery conclude that the government had few 
alternatives to restore the macroeconomic balances without making matters worse for the 
poor. The government's chosen policies for cutting and switching expenditures as well as 
devaluing the exchange rate did much to protect the poor. 
M4, the acronym for the Malaysian Micro Macro Model, is the latest CGE model 
to be developed at EPU. The model, described in Demery, Harrigan, and McGregor 
(1992) and Harrigan (1991), has a much richer macroeconomic texture than earlier CGE 
models described above. It incorporates a number of macroeconomic closures that 
encompass both Keynesian and Neo-Classical perspectives as well as a range of 
alternatives in between. M4 is calibrated on the 1983 SAM and used for historical 
simulations of the Malaysian economy between 1983-90. The model was subsequently 
updated to 1990 and extended to address subnational and regional concerns. 
An application of M4 to evaluate policy options is given in Harrigan (1996) 
which examines the implications of Malaysia adopting a forest conservation policy by 
surrendering the lumber value of its forest resources to non-lumber uses. Tropical forest 
conservation is treated as the permanent withdrawal of an immobile resource from the 
traded goods sector of a small open economy. In the lumber activity, the representative 
producer is assumed to face an output constraint and seek to minimise cost. The market 
for Malaysian lumber is cleared through rationing exports, while unsatisfied domestic 
demand is met through imports. With lumber initially contributing 2 percent to aggregate 
income, a switch from lumber to non-lumber uses of tropical forests is estimated to cost 
up to 4 percent of baseline income. The associated dynamic general equilibrium 
multipliers were found to be larger than unity. The study also found that prompted 
by the 
loss of lumber foreign exchange revenue, there was a terms of trade deterioration which 
accounts for about one half of the total income losses observed. 
This loss will 
presumably be greater for countries that rely more heavily on lumber 
foreign exchange 
revenue than Malaysia. 
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The Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER) model has been used to 
crenerate projections on the Malaysian macro economy as well as for policy s1mulati t: ) ions. 
This model, described in Semudram, Gan and Chew (1990), is essentially a neo- 
Keynesian macroeconometric model whereby aggregate income is demand determined. 
The constraints,, which are explicitly imposed on short-run movements in real activities, 
are made through the commodity sector . The model is disaggregated into several blocks 
comprising aggregate demand, public sector, balance of payment, monetary sector and 
price block. It is highly aggregated with a total of 57 equations, of which 28 are 
stochastic. As a non-CGE model,, the MIER model overlooks supply-side issues and 
would not be able to accommodate issues such as labour shortages that have become 
important in some sectors of the Malaysian economy. 
In his Ph. D. thesis, Gan undertook an empirical study of tariff and trade policy 
reform of Malaysia using an adapted version of Tower's simple linearised CGE model 
(Gan, 1985; Gan and Tower, 1987). Unlike the more complex non-linear CGE models, 
the advantage of this model is its simplicity and flexibility. The utility functions are 
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas and the model solution relied on matrix inversion and 
matrix multiplication. The model used a simple 5-sector model of Malaysia with a 
representative consumer and intermediate inputs used in fixed proportions in 
combination with a value-added composite comprising labour, land, and capital to assess 
the consequences of changed tariffs. Gan simulated two versions of the model. In the 
short-run model, capital was assumed to be sector-specifiC; in the long-run model, capital 
was variable, where changes in investment bring an equalisation of the after-tax rate on 
investment in Malaysia with the rest of the world. The model assumed homogenous 
labour and perfectly flexible wages and prices, so that resources were fully employed. 
Gan found that there was a high welfare cost associated with using tariff protection to 
maintain employment in import-competing sectors. The welfare cost was 91 percent of 
the value of employment created at the margin in the short run and 113 percent in the 
long-run. Gan also used the model to calculate shadow prices of goods, labour, and the 
capital stocks in various sectors to assess the welfare implications of government 
proj ects. 
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Barjoyai Bardai (1993) uses the Keller general equilibrium model (Keller, 1980) 
to evaluate the MIER 1988 proposals for tax reform in Malaysia in terms of three criteria, 
namely, efficiency, equity, and revenue generation. The effects of tax changes are 
evaluated within a static framework where two equilibrium states before and after the tax 
changes are compared. All relationships are assumed to be linear, implying that the 
model would be better suited for examining small rather than large changes in taxes. The 
model adopts the assumptions of perfect competition in the private sector markets, profit 
maximisation for producers and utility maximisation for households, and equilibrium of 
the economic system before and after tax changes. The model does not take into account 
inflation, unemployment, uncertainty and growth. Compensating variation is used to 
measure tax burden. In the model, there are eight classes of consumers, including foreign 
and government sectors, 10 industrial groups, and 19 goods or expenditure categories. 
After model calibration and construction of the data set for the benchmark 
equilibrium, Bardai compared the effects of changes in the main tax categories on their 
respective tax incidence. In addition, he examined the MIER tax reform proposals that 
included the following: reducing corporation tax by 10 percent, introducing the value 
added tax (VAT) system, increasing sales tax as a short-term measure before the 
introduction of VAT, reducing export tax, and broadening the base of import tax. Bardai 
argued that rather than reducing corporate tax, which is one of the most efficient and 
productive tax instruments, payroll tax should be reduced instead in order to reduce the 
cost of doing business in Malaysia. He favoured the introduction of VAT that was 
desirable from the efficiency, equity, and tax revenue productivity criterion and would 
not create inflation. He supported abolishing export taxes and proposed increasing the tax 
rates on clothing and footwear and manufacturing durables. 
4 DESCRIPTION OF THE MALAYSIAN MICRO-MACRO MODEL 
This section presents an outline of the Malaysian Micro-Macro Model (M 
4) which we 
use in the tax simulations that follow. M4 is a computable general equilibrium model 
belonging to the family of models described by Robinson (1991) and Bourguignon, 
Branson and de Melo (1992). The model is specified for a small open economy. The 
foreign sector describes both international trade in goods and services as well as trade in 
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financial assets. A novel feature of M4 is providing users with an extensive menu of 
specification options that enable them to change parameters, behavioural assumptions, 
and macroeconomic identification restrictions and choose alternative characterisation of 
the Malaysian economy, if they so desire. 
M4 encompasses macro and micro links in a general equilibrium framework. 
Since there are both the macro as well as the micro elements of the model, M4 is provides 
a rich framework for policy analysis. It is much broader than the standard open-economy 
IS/LM framework or the neo-classical CGE models used to analyse long-run trade and 
tax issues. There is much more disaggregation of the product and factor markets in M4 
than the IS/LM framework; it has a financial component in addition to the real side of the 
standard CGE model. M4 can be applied to focus on questions of achieving equilibrium 
among various macro aggregates and the structural impact of changes in the composition 
of the macro aggregates, such as savings- investment balance, balance of trade,, 
government deficit, exports and imports. It also provides a good framework for analysing 
changes arising from a tax reform. 
As noted by Robinson (1991: 1513), there are two approaches to bringing macro 
features into a CGE model: (1) relationships among the macro aggregates are based on 
macroeconomic theory and lie outside of the CGE model; and (2) financial variables are 
included in the CGE model and the notion of equilibrium is expanded to incorporate the 
loanable funds market,, assets, and expectations. M4 adopts the second approach and 
directly incorporates macro phenomena into an operational CGE framework. It provides 
for an asset market closure in which the loanable funds market, with the variety of 
different assets, and the nominal exchange rate can be specified. 
4.1 Links Between Real-Financial Economies 
Although M4 shares some similar features with the financial CGE model of 
Bourguignon, Branson, and de Melo (1989), there is a difference in which changes in 
assets and liabilities are treated. The model by Bourguignon et. al is expressed in asset 
flows based on the assumption that adjustments in asset holdings are made at the margin, 
and actors are either unable or do not wish to restructure their portfolios completely for 
every period. In M4 the assets are treated as stocks, and the bond or loan rates adjust to 
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clear the demand and supplies of the stocks of the assets. Stocks are given more 
prominence in M4 than other comparable models. In fact, one of the novel features of M' 
is that transactors' balance sheet positions are modelled directly so that flows of funds 
emerge in the movement from one stock position to another. Changes in asset stocks, 
particularly private sector wealth, provide an important transmission mechanism from the 
financial to the real economies. The links between real and financial economies are 
captured through endogenous interest rate changes. 
Before going into the details of the model structure, it might be useful to consider 
the interactions between the real and financial components of the model. Since the model 
is for an open economy, the balance of trade acts as a equilibrating mechanism for 
achieving savings-investment balance. 10 As a system constraint, some CGE models 
place the requirement that the exchange rate serves as the equilibrating variable to bring 
the balance of trade into equilibrium. There is no such requirement for trade balance in 
M4, and it allows for a surplus or deficit in the balance of trade. Under our assumption of 
flexible exchange rate with perfect capital mobility and elastic supply of foreign capital 
to the Malaysian economy, there could be unlimited capital inflows from the rest of the 
world to make up for the balance of payments deficit. Changes in the flexible exchange 
rate would affect aggregate savings through changes in the value of the balance of trade. 
The savings-investment link is made stronger because the balance of trade, which is 
endogenous in the model, adjusts to achieve equilibrium between savings and 
investment. 
In our model, the current account balance is endogenous. Together with other 
asset yields, the nominal exchange rate adjusts to bring about the asset market 
equilibrium. Changes in the real exchange rate affects the competitiveness of and 
demand for exports, thereby changing the structure of production. There is also the role 
of the interest rate on the real-financial interactions. The supply and demand for loanable 
funds respond to changes in the interest rate. With the endogenous balance of trade 
assumed in M4, the interest rate can affect investment, capital flows, the real exchange 
10 The nominal system constraint for sav ings- investment is given by: SP+ SG +r-B-l =0, where 
SP is private 
savings, SG is government savings, r is exchange rate, B is balance of trade, and I 
is investment. 
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rate, the balance of trade, which in turn influence the structure of production and 
employment. 
4.2 Model Structure 
There are eight basic transactors in the model: households, government, non- 
financial corporations, non-financial public enterprises, banks, Employees Provident 
Fund, other financial institutions,, and the rest of the world. Except for households and 
the rest of the world, six of the agents are institutional transactors that participate in asset 
markets and for whom flow and stock accounts are separately collated. M4 has thirteen 
goods markets, 11 five labour markets, 12 and four asset markets. ' 3 The classification of 
transactors and markets is circumscribed by available data and the need for sufficient 
sectoral detail for policy simulations at the macroeconomic level. M4 makes a distinction 
between activities and commodities. Activities produce the goods which are sold in 
commodity markets. For the factor markets, the model identifies five labour markets and 
three occupational groups. 14 Labour is mobile across sectors and occupations in response 
to wage and excess demand differentials. Physical capital is categorised into a corporate 
and an unincorporated component. Capital and land are aggregated in a Hicks composite 
factor. They are quasi fixed, with their sectoral allocation responding to relative rewards 
through the allocation of net investment. The four primary asset markets are identified by 
the financial instruments. The supply and demand of these markets are equated by the 
adjustment of relative yields. 
As with other CGE models, the behavioural rules for the model are that Producer 
are assumed to maximise profit subject to multi-level constant returns CES technology 
constraints and households maximise utility subject to income constraints. These 
determine input demands and output supplies. Demands that are not satisfied 
domestically are made up by imports. Agents make their decisions on the basis of price 
signals they observe. In the model specification adopted, we assume a perfectly 
Export Agriculture, Domestic Agriculture, Forestry, Mining, Resource Manufacturing, Competitive Manufacturing, 
Domestic Manufacturing, Private Services, Oil, Construction, Utilities, Government Services, and Dwellings. 
12 Agricultural, Professional Non-Agricultural, Skilled Non-Agricultural, Unskilled Non-Agricultural, and Public 
Sector. 
13 Currency, Domestic and Foreign Equity, Loans and Deposits, and Other Domestic Assets. 
14 Professional and Administrative workers, Clerical and Skilled workers, and Production and Unskilled workers. 
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competitive goods market and market clearing for the labour market. This means that 
prices are flexible and each agent is a price taker. Prices are the equilibrating variable and 
adjust to clear the markets for goods, factors, labour, and asset; in other words, 
equilibrium is achieved when all excess demands are zero, as specified in the system 
constraints. Markets clear in each period (one calendar year), though there are some 
elements of quantity adjustments in the goods markets. There are no extrinsic dynamics 
in the model, other than through its adaptive treatment of expectations. Nevertheless, it 
has extensive intrinsic dynamic relationships governing the accumulation of all physical 
and financial stocks. Asset markets clear at the end of each period through the adjustment 
of interest rates and the nominal exchange rate. 
As given by the production function, agents transform labour, capital and 
intermediate output into goods for the domestic and export markets. The function for 
transforming output into different goods for domestic sales and export is described by the 
constant elasticity of transformation. Since this is a multisectoral model, it is assumed 
that goods for domestic sales and exports are different even if they share the same 
sectoral classification. For the import demand function, we assume the Armington 
function, that is, domestic goods sold on the domestic market are imperfect substitutes 
for imports. The purchasers of goods demand a composite commodity, which is 
described by a CES aggregation of imported and domestic goods. Investment demand is 
exogenous for some activities, while for other it is an increasing function of Tobin's 'q', 
which is the ratio of the marginal revenue product of capital to its user cost. More details 
on the model structure are provided in Appendix 1. 
For its solution, M4 uses the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm which exploits the 
power of both 'inverse-Hessian' and 'steepest descent' function minimisation methods. 
When iterates are far from the final solution, the algorithm approximates steepest descent 
and as iterates move closer to their terminal values, inverse-Hessian updates are 
computed. Essentially, through a recursive ordering of the equations, variable elimination 
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The initial database for the model was the Social Accounting Matrix 1983 for 
Malaysia (Demery and Harrigan, 1990) which compiled the social accounts, flow of 
funds and asset stock data collated for the period 1983-84 into a consistent framework. 
M4 was subsequently recalibrated on the more recent data with available Malaysian 
National Accounts for 1990. Although the M4 database is more recent than most other 
Malaysian models on the economy, the original database is over a decade old. There 
might be some concern that unless the data can be updated, the usefulness of this model 
may be compromised. There are some options available to address this issue. The data in 
the model could be updated by the user by incorporating the latest economic trends 
gathered from published data in the exogenous data set, as we have done for our tax 
simulations. For instance, one area of rapid change is the composition of demand, 
especially the rapid increase in import and export demand starting from 1988. In 
addition, the manufacturing sector expanded rapidly during the late 1980s. This was 
triggered by a combination of the relaxation of controls on export-oriented 
manufacturing investment, the policy of keeping the ringgit and unit labour cost low, and 
deregulation of the investment policy. 
The model enables other forms of 'updating' to be carried out. The technology 
model accommodates various forms (Hicks, Harrod and Solow) as well as different rates 
of technological progress. The improvement in labour productivity can be specified in 
the model to reflect the modernisation of the economic sectors, particularly 
manufacturing. The model's intrinsic dynamic relationship would also address 
depreciation of the stock variables as the model moves through time. 
4.4 Model Specifications 
As the basic model for our tax policy reform simulations, we have adopted an 
essentially neo-classical model specification, with the supply-side driving the economy. 
We provide a description of the basic model assumptions below and in Table 5.1, 
but 
more details on the specifications are provided in Appendix 2. Admittedly, many of these 
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Model Neo-classical 
Characterisation 
Labour markets Market Clearing for the five categories of labour. Nominal and real 
wages endogenously determined. Unemployment set at 5 percent 
exogenously. 
Goods Markets Mostly perfectly competitive except for utilities, owner occupied 
residence, and government services. Law of one price options 
activated for export agriculture, forestry, and oil and gas. Elsewhere 
high substitution elasticities between traded domestic and foreign 
output. 
Asset Markets Freely determined asset yields. Flexible exchange rate with a 
managed float. Transactions rather than speculative motives 
dominate demand for money. Passive budget constraint with 
endogenous government financial surplus/deficit. 
Technologies Constant returns. Price generally equated to marginal cost. Multi- 
level CES technology. Substitution elasticities low for intermediate 
inputs and high substitution between domestic and imported 
intermediate components. 
Trade Competitive determination of all imports. Armington specification 
for imports and domestic output. Export demands determined by 
domestic and international prices. 
Demands Public sector recurrent and capital are exogenous, while private 
investment is a function of Tobin's q. Stone-Geary linear 
expenditure system to decompose aggregate consumption 
expenditure. 
Supplies Higher degrees of mobility, strong relative price pulls. 
Period of Ten years 
Analysis 
Technical Always exogenous 
Progress 
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assumptions are subjective in nature, but in the absence of hard evidence such 
subjectivity is unavoidable. Through model calibration, we arrive at a working model 
that provides a fair representation of the Malaysian economy in the medium term. These 
assumptions appear to reflect the macroeconomic framework and objectives that are 
embodied in Malaysia's Second Outline Perspective Plan. 
Goods markets closure. In the goods markets, we assume perfect competition for 
ten goods markets, which exclude utilities, owner occupied dwellings and government 
services. Utilities is based on a mark-up of 1.0, which is expressed as the ratio of the 
basic price of activity output (exclusive of all taxes) to marginal cost. The household 
consumption of owner occupied dwellings adjusts passively to satisfy endogenous 
imputed rent plus a small amount of current account expenditure attached to imputed 
rent. The flow of goverm-nent services is supply driven through simple technology 
relationships and exogenous employment in the government sector. In addition, world 
prices are imposed on export agriculture, forestry, and oil and gas commodities. There 
are also export quotas on oil and forestry products. 
Labour markets closure. We assume market clearing for the five categories of 
labour, that is, where wage is determined by equating demand and supply of agriculture, 
professional, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers. This is not an unreasonable 
assumption because the period under consideration is for the medium term and published 
data suggest that Malaysia is close to full employment, although some frictional 
unemployment remains. The labour markets are assumed to clear in each period and 
satisfy an exogenously determined equilibrium unemployment rate of 5 percent. Nominal 
and real wages in each labour market are determined endogenously, while the level and 
growth rate for labour supply are specified exogenously. We have not opted for an 
endogenous labour supply because as will be shown in Chapter 7, the labour supply for 
both males and females are inelastic and negatively related to wages, suggesting that the 
labour supply curves are backward bending. Furthermore, the effect of income tax on 
labour supply is negligible. For the purpose of our simulations, aggregate labour force is 
assumed to grow at around 3 percent per annum, with the markets for non-agricultural 
labour growing faster than agricultural labour. This pattern of labour supply growth is in 
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keeping with actual trends exhibited in the Malaysian economy during the eighties and 
early nineties. 
Asset market closure. The asset market closure is treated in terms of key asset 
market prices or yields, namely, the bond rate, the lending rate, and the nominal 
exchange rate. The bond rate and the lending rate are assumed to be flexible so that they 
adjust to clear the demand and supplies of the stocks of those assets. The nominal 
exchange rate is assumed to be a flexible exchange rate regime with a managed float. For 
the public sector, we assume a 'passive' budget constraint where the government's 
financial surplus and deficit is fully endogenous. 
Expectations closure. Expectations in M4 are assumed to be formed adaptively. 
Agents are assumed to revise previous periods' expectations of the nominal exchange 
rate and inflationary expectations by the parameter value of 0.2. The parameters are 
bound by zero and unity; the larger the parameter value, the greater would be the 
influence of past forecast errors on current expectations of future prices. Since the value 
of 0.2 is chosen, this means that expectations are less strongly adaptive, which is 
reasonable for a neo-classical model specification. 
Production. The assumptions adopted for technology are fairly standard. 
Activity output is produced with a multi-level CES technology where the rates of 
substitution between factors may vary at each level. We assume low substitution for 
different intermediate inputs (0.25) and high substitution between domestic and import 
intermediate components (0.50 and above). We also assumed low substitution (0.25) 
between aggregate intermediate inputs and value-added. At the value-added level, the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour varies across sectors. The elasticity 
of substitution is assumed to be high (0.75) for agriculture, forestry and construction, 
medium (0.5) for manufacturing, and low (0.25) for oil and gas, mining and utilities. The 
substitution composite labour technology varies between 0.25 and 0.50 for the activities. 
Trade. The nature of the demands for imports and exports are determined under 
this module. Import and export demands are disaggregated by commodity. In the model, 
imports are classified by intermediate, consumption and investment uses. We assume that 
the competitive option is applied in the determination of all imports. 
This activates the 
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Armington specification which requires some assumptions on the substitution elasticities. 
Imports respond to relative prices and domestic demand. For our model, we assume that 
the law of one price (LOP) closure is applied to export agriculture, forestry, and oil and 
gas, where Malaysian producers accept world prices (in foreign currency units) when 
making their supply decisions. In all other activities, Malaysian producers enjoy some 
degree of price autonomy. For resource and traded manufacturing exports we impose 
export price elasticities that are comparatively large (ý! 5), which are close to those 
estimated by Reidel (1988) for Hong Kong's manufactures. Export demands are 
determined by domestic prices relative to the prices of similar commodities produced 
elsewhere in the world. 
Demand. For the demand components, public sector recurrent and capital 
expenditure are exogenously determined. Private investment is a function of Tobin's q. 
All other demand components are taken to be endogenous to the model. Private 
consumption is a function of household disposable income, but is also affected by private 
sector wealth (determined by capital accumulation net of foreign indebtedness) and 
interest rates. 
Growth rates of sectoral output are determined endogenously for all sectors 
except forestry, oil and LNG and public services. In establishing the sectoral growth 
rates, we are guided by the targets set in the Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-2000 
(Malaysia, 1991). During the decade, forestry output is assumed to exhibit constant 
growth, oil and LNG production grows very slowly at 1.5 percent per annum, and public 
services output grows at the economy-wide average rate of around 8 percent per annum. 
For the remaining sectors of the economy, the growth trend is determined largely by the 
assumed growth rates of their capital stocks (net investment) and the rate of growth of 
labour augmenting technological progress. Our assumptions imply fast growth in 
manufacturing (10- 15 percent) and private services (9 percent); slow growth in 
agriculture in agriculture and mining (1-3 percent), and average growth (7-8 percent) in 
the remaining sectors. These growth rates are not unreasonable given the track record of 
sectoral growth, especially during the last few years. 
The Stone-Geary linear expenditure system is used to decompose aggregate 
consumption expenditures. The demands for durable and semi-durable goods are 
164 
CHAPTER 5 TA. v REFoRm SIA IULA TIONS 
assumed to be income elastic while the demand for food and drink is income inelastic. 
Other income elasticities are close to unity. The equat ions governing the split of 
consumption demands into their domestic and imported components have universally 
high substitution elasticities. In the case of investment, the demands for capital goods by 
NFPEs and the government are treated as exogenous. The demand for capital goods by 
the other activities are determined endogenously. Investment demands are translated into 
demands for commodities via a capital aggregation matrix and split into their domestic 
and imported components using Armington relationship. 
Finance. In the asset markets, interest rates and nominal effective exchange rate 
are market determined. The supply of base money, foreign currency (backing money) 
and bonds are set exogenously at a growth rate that imply inflation of 2-3 percent per 
annum. The public sector finances its residual deficit by borrowing from foreign sources, 
the supply of which is infinitely elastic at world interest rate. The nominal effective 
exchange rate adjusts in each period, and together with the model's asset yields, bring 
about an equilibrium in the asset market at end of period. 
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5 MODEL CALIBRATION 
The model is calibrated against actual data over the period 1990-95. Two sets of controls 
are used: 
1. National Accounts controls for variables, such as real GDP, consumption, 
investment, government expenditure, exports, imports, etc. 
2. Tax receipts in current prices. 
The aim of this exercise is to 'mimic' as closely as possible the structure and trends of 
the economy. It is important to bear in mind that unlike time-series models, CGE models 
such as M4 are better in projecting broad trends of economic developments rather than 
short-run business cycle fluctuations. What is essential in the calibration exercise is 
whether the model can produce estimates for a number of key endogenous variables that 
correspond to actual outcomes. 
After calibrating the model with published macroeconomic data, we arrived at the 
baseline model that was used for subsequent tax reform simulations. The model 
predictions and the published figures of the Economic Report are given in Table 5.2. 
Generally, the model reproduces the macroeconomic developments between 1990-95 
rather well, although estimates for some variables are closer to published data than 
others. The annual growth rates for nominal GDP, private consumption and government 
consumption generated by the model are fairly close to the published data for 1990-95. 
The model's estimated growth rates are lower for total investment, exports and imports 
than published data, though not unreasonably so. The base-run trajectories of nominal 
GDP, consumption, investment, export and import for 1990-95 are shown in Figure 5.2. 
In the second stage, we calibrated the model against the published tax receipts in 
current prices for 1990-95. The following taxes are represented in the exogenous 
database: 
1. Domestic Taxes (intermediate uses, consumption uses, and capital uses) 
2. Export Taxes 
3. Import Taxes (intermediate uses, consumption uses, and capital uses) 
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TABLE 5.2 BASE-RuN SIMULATION WITH ECONOMIc REPORT DATA 
(In RM Millions and 1983 Constant Prices) 









Model Adj. ER Model Adj. ER Vod-e7l-T Adj. ER 
103,636 103,723.7 155,547 154,955.7 8.4 8.3 
51,458 52,907.8 75,993 74,242.4 8.1 7.0 
13,439 12,695.5 18,560 18,429.6 6.7 7.7 
33,582 33,986.5 58,164 64,583.0 11.6 1). 7 
84,117 80,846.5 156,432 159,604.7 13.2 14.6 
78,972 75,836.7 153,407 162,106.6 14.2 16.4 
Adj. ER refers to adjusted Economic Report figures. The aggregate figures in the Economic Report are 
given in current prices as well as 1978 constant prices. It was necessary to adjust the ER figures into 1983 
constant prices to make them comparable with the figures generated by the model. 







Other Individual Inc. Tax, 
Individual Inc. Tax 
Other Corporate Tax 
Petroleum Income Tax 
E] Corporate Tax 
167 
TI- N cle) I- LO 
CY) 0) 0) 0) CY) 
0) CY) CT) a) M 
Ir- Ir- T- 
CHAPTER 
Non-Commodity Taxes 
5. Household Income Tax 
6. Corporate Tax 
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M4 is a sectoral model that provides rich details about production sectors. This is 
an over- simplification of the complex structure of tax rates in practice, but in a micro- 
macro model of this type, including a highly detailed structure of taxes would make the 
model excessively unwieldy and undesirable. M4 treats direct taxes as simply 
proportional to income and indirect taxes as ad valorem taxes. Because of this, the tax 
categories in M4 do not always match conveniently with those published in government 
accounts. Three specific problems should be stressed: 
1. m4 has consolidated government accounts and does not distinguish central 
from local or state government. This is particularly problematic since the latter 
has grown significantly since 1983. 
2. M4 does not separately identify petroleum tax, but taxes the consolidated 
corporate sector income. 
3. Sales and service taxes and excise duties are not separately identified but 
classified under domestic indirect taxes. 
Calibration of tax revenue is performed by adjusting the tax rates' 5 in the 
exogenous data file so that the tax revenues predicted by the model correspond with the 
control totals from published data in the Economic Report between 1990-95. It is 
assumed that for 1996 onwards, the tax rates for 1995 remain unchanged for the base run. 
Adjustment of direct taxes. There are two groups of direct taxes in the exogenous 
data file of the model, namely, Personal Income Tax and Corporate Income Tax. Since 
Petroleum Income Tax and Other Income Taxes 16 are not given as a separate category in 
the exogenous data set, we have combined Petroleum Income Tax with Corporate 
Income Tax. As for Other Income Taxes, revenue from this source is distributed 
proportionately between corporate and personal income taxes. 
15 The model assumes that the marginal tax rate is equal to the average tax rate. 
16 This residual category of income taxes include stamp duty, capital gains duty, estate duty, and film rental tax. 
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In the government accounts, the revenue sources received by the Federal 
Government are given in some detail, but not for revenue received by the state and local 
governments and statutory authorities, which are given in aggregate. For data 
consistency, care was taken to ensure that the payments made by institutions and 
transactors to government agencies should be reflected on the receipt side. For modelling 
purpose, we treat the Own Sources of Revenue category for state and local governments 
and statutory authorities as tax revenues. The approach adopted was to consider these 
sources of revenue as dependent on the income flows of households and corporations, 
even though they are not levied as a proportion of these. The rationale for this approach 
is that the revenues received by state and local governments tend to be related to property 
ownership and wealth, such as land taxes and property assessment rates. These are likely 
to move with income. The revenue from statutory authorities is derived from services 
rendered to households and firms. The demand for these services is assumed to be a 
function of income. The composition of actual direct taxes is shown in Figure 5.1. This 
chart makes a distinction between Personal Income Tax and Corporate Tax received by 
the Federal Government and the Other Personal Income Tax and Other Corporate Tax 
categories that resulted from the adjustments made. 
Adjustment of indirect taxes. The exogenous data file provides export duties, 
import duties, domestic indirect taxes and non-commodity taxes as separate categories. 
In the model, sales and service taxes, excise duties and other indirect taxes are grouped 
under domestic indirect taxes because their contribution to total revenue was small in the 
1983 SAM. Non-commodity taxes refer to the revenue for the Federal Government 
coming from a disparate list of revenue items. They include earnings from government 
commercial undertakings, interest and returns on investment, licences, service fees, road 
tax, fines and forfeitures, rental revenue from Federal Territories, contributions from 
foreign governments and international agencies, and petroleum royalties and gas cash 
payments. This category of taxes is calculated in the model by relating them to value 
added. Table 5.3 shows the base-run estimates on revenue, expenditure and budget 
deficits and the control totals based on published data for 1990 
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TABLE 5.3 BASELINE REVENUE WITH ECONOMic REPORT DATA 
Export Tax 
Import Tax 
Domestic Indirect Taxes 
Personal Income Tax 
Corporate Tax 
Adjusted Personal Income Tax 
Adjusted Corporate Tax 
Total Tax Revenue 
Non-Commodity Tax 
Interest Received 
Rest of the World Transfers to Government 
Non-Tax Revenue 
Consolidated Govt Revenue 
Consolidated Govt Operating Expenditure 
Consolidated Govt Current Surplus 
Consolidated Govt Development Expenditure 
Consolidated Govt. Financial Surplus 
1990 1995 
Model ý Control Model I Control 
1,977 1,970 957 989 
35374 31420 5,942 6,014 
5,407 5,452 10,515 10,691 
- 2ý702 - 55935 
- 7,700 - 14,250 
55036 55027 9,077 9,002 
149480 14,326 22ý331 21,614 
30,274 30,195 48,822 48,310 
61781 - 5,712 - 
11,359 31,025 
142 - 220 - 
8ý282 81277 8,957 8,955 
389558 38,472 57,780 575265 
30,105 29,409 40,807 40,627 
8,453 91063 16ý973 16,638 
9ý923 10,076 17ý098 16,182 
-1,470 -11013 -125 456 
The control totals are based on published data in the Economic Report 1994195 
Note: 
1. Estimates for Personal Income Tax and Corporate Tax include the apportionment of Petroleum Income Tax 
and Other Income Tax. To derive the Adjusted Personal Income Tax and Adjusted Corporate Tax, revenue 
from State Government, Local Authorities and Statutory Authorities are added to these estimates. The 
model provides estimates only for Adjusted Personal Income Tax and Adjusted Corporate Tax. 
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and 1995 in current prices. The growth and composition of tax revenue generated by M4 
are given in Figure 5.2 through Figure 5-4. 
Unfortunately, we lack detailed information on taxes by commodity, sector, or 
distribution among households. The import, export, and domestic indirect taxes in the 
exogenous data base are adjusted by scaling the relevant tax rates on a pro-rata basis so 
that the tax revenues from each source match with the revenue tables of the government 
accounts. While we appreciate that this approach has an inherent weakness, it does 
convey the general direction of policy. In addition, there is no mechanism in M4 through 
which lump-sum taxes or subsidies could be imposed or distributed (Demery et al., 
1992). 
6 TAX POLICY SIMULATIONS 
The baseline simulations (BL) for 1990-99 are given in Figure 5.5 through Figure 5.9. 
Real GDP in (1983 prices) is projected to grow by 8.6 percent per year from RM106,500 
million in 1990 to RM225,400 million in 1999. Consumption and investment are 
expected to grow rapidly, with real annual growth rates averaging between 8-8.5 percent 
per annum. during this period. Under the baseline simulation, the consumer price index is 
expected to increase at around 5 percent per year, while the nominal exchange rate and 
the terms of trade are expected to change very slightly. In terms of financial surpluses, 
national savings more than double from RM29,500 million in 1990 to RM91,300 million 
in 1999. Real wages for professional workers and skilled workers are expected to grow 
more rapidly than unskilled workers and agricultural workers. At the household level, 
real disposable income and real consumption are expected to double during the decade. 
We proceed to make some counterfactual policy experiments by examining the 
economic effects of varying each category of taxes. These simulations are performed for 
the whole decade, 1990-99. In our simulations, we adjust the average tax rates in order to 
generate a target level of revenue. While an increase in tax rate generally corresponds 
with an increase in tax revenue, in practices the exact nature of their relationship is 
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are collected. For instance, there are several marginal tax rates in a progressive income 
tax system, each of which apply to different taxable income categories. Income tax 
revenue is a function of the marginal tax rates, the exemptions and deductions allowable, 
the composition of the taxpayers, and the way the tax is administered and collected. It is 
possible to increase tax revenue by changing the variables, such as improving tax 
administration or expanding the tax base, without modifying the marginal tax rates. For 
instance, in the case of corporate taxation, the government can increase tax revenue by 
reducing the investment tax incentives that are currently extended to particular types of 
investments,, without even changing the corporate tax rate. 
Evaluation of simulations. In our evaluation of tax reform simulations, we 
compare the effect of the tax change against the baseline position in terms of four sets of 
key economic variables. Although M4 produces a wide range of output, to facilitate 
analysis we summarised the results in terms of four charts to capture the salient aspects 
of each simulation. 
1. Real GDP aggregates. The first chart shows the changes in real GDP 
aggregates. The preferred tax change would be one that has the least negative 
or the most positive effect on GDP, private consumption, government 
consumption, and total investment. 
2. Aggregate prices. The second chart shows the effect of the tax change on 
aggregate price movements. The consumer price index (CPI) and the GDP 
price deflator indicate the extent of inflation. While the CRI measures the cost 
of buying a fixed bundle of goods for the consumer, the GDP price deflator is 
the ratio of nominal GDP in a given year to real GDP. The CPI uses the same 
basket of goods, which includes imports, from year to year. The GDP price 
deflator, on the other hand, measures a much wider group of goods and only 
include those produced domestically. The nominal exchange rate is the 
effective rate against a bundle of foreign currencies, while the terms of trade 
shows the relative position of the prices of exports against imports. 
3. Real wages. The third chart shows the relative wage movements by skills and 
occupational categories, that is, agricultural workers, professional workers, 
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semi-skilled workers, and unskilled workers. Agricultural workers and 
unskilled workers are generally those in the low income groups, while the 
semi-skilled workers and the professional workers refer to those in the middle 
and upper income groups, respectively. A divergence in real wage trends 
between the professional workers and the agricultural workers and unskilled 
workers shows increasing inequality arising from the tax reform. 
4. Household aggregates. The fourth chart pertains to real household disposable 
income, consumption and savings. 
Two categories of simulation are performed. The first category is revenue- 
enhancing tax reforms, while the second is revenue-neutral tax reforms. 
6.1 Revenue-Enhancing Tax Reform Simulations 
In our first group of policy experiments, we examine the implications of a 10 
percent increase in govenu-nent revenue above the baseline position for all the years 
under consideration. Revenue generation is always an important consideration for any 
government, and revenue enhancement has often been a prime motive for tax reform. If 
the Malaysian goverm-nent wishes to increase its tax revenue either to meet increased 
govenu-nent expenditure or to reduce its current deficit, the important policy issue is 
which particular tax or group of taxes could be used for the purpose that would bring 
least negative effects to the key economic variables. We perform the simulations by 
increasing the tax rate for each category of taxes in turn while keeping the other taxes 
unchanged. Since by construction the annual amount of revenue raised from each tax is 
identical, this provides us with a consistent basis for comparing the relative merits or 
demerits associated with the tax increase. 
6 LI Increasing personal income tax (SI) 
Very often the analysis of income tax changes is linked to a discussion on work 
incentives. This issue is discussed at greater length in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the 
thesis where microeconometric techniques are used to analyse the Malaysian 
labour force 
and income data. In this section, however, we confine our analysis to the macroeconomic 
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implications of income tax changes under the assumption that labour supply is unaffected 
by tax reform. 
In the model , income tax is treated as a tax on household labour income net of 
workers contributions to the Employee Provident Fund. Using M4 we performed a 
counterfactual simulation (S 1) of increasing income tax in order to generate an extra 10 
percent of overall government revenue above the baseline simulation (BL) for each year 
over the period 1990-99. The results are summarised in Figure 5.10 through Figure 5.13. 
The most obvious implication of the tax increase is the fall in household disposable 
income and household consumption by around 5 percent in real terms. The fall in real 
disposable income is accompanied by a corresponding decrease in real household savings 
between 20-25 percent over the baseline position. In terms of real wages, there is a 
relative increase in the wages of unskilled labour and a decline in the wages for other 
categories of workers. 
At the GDP aggregate level, real private consumption falls by 3-5 percent below 
the baseline estimates. Other than the change in private consumption at the aggregate 
level,, there is very little change in real GDP, government consumption and investment. 
In M4 total investment is obtained by summing investment by activity of the private 
sector, government and the non-financial public enterprises (NFPE). Both NFPE and 
government investment are exogenous in the model. In terms of price change, the 
baseline simulation predicts an increase in CPI and GDP price deflator ranging between 
1.0-1.8 percent throughout the decade. In this simulation, the changes in CPI and GDP 
price deflator are generally much slower than the baseline simulation. There is a 
relatively higher appreciation of the nominal exchange rate during the early part of the 
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6.1.2 Increasing corporate income tax (S2) 
As discussed in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), the issues connected with the 
effects of corporate income tax are more complex than is often assumed in econometric 
studies. Corporation tax can take several forms and it depends on, among other things, 
the tax deductibility of interest payments and the depreciation provisions. Tax policy 
affects the capital structure of the firm and, accordingly, the marginal cost of capital. 
According to theory, as a result of corporate profits tax the cost of capital will rise and 
cause the firm to adopt less capital -intensive technique at any level of output and to 
switch from corporate to the non-corporate sector in their demand for factors. Hall and 
Jogenson (1967) undertook an investigation of taxation and investment. They showed 
that the adoption of accelerated depreciation allowances in the United States following 
the 1954 legislation reduced the cost of capital by 9 percent and accounted for a 
substantial increase in investment. A cut in corporation tax from 52 to 48 percent in 1964 
is estimated to have increased the cost of capital by I percent 21 and caused a small 
reduction of investment. However, the results are still not firmly established because of 
the considerable difficulties in making the transition from the theoretical model to the 
empirical work. Corporate profits tax is also linked to the choice of factor intensity as 
well as relative output demand in the corporate/non-corporate sectors. In addition, studies 
have been conducted on the general equilibrium effects of investment tax credits against 
corporate tax changes for promoting investments in developing countries. 
22 
17 Total government receipts are equal to the sum of its direct and indirect taxes, plus exogenous transfers from the 
rest of the world plus the interest income that the government enjoys on claims it holds against financial 
institutions. 
18 There are two categories of government expenditure in Malaysia, namely, 'operating expenditure' and 
'development expenditure'. Operating expenditure, which falls under the purview of Treasury, is allocated as part 
of the annual budgetary exercise for the running of government, as well as other expenses borne by the government. 
In the model, government operating expenditure is defined as the sum of its current account expenditures on goo s 
and services plus the sum of its transfers to other domestic institutions and to residents in the rest of the world. 
Transfers include service payments on government debt. Development expenditure is made for new government 
investments and is allocated under the five-year Malaysia Plans, with provisions for a mid-term assessment. 
This 
fund is controlled by the Economic Planning Unit. 
19 In M4 the Government sector is narrower in scope than the 'Public Sector'. The Non-FInancial Public Enterprises 
are separately identified in the model. 
20 Government current surplus is defined as the difference between current account receipts and expenditures. 
Government financial surplus/deficit is obtained from subtracting the nominal value of government investment (or 
'Development Expenditure') from government current surplus. 
21 It is argued that this is the result of the depreciation provisions being in excess of true economic 
depreciation. 
22 See Feltenstem and Shah (1993) for Pakistan and Feltenstein and Shah (1995) for Mexico. 
178 
CHAPTER 5 T-i. VREFORAf SIAIULATIONS 
In our simulation, we do not attempt to go into the detailed intricacies of 
corporate taxation. For Malaysia this would require a model that allows for depreciation 
allowances, industrial incentives and investment tax credits. In addition, it is not possible 
to specify in M4 how the increase in corporate tax revenue is to be accomplished: 
whether through an increase of corporate tax rate, a reduction of tax incentives and 
allowances, or a combination of both. Each of these alternatives would presumably have 
different effects on the economy. Despite this limitation, we have opted for a more 
modest aim of using the model to examine the general macroeconomic effects of 
increasing corporate tax revenue against the baseline simulation. It should be recalled 
that for the purpose of our simulation, corporate tax revenue includes the contribution 
from petroleum tax. 
In the model, corporate income is the sum of its factor income (profits), its 
dividend income and transfer receipts from the rest of the world, interest from financial 
corporations, dividends from NFPEs and transfers from Government. From their income, 
business companies distribute dividends to households, to financial corporations, and to 
residents of the rest of the world. They also pay interest on loans to financial 
corporations, which are calculated gross of margins. In the computation of total 
disbursements, some allowance is made for exogenous transfers of corporations to the 
rest of the world. The total taxes paid by business corporations are split into corporate 
and other taxes. In the absence of any other information, the model assumed that 
corporate depreciation allowances qualifying for tax relief constitute 10 percent on 
nominal private investment in the current period. 
From the results of the simulation, it appears that the effect of increasing 
corporate taxation has only minor favourable effects on our selected indicators (see 
Figures 5.14-5.17). Real GDP and real private consumption are higher than the baseline 
estimate, while total investment is slightly lower. All the changes are less than 0.5 
percent from the base position. Although aggregate prices are higher than the baseline 
simulation at the start of the decade, the difference between the two simulations becomes 
narrower by the middle of the decade. After 1996, the aggregate prices of Simulation 
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disposable income and consumption are expected to rise to I percent of the baseline 
estimates. Real household savings rise to around 9 percent above the base by the end of 
the decade. There is a slight improvement in real wages for agricultural workers and 
unskilled workers and a worsening in the wages of professional workers and especially 
semi-skilled workers. 
6.1.3 Increasing export taxes (S3) 
The contribution of export taxes to total tax revenue has been declining over the 
years. The taxes are levied on primary commodities based on ad valorem rates and on the 
excess of export prices over some notional cost of production. In the model, export taxes 
are calculated by multiplying the ad valorem tax rates by the appropriate nominal flows 
and then summing over all transactions on which export taxes are levied. 
Simulation S3 is based on the assumption that the export tax rates are raised to 
increase government revenue by 10 percent above the base simulation. The results of the 
S3 compared with the baseline (BL) are shown in Figures 5.18-5.21. This simulation 
results in a relative decline in real GDP of up to 0.5 percent of the base, and a sharper 
decline in private consumption. The rise in export taxes leaves total investment 
unchanged. In terms of the effect on aggregate prices, the GDP price deflator is higher 
than the base by 2-3 percent, while the CPI remains unchanged during the initial years 
but increasing up to 2 percent by the end of the decade. This is accompanied by an 
appreciation in the nominal exchange rate and a worsening of the terms of trade. 
Household disposable income and consumption are initially lower than the base 
simulation by I percent and gradually falling to 4 percent by the end of the decade. Real 
household savings are expected to record a steeper decline from 2 percent below the 
baseline position in 1990 to around 13 percent in 1999. Increasing export taxes have a 
negative effect on the real wages of professional, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. 
Wages of agricultural workers seem to be least affected by the tax increase. This may 
appear rather surprising since the traditional argument for lowering export taxes 
is to 
reduce the regressive effects of the tax on the income of primary producers. 
However, it 
is because of the regressive nature of the tax on poor households engaged 
in primary 
commodities production that many of the export taxes 
have either been reduced or 
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derived from petroleum export, while the export taxes from rubber, tin and palm oil were 
negligible. 
6.1.4 Increasing import taxes (S4) 
Import duties are levied on a wide range of imports. Most goods are charged rates 
between 10-35 percent. There is an additional surcharge of 2 percent for raw materials 
and some machinery and 5 percent surcharge for other goods. The most important source 
of import duty revenue comes from petroleum and fuel oil. Tax exemptions are given to 
imports used by government and public enterprises as well as certain types of 
investments. " Import taxes are calculated in the model by applying ad valorem tax rates 
to the appropriate nominal flows and then summing over all transactions of imports for 
intermediate, consumption and capital uses. Many CGE studies of the effects of trade 
liberalisation use classical models in which all factors, including physical capital, are 
freely mobile between sectors. In addition, commodity and factor markets are assumed to 
be perfectly competitive. The results of these studies suggest that there are welfare gains, 
though small , in 
liberalising trade. 
Figures 5.22-5.25 show the results of the simulation for import taxes (S4) 
compared with the baseline simulation. The model predicts that with an increase of 
import taxes, there is relative decline in real GDP and real government consumption 
between 0.5-1.0 percent. The decline in real private consumption is larger, between 3.0- 
4.5 percent. There is also an increase in consumer prices and GDP price deflator up to 
1997 and a depreciation in the nominal exchange rate of 1-2 percent. There is no change 
for the terms of trade. 
24 The MIER Tax Reform Group (1988) proposes that the current import system could be strengthened 
by abolishing 
exemptions from import duties granted to government departments and public enterprises and 
introducing a near 
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Simulation 4 predicts that there will be a decline in real household disposable 
income and real household consumption of 3-5 percent compared with the baseline 
position. The simulation output shows that both the import and export volumes are lower 
than the baseline simulation, which suggests a lesser degree of openness of the economy. 
The demand for imports falls as a result of lower disposable income among consumers. 
The model also predicts a slight decrease in exports that is stimulated by the appreciation 
of the real effective exchange rate. GDP, government consumption and total investment 
in real terms are all expected to show a slight decrease of less than 0.1 percent. In other 
words, the change in the tariff regime is not expected to have any significant effect on 
aggregate output. Although a rise in the import tax rate should generate a negative effect 
on the economy arising from more expensive products and intermediate goods, the effect 
is subdued because of the low substitution elasticities adopted in the model. Physical 
capital is not freely mobile in M4 . The re-allocation of capital to its most productive uses 
can only be brought about through new investment, thereby contributing to some degree 
of inertia in the model. 
6 1.5 Increasing domestic indirect taxes (S5) 
This category of tax captures the other indirect taxes, such as excise duties, sales 
tax, service tax, and the other indirect taxes. Excise duties are collected by the Customs 
and Excise Department from licensed factories that produce excisable goods. The duties 
are imposed when the product moves through the gate that is monitored by a customs 
officer. Excise duties are levied on products for domestic consumption and not on 
exports. Over 75 percent of the excise revenue are derived from fuel oils, petroleum 
products and vehicles, and about 30 percent from alcoholic and soft drinks, and 
cigarettes. Sales tax contributes a growing share to tax revenue in recent years. It is 
levied on manufacturing activity and excludes retail trade. Only the larger manufacturers 
are subject to sales tax. Licensed manufacturers are entitled to claim tax credit on sale of 
products to other manufacturers in the 'ring system'. Service tax is imposed on certain 
services, such as lodging, entertainment, body services and other services. Other indirect 
taxes are road tax and stamp duties. As with the case of export and import taxes, the 
model calculates domestic indirect taxes by applying ad valorem tax rates on the 
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The increase of domestic indirect taxes has a negative effect at the aggregate GDP 
as well as household level. Real GDP and real government consumption decline by 
around 1-2 percent of the baseline position, while real private consumption falls by 5-6 
percent. Higher excise duties on fuel oils, petroleum products and vehicles as well as 
higher sales tax contribute to higher prices which are passed on to consumers. The CPI 
rises by about 2 percent above the baseline simulation. There is a slight depreciation of 
The nominal exchange rate depreciates slightly and increases the competitiveness of 
exports, contributing to an increase in net exports. At the household level, real household 
disposable income and consumption declines by about 5 percent (see Figure 5.29). 
6.1.6 Increasing non-commodity taxes (S6) 
In Simulation 6, non-commodity taxes are raised to generate additional 10 
percent revenue for the government. Non-commodity taxes on production are calculated 
as an ad valorem mark-up on the (net factor cost) price of value-added. This tax rise 
leaves real GDP, government consumption, and total investment practically unchanged 
over the base position. Real private consumption, however, declines between 2.5-4.0 
percent. The nominal exchange rate and CPI are expected to decline within one percent 
from the base. The GDP price deflator initially rises to around 4.5 percent above the base 
at the start of the decade, but later falling to around 2 percent. The negative effects of 
increasing non-commodity taxes are felt more strongly at the household level. Real 
household disposable income and real household consumption decline by 2-4 percent, 
while real household savings fall between 10-14 percent over the base position. This 
decline has partly been caused by the real wages for four categories of workers falling by 
4-7 percent during the decade. 
6.2 Revenue-Neutral Tax Simulations 
In this section, we perform the second group of counter-factual simulations by 
varying two groups of taxes simultaneously so that the tax reform is revenue neutral. 
This set of simulations will answer the question whether there could be some economic 
and welfare gains from changing the existing tax structure without 
fundamentally 
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simulation. Two simulations are performed here. The first considers the effect of 
reforming direct taxes, while the second examines the implications of reforming indirect 
taxes through the introduction of value added tax. 
6.2.1 Reducing personal income tax and increasing corporate tax (S7) 
In this simulation, personal income tax revenue is reduced by 10 percent 
throughout the decade. This reduction is balanced by increasing corporate tax such that 
the net effect of this tax reform leaves the yearly government revenue unchanged from 
the baseline position. As shown in Simulation 1, a rise in personal income tax has a 
negative effect on household income and real wages. This is not the case with raising 
corporate tax. It is useful to bear in mind that although corporate tax revenue can raised 
by increasing the corporate tax rate, it is by no means the only way of raising revenue 
from this source. Changes in depreciation allowances, investment subsidies, tax holidays 
and other breaks will affect the amount of revenue collected from this source. 
One way of raising corporate tax revenue in Malaysia is trimming the industrial 
tax incentives. According to the Financial Survey of Limited Companies (Department of 
Statistics, 1988), foreign non-manufacturing firms paid 40 percent of their profits in 
taxes against 44 percent for domestic non-manufacturing firms. Generally, manufacturers 
pay lower taxes as the result of business tax incentives, which amounts to providing tax 
subsidy to industry. In fact, some businesses benefit more from these incentives than 
others. Foreign manufacturers pay 15 percent of their profits in taxes compared to 29 
percent for domestic manufacturers. At Malaysia's current state of economic 
development, it has still not been ascertained whether business tax incentives help to 
increase inward foreign direct investment (FDI) or to give domestic firms an edge in 
world trade competition. There was a proliferation of 'pioneer status' firms with the 
introduction of the Promotion of Investment Act 1986. In addition, there are other 
incentives, such as the Investment Tax Allowances (ITA), Industrial Adjustment 
Allowances, abatements, and specific export incentives, which reduce the corporate tax 
paid by companies. The direct costs of these incentives to the government are the 
revenue foregone and a reduced tax base. Society loses as a result of the lower pre-tax 
profits of firms that take full advantage of the incentives available. Notwithstanding the 
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CHAPTER 5 TAX REFORA f SIA fULA TIONS 
certainty, the economic literature hasgenerally been unable to find any relationship 
between corporate income tax incentives and FDI or trade performance in any other 
countries. 24 
The results of the simulation compared with the base position are shown in 
Figure 5.334 through Figure 5.37. While this tax reform leaves real GDP, government 
consumption and total investment unaffected, private consumption increases by 1-1.2 
percent above the base position. This is also reflected in the higher real household 
disposable income and real household consumption. This tax reform seems to have a 
strong positive effect on household savings, which is 5-8 percent higher than the base 
position. There is a rise in the real wages of agricultural, professional and semi-skilled 
workers which have contributed to the higher household disposable income and an 
increase in the consumer price index and GDP price deflator. 
6 2.2 Adopting value added tax and abolishing sales and service taxes (S8) 
In Chapter 4, we discussed about the weaknesses of the existing sales and service 
taxes and the rationale for adopting a version of the value added tax (VAT). The 
intention of the Malaysian government in adopting value added tax had been expressed 
in the past Budget speeches of the Finance Minister. The new value added tax 25 will 
consolidate and restructure the current sales and service taxes that it replaces. In the 
model, sales and service taxes are subsumed under Domestic Indirect Taxes. The sources 
of Non-Tax Revenue (such as stamp duty, vehicle license payments, etc. ) are modelled 
under the rubric of Non-Commodity Indirect Taxes that are levied on activities and 
calculated as an ad valorem mark-up on the net (factor cost) price of value-added. In 
carrying out this simulation, we transfer these two taxes out of Domestic Indirect Taxes 
24 This issue was discussed earlier in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
25 In official pronouncements, the tax is dubbed 'Sales and Service Tax' (SST). However, to avoid confusion with the 
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CHAPTER 5 T-i. v REFORA I SLI IULA TIONS 
TABLE 5.4 CONTROL TOTALS FOR SIMULATION ON VALUE ADDED TAX 
Domestic Non-Commodity Sales Tax & DIT-STST NC T+ VA T 
Indirect Taxes Tax (NCT) Service Tax Control Control 
(D I T) (S TS T) 
1990 5,452 6,776 2,563 2,889 9,339 
1991 6,444 69387 2,897 3,547 9,284 
1992 7,297 8ý075 3,404 3,893 11,479 
1993 8,800 7,439 4,081 41719 11,520 
1994 9,654 79958 4ý419 5,235 12,377 
1995 10,691 51680 4,871 55820 10ý551 
Source: Calculated from Economic Report (Ministry of Finance, 1995). 
Assumption: The introduction of VAT is intended to replace the revenue lost from 
repealing sales and service taxes. 
to the Non- Commodity Indirect Tax. The control totals for Domestic Indirect Taxes and 
Non-Commodity Tax are shown in Table 5.4. The rates for the two taxes are scaled 
accordingly such that government revenue remains unchanged. In lieu of better data on 
the anticipated revenue from sales tax and service tax for 1996-99, we assume that the 
two tax indices for 1995 apply throughout the remaining years of the decade. Compared 
to the base position, the shift to value added tax is accompanied by an improvement in 
real household disposable income and real consumption. Consumer prices fluctuate 
within one percent of the base position. Gross domestic product and government 
recurrent expenditure register are higher by 0.5 - 1.0 percent than the base. There is also an 
improvement in real private consumption throughout the decade. The adoption of value 
added tax would have a slight effect in stimulating exports and imports, with a slight gain 
in net exports. 
There has always been a worry on the part of policy makers and members of the 
public that the adoption of VAT would contribute to increases in retail prices. 
The 
simulation shows that the consumer price index is expected rise 
by no more than I 
percent following the shift from sales and service taxes to 
VAT. It will be maintained at 
that level from 1993 onwards. As discussed in Chapter 3, VAT would address 
the 
problem of tax cascading encountered in the sales and service taxes 
that contribute to 
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higher retail prices. However, the question whether the introduction of VAT causes 
inflation is also very much an implementation issue. It is possible that consumer prices 
would be affected if there were a great deal of uncertainty among the public about how 
VAT works. As a contingency measure against uncertainty, traders may attempt to widen 
their margins and pass on the higher retail prices to consumers during the introductory 
phase of the tax. This problem caused inflation in Indonesia when it first implemented 
VAT (Ridwan, 1988). At the aggregate level, the adoption of VAT would contribute to 
an increase in the GDP price deflator of 4 percent for most years of the decade. This is a 
once and for all shift in prices, but will not lead to an acceleration of price changes. This 
simulation is consonant with the experience of other countries. In examining the 
experience of 35 countries which adopted VAT, Tait (1988) found that in 22 countries, 
there was little or no effect of the introduction of VAT on the consumer price index. In 
seven countries, there was a shift in the trend of the consumer price index; in five 
countries there was an acceleration in CPI; and in only one was there both a shift and 
acceleration in CPI. 
6.3 Revenue Enhancing Value Added Tax Reform (S9) 
In this simulation, we examine the implications of using value added tax to raise 
10 percent government revenue (VAT10). The changes in real GDP, government 
consumption, and total investment in relation to- the base are similar to those in 
Simulation 8. Real GDP and real government consumption rise between 0.5-1 percent, 
while real total investment falls by less than 0.5 percent for most of the years. Unlike 
Simulation 8, real private consumption is expected to fall below the baseline estimation. 
This is mainly brought about by the decline in real wages where all labour categories are 
affected. Agricultural workers will experience the largest decline with real wages falling 
between 3-5 percent of the baseline simulation. At the household aggregate level, real 
household disposable income and real household consumption are slightly below the 
baseline position, while real household savings register a larger decline after 1994. 
This 
is unlike Simulation 8, which has a positive effect on the household aggregates. 
The 
pattern of changes in aggregate prices is similar to Simulation 
8, although in this 
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CHAP TER 5 
7 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, 
T-ix REFORA f SIA f ULA TIONS 
In this chapter, we perform seven tax reform simulations on raising 10 percent of 
government revenue and two revenue-neutral tax reform simulations. In order to compare 
the effects of the tax reforms, we shall consider their relative merits in terms of the four 
sets of indicators used in the analyses above. A summary of the simulation results is 
given in Table 5.5. 
First,, we consider the seven simulations on revenue enhancement tax reform. The 
simulations show that it is possible to raise the level of real GDP over the baseline while 
increasing the rates of two taxes. They are corporate tax (S2) and value added tax (S9). In 
both cases, real government consumption will increase, although the response of real 
private consumption depends on the effect of these taxes on the household aggregates. 
The effects of raising personal income tax (Sl) and non-commodity taxes (S6) on the 
GDP aggregates are fairly neutral, while increasing the three other taxes, i. e. export tax 
(S3), import tax (S4) and domestic indirect tax (S5), will lead to a decline in GDP and 
private consumption. 
At the household aggregate level, only the simulation on raising corporate tax has 
a positive effect on household disposable income, consumption and savings. The effect 
on households of using non-commodity tax with value added tax to raise 10 percent of 
government revenue (VAT 10) is fairly similar to the baseline position, especially later in 
the decade. The remaining five other taxes simulations show a worsening of the 
household aggregates. 
In terms of aggregate prices, the simulations on increased corporate tax, exports 
and import tax indicate higher consumer price indices and GDP price deflators at least 
for the first part of the nineties, while increasing income tax leads to lower consumer 
prices. Simulations S5, S6, and S9 show that increasing domestic indirect tax, non- 
commodity tax, and VAT 10 to raise government revenue have a mixed effect on CPI and 
GDP price deflators. Tax increase generally leads to lower real wages compared with the 
baseline, except for agricultural wages in S2 and S3 and unskilled wages in Sl and 
S2, 
which tend to be higher than the baseline position. 
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TABLE 5.5 COMPARISON OF SIMULATION RESULTS 
Indicators 
GDP Aggregates 





Consumer Price Index 
GDP Price Deflator 
Nominal Exchange Rate 










Revenue Enhancing Tax Reform Simulation 







o +1- +-- 0/- +0+ 
0-0-0 -/0 -/0 00 
+/- 





-+---- 0/- ++ 
-+---- 0/- ++ 
+---- 
+/- ++ 
Note: The symbols refer to the direction of the simulation results compared with the baseline outcomes. 
The symbol '+' means an increase, '-' is a decline, and '0' is no change over the base position. When two 
symbols appear together it means that the outcome is mixed. For instance, '+/-' refers to a rise for some of 
the years followed by a decline. 
Simulations: SI = raising personal income tax; S2 = raising corporate tax; S3 = raising export tax; S4 
raising import tax; S5 = raising domestic indirect tax; S6 = raising non-commodity tax; S7 = raising 
corporate tax and lowering personal income tax; S8 = raising non-commodity tax and lowering domestic 
indirect tax by the amount of sales and service taxes, i. e. switching to VAT; S9 = raising non-commodity 
tax including VAT. 
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Taken as a whole, if the Malaysian government intends to raise revenue from a 
single tax source without hurting households or negatively affecting GDP aggregates, 
then corporate tax (which include petroleum tax) would indeed be an ideal candidate. In 
fact, as shown by Simulation 2, the effect on these two aggregates can be positive. If the 
revenue increase were to come from more than one tax source, VATIO in combination 
with corporate tax would be a good way to raise revenue. Income tax can also be used for 
revenue generation since it does not have a negative effect on real GDP. However , it can 
have a sizeable reduction on real household disposable income and private consumption 
compared with the base. The advantage of raising revenue from these three sources is 
that the revenue derived from these taxes is large enough without the government having 
to levy a large increase in their tax rates. For instance, to raise one percent of government 
revenue in 1990 from a single tax source, the tax rates would have to be increased by 3.5 
percent for corporate tax, 6.6 percent for non-commodity taxes with VAT (or VATIO), 
and 8.2 percent for personal income tax. For the government to raise the same amount of 
revenue from the other taxes, the tax rates would have to be increased by 36.8 percent for 
export tax, 17.6 percent for import tax, 11.6 percent for domestic indirect tax, and 9.1 
percent for non-commodity taxes excluding VAT. 
Regarding the revenue neutral tax reforms, both the simulations S7 and S8 bring 
an improvement to the household aggregates, with higher levels of disposable income, 
consumption, and savings in real terms. In the case of switching from the current sales 
and services taxes to VAT, there is also an improvement in the levels of GDP. Real 
wages for many categories of workers are higher than the baseline position. This increase 
brings an improvement to household disposable income as well as slightly higher price 
levels. The two simulations indicate that there could be some economic and household 
welfare gains by reforming both the direct as well as the indirect taxes in Malaysia. 
In terms of policy implications, it would be useful to discuss the simulation 
results in relation with the MIER Tax Reform Proposals and Bardai's (1993) 
recommendations. The MIER Tax Reform Group put forward many proposals which 
included the reduction of corporate tax rate, broadening the coverage of tax incentives, 
reducing the top rate of personal income tax, raising the rebate given to taxpayers with 
chargeable income not exceeding RM10,000, phasing out export taxes on traditional 
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commodities, and improving on the sales and service taxes while the adoption of a value- 
added type tax is being considered. Bardai argued that the corporate tax rate should not 
be reduced since this tax is one of the most efficient and productive tax instruments in 
the economy and its tax burden distribution was found to be positive. He supported the 
introduction of VAT system, which he said would be non-inflationary, as well as the 
abolition of export tax. 
Our simulations support lowering income tax and adopting VAT system, both of 
which would be beneficial to households and the economy. We agree with Bardai that 
corporate tax should not be reduced. As shown by our simulations, the increase in 
corporate tax is not expected to have negative effects for real household and GDP 
aggregates. In fact, there might be some benefits to be gained by raising tax revenue from 
this source. Some of the actions could include rationalising the generous tax incentives 
offered to corporations. There had been arguments that export tax is regressive and 
should be reduced. Since the MIER tax reform proposals, duties on the export of primary 
commodities had fallen, and in many cases eliminated. Arguments about the regressivity 
of this tax on poor households now no longer apply as they used to. Petroleum export is 
currently by far the most important contributor to export tax (over 97 percent). 
8 CONCLUSION 
The computable general equilibrium model is a powerful analytical tool for policy 
simulation and represents a substantial advance over the earlier techniques used in 
economic and development planning, such as input-output model and linear 
programming model. Unlike the traditional partial equilibrium approach which relies on 
ceteris paribus assumptions, CGE model enables an analyst to undertake a 
comprehensive examination of a tax reform, with its complex interactions among 
different sectors and agents in the macro economy. 
In this chapter, we used M4, the latest CGE model developed for Malaysia, in our 
counterfactual. tax reform simulations. The model was calibrated on the Malaysian 1983 
Social Accounting Matrix and was subsequently updated based on more recent data from 
the Malaysian National Accounts for 1990. The basic model for our tax policy reform 
simulations has an essentially neo-classical model specification, with the supply-side 
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driving the economy. Before performing tax simulations for the 1990s, the model was 
calibrated so that it produced estimates for a number of key endogenous variables that 
corresponded with actual development. In establishing the sectoral growth rates and the 
macroeconomic framework, we were guided by the Malaysian Second Outline 
Perspective Plan for 1991-2000. It was also necessary to reprogram the model so that 
more details on the various sources of government revenue and expenditure could be 
obtained from the output. The model was also calibrated so that the revenue from various 
tax sources matched with published data for 1990-95. From 1996 onwards, we assumed 
that the tax indices for 1995 remained valid for the rest of the decade. Through iterative 
model calibrations, we arrived at a baseline simulation which replicated rather well the 
features and trends of the Malaysian economy and its tax structure. The baseline 
simulation was then used as the standard against which we compared the outcome of the 
tax reform simulations. 
In the previous chapter, we discussed about how the Malaysian Government is 
actively taking steps to reform its tax system, in pursuit of the objectives of economic 
growth, industrial efficiency, inflation control, and improved public sector finances. This 
chapter explores what the category of taxes could be raised to generate 10 percent of 
government revenue, with minimal negative effects for households and the economy. 
The main conclusion from the simulations is that probably the most ideal tax for this 
purpose is corporate tax, which for the purpose of our estimation includes petroleum 
income tax. The two other taxes that could be used in combination with corporate tax are 
VATIO and possibly income tax, although the latter would have a negative effect on 
household aggregates and private consumption. 
The chapter also investigates if there could be some efficiency gains from 
reforming the structure of direct and indirect taxes in a revenue-neutral context. For the 
reform of direct taxes, we reduce personal income tax by 10 percent and calibrate the 
increase in corporate taxes such that government revenue will be similar to the baseline 
position. This reform will have a neutral effect on GDP aggregates but a positive effect 
on households. In simulating the reform of indirect taxes, we also explore the benefits of 
opting for VAT to replace the existing sales tax and service tax. The shift to value added 
tax was accompanied by an improvement in real household aggregates, as well as real 
200 
CHAPTER T-ix REFOR, ý f S11 f ULA TIONS 
GDP and private consumption. This simulation showed a slight effect in stimulating 
international trade, with some gain in net exports. Assuming that the implementation of 
this tax is well executed, the introduction of VAT in Malaysia was not foreseen to bring 
inflation. The GDP price deflator would rise by 2 percent throughout the decade which 
suggests that there would be a once and for all shift in prices, without the acceleration of 
price changes. This result suggests that the adoption of VAT would not be inflationary. 




LABOUR SUPPLY WITH TAXATION 
LITERA TURE RE VIEW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter and the next investigate the labour supply behaviour of household members 
subject to income taxation in the case of a developing country. This chapter discusses the 
theoretical aspects of estimating the parameters of labour supply with taxation, while the 
next chapter performs an empirical analysis of labour supply with taxation on the 
Malaysian data set. 
Labour supply has traditionally been viewed in terms of the demand for leisure. 
The substitution and income effects operate together when there is a change in the wage 
rates. According to theory, an increase in wage rates would increase the price of leisure 
relative to the time spent at work, thereby increasing the hours of work through the 
substitution effect. A wage increase would also increase the demand for leisure, which is 
assumed to be a normal good, as a result of the income effect. According to 
microeconomic theory, an increase in net wage resulting from tax reduction could either 
reduce or increase the hours of work, depending on the relative strength of the income 
and substitution effects. It will be interesting and useftil to find out whether the labour 
supply response of a developing country, with socio-economic and institutional 
characteristics that differ from developed countries, corresponds with the general 
findings of empirical studies mainly conducted in the West. 
Almost all the empirical studies on labour supply with taxation are performed for 
the developed countries. Hardly any study of this nature have been conducted for the 
developing countries, thereby making the study by Rochjadi and Leuthold (1994) on 
Indonesia a rare exception. There are several reasons to explain the scarcity of empirical 
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labour supply studies with taxation in developing countries. First,, most of the available 
data are in aggregate form. Second, consistent with the high rates of unemployment and 
low wages in developing countries, the focus of many labour studies is on labour market 
segmentation and unemployment. Among the common themes of studies in developing 
countries are labour market structure and segmentation, the unemployment and 
underemployment problems, and rural-urban migration within the Arthur Lewis or 
Harris-Todaro frameworks. These studies usually adopt an interdisciplinary approach to 
the problems of poverty, low literacy rates, high fertility and environmental deterioration. 
A study on labour supply with taxation in Malaysia will, therefore, be a step in filling in 
this gap in the field of knowledge. 
In examining the literature on labour supply modelling, this chapter first surveys 
the first and second generation studies conducted in this area, tracing the estimation 
problems and the procedures adopted to overcome them. It then presents the results of 
empirical studies along with some factors that could account for the wide disparity in 
estimates among the two generations of studies. Next, it examines the specification of 
taxes in labour supply modelling and the two common approaches used for parameters 
estimation. This is followed by a discussion on the importance of taxes in affecting 
labour supply based on empirical findings from studies conducted in the developed 
countries. The chapter finally examines the limited empirical work done on labour supply 
in developing countries, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
2. LITERATURE SURVEY ON STATIC LABOUR SUPPLY MODELS 
2.1 First Generation Studies 
There exists a large volume of empirical studies using the static labour supply models 
especially in the last 30 years. I One of the important lesson that has emerged is that the 
quality of empirical results is sensitive to the model specification and estimation 
techniques used. Labour supply parameter estimates should in principle be based on 
sound theory and careful structural analysis rather than on ad hoc models. The early 
For some excellent surveys on this topic, see Heckman, Killmgsworth and MaCurdy 
(1981). Killingsworth (1983). 
and Heckman (1993). 
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empirical studies used the ordinary least squares method (OLS), but many techniques 
have been developed later to overcome the inadequacy of this method in dealing with 
econometric problems such as selectivity, endogeneity, and errors arising from 
measurement, optimisation and heterogeneous preferences in the model. 
Empirical labour supply research are often divided into first and second 
generation studies. The first generation empirical studies began from the 1930s to about 
1974. Since the pioneering work of Schoenberg and Douglas (1937) on labour force 
participation, most empirical work on labour supply have been based on the neo-classical 
analysis of individual choice (Heckman, Killingsworth, and MaCurdy, 1981). Analysts 
used OLS to calculate the substitution and income elasticities. The general conclusion is 
that women are more sensitive than men to changes in wages and income. 
A collection of first generation studies using advanced techniques on micro data 
is contained in the book, Income Maintenance and Labor Supply, edited by Cain and 
Watts (1973). These studies are concerned with the effects of different variables on 
labour supply and the work response of non-poor groups in the population. This book, 
which brings together seven research papers, 2 reflects the econometric concerns and 
weaknesses of first generation work and introduces a number of econometric and 
methodological innovations. The empirical findings of these studies correspond with the 
other first generation research in concluding that female labour supply is more sensitive 
to changes in wage rates and property income than is male labour supply. Furthermore, 
leisure is a normal good for both male and female, and the compensated substitution 
effect of an increase in wage will raise labour supply. Male labour supply schedule 
appears to be sloping gently backwards with respect to wage, while the female schedule 
is strongly positively sloped. 
In their concluding chapter, Cain and Watts examine the fundamental 
methodological problems faced by the studies and raised some points that set in place the 
agenda for second generation research on labour supply. Since the points raised have an 
2 The authors of the seven papers are: (a) Robert E. Hall, (b) Michael J. Boskin, 
(c) C. Russell Hill, (d) Irwin 
Garfinkel, (e) David H. Greenberg and Marvin Kosters, (f) Orley Ashenfelter and James Heckman, and (g) Belton 
M. Fleisher, Donald 0. Parsons and Richard D. Porter. 
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important bearing on the direction of future studies, it may be useful to outline these 
issues. 
I. Sample selection. Many of the studies on income-maintenance programme 
eliminated from the sample all groups above the poverty line. This data 
truncation introduces biases in the resulting estimates of income and wage 
effects on labour supply. 
2. Choice of the dependent variable. Labour supply can be represented by either 
hours of work or labour participation. Both measures generate different 
elasticity estimates even if the same data set is used. 
3. Specification and measurement of independent variables. The problems raised 
include the simultaneity problem between wage and hours of work, omitted 
variables (such as preference for work, personal traits, quality of education and 
work experience, etc. ) that could potentially cause bias in the measure of wage 
and income effects, and measurement errors in the wage variable and income 
reporting. 
4. Dealing with non-participants. There is the problem of how to deal with 
missing wages of non-workers and their zero hours of work. 
First generation studies generally ignore the underlying sources of error. The 
error term is assumed to be random and the studies gave no consideration whether the 
error is generated by measurement error or omitted regressors. In later studies by Burtless 
and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1979) and Blomquist (1983), the model specifications 
take account of some of the errors, whether they are attributable to missing variables 
only, or errors in measuring hours, or both. Another problem with most first generation 
studies is that they do not make clear the distinction between (a) decisions on 
participation and employment, which is a dichotomous choice variable, and (b) decisions 
on the number of work hours. 3 An appreciation of the participation-hours of work 
dichotomy is tied up with the issue of selection bias. 
3 The studies by Boskin (1973) and Kalachek and Raines (1970) are exceptions since they deal with the labour supply 
decision in two stages: participation and hours of work. 
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In principle, the parameter estimates of labour supply models provide information 
on different aspects of labour supply. Four different labour supply functions are confused 
in earlier literature (Heckman, 1993; Killingsworth, 1983). They are: 
E (H I W, Y, E: ) (1) 
E(Hl W, YH>0) (2) 
Pr (H> 01 W, 1) 
E(Hl W, lý=E(Hl W, YH> 0) x Pr(H>O 1 W, lý (4) 
where H is hours of work, W is wage, Y is non-labour income and F, is a non-random 
error term to capture individual differences in work preference and reservation wage. 4 
Equation I is the conditional expectation of H given wage, non-labour income and F.. It is 
the structural labour supply equation that yields the standard neo-classical income and 
substitution effects of labour supply. Equation 2 is the labour supply of workers which 
describes an empirical relationship but does not control for 'taste for work'. The 
probability of participation or employment is given in equation 3, while Equation 4 is an 
aggregate labour supply curve conditional on Wand Y. Heckman (1993: 117) argues the 
case for making clear the distinction between participation and hours because this 
distinction is a 'legacy of the research conducted on labor supply over the past 20 years. ' 
Once the distinction is made, the problem of missing wages for non-workers which was 
regarded as somewhat a nuisance by earlier literature became a central research problem 
in economics, i. e. the issue of self-selection bias in estimating wage and labour supply 
functions on samples of workers. 
2.2 Second Generation Studies 
The methodological approach for the second generation studies is, firstly, to 
develop theoretical models which set out in detail the various structural aspects of labour 
supply decision, and secondly, to develop the statistical procedures for estimating labour 
supply parameters. Briefly, the approach adopts a functional form for the individual's 
preference structure that could be specified in terms of direct utility function or some 
4 The reservation wage is the asking wage of an individual who Is only willing to accept ajob 
if the offer wage is 
above it. If the offer wage is equal or less than the reservation wage, the 
individual would prefer not to work. 
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related function, such as the marginal rate of substitution or the indirect utility function. 
The budget line is considered specifically and the individual's utility is evaluated at each 
point of the budget line to obtain the point which yields the highest utility. The 
equilibrium can be a comer solution, interior solution, . or on a kink. The non-random 
error E; associated with the reservation wage and participation decision of workers and 
non-workers is specifically considered in the model. The term E is assumed to arise from 
factors known to the individual who is making the decision of whether to participate or 
not,, but is unknown to the analyst. The error term is also affected by the unobserved 
components associated with both sides of the labour supply equations, such as error in 
measuring hours of work H and omitted explanatory variables. 
Addressing the problem of selectivity is an innovation in second generation 
research. Hours and wage data are available for workers but not for non-workers. The 
issue is how to treat missing wages for non-workers in parameter estimation. First 
generation studies used two approaches to treat non-workers. In the first approach, non- 
workers were included in the sample, with their values of H set to zero, which is 
generally referred to as Procedure 1.5 This creates a misspecification problem. In the 
utility maximisation model, an individual will work if his/her offer wage exceeds the 
reservation wage. When this happens we observe positive number of hours. When H=0 
we can only deduce that the offer wage is less or equal to the reservation wage. 
Individuals have a range of reservation wage unknown to the analyst. When we include 
non-workers in the sample and maximise utility by equating the marginal rate of 
substitution (MRS) with real wage in our model, we are assuming that the non-workers 
choose H=0 in the same way workers choose their positive values of H. This clearly 
constitute a misspecification problem. 
The second approach adopted in first generation work is Procedure 11 which 
excludes non-workers from the sample when estimating hours of work. This gives rise to 
the sample selection bias problem, which is more acute for females than males because 
of the lower rate of participation among females The exclusion of non-workers results in 
5 In Chapter 4 of Labor Supply, Killingsworth (1983) describes eight procedures commonly used in 
first generation 
and second generation work on static labour supply modelling. The procedures are numbered 
from I to VIII. 
Procedures I and 11 are used in first generation research, while the remaining six procedures, which are 
econometrically more sophisticated, are used in second generation research. 
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the non-random selection of the error term. As a result of the censorship, wage and non- 
labour income variables used in the model are correlated with the error term. The 
parameter estimates with the excluded non-workers will give rise to inconsistent 
estimators of the total labour supply parameters. The assumption here is that the non- 
workers who are excluded from the estimation differ in characteristics from the workers. 
There are some reasons why this might be the case. Workers are those for whom the offer 
wage is higher than the reservation wage. This implies that workers can either attract a 
high market wage or they have low asking wage. Hence, workers are unlikely to be 
representative of the entire population. An exception where sample selection bias is not a 
problem is when everyone in the population works, say, in the case of prime-age males in 
an economy with full employment. 
The distinguishing feature that separates the first and second generation studies is 
that the latter pays more attention to specification and estimation issues. Unlike first 
generation studies, second generation work estimates the labour supply parameters by 
maximising an explicit utility function subject to budget constraints. In other words, the 
labour supply parameter estimates are based on microeconomic foundations rather than 
on ad hoc models. 6 In addition, second generation work has also carefully distinguished 
different aspects of labour supply, such as participation and hours of work. Modelling for 
participation is a crucial stage in dealing with sample selection bias. 
An approach to deal with sample selection bias has been introduced by Heckman 
(1976,1979). This approach presents a consistent two-stage estimation method that 
eliminates the specification error in the case of censored samples. It can be shown that 
the conditional meanOf 6Hi 
7 is as follows: 
Ki = cyHki (5) 
where ki = J( -Jj1uH)1[I - F( -JilaH)]. The term 
ki is the inverse Mill's ratio that is 
obtained by performing a probit estimate on participation for all observations, workers 
6 An excellent exposition on the specification of labour supply functions used 
in second generation research is g iven 
in Stern (1986). Among the many criteria mentioned in choosing a functional 
form for a labour supply function are: 
consistency with utility theory; convenience in estimation; ease of calculation; ease of use in applied 
policy 
problems; facility of computation; behaviour of labour supply at 
low levels of work; aggregation; and flexibility in 
possible response of labour to changes in the wage. 
7 F-Hi is the error term associated with the heterogenous preference 
for work, which is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation (YH. 
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and non-workers alike. The terms f and F refer to the standard normal and cumulative 
normal density functions, respectively. The inclusion of ki in the regression would yield 
consistent estimate of the coefficients in the hours of work equation, even when the 
sample is restricted to workers. 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 6.1 summarises the range of elasticities from first generation work. The empirical 
results of first-generation studies of labour supply show a wide range of estimates that is 
perhaps too large for analytical or policy purpose. Even the elasticities in Cain and Watts 
vary widely. The elasticity estimates suggest that the introduction of Negative Income 
Tax scheme in the United States could bring about a reduction of between 4 to 40 hours, 
depending on the elasticity estimates used for the simulation. The large disparity in the 
elasticities was noted with some concern in Cain and Watts since this implies an 
unacceptably wide range of reduction in labour supply arising from the income- 
maintenance plan. 8 
TABLE 6.1 SUMMARY OF LABOUR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES 
IN FIRST GENERATION STUDIES 
Gross own- Compensated Compensated Property 
wage elasticity own-wage spouse's wage I. ncome 2 
elasticity rate I 
Males -0.45 to -0.05 to 0 or <00 to -0.16 
+0.55 +0.96 
Females -0.10 to -0.05 to 0 to -0.40 -0.1 to 
+1.60 +2.00 -0.75 
'Cros s- substitution effect expressed as an elasticity 
2 Elasticity of hours of work with respect to property income 
Source: Heckman, Killingsworth, MaCurdy (1981: Table 1.1) 
8 The largest substitution elasticity evaluated at the mean is 0.5 as reported by Hill (1973), while the smallest are close 
to zero if we ignore a few cases of negative substitution elasticities. Hill's estimate is still smaller than 
Kalachek 
and Raines (1970) who report a much larger elasticity of substitution of 0.9. The income elasticites are negative and 
range between 0 and -0-8. 
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Despite methodological improvements in the second generation procedures, they 
do not manage to narrow the range of elasticity estimates. q There were more studies on 
female labour supply in second-generation studies than on male labour supply. The few 
studies on male labour supply indicate that male labour'supply is less sensitive to wage 
rates and property income than female labour supply. According to Killingsworth (1983), 
most of the second- generation studies imply that the gross wage elasticities range 
between -0.20 and +0.14 for males and -0.32 to +15.0 for females. The compensated 
wage elasticities range from -0.06 to +1.00 for males and from -1.06 to +14.79 for 
females. However,, Killingsworth argues that when studies with negative compensated 
elasticities are discarded, this narrows the range of uncompensated elasticities for U. S. 
men to -0.03 to 0.14. The anomaly to these findings is the results reported by Nakamura, 
Nakamura, and Cullen (1979, for Canadian women) and Nakamura and Nakamura (198 1, 
for both Canadian and US women). Their results depart from the other first- and second- 
generation research by showing that the uncompensated wage elasticities for female 
hours of work are negative. 
It has been argued that differences in estimation method, functional form and data 
base of the various studies account for the wide heterogeneity of elasticity estimates. In 
the seventies and eighties, there were some studies using a similar data set to test the 
sensitivity of different estimation procedures and assumptions. DaVanzo, DeTray and 
Greenberg (1973) applied many different procedures to the 1976 Survey of Economic 
Opportunity (SEO) data set in the United States. Another sensitivity study was 
performed by Masters and Garfinkel (1977) who pursued the same research question 
using the data from the 1967 SEO and the 1972 Michigan Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). The two studies conclude that the wide diversity of results are the 
outcome of some of the following factors: 
' 0 
1. Problems in measuring the hours and wage rate variables. Several definitions 
of hours worked have been used in different studies. Since 
hours worked is 
often used in calculating the wage rate, errors in measuring true 
hours worked 
9 For a listing of the estimates of structural elasticities derived in second-generation research, 
see Table 4.3 in 
Killingsworth (1983). 
10 Pencavel (1986) and Fallon and Verry (1988: 60-64) provide some elaboration on the problems of 
measurement 
and definitions of variables. 
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induce a spurious negative correlation between the two variables. In tax 
analysis, the tax liability used to calculate net wage is based on official 
income tax schedule which is unlikely to conform to the actual tax paid by the 
individual since the analyst does not know the exact amount of tax deductions 
and the extent of tax avoidance and tax evasion in the system. 
2. Difficulty in measuring non-wage income accurately. Different procedures are 
used in the calculation of non-wage income that give rise to the wide range of 
non-wage income effects estimated in the various models. It is not uncommon 
for studies to report a positive association between non-wage income and 
hours of work. Of the 57 different estimated coefficients on non-wage income 
reported in DaVanzo, DeTray and Greenberg, only 16 are significant; of 
these,, half of the estimates have positive signs while the other half negative 
signs. 
3. Effect of other explanatory variables. Some of the explanatory variables used 
in the models include age, education, work experience, family size and 
structure, region, job satisfaction, state of health, etc. DaVanzo et al. found 
that the size and signs of the wage coefficient are extremely sensitive to the 
presence of years of schooling. Studies that include education and number of 
dependants as the explanatory variables for the hours of work equation show a 
significant positive relation relationship between these variables and hours of 
work. 
In the eighties, an influential sensitivity analysis was undertaken by Thomas 
Mroz (1987) on the 1976 Panel Study of. Income Dynamics data set. Using a sample 
consisting of 753 white married women aged 30-60, he conducted a detailed sensitivity 
analyses using the alternative first- and second-generation estimation methods. His 
simulation exercises show the sensitivity of elasticity estimates to the choice of 
instruments and endogeneity assumptions. 
As a baseline approach, Mroz uses OLS to estimate the hours equation on a 
sample of those who work (428 women in the sample were working in 1975). This 
approach is often used in first generation work and is referred to as Procedure 11 by 
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Killingsworth. This procedure yields negative elasticities for both the uncompensated 
wage effect (-0.0113) and income effect (-0.0028), while the inclusion of the variable 
children under age six reduces hours of work substantially. It was pointed out that a 
negative wage effect can arise if there is a random measurement error in hours of work 
which causes a spurious negative relationship between hours of work and wages. As a 
variant to Procedure II, Mroz uses the women's labour market experience' I as an 
instrumental variable for wage, which is regarded an endogenous variable. By using the 
two stage least squares (2SLS) method, the estimate for the uncompensated wage 
response becomes positive and significant, while the income effect is negative and large. 
By excluding the experience variable as an instrument, the uncompensated wage 
elasticity and the income elasticity decrease in size while still retaining their signs. Mroz 
performs exogeneity tests for experience, children and non-wage income and concludes 
that labour market experience is not exogenous in the labour supply equation. He, 
however, cannot reject the exogeneity of children and non-wage income. 
The procedure 11 described above is based on a subsample of working women and 
does not control for self-selection bias. To examine the importance of self-selection bias, 
Mroz uses the Heckit multistage approach or Procedure VIII. He calculates the inverse 
Mills ratio k from the probit model. The wage variable is instrumented and used in the 
2SLS estimation of the hours worked equation. The regression yields a small positive 
uncompensated wage effect and a small positive income effect. The statistics are 
significant when labour market experience are excluded from the model but are 
insignificant with the inclusion of experience. Mroz concludes that the estimated 
uncompensated wage effect is positive but very small and the income effect is negative 
and small. This result also challenges the conventional wisdom that the wage and income 
elasticities for women are larger than of men and, therefore, concurs with Nakamura and 
Nakamura (19 8 1). 
The measure of labour market experience used in this study is the number of years the woman worked for money 
since her eighteenth birthday. Mroz (1987: 774) argues that women who have worked many years in the past tend 
to have higher wages and work more hours in the present. The number of years worked between two women 
reflects a systematic difference in the unobservables influencing their labour supplies (e. g. 'tastes for work'), which 
makes women's labour market experience endogenous to the labour supply function. 
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4. TAXES AND LABOUR SUPPLY 
The incorporation of taxes in labour supply estimation is an extension of basic labour 
supply model. In the basic labour supply model, the budget constraint is depicted by a 
straight line with the slope -w that intersects the vertical axis on the right hand side at Y. 
The preferred hours of work, H*, is where the individual's indifference curve 11 is 
tangent to the budget line YWB at A (see Figure 6.1). The effect of taxation on labour 
supply is to lower the after-tax wage or net wage. In the proportional tax system, the 
application of the tax rate r will lower the post-tax wage to w, = w(I-T) and the budget 
line rotates from YWB to YWA. Only labour income is taxed and not non-labour income. 
The new utility-maximi sing equilibrium is now at point C where the indifference curveI2 
is tangent to the budget constraint YWI. Hours of work decline from H* to H2. 
This decline is a combination of two effects. The movement around the original 
indifference curve I, from A to B shows the substitution effect as a result of the change 
in the price of leisure relative to market work, holding utility constant. In this case, the 
opportunity cost of leisure has fallen relative to market work, thereby encouraging the 
worker to consume more leisure and reduce the hours of work from H* to H1. The 
movement from B to C denotes the income effect, reflecting the worker's response to a 
decline in real income as a result of income tax. If leisure is assumed to be a normal 
good, the worker would reduce the consumption of leisure and increase the amount of 
hours worked from H, to H2. 
Using the Slutsky equation, the response in the hours of work will be determined 
by both the income and substitution effects as follows: 






The first term on the right hand side is the compensated substitution effect holding utility 
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FIGURE 6.1 THE EFFECTS OF PROPORTIONAL TAX ON THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
decline in wage rate (as a result of tax increase) will reduce the price of leisure, making it 
relatively cheaper. Workers are inclined to choose more leisure and put in less hours of 
work. Therefore, with the substitution effect, a fall in wage rate as a result of tax increase 
is accompanied by a decline in hours of work. The second term on the right hand side of 
the equation is the income effect. Since leisure is assumed to be a normal good, the 
demand for it declines with a reduction in real income. Therefore, a decline in wage rate 
is accompanied with an increase in hours of work. 
Although the majority of the first and generation studies produce elasticity results 
that have the 'right' signs according to theory, some of the empirical results also produce 
signs that go the opposite way. When this happens, they are sometimes dismissed on 
grounds that the estimation procedure might be suspect or there are some measurement 
errors or endogeneity problems not addressed by the model (see, for instance, 
Killingsworth, 1983: 128-129,185,200). One may reasonably ask whether there is a 
need to probe deeper into the reasons for these results rather than quickly dismissing 
them as estimation or measurement errors. 
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FIGURE 6.2 THE EFFECTS OF VARYING MARGINAL TAx RATES 
ON THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
In a progressive tax system, the budget set is convex and piecewise-linear (Figure 
6-2). Let us assume that there are three tax rates and three after-tax wages. If an 
individual works up to H, hours, the marginal after-tax wage is w(I-CI). As the 
individual increases the amount of work hours and earns more wage income, he or she 
moves into successively higher tax brackets. Accordingly, the marginal after-tax wage 
rates areWO _T2) for hours worked between H, and H2 hours andWO _T3) for hours 
above H2. The linear budget segments become flatter with increasing marginal tax rates 
'C3 > 'C2 > T1. The kinks on the budget set occur at the points of transition, where the 
marginal tax rates change fromr, to T2 and fromT2 to T3. which correspond with hours 
worked H, and H2on the horizontal axis. Under progressive taxation, the preferred hours 
of work is unique and is given by the point of tangency between the indifference curve 
and the budget set. Since the budget set is convex, the tangency represents the global 
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FIGURE 6.3 MULTIPLE TANGENCIES IN A NON-CONCAVE BUDGET SET 
those in the low income category, the budget set is no longer strictly convex and can 
result in multiple tangencies. In Figure 6.3, the indifference curve is tangent to the budget 
constraint YW at two points, A and B. In this case, small changes in the wage, tax or 
benefit system can bring about large changes in the desired hours of work due to the 
possibility of skipping entire budget segments (Hausman, 1985). Among some studies 
that address the data analysis issues of the kinked budget set arising from social security 
systems are Burtless and Moffitt (1984,1985) and Blundell, Meghir, Symons and 
Walker (198 8). 
There are two difficulties involved in the estimation of progressive taxation. First, 
as Hausman (1985) observes that if non-labour income is affected by the tax rate, then 
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where H is hours worked, -c is marginal tax rate, m is net wage after tax, and Y is non- 
labour income. This implies that in estimating the effect of taxes on labour supply in a 
progressive tax system, the income and substitution effects of the changes in both wage 
and income should be considered. 
The difficulty involved in the estimation of progressive taxation is finding the 
point of tangency on a curved budget set. Under progressive taxation, the budget set is 
convex and a global optimum can be found as a comer solution, at a budget segment or 
even at one of the kinks. Moffitt (1990) provides a good discussion of some methods that 
could be used in estimating a non-linear budget set. There are two common approaches 
have been used in the literature used for analysing labour supply with taxation. First, is 
the Piecewise-Linear Budget Constraint approach that had been used in studies such as 
Burtless and Hausman (1978), Wales and Woodland (1979), Flood and MaCurdy (1992), 
and Blomquist (1996). The second approach is the Instrumental Variable method that is 
used in Boskin (1973), Hall (1973), Mroz (1987), Flood and MaCurdy (1992) and 
Blomquist (1996). However, before elaborating on the two commonly used approaches, 
it will be useful to explain the concept and derivation of the 'virtual income', a device 
that is used by both approaches to overcome the difficulty of finding the maximum on a 
convex budget set. 
Virtual income refers to the proxy non-labour income that results from extending 
a given budget segment to the vertical axis on the right hand side. This device is used by 
analysts during the last two decades ranging from Rosen (1976), Hausman (198 1 a) to 
Flood and MaCurdy (1992) and Blomquist (1996). The intersection of the extended 
linear budget segment with the vertical axis gives the level of virtual income. It is the 
assumed level of property income that corresponds with the marginal wage rate 
applicable to the individual. In Figure 6.2, the virtual income corresponding with the 
marginal tax rates 'r2and'13 are Y, and Y2, respectively. 
4.1 Piecewise-Linear Budget Constraint Approach 
Sometimes dubbed the Hausman Method, this approach was used by Burtless and 
Hausman (1978) to study the labour supply effects of a negative income tax and the 
federal income which creates a budget constraint that is not strictly convex. 
Hausman 
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(1979,198 1 a) provide details on this approach which are further elaborated by Blomquist 
(1983), Moffitt (1990), and Flood and MaCurdy (1992). The econometric estimation 
allows for two error terms. The first error term is to represent unobserved heterogeneity 
of preferences since different individuals will choose to work different amount of hours 
even if they face the same budget constraint. The second error term represents 
optimisation error which arises because individuals cannot choose their hours of work 
precisely even if they wish to locate at a particular point on the budget constraint. 
Although measurement error is conceptually different from optimisation error, this model 
does not make an econometric distinction between the two types of errors. 
To illustrate the model, let H be hours of work, W(l --c 1) andWO -'C2) be the net 
wage on segments I and 2, T, and T2 are the corresponding marginal tax rates, yj and Y2 
are the intercepts or virtual income for the first and second segments, and H* hours of 
work be the kink. Let u be the heterogeneity error term and 6 be the optimisation error. 
The equations describing the hours of work an individual would have under each of the 
three possible locations which would maximise his or her utility are as follows: 
(x +ßW(I-T1) + yyl +U+E if utility is max. on segment I 
H= cc +P WO -T2) +7Y2 + ý) +6 
H=H*+c 
if utility is max. On segment 2 
if utility is max. on the kink 
The equations that describe the choice of segment or kink that would maximise utility are 
as follows: 
Segment I if (x + PW(I--cl) + 7y, +< H* (8) 
Segment 2 if (X + PWO-T2) + 7Y2 +> H* (9) 
Kink if a+ PW(I-, rl) + 7y, +u> H* (10) 
and (X + Pw(l-T2) + YY2 + 1) < H* 
The distributIon of the error terms are assumed to be normal and the studies using 
this approach estimate the equation coefficients by maximum likelihood. 
The parameters 
are estimated using an iterative algorithm. First, the estimation procedure checks 
if utility 
is maximised by a comer solution where H= HO. If it 
is not, the procedure checks 
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whether the maximum lies on the first segment where desired hours is less than H*. If 
this is not the case, then the procedure checks whether the maximum lies on the second 
segment where desired hours is greater than H*. Hence, individuals with lower values of 
u would choose the first segment and individuals with higher values of U would choose 
the second segment. If utility is not maximised at the two segments, the maximum is 
assumed to lie on the kink where u falls between the high and low values. This iterative 
method searches all possible parameter values that would maximise utility for all 
observations in the sample. 
The model can be estimated with only one error term. In studying the effect on 
income tax on labour supply, Wales and Woodland (1979) estimate the model with 
optimisation error F- but do not include the heterogeneity error u, which suggests that 
individuals with the same budget constraint are maximising at the same points. Some 
other studies such as Hausman (1980), Zabalza, Pissarides and Barton (1980), and 
Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) adopted the model which includes the heterogeneity error 
but not the optimisation error. The assumption here is that individuals could locate at the 
kink points without any error. As Moffitt (1990: 136) observes, the implication of the 
model with the optimisation error is that the observed segment location for an individual 
need not necessary be the location where he or she maximises utility. 
When the tax system is not strictly progressive, especially in the presence of 
government transfer programmes, the analysis becomes more complicated because the 
budget set is no longer convex. This gives rise to the possibility of multiple tangencies 
between the indifference curves at the budget set. Hausman (1985) describes how the 
estimation can be done. The labour supply function can be derived from the indirect 
utility function by using Roy's identity. The global optimum can be found by comparing 
all feasible tangencies and the tangency with highest utility is chosen as the preferred 
hours of work. Either the non-linear least squares or a Tobit procedure could be used to 
estimate the unknown coefficients, as with the case of the convex budget set. 
The Hausman method provides an elegant solution to the parameter estimation of 
the labour supply function. It takes into account the linear segments and kinks on the 
after-tax budget set as well as admits randomness in hours of work arising from 
both the 
measurement error and the variation in individual preference. It also takes 
into account 
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the endogeneity of the marginal tax rate in estimation. However, there are some 
shortcomings that can affect the reliability of the estimates. The empirical studies of male 
labour supply using the Hausman approach tend to Produce higher substitution and lower 
income effects than empirical work based on other approaches, thereby producing larger 
estimates of both labour-supply responses and dead-weight losses associated with the 
progressivity of taxation (Heckman, 1983; MaCurdy et al., 1990). 
The Hausman method assumes that there is perfect knowledge on the part of the 
analyst and the individual with regard to the entire budget constraint. The assumption is 
that the analyst is able to observe perfectly the wage and income variables and the model 
makes no allowance for errors in measuring the budget constraint. This assumption is 
most likely to be violated in empirical analysis. The true budget set is not known to the 
econometrician because of measurement errors, including those made in tax 
computations as a result of unobserved variability in deductions and exemptions. 
Without full accounting of the variability, Heckman (1983: 73-74) argues that the 
piecewise-linear budget constraint procedure does not produce consistent estimates and 
may be less robust than the earlier instrumental variable estimation procedures of Boskin 
(1973) and Hall (1973). 
In addition, the Hausman method makes very strong exogeneity assumptions in 
presuming that all variables, including gross wages and non-labour income, used in the 
calculation of taxes are exogenous determinants of labour supply behaviour. Some 
authors such as Da Vanzo, De Tray and Greenberg (1976), Pencavel (1986), and Flood 
and MaCurdy (1992) argue that wages and income are endogenous variables. If this is 
the case, the substitution and income effects obtained from this method may not be 
dependable. 
Finally, a major problem with this approach is the parametric restriction adopted 
that constraints the signs of the substitution and income effects. MaCurdy, Green, and 
Paarsch (1990) observe that requiring the Slutsky condition to hold at various points is 
not based on economic theory but, in the case of this procedure, on the need to obtain a 
properly defined statistical model. This inequality restrictions must hold in order for the 
likelihood functions, which are used in deriving the maximum on the linear segments of 
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the budget constraint, to be defined. To satisfy globally the Slutsky condition, the 
inequality constraints are: 
alllaoll, =aHlam -H(aHlan>O (11) 
Since 6H/6o) = cc and 8H16 Y=P, we obtain 
(x-ßHij > 0, Vi 
where Hy. represents the hours-of-work values corresponding to the interior kink points j 
on an individual i's budget set, (o is the wage after tax, and Y is the intercept or virtual 
income. This implies that the condition (x >0 must be fulfilled if labour supply is to be 
defined within 0 :! ý- H : ý- Hma, This method imposes the assumption that leisure is a 
normal good which means that P<0. Since these conditions are imposed at the start of 
the estimation procedure, it is hardly surprising that studies using this method had a 
positive sign for wage substitution effect and a negative sign for the income effect, i. e. 
having signs in the 'right direction. ' According to Heckman (1983), these restrictions are 
not justified because there is a long-standing empirical controversy surround the sign of 
the income effect (P). 
In previous research where P is not restricted, the studies sometimes produce 
negative substitution effects and zero or positive income responses. This is also what we 
discover from the Malaysian data, as we shall see in Chapter 7. The two reasons given to 
explain why the signs go the 'other direction' are: (a) the correlation between preferences 
for work and savings, and (b) the endogeneity of assets in a life-cycle model of labour 
supply. The taste variation regarding the process of asset accumulation can be a serious 
source of bias. Greenberg and Kosters (1973) argue that some individuals who prefer to 
acquire assets tend to work longer hours to achieve their desired asset levels. In their 
study, they attempt to control for differences in preference structures in estimating wealth 
effects on labour supply. 
Another approach to address the weakness of the basic labour supply models 
is 
adopted by Smith (1980) who argues that a weakness in the use of asset 
in labour supply 
models is the lack of emphasis on the life-cycle dimension. 
Smith develops a life cycle- 
model to explore the relationships between working 
hours and assets. This approach 
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shows that both the variables are simultaneously determined by similar economic forces, 
and the correlation between them should not be interpreted as evidence of a causal 
sequence from assets to market work. As Smith argues, the standard practice of using 
assets to measure wealth effects on the demand for leisure is theoretically inappropriate 
since it overlooks or lack emphasis on the life-cycle approach. They have to be 
considered in a multiperiod model instead of being forced into the confines of a one- 
period model. 
4.2 Instrumental Variable Approach 
This is another method that is often used in labour supply studies. In the past, 
analysts had tried to estimate the labour supply parameters by linearising the budget 
constraint around the optimum point and used net wage and virtual income as 
independent variables in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure. However, using 
OLS on the linearised model will generate inconsistent estimates as a result of either 
heterogeneous preferences or measurement/optimisation errors or both. In first 
generation research, OLS is applied to the labour supply function 
Hi = g(Wi, Vi) + Fi 
where Hi is the individual's observed quantity demanded, Wi is the individual's wage, V, 
is the individual's virtual income for that segment, and ci is the error term. This approach 
can give rise to biases because of the problems of endogeneity and reverse causality. The 
right-hand side variables for wage and virtual income are endogenous because they are 
partly determined by the individual when he or she makes the choice of labour supply. In 
other words, wage and virtual income are partly determined by hours of work. Hence, the 
causality runs from the choice of hours to the choice of wage and virtual income, rather 
than the other way round. This approach does not take into account the problem of 
individuals locating at the kinks, which can be a problem if there is the tendency of 
workers to do this as a way of reducing their tax burden. 
To get around the reverse causality problem, the instrumental variables 
techniques have been used in studies that have linearised the slope and used it along with 
the intercept as independent variables in the regression equation. The method is 
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essentially to construct an instrumental variable that is correlated with the endogenous 
regressor variable but, uncorrelated with the error term. In this case, the analyst tries to 
develop instrumental variables for the wage and virtual income variables that are 
exogenous but are uncorrelated with the error term. Thi's approach is equivalent to the 
technique used in getting around the simultaneous equation problem where there is a 
two-way relationship between the variables on the left- and right-hand side of the 
regression equation and where the right-hand side variable is correlated with the error 
term. The choice of instrument set varies across studies which adopt different 
assumptions on exogeneity. 
Among the first attempts to use the instrumental variable approach are Boskin 
(1973) and Hall (1973). In cross section studies, the observed wage, W, may differ from 
the true wage, Wi*, by a random error of measurement, u. In addition, the wage rate is 
often calculated by dividing total earnings on hours of work. This implies that errors in 
measuring hours of work are transmitted to the wage variable which will be related to the 
error term, giving rise to biased, even inconsistent, estimate of P. To overcome this 
problem of wage measurement, Boskin and Hall use the instrumental variable estimator, 
which is expressed in terms of observable personal characteristics. 
A different approach is adopted in Rosen's (1976) study on the effect of the 
federal income tax and Hausman and Wise's (1976) study on the effect of a negative 
income tax. The marginal tax rate was evaluated at the same level of hours of work (i. e. 
at 40 hours per week) for all individuals in order to construct net wage rates and virtual 
incomes. The rationale for this procedure is that since the net wage variable is not 
constructed on the basis of actual, chosen hours of work, it is uncorrelated with the error 
term in the labour supply equation. This approach faces the problem of partly 
misrepresenting the actual tax rate faced by individuals who do not work at 40 hours per 
week. 
There is yet another problem. While the instrumental variable approach can 
adequately deal with the problem of endogeneity of wage and virtual income, this 
approach does not address the issue of kink locations. This can be a problem unless it is 
assumed that individuals do not locate themselves at kinks or there is no evidence of such 
clustering in the data set. 
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Flood and MaCurdy (1992) use both the piecewi se- linear budget constraint 
approach and the instrumental -variable approach to measure work disincentives effects in 
Sweden using cross-section data. They conclude that the instrumental-variable procedure 
offer a robust method for estimating the coefficients of the labour supply function. In the 
absence of measurement error, the error term enters linearly into the specification. The 
variables that are orthogonal to the structural disturbance can serve as valid instruments 
for estimating the parameters of the substitution and income effects. 
Blomquist (1996) conducted a study to investigate the small sample properties of 
the methods used in estimating the labour supply parameters with taxes. Using the 
instrumental variable approach and the Hausman method on Swedish data, he obtained 
wage elasticities ranging from -0.19 to 0.26, which reiterates the fact that different 
estimation methods applied to the same data can yield very different results. For the 
instrumental variable estimator, he uses two different sets of instruments. The first set 
consists of gross wage rate, taxable non-labour income, non-taxable non-labour income, 
the squares of these variables, a dummy variable each for age and number of children, 
which he denotes as IVI. Some analysts such as Flood and MaCurdy (1992) claim that 
gross wage rate and before tax non-labour income are invalid as instruments because 
they are not exogenous. They assert that a better set of instrument variables are socio- 
demographic variables since this will take care of both the endogeneity in the gross wage 
rate and non-labour income and the endogeneity in net wage rates imposed by non-linear 
taxes. Taking into account Flood and MaCurdy's argument, Blomquist uses socio- 
demographic variables for the instrumental variable estimator in his simulation which he 
denotes as IV2. 
In his base simulation, Blomquist keeps the sample size to around 600 and 
assumes no measurement error. He finds that the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator 
(QML) of the Hausman method has no small-sample bias and IV I performed as well as 
the QML estimator. IV2, which uses socio-demographic variables as instruments, has a 
negative bias close to -200 percent for the wage rate coefficient in the case of small 
sample. But when the sample size was increased to 18,000, the bias from IV2 was less 
than -10 percent. Blomquist argues that the small-sample 
bias of IV2 is because the 
instruments are only weakly correlated with the net wage rate. Using the Monte 
Carlo 
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simulation which incorporated measurement errors, he finds that the bias for the wage 
coefficient using the QML method tends towards zero, while IVI shows a negative bias 
of around -100 percent. However, an additive measurement error in the non-labour 
income causes the QML to break down, while IVI estimator performs fairly well. The 
conclusion from the Monte Carlo simulation is that no estimator is uniquely best and the 
choice of the estimator should depend on the sample size and type of measurement error 
in the data. 
5. RESULTS OF EmPIRICAL LABOUR SUPPLY STUDIES WITH TAXES 
Past studies are divided on the importance of taxes in affecting labour supply. The 
studies from personal interviews (e. g. Break, 1957; Barlow, Brazer, and Morgan, 1966) 
found that income tax does not affect the supply of labour. By contrast, econometric 
studies (e. g. Hall, 1973 and Kosters, 1967) assume that individuals react to taxes with 
perfect rationality. 
Rosen (1976) argues that the scepticism on the importance of taxes as a 
determinant of work effort is associated with two issues: (a) inaccuracy of an individual's 
perception towards his or her marginal tax rate, and (b) wage does not matter in the work 
decision. Using cross-section data on white married women, Rosen found that the two 
assertions are incorrect because these women do not suffer from tax illusion and married 
women's labour supply is highly responsive to net marginal earnings. In studying the 
participation and hours worked among married women in the United States, Leuthold 
(1978) similarly concludes that increases in the marginal tax rates will reduce both the 
participation and hours worked among married women, particularly the blacks. Since a 
tax increase is equivalent to a wage decrease, these findings are consistent with the other 
studies on the labour supply of married women that their labour supply decrease when 
wages fall. 
Some other studies which derived elasticity estimates of the labour supply 
response of wives to taxation are Hausman (1981a, 1981b) and Hausman and Ruud 
(1984) for the United States, Ashworth and Ulph (1981) for the United Kingdom, and 
Nakamura and Nakamura (1981) for Canada. The estimates obtained from these studies 
vary widely, partly as a result of different estimation techniques. For 
instance, Rosen 
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(1976) showed the highest elasticity estimate of 2.3, while Nakamura and Nakamura 
(1981) found significant negative uncompensated wage e lasticities of -0.30 or less. 
Hausman (1981a) found that the overall effect of tax on wives wages compared to the 
no-tax case in the United States is a reduction in labour supply by 18 percent. Hausman 
(1981b) simulated tax changes on wives labour supply and estimated that a 10 percent 
tax cut would increase wives labour supply by 4.1 percent. The dead-weight loss 
decreases significantly with a tax cut. The comparatively high estimates from Hausman's 
study is a subject of some discussion. In his comments to Hausman's paper, Heckman 
(1983) raises doubt about the large size of these estimates, which are sensitive to the 
choice of the functional form of the model and the distributions of unobservables. 
Most labour supply studies on prime-age males which ignore taxes estimate a 
backward bending supply curve. This implies that a reduction in tax rates will increase 
wages and lead to a reduction in hours of work. A different argument has been forwarded 
by the supply-side economists that a reduction in tax rates will stimulate a large labour 
supply increase to such an extent that govermnent revenue would increase. 12 Hausman 
(1981a, 1981b) found that compared to a no-tax situation, the United States tax system 
lower desired labour supply by 8.2 percent among males. According to his estimates, 
Hausman asserts that the increase in labour supply arising from a 30 percent tax cut is 
roughly three times as large as a 10 percent cut. 
A similar study was performed by Ashworth and Ulph (1981) for the United 
Kingdom which considers a tax change of plus or minus 7 percent and 15 percent of the 
standard rate of tax for prime-age males. The quantitative results of this study resembles 
those of Hausman. The predicted response of labour supply to tax changes is greatest 
among individuals in the highest income brackets. There is some evidence that the 
income effect dominates in the lowest quintile. The labour supply in this income 
category is expected to decrease when taxes are lowered. As in Hausman's study, 
Ashworth-Ulp found that the rise in labour supply is not sufficient to make a tax cut self- 
financing, since it will only offset about 10 percent of the reduction in revenue from the 
tax cut. 
12 The tax rate has to be very high for this argument to hold. Bruce Bender (1989) estimates 
that the tax rate that 
maximises real tax revenue is in the range of 72 to 82 per cent. This 
finding corresponds with the tax rates of 
approximately 70 percent calculated by Stuart (1981) for Sweden and 
79 per cent by Fullerton (1982) for the U. S. 
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Blomquist (1983) uses Hausman's approach in estimating the effect of taxes on 
labour supply in Sweden. His estimates indicate that taxes have a substantial effect on 
labour supply. The changes in labour supply corresponding to different wage levels are 
almost twice as large as the estimates for the United States, in line with the considerably 
higher tax rates in Sweden. 
Despite the sophistication of econometrics in second generation research, the 
empirical findings on taxes on labour supply are not, in any way, more 'definitive' than 
the first generation work. The general conclusion is that male labour supply is less 
sensitive to wage rates and property income than female labour supply, although this is 
disputed by Nakamura and Nakamura (1981), Mroz (1987), and MaCurdy, Green, and 
Paarsch (1990). There are outliers and anomalies in the elasticity estimates, but the 
general range of gross wage elasticity for males is between -0.20 and 0.14, while that for 
females can go above 0.60. As with the case of first generation studies, the variation of 
elasticity estimates for hours worked produced by second generation studies is as wide, if 
not wider, than first generation research. 13 Part of the reason for the variation is that the 
estimates are not always for the same category of people within and across studies. For 
instance, even for the same data set, women in different age groups exhibit different 
structural response to changes in wage and income. In addition, the variation in estimates 
is also due to the use of different variables and methodologies. Killingsworth (1983) 
notes that the second-generation elasticity estimates are higher for estimation methods 
that assume continuous supply than those that allow for a discontinuous labour supply 
schedule. The procedures used in the first generation work generally produce lower 
elasticity estimates than the second generation methodologies. 
Mroz (1987) examines how the estimated labour supply parameters change when 
after-tax marginal wage rate is used in the place of wage and virtual income replaces 
non-labour income. The standard deductions from the tax tables are used to compute the 
taxes paid and the marginal tax rates. The assumption for virtual income is that the 
husband's hours of work does not change in response to the wife's hours of work. The 
estimates of the single worker model are performed with and without adjustment 
for 
taxes. Controlling for taxes appears to affect only the estimated wage coefficient. Since 
13 For instance, see Table 4.3 in Killingsworth (1983). 
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the estimated wage coefficients with controls for taxes lie within one-fifth of one 
standard deviation of the estimates without taxes, Mroz concludes that the influence of 
taxes on the estimates of labour supply parameters is at most a second order effect. As an 
extension to the effect of taxes on labour supply, Mroz tries to test Rosen's (1976) 
finding that taxes have a significant impact on married women's labour supply. The 
result of this test is inconclusive implying that we can neither accept or reject the 
hypothesis that women take taxes into account in their labour supply decision. The fact 
that Mroz uses a semilogarithmic form while Rosen uses a linear form could be a reason 
explaining the discrepancy. The semilogarithmic form implies that the uncompensated 
wage effect diminishes as wages increase, while the linear specification implies a 
constant uncompensated effect. 
6. EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
There is little empirical research in developing countries on the elasticity of labour 
supply with regard to wages, and even less with income taxation. 
14 Available data in 
developing countries are generally deficient, with much of the empirical work using 
aggregate macroeconomic data. These studies have limited value in providing some 
direction to policy makers with regards to tax reform. There is very little in the empirical 
literature even for the aggregate labour supply elasticity. 
In studying urban workers in Africa, Berg (1961) finds that their aggregate supply 
curve is positively sloped instead of backward-sloping as was the view at that time. 
Regarding the two seemingly conflicting views, Miracle and Fetter (1970) and Miracle 
(1976) use qualitative historical data drawn from the copper belt of Africa and 
from 
Kenya, respectively, and argue that the two views are not inconsistent since the 
considerable risk of dying from disease in the early part of the twentieth century 
had 
raised the cost of working in urban areas. The backward-bending 
labour supply curve in 
Africa later became positively slope with the improvement in health and economic 
conditions that reduced the costs associated with urban employment. 
Among the few 
studies on the rural labour market, Bardhan (1979) finds evidence of a positively sloping 
labour supply response to wage among the agricultural workers and small cultivators 
in 
14 For a brief survey of the empirical 
literature, see Ebrill (1987a, 1987b). 
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India. Using data from rural Egypt, Hansen (1969) concludes that there is a strong 
positive correlation between rural wages and hours worked per day among the rural 
workers. 
Chesher (undated) undertakes an empirical analysis of female labour force 
participation in Peninsular Malaysia, using the combined household data from the 1980 
labour force and income survey data. The income data are net of taxes. Using the probit 
analysis on participation, he finds that that there is no ethnic difference in the 
participation of women. The presence of children aged 4 years and below has a negative 
effect on the participation of women in all age categories, while the presence of children 
aged 5-9 years has a negative effect on women in the 26-35 years age group as well. For 
women in the 36-59 years age group, the presence of older children has a positive effect 
on their participation. Family income has an inverse effect on participation of women in 
the 20-35 years age group and a quadratic effect on older women. There are positive age 
effects for younger women and negative age effects for older women. Chesher has also 
undertaken a similar probit analysis on female employment which has slightly greater 
explanatory power. He has also tried to capture the interactive effects of ethnicity in 
some alternative runs. While there appears to be some differences in the coefficients 
across ethnicity, many of the coefficients are poorly determined because of small sample 
sizes. 
In modelling hours of work, Chesher applies Heckman's (1979) two-step 
estimation procedure and finds little evidence of selectivity bias arising from the use of 
observed hours of work data. He then proceeds to estimate hours of work equation by 
ordinary least squares. While higher levels of education increase the chance of being 
employed, working women who are more highly educated tend to put in less hours than 
those who are less highly educated. Women in urban areas are less likely to participate, 
but when they choose to work, they put in more hours than their rural counterparts. The 
presence of children has a slight depressing effect on the hours worked by women. In 
another study on Malaysia, Chesher (1989) finds that the local unemployment rate has a 
negative effect on the probability of participation, indicating that the discouraged-worker 
effect outweighs the added-worker effect of unemployment. The negative effect 
is 
strongest for women under 25 years. 
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Studies on labour supply with taxation in developing countries are extremely 
scarce. In a recent study, Rochjadi and Leuthold (1994) estimate the effect of taxation on 
labour supply in Indonesia. Using a restricted subsample of 1,353 households from 
Indonesia's National Social-Economic Survey for 1982, the study estimates the 
elasticities for male and female head of households between the ages of 21 and 65 years 
with high school education or above and who were employed in the private sector. In the 
study, the utility function is assumed to take the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
form 
U= (aY b+L -b Y Ilb (12) 
where a and b are parameters of the utility function, Y is income, and L is hours devoted 
to leisure. The elasticity of substitution, s, between income and nonmarket activity is a 
function of b, where s= 1/(l + b). Since s is greater than zero, b> -1. The estimation 
model is: 
In (L11) = Po + P, Age +P2Sex +P3Education +P4Region 
P5Children +P6 In W+ u (13) 
and the ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to estimate equation (15). In their 
estimations, Rochjadi and Leuthold have only provided the uncompensated wage 
elasticity and the compensated wage elasticity, but not the non-labour income elasticity 
since Y is the denominator in the dependent variable. In their estimation for various 
regions and occupational groups, the uncompensated elasticities for all workers range 
from -0.02 to -0.06 and the compensated elasticities range from 0.33 to 0.58. Whereas 
the sign of the uncompensated wage elasticity is ambiguous, using the Slutsky condition 
they argue that the sign of the compensated wage elasticity is always positive (Rochjadi 
and Leuthold, 1994: 336). Using an estimation procedure that produces positive 
compensated wage elasticity for all the estimates would imply that the implicit income 
elasticity is restricted to be greater than zero. Although Rochjadi and Leuthold use a 
different estimation procedure, the process of restricting the income effect to be greater 
than zero is similar to the approach adopted by Hausman. This process will produce 
elasticity estimates with the 'right' signs. In this regard, Heckman's (1983) critique of the 
Hausman approach discussed earlier can equally be applied to Rochjadi and Leuthold. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
From the literature review, it is apparent that issues pertaining to the estimation of labour 
supply parameters are complex. Estimation problems abound and challenge the skill and 
creativity of analysts for over two decades. After the early estimation efforts in first 
generation research, analysts soon realised the importance of paying careful attention to 
model specification. This led a new generation of static labour supply research using 
advanced techniques. Despite the innovative procedures adopted in second generation 
research, the wide range of labour supply parameter estimates persist. Sensitivity 
analyses were conducted on the estimation methods, functional forms and assumptions 
adopted to determine the source and extent of variation. The results of these studies have 
been revealing. Economic and statistical assumptions can have a substantial impact on 
the estimates obtained. However, not all of the disparate results are due to differences in 
estimation procedure since some studies conduct analysis on subsamples of the same 
data set and produce different estimates for each category of the subsample. 
The incorporation of taxation in the labour supply model presents additional 
problems to the analyst. Under progressive taxation, the budget set is no longer linear but 
convex and piecewise linear. The concept of virtual income is used as a device to 
linearise the budget set so as to simplify the estimation procedure. An advance to the 
estimation methodology was made by Burtless and Hausman (1978) which allowed the 
econometric model to have two error terms instead of one, i. e. unobserved heterogeneity 
of preferences and optimisation error. The maximum likelihood technique is used to 
solve the equations. In the case of the non-convex budget set, Burtless and Hausman 
demonstrated the technique of using the Roy's identity to generate the labour supply 
function from the indirect utility function. This method is valid as long as the Slutsky 
condition holds. Hausman later elaborated on this technique in a number of papers 
(Hausman, 1979,1980,1985). While the Hausman approach has been adopted by 
analysts in analysing the non-convex budget set as a result of taxes and welfare 
programme, Heckman (1983) raises the question whether the 
Hausman procedure is 
trying to 'fine tune' too much in the face of data that neither he nor economists are 
likely 
to have. This is echoed by Mroz (1987: 786) that the Hausman procedure requires 
exceptionally strong assumptions on the tax structure and the stochastic 
disturbances in 
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the model'. Heckman (1983: 74) argues that 'previous empirical procedures such as 
those of Boskin and Hall that incorporate less (false) information into the estimation 
procedure may be more robust than procedures such as Hausman's which assume 
information that does not exist and which produce inconsistent estimators if the 
information is false. ' These arguments provide a case for using the instrumental variable 
approach, which has recently been applied on Swedish data. 
In the next chapter, we draw from the methodological experience of second 
generation work to assess the importance of taxes in the Malaysian labour supply 
function. We use the instrumental variable approach in the next chapter for this purpose. 
It is not clear at this stage whether results obtained will correspond to general findings of 
studies from developed countries. While there is no a priori reason why this should not 
be the case, the differences in the work environment, work culture, and institutional 
underpinnings with regards to employment, wages, social security and benefit, and 




MODELLING LABOUR SUPPLY WITH TAXATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After reviewing the relevant literature on static labour supply modelling in the last 
chapter, we now proceed to discuss the model specification and the estimation results. 
This chapter seeks to estimate the labour supply response of married couples in the prime 
age groups facing the 1984 and 1992 Malaysian income tax rates. Since 1986 the 
marginal rates of the individual income tax have been reduced in stages. The top rate of 
55% was reduced to 40% in 1986 and subsequently brought down to 32% in 1995. 
The average family income has expanded rapidly relative to tax exemptions and 
deductions. As discussed in Chapter 4, the tax base expanded during this period, with 
more people now falling within the taxable category as the result of bracket creep. The 
reduction of the top marginal tax rate and the growth in average family income resulted 
in individuals reaching the top tax bracket faster than they did a decade before. On the 
other hand, the marginal tax rate at each taxable income category has fallen. This implies 
that households with family income at the national average, or some multiples of it, are 
now paying lower taxes. In the light of these developments, it will be interesting and 
useful to examine the labour supply response under the tax regimes of 1984 and 1992. In 
this chapter, we examine the effect of income tax on the response of individuals towards 
participation and hours worked. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of 
income tax on work incentives in Malaysia. It will generate elasticities of labour supply 
with and without taxation, and the basis of which will provide some indication whether 
the treatment of labour supply as an exogenous variable in the tax reform simulations 
performed in Chapter 5 is reasonable. 
CHAPTER MODELLING LA BO UR SUPPLY WITH T4X, 4 TION 
This task of estimating the coefficients of the labour supply function with 
taxation for Malaysia is very much facilitated by the availability of income and labour 
force data collected by the Department of Statistics. This estimation will certainly 
increase our understanding of the labour supply characteristics of countries having 
economic, social and institutional structures which differ from the developed countries. 
While Malaysia may not represent an average developing country in terms of its income 
level, growth rate, and rates of unemployment and inflation, it nevertheless shares a 
similar pattern of development with many high middle income countries, ) especially those 
in the Far East. 
Much of our understanding of labour supply with taxation are derived from 
studies conducted in the developed countries which have different tax and transfer 
payment structures from the developing countries. For instance, in the developed 
countries, taxes on income, profit and capital gains account for 40 per cent of central 
government revenue in 1985, while social security contributions account for 30 per cent. 
The comparable figures for middle income developing countries are 24 per cent and 10 
per cent, respectively (World Bank, 1987: Table 24). In Malaysia, total income tax in 
1985 contributes about 42 per cent of the federal government revenue and 11.4 per cent 
of GDP, while individual income tax constitutes about 20 per cent of the total income tax 
collected. 
Many of the elaborate welfare and social benefit systems in operation in the 
developed countries do not have their equivalent in the developing countries. Without 
unemployment benefit and income support programmes, an individual who is out of 
work in a developing country will have to fall back on past savings or rely on the 
goodwill of relatives. This means that there is a stronger motivation for a person who has 
just lost his job to get back to work or perform some part-time work. There is no 
financial advantage for him to choose to remain unemployed or to limit his hours of work 
as might be the case if he faces a non-convex budget constraint arising from welfare 
transfer payments within a progressive tax system. The hours of work put in by members 
of a household may also be affected by welfare programmes, or the lack of them. 
Without the benefit of income support programmes, poor households in developing 
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countries would have to increase the hours of work to make ends meet. One can argue 
that under such circumstances some caution should be exercised when trying to make 
some inferences about the labour supply responses of developing countries on the basis 
of studies conducted in developed countries. 
Much of the discussion of the backward bending supply curves relates to high 
levels of income (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Sapsford and Tzannatos, 1993). An 
important assumption in the labour supply model of developed countries is that work is a 
Giffen good while leisure is a normal good. At higher levels of income, an individual 
will demand more leisure and correspondingly, less work. Hence, at higher income 
levels, the individual's supply curve of hours becomes backward-sloping as the wage rate 
increases because the income effect (which is linked with the demand for more leisure as 
income increases) is expected to outweigh the substitution effect (which encourages the 
individual to substitute leisure for work as it becomes relatively more expensive). 
There is some evidence of backward-bending labour supply curves in developing 
countries. These curves occur not at the high income level, but rather among subsistence 
farmers in rural communities where income is among the lowest. In his study of the 
supply and demand for labour in Rural West Bengal, Bardhan (1984) found that the 
supply curve of the hired out farm labourers were backward-bending. Huang (1976) 
examines the peasant economy of three paddy areas in Malaysia and argues that 
subsistence farmers are not responsive to economic opportunities and behave according 
to the notion of a backward-bending supply curve. In examining the effect of taxes on 
labour supply in Malaysia, we would also be generating results that could shed some 
light whether there is evidence of a backward-bending labour supply curve for the whole 
economy, and not just among subsistence farmers, and if so, at what income level 
is it 
most evident. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 
discusses the 
sources of data and concepts on labour force and household income used 
in the analyses. 
This is followed by a discussion on the labour force and income characteristics in Section 
3. The model specifications on estimating the labour supply coefficients 
before and after 
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taxes are elaborated in Sections 4 and 5. Results from the estimations using different 
alternative assumptions are presented in Section 6, followed by regression results on 
subgroups in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 discusses the main implications of the findings 
before the conclusion in Section 9. 
2. DATA ON LABOUR FORCE AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
The data used for the analysis in this chapter are drawn from the Malaysian 
Labour Force Surveys and Household Income Surveys which are collected by the 
Department of Statistics. It may be useful to provide some details on the two sources of 
data. 
2.1 Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) collects information on the structure and 
distribution of labour force, employment and unemployment. The survey covers around 
60,000 living quarters and is conducted several times a year to even out the effects of 
seasonal variations on labour. It employs a stratified multistage sample design in order to 
obtain reliable estimates at the national and regional level, as well as rural and urban 
areas. Two categories of information are collected in the survey: (a) the demographic 
particulars of all household members irrespective of age, and (b) labour force particulars 
for household members within the 15-64 working age group. Persons living in private 
households are included in the survey population but not those residing in institutions, 
such as hostels, hotels, hospitals, prisons, boarding houses and military barracks. 
To determine the labour force status of individuals, questions are asked in relation 
to the reference week immediately preceding the date of the interview. The key question 
is whether the respondent had worked at least I day for pay, profit or family gains during 
the reference week. Based on the individual's response to a series of questions, it will be 
possible to categorise an individual's labour force status into a few categories: employed, 
underemployed, actively or passively unemployed, and out of the labour force. The 
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2.1.1 Determining labour force status 
A person's labour force status is determined on the basis of his or her responses 
to the questions asked in the LFS. If a person answers 'Yes' to Question 1, the he/she 
will be asked Question 3 to determine the number of hours worked. If the answer is 'No' 
to Question 1, then he/she will be asked Question 2 of whether he/she has a job to return 
to. If the answer is 'Yes' to Question 2, then he/she is asked why he/she was not at work 
during the reference week. If the answer is 'No' to Question 2, Questions 5-7 are asked 
to determine the nature of unemployment. 
Response of 'Yes' to Question I 
1. If a respondent has worked for at least I day in the reference week, he or she is 
considered 'employed'. 
2. If a respondent worked less than 30 hours, he or she is 'underemployed'. 
Response of 'No' to Question I 
1. If a respondent is not working but has job to return to, he or she is 'employed'. 
2. If a respondent is not working but looking for work, he or she is 'unemployed'. 
3. If a respondent is not working and not looking for work, he or she is asked the reasons 
for not looking for work. If the respondent believes that there is no job available, or 
because of bad weather, illness, confinement, waiting for answer from an application, 
and no qualifications, then he or she is regarded to be 'passively unemployed'. If the 
respondent is schooling, a housewife, disabled, retired, or not interested in working, then 
he or she is considered to be 'out of the labour force'. Except for those out of the labour 
force, all others in the 15-64 age groups are considered to be part of the labour force. 
2.2 Household Income Survey (HIS) 
There are few household income surveys in the past. Income data at the beginning 
of the seventies can be obtained from the Post Enumeration Survey (PES) of the 
Population Census 1970. While conducting PES to ascertain the extent of census 
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undercounting, the Department of Statistics included questions on household income in 
the survey. In the mid-seventies, the Agricultural Census 1976 contains some questions 
on household income. After the Agricultural Census, there was a long lapse before the 
Household Income Survey (HIS), specifically designed to collect household income data, 
was conducted in 1984. Starting from this survey, the Department of Statistics adopts the 
strategy of conducting HIS at regular intervals. The Household Income Surveys are 
attached to the Labour Force Surveys so that the two surveys can be conducted 
simultaneously for the same sample of households. The HIS for 1984,1987,1989, and 
1992 were conducted using this strategy. After gathering information on household and 
labour force characteristics using the Labour Force Survey questionnaire, the 
interviewers then proceed to obtain income data from the same individuals. Since the 
households and individuals for the two surveys are similar, it is possible to combine the 
information from the two surveys to yield a complete record which contains information 
on household, labour force and income characteristics of an individual. 
The HIS collects data on income, taxes as well as transfer receipts and payments 
for the whole year, using the previous year as the reference year. Where information 
cannot be obtained directly, interviewers use work sheets to calculate the imputed value 
of agricultural and non-agricultural activities, home produce consumption, as well as rent 
for dwelling and agricultural land. 
2.3 Concept ofHousehold Income 
2.3.1 Earnings 
There are two categories of earnings: paid employment income and self 
employment income (see Table 7.1). Paid employment income 
includes wages and 
salaries, allowances,, bonuses, commissions and tips, overtime earnings, 
free food, 
free/concessional lodging and consumer goods, other payment in kind, and employers 
contribution to the Employees Provident Fund. If a person is not an employee 
but is self 
employed, his or her income is classified as income accrued 
from self employment. 
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TABLE 7.1 ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME DURING THE LAST 12 MONTHS 
EARNINGS 
1. Earnings during the last twelve months from paid employment 
i. Wages and salaries (before income tax, social security contributions, etc. ) 
ii. Allowances (e. g. cost of living allowances, specialist allowances, housing allowances) 
iii. Bonuses 
iv. Other cash (like commissions, tips, earnings from overtime work, etc. ) 
V. Free concessional food 
v i. Free concessional lodging 
vii. Free concessional consumer goods and services 
viii. Other payments received in kind (like paddy, coconut, rubber, etc. ) 
ix. Employer's contributions to social security 
A. Total Paid Employment Income 
2. Earnings from self employment during the last twelve months 
3. Receipt during the last month from 
i. Imputed rent of owner-occupied house 
ii. Rent from houses or other property 
iii. Rent from lodging 
B. Total Other Earned Income 
INCOME OTHER THAN EARNINGS 
4. Income received during the last twelve months from property 
i. Royalties (in respect of copyrights, patents and similar rights) 
ii. Rent from agricultural land 
iii. Interest (from banks, deposits, bills, bonds, loans, etc. ) 
iv. Dividends (such as from ownership of shares) 
C. Total Property Income 
5. Income received during the last twelve months from transfers 
i. Remittances (from other households from within and outside the country) 
ii. Alimony 
iii. Scholarships / Bursaries / Fellowships 
iv. Pensions 
v. Other periodic payments received (e. g. from an inheritance or trust fund, etc. ) 
vi. Gifts in cash and in kind 
D. Total Current Transfers Received 
TOTAL INCOME [A +B+C+ DI 
Source: Surnmarised from the Household Income Survey questionnaire 
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2.3.2 Income other than earnings 
This category of income consists of property income and transfer income. 
Royalties, rent from agricultural land, interest, and dividends are considered property 
income, while transfer income, scholarships, pensions, and gifts received are classified as 
current transfer income. The summation of earnings and income other than earnings 
constitutes the total income of an individual in a household. 
2.4 Sample Usedfor Analysis 
The analysis uses a 25 per cent sample of households from the combined data of 
the Labour Force Survey and the Household Income Survey for 1984 and 1992. The 
subsample is randomly selected from the survey tape on the basis of households so that 
the individual records for the selected households appear together. There are about 
60,000 individual records on both adults and children for each of the two years. Care is 
taken to ensure that the households included in the subsample are identical for both LFS 
and HIS. After verifying that the household indentifiers of the two data sources match 
exactly, the two data sources are merged. The analysis on households is only confined to 
the year of the survey. No attempt has been made to combine the data across several 
years for a longitudinal analysis since a different sample of households is selected for 
each of the years. 
The focus of the study is to examine the participation and labour supply of males 
and females within the household context. The data base consists of the head of 
household and his or her spouse who are in the prime age group of 20-54 years. The joint 
income and joint taxes of the couple are calculated and attached to the couple's record 
together with the number and ages of their children. Included in the sample are 
employees, own account workers, housewives, and those of other employment status, but 
not employers and students. The inclusion of employers would complicate the 
relationship between earnings and hours of work since only part of their earnings can 
be 
attributed to their own labour input. Students are excluded because they are technically 
out of the labour force. Housewives are included in the sample 
because most married 
women who are not working would be classified into this category. 
Since we wish to 
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consider the participation decision of married women, it is necessary to include 
housewives in the data. 
2.5 Concepts Used in the Model 
Participation: This variable refers to those who supply positive hours of work 
during the reference week and non-participation to those who work zero hours. Those 
who are out of the labour force are not considered in the participation formulation. ' Prior 
to the late 1960s analysts failed to distinguish between participation (employment) and 
hours of work. This distinction is important because labour supply coefficient estimates 
based on participation show greater responsiveness to wage and income variation than 
hours-of-work equation. Heckman (1993) notes that labour supply empirical studies in 
1960s showed that the wage and income elasticities are higher for females than for male 
largely because analysts were using elasticity estimates from the participation equation 
for females and elasticity estimates from the hours-of-work equation for men. Mroz 
(1987) dismissed the conventional wisdom that the wage and income elasticities for 
women are larger than men when he controlled for self-selection bias in the participation 
equation. This finding concurs with Nakamura and Nakamura (198 1) and is supported by 
Thomas MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990). 2 
TT- 
hours: This variable refers to hours of work per week. Hours are positive for 
those who are working, and zero for those not working. The measurement of hours is a 
potential source of error because there is inadequate data for paid holidays, absenteeism, 
time not working due to illness, overtime etc. In addition, the number of hours worked 
during the reference week need not be the typical hours worked throughout the year. 
Should an individual work overtime during the reference week, there will be errors in 
calculating the number of hours worked and, correspondingly, the average wage, which 
uses hours worked as the denominator. Another source of error is that the observed hours 
I There is a difference in the usage of the term 'participation' in the labour supply 
literature and the 
Labour Force Survey. In labour supply analysis, participation refers to positive hours of work and non- 
participation to zero hours of work. In the Labour Force Survey, labour 
force participation refers to 
those in the 15-64 age group who are not 'out of the labour force'. 
More discussion on this issue is found in Chapter 6. 
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do not correspond to the desired hours because of constraints on the supply side (e. g. 
health) or the demand side (such as minimum or maximum hours and institutional 
working hours). In the sample, we have removed those who are employed but reported 
zero hours of work in the reference week, as a result of being on a holiday, illness, strike, 
etc. Their inclusion would complicate the calculations since they would appear to be 
earning wages for supplying zero hours of work. 
Wage: The Labour Force Survey does not collect wage data. To derive this 
variable, annual labour earnings is divided by the hours of work per year, i. e. hours 
worked during the reference week multiplied by 52 to yield the wage rate before tax (w). 
The net wage rate or marginal wage (WAGETAX) is given by w(l - T)where w is the 
wage rate and T is the marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate is calculated from the 
income tax paid by the individual as reported in HIS. Based on the amount of taxes paid 
reported, it is possible to derive an individual's marginal tax rate, that is, his or her tax 
bracket. The marginal wage is used to find the point of tangency between the utility 
function and the budget constraint in order to determine the hours of work. Theoretically, 
it is the marginal wage rather than the average wage that an individual is concerned with 
in deciding whether to put in an extra hour of work. In many studies, the marginal wage 
is estimated from official income tax schedules calculated on the basis of reported 
income. In this case, assumptions need to be made about the amount of allowable 
deductions and the extent of separate or joint assessment of the income of married 
couples. The calculated tax is unlikely to correspond with the actual amount of tax paid 
by the individual since it overlooks tax avoidance and evasion. Since hours of work is 
used to derive WAGETAX, errors in measuring hours are transmitted to the 
measurement of wage. 
Non-Labour Income Variable: This variable is equal to an individual's total 
income minus his/her labour income plus the total income of his or her spouse. There is 
the practical problem of estimating the non-labour portion of an individual's income. In 
some cases, it may require imputing the value of the rental of owner-occupied dwellings 
and goods produced for own consumption. The model considers only income from the 
spouse and not the other people in the household. Some older couples may have married 
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children or other relatives living in the same household but it is difficult to say to what 
extent their income affect the labour supply of the couple. In most Asian families, the 
men are the main breadwinner, as indicated by over 95 per cent of married men who 
were reported as being the head of household. 
Education (EDUQ: Dummy variables are used for primary, lower secondary, 
upper secondary, and tertiary education against the reference group of those not having 
any education. The US provides the highest level of educational attainment for each 
household member. 
Experience (EXPRQ: This variable refers to potential work experience, which is 
measured in years and is used only for males. This variable is estimated because LFS 
does not collect information on work experience. To calculate this variable, we estimate 
the age of leaving school, i. e. years of schooling plus 6, which is the first age of 
schooling. If the age of leaving school is greater than 15 years, then the potential work 
experience variable of an individual is his age minus the age of leaving school. If the age 
of leaving school is less than 15 years, then the potential work experience variable is 
assumed to be an individual's age minus 15. The rationale for using 15 years as a cut off 
point is because there is automatic promotion up to 9 years of schooling, while child 
labour is a non-issue in Malaysia. It may be argued that children below 15 years may 
help out in the farm or family business and that would contribute to their experience. The 
model, nevertheless, assumes that an individual would begin to accumulate work 
experience that would make a difference to his wage only after 15 years of age. The work 
experience variable can be used for the males without much problem because of their 
high participation rate and very low unemployment rate, which means that there is no 
breaks in estimating an individual's work experience. This variable is not used for 
females since there may be career breaks in a woman's life-cycle and on which we 
have 
no information. 
Children: Dummy variables are used for children in different age groups, 
i. e. I 
year and less (CHI), 2 years (CH2), three to five years 
(CH3_5), six to eleven years 
(CH6_1 1), and twelve to sixteen years (CH12_16). In LFS, age 
is reported in years. The 
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age group 6-11 years corresponds with 6 years of primary education, while the age group 
12-16 years corresponds with 5 years of secondary education. Children undergoing 
tertiary education and high school are above 16 years old where many would have to 
leave home to attend college or university. 
Urban (URB) is a dummy for all gazetted areas with population of 10,000 and 
above. This variable refers to the place of dwelling and is not necessarily the work place 
of a respondent. 
Occupation: The classification of occupation follows the Malaysian Dictionary of 
Occupational Classification which adopts the recommendations of the International 
Labor Organization. The acronyms for the occupations used in the model are as follows: 
TEACH = teachers who are classified under the professional and technical 
occupation. Teachers generally report lower hours of work, averaging 25-30 
hours per week. In collecting this information, it is clear that US takes into 
account the time spent during normal schooling hours but not the time spent by 
teachers on extra-mural activities, preparation of teaching materials, and marking 
of school work outside schooling hours. 
PROF = professional and technical workers, excluding teachers; ADM = 
administrative and managerial workers; CLR = clerical workers; SALE = sales 
workers; SER = service workers; AGRIWKR = agricultural workers, who are not 
necessarily farmers since this occupational group include estate managers, 
planters, and fishermen as well; and PROD = production workers. 
3. LABOUR FORCE AND INCOME CHARACTERISTICS 
Malaysia's labour force was growing at an annual growth rate of 2.7 per cent and is 
estimated to be 8.1 million in 1995. During the last 10 years, the size of the labour force 
was growing at 2.9 per cent per annum, while the labour force participation rate for those 
in the 15-64 age group was 67 per cent. Although the unemployment rate peaked at 8.8 
per cent in 1986 during the height of the recession, it has fallen steadily to around 3.0 per 
cent for the last three years when the country reached full employment of its workforce. 
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According to Lucas and Verry (1990), married women plays an important role in 
bringing about labour force adjustments as economic conditions change, both cyclically 
and in the long term. Despite the recent increases in labour force participation of females, 
their participation rates for all age groups are below 50 per cent and married women tend 
to respond readily to economic incentives, such as changes in wages, labour market 
conditions, educational opportunities, etc. 
The effects of education on labour force participation in Malaysia do not form a 
clear pattern. Except for those with primary education, individuals of either sex are more 
likely to participate in the workforce as their educational levels increase. This pattern is 
more marked for females than for males. Those with primary education have higher 
participation rates than those with lower secondary education (Lucas and Verry, 1990: 5). 
Participation seems to be higher in rural than in urban areas, although the nature of 
participation in the two strata may not share similar characteristics. For instance, women 
in rural areas may perform agricultural activities alongside their other household 
activities. 
Household income grew rapidly during the last two decades. This was 
accompanied by the reduction of the poverty incidence of 49.3 per cent in 1970 to 16.7 
per cent in 1990 (Malaysia, 1991a: 43). Households benefited from productivity 
increases and structural changes in rural employment that widen the scope of economic 
activities and raised income. The expansion in non-agricultural jobs encouraged large 
numbers of self-employed and unpaid family workers to enter the waged labour market 
and made wage income an important component of income in rural areas. 
Table 7.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of the variables for males and 
females in the sample based on the combined Labour Force Survey and Household 
Income Survey (LFS/HIS) data set for 1984 and 1992. The sample consists of married 
heads of household and his/her spouse in the prime age groups. The average age in the 
sample is 38 years for males and 36 years for females, both of whom have around 
6-7 
years of education. Waged employment is the most important source of 
income for the 
average individual, while the income accrued from self-employment 
is much smaller. 
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The contribution of property income and net transfer income to the total income of an 
average male is small, although the contribution of net transfer income to female income 
is slightly larger than the males. Average income has increased between 1984-1992 and 
average hours worked have risen by 2 hours for males and I hour for females. 
In terms of hours worked, four-fifths of the males in urban areas and three- 
quarters in the rural areas work between 31-60 hours per week (see Table 7.3). Among 
females, two-thirds of the workers in the urban areas and three-fifths of workers in the 
rural areas work between 31-60 hours per week. The degree of under employment, i. e. 
people working below 30 hours per week, is larger in rural areas than urban areas and for 
females than males. This corresponds with the nature of agricultural activities in rural 
areas, which are influenced by weather and outdoor working conditions, seasonality and 
minimal manpower input required during the growth phase of some field crops. Women 
who work shorter hours per week are normally involved in part-time work to augment 
family income while performing their household activities. The degree of 
underemployment was generally lower in 1992 than 1984. 
The distributions of taxes paid and marginal tax rates are shown in Table 7.4 and 
Table 7.5, respectively. The majority of people in the labour force in Malaysia do not pay 
income tax. An important reason for this is the low net wage earned by the average 
worker (see Table 7.2). About three-quarters of the males are non-taxpayers and among 
those who pay taxes, the median taxpayer falls within the 12 per cent tax bracket. The 
proportion of females who are non-taxpayers is even larger than the males, attributable to 
the lower female participation rate (38 per cent in 1984 and 40 per cent in 1992) as 
against 97 per cent for the males. Over 90 per cent of females do not pay taxes although 
the percentage of female non- taxpayers is lower in 1992 than it was six years before. 
The median female taxpayer has also moved up the tax bracket, from 9 per cent in 1984 
to 12 per cent in 1992. 
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TABLE 7.2 MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF VARIABLES 
Male 
1984 1992 
Variable Mean Std DeV Mean Std Dev 
Age 37.8 8.4 38.7 8.0 
Experience 22.3 8.3 23.2 8.0 
Education 6.1 3.1 6.5 3.1 
Hours 45.6 15.9 47.4 15.7 
Net wage 5.45 7.02 6.11 7.29 
Tax paid 449 21392 397 1,823 
Employment income 8,771 12,339 10,742 15,580 
Self employed income 11931 81712 2,044 5,065 
Property income 121 11840 173 1,207 
Net transfer income 181 11233 278 1,609 
Total mean income 11 ý007 165167 13,237 17,365 Virtual income ('000) 2.921 5.563 4.621 17.350 
Non-labour income ('000) 3.288 6.872 4.998 17.757 
Total in sample 6,654 8,007 
Female 
1984 1992 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Age 35.3 8.8 36.4 8.6 
Education 6.8 3.9 6.7 3.6 
Hours 15.8 22.6 16.9 23.0 
Net wage 3.66 4.40 4.94 12.99 
Tax paid 34 318 64 390 
Employment income 19463 31958 29579 15,158 
Self employed. income 222 1,300 307 11869 
Property income 89 123 44 419 
Net transfer income 209 1,134 246 1,533 
Total mean income 15903 4,493 3!, 176 15ý503 
Virtual income ('000) 11.580 15.530 14.700 49.740 
Non-labour income ('000) 12.100 17.330 15.199 50.313 
Number in sample 8,138 9,526 
Source: Sample from LFS/HIS 
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Hours Urban Rural Urban Rural 
I- 10 hours 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.6 
11 - 30 hours 6.7 14.0 3.8 13.9 
31 - 35 hours 4.5 7.0 3.5 8.0 
36 - 40 hours 14.0 16.4 9.2 10.8 
41 - 45 hours 17.6 13.4 15.0 12.0 
46 - 50 hours 28.5 25.6 36.9 27.2 
51 - 60 hours 16.6 12.1 18.1 16.8 
61 - 80 hours 8.5 8.4 10.1 8.4 
81 - 100 hours 2.2 2.0 2.8 1.9 
Above 100 hours 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Median category 46-50 hours 41-45 hours 46-50 hours 41-45 hours 
Female 
1984 1992 
Hours Urban Rural Urban Rural 
I- 10 hours 2.3 3.6 1.5 3.0 
11 - 30 hours 20.4 28.4 16.7 26.3 
31 - 35 hours 6.1 9.6 6.1 10.2 
36 - 40 hours 12.2 12.0 10.3 10.7 
41 - 45 hours 16.6 13.4 15.5 10.5 
46 - 50 hours 22.6 17.5 30.0 21.4 
51 - 60 hours 9.6 7.9 11.0 
9.9 
61 - 80 hours 7.5 5.2 6.4 
6.3 
81 - 100 hours 2.1 2.1 2.2 
1.5 
Above 100 hours 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Median category 41-45 hours 36-40 hours 41-45 hours 36-40 hours 
Source: Sampleftom LFSIHIS 
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TABLE 7.4 DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES PAID 
Male 
1984 1992 
Ta x (R M) Frequency % % of Frequency % % of 
Taxpayers Taxpayers 
No Tax 5,081 76.4 - 5,877 73.3 
150 and less 329 4.9 20.9 390 4.9 18.3 
151 -375 339 5.1 21.6 511 6.4 24.0 
376- 1,050 410 6.2 26.1 563 7.0 26.4 
1,051 - 2,050 210 3.2 13.4 310 3.9 14.6 
2ý051 - 5,000 146 2.2 9.3 241 3.0 11.3 
50,001 - 10,000 77 1.2 4.9 69 0.9 3.2 
10,001 - 15,000 23 0.3 1.5 21 0.3 1.0 
155001 - 301,000 34 0.5 2.2 22 0.3 1.0 
Above 30,000 5 0.1 0.3 3 0.0 0.1 
Total 65654 100.0 100.0 8,007 100.0 100.0 
Median category RM375-1,050 RM375-1,050 
Female 
1984 1992 
Tax Frequency % % of Frequency % % of 
Taxpayers Taxpayers 
No Tax 7,745 95.2 8,719 91.5 - 
150 and less 118 1.4 30.1 159 1.7 19.7 
151 -375 91 1.1 23.2 233 2.4 28.9 
376- 11050 126 1.5 32.1 247 2.6 30.6 
1,051 - 29050 34 0.4 8.4 111 
1.2 13.8 
2,051 - 5ý000 18 0.2 4.6 46 
0.5 5.7 
50,001 - 10,000 4 0.0 1.0 
10 0.1 1.2 
10,001 - 15,000 2 0.0 0.5 
1 0.0 0.1 
Total 8,138 100.0 100.0 91526 100.0 100.0 
Median category RM151-375 RM376-1,050 
Source: Sampleftom LFSIHIS 
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Frequency % Frequency 
329 20.9 390 
339 21.5 511 
236 15.0 315 
174 11.1 248 
210 13.4 310 
93 5.9 141 
41 2.6 77 
64 4.1 74 
43 2.7 35 
30 1.9 24 
9 0.6 3 













Median category 12% 12% 
Female 
Marginal Tax 1984 1992 
Rate ('16) Frequency % Frequency % 
_ 6 _ 118 30.1 159 19.7 
9 91 23.2 233 28.9 
12 70 17.9 147 18.2 
15 56 14.3 100 12.4 
20 33 8.4 111 13.8 
25 14 3.6 35 4.3 
30 4 1.0 10 1.2 
35 2 0.5 8 1.0 
40 4 1.0 4 0.5 
Median category 9% _12 
% 
Source: Sampleftom LFSIHIS 
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4. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The model used to estimate the labour supply equation parameters follows the theoretical 
and economic strategies employed in second-generation research for static labour supply 
models. 3A key aspect of second generation model specification is the incorporation of 
unobservables which affect the labour supply decision. To keep the model specification 
simple, we shall begin by specifying the basic model of labour supply before taxation. 
Let the individual's utility function be given by 
U= COV (1) 
subject to 
PC= W(I -L)+ Y 
L=(l -H) 
where C is a composite consumer good, L is leisure time, P is price, W is wage and Y is 
non-labour income. Total time T is normalised to I so that H is the proportion of time 
spent at market work, while (I - H) -= L is the proportion of time spent in leisure. To 
simplify, we drop P and redefine W and Y to be real wage and the level of property 
income. However, this theoretical model overlooks the fact that individuals differ not 
only in terms of observable variables, such as W and Y, but also in terms of the 
unobservable error term,, e, which plays a role in labour supply decisions. 
Substituting 
C= W(H+e)+ Y 
L= I -(H+e) 
into the utility function, we have 
W(H+ e) + ll'x [I- (H+ e)f (6) 
3 There are several ways of presenting the formulations for static labour supply with taxation 
in second 
generation work. For the sake of consistency, we use the approach adopted by Killingsworth 
(1983) as 
the basis for our model specifications. 
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where e is an unobservable, non-random error term that varies from one person to 
another. The term in the first set of square brackets is real goods consumption C while 
the term in the second square bracket is leisure. The unobservable error term e represents 
'taste differences' or 'heterogeneity in preferences' that account for the different levels of 
utility that individuals derive from identical combinations of consumption and leisure. It 
is also associated with reservation wage and participation decision of individuals. 
The marginal rate of substitution M is given by 
aulaL 
aulac 






where b =- p/ (cc + P). The reservation wage M* is where H=0 and L=I is given by 
b (We + Y) 
(I - b) (I - e) 
(9) 
An individual with a given value of e will work if and only if his offered wage exceeds 
his reservation wage, i. e. W> M*. Substituting for the reservation wage and expressing 
the participation criterion as a condition on the error term yields the following conditions 
H>O iff 6H > -j (10) 
H=O iff 6H ýý -j (11) 
where - -e and J= [(I - 
b) - b(Ylffý]- If an individual chooses to work, 
his or her 6H == 
utility is maximised at the point of tangency between the budget line and the 
indifference 
curve, which is given by equating W with M. Applying this condition to 
Equation (8) and 
solving it for H, the empirical labour supply function for workers 
is 
-b)-b 
(y/ffý + EH (12) 
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The incorporation of the error term in the utility function has made it possible to 
derive the threshold condition for participation, as given 'by Equation (10) and Equation 
(11). Based on the values of W and Y, the analyst can never be sure if an individual 
chooses to work or not since his/her decision would also depend on his/her 'inclination 
towards work', as given by F- H. The individual will participate if his or her 6H is 
sufficiently large and exceeds -[(I-b) - b(Y/ffý], or if the value of the right-hand side of 
the equation becomes smaller than F, Has a result of an' increase in real wage. An 
individual would choose not to work whenc H< -[(I-b) - b(Ylffý]. 
4.1 Participation Equation 
Initially, let us assume that we observe the real wage rate W for all individuals in 
the population, including non-workers. To derive the probability that a given individual i 
will work, we further assume that F, Hhas a mean of zero, has a standard deviationOf cTH, 
and is normally distributed in the population as a whole. This implies that the 
standardised normal variable F-Hi ICYHhas a mean of zero and a variance of 1. Given the 
assumption of the population distribution of FHj, the probability that the individual will 
work is given by 
Pr [i works] = Pr I(F-Hi ICYH) ýý* ( -ji 
/ CFH)l 
00, ff (t)dt =I- F(-Ji 
/ (TH) 
Ji /all 
where Ji =I-b- b(Y/W), F-H =-e for all positive values of H, f is the standard normal 
density function, and F is the cumulative normal density function. The cumulative 
normal density function F(-Ji ICFH) gives the proportion of those who are not working. 
Given a sample of N individuals of whom k are observed working, the 
likelihood 
function for a sample of individuals in terms of employment status (working or not 
working) is given by 
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N k (I - b) by+b Yj L=fl I-F -+ cy xFj F- i=l Cy HHi i=k+i H 17 H 
I 
Equation (14) is the standard probit likelihood function which is the product of the 
probability of observing k individuals working and the probability that (N-k) individuals 
are non-workers, given their respective values of Y and W. The two parameters of bIGH 
and (I -b)/aHcan be estimated by maximising the likelihood function with respect to 
b/(THand (I - b) ICTH. 
As discussed in the earlier chapter, there is a problem with using real wage in the 
labour supply model. Wages are only available for those who work but not for the non- 
workers. Estimating hours of work using the data based on workers, with the values of 
non-workers set to zero, would create a misspecifi cation problem. On the other hand, 
excluding non-workers from the sample to estimate hours of work creates a sample 
selection bias problem. Even the remedy that had sometimes been adopted, that is, by 
deriving the impute wages based on the least-squares estimate of the wages for workers 
and use the imputed wages in place of W, would give rise to potential selectivity bias 
problem. 
Heckman (1974,1976) addresses this problem by adopting the 'proportionality' 
hypothesis in which hours of work are taken to be proportional to the difference between 
the real wage W and the reservation wage M* whenever W>M* and zero otherwise. The 
model is 
Wi =A+ F-wi 
am* + cm* Yi + dm* Zi + Emi* i 
Hi = b(Wi - Mj*) == a+ bWj + cYj + dZi - bE; mi* 
(17) 
if and only if Wi > Mj* 
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Hi =0 if and only if Wj:! ý Mj* (18) 
where a= -baAf*, c= -bcm*, d= -bdm*, W, is real wage, M* is reservation wage, X, and 
Zi are observable variables, Yj is non-labour income, and Hi is hours of work. The 
participation equation implied by equations (15)-(18) is 
Pr [i works] = Pr [Wi > Mi*] 
= Pr [yXi + F, kvi > am* + cm* Yi + dm* Zi + Emi* ] 
= Pr [cwj - E; mi* > -JI] 
where Ji = yXi - (am* + cm* Yj + dm* Zj). Let us defineF -Di (6wi - Fmi*) as the difference 













As before, the parameters of the participation function can be estimated by using 
probit likelihood function on the set of workers and non-workers. Assuming a set of N 
individuals of whom k are working, the likelihood function is given as follows 
kN 
L I[I - F(-Jj 1 CYDA 
11 
F(-Jj 1 CYD 
i=l i=k+l 
where Ji = yXj - am* - cm*Y, - dm*Zi. This approach replaces W for which data are 
usually available for workers only with variables on the right hand side of Equation (15). 
4.2 Wage Equation 
The purpose of estimating the participation function is to form a measure of k so that it 
could be used to estimate the parameters of the wage equation via selection bias- 
corrected regression. Using results well known in the literature (see Heckman, 1979: 
156) and applying it to the wage equation, we have 
E [F-wi 1 FHi > -JA = (cy wH ICYH) 
4 
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where f and F are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution 
function, respectively, for the standard normal random variable, and /ki is the inverse of 
Mills' ratio, which is the ratio of the ordinate of a standard normal to the tail area of the 
distribution. The estimated ý computed from the probit parameters from Equation (19) 
are used with Xi to estimate a selection bias-corrected regression for the wage equation 
using data on workers. The wage equation is given by 
Wi =A+ Zý +L)i (21) 
where ui is a mean-zero random error term, z is an estimate of the. ratio cTWD ICTD, and CFwD 
is the covariance between cwi and F-Di (ýE: Wi - 6mi*). The computations used in the 
'Heckit' estimation procedure, which is based on the method of moments and consistent 
estimationsl are discussed in Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981). 
4.3 Hours o Work Equation )f 
The estimation of the wage equation parameters provides the means of getting 
around the endogeneity problem of net wages in the hours of work equation to be 
estimated in the next stage. The expected value of hours worked among people who work 
is as follows 
E [Hi I Wi > Mi*] =E [Hi I (F-Di IC7D) > (-Ji ICYD)l 
= aH+ bHyXi + CHyi+ dHZ, +E 19Hi + bHEwi 
1 (FDi /CYD) > (-ji ICYD)] 
= aH + bH7Xi + CHyi +dHZi + RCYHD 
ICYD)+ bf, (cywD /CYD)l Iýli 
where 
cTHD= covariance between 6Hj and6Di (which is equal to Fwi - Fmi*) 
(YwD = covariance between E; wi and F-Di 
ý= -j 
1(3D) I[ I -F(-Ji 
1C7D)l 
'i 
Ji = yXi - (am* + cm* Yi + dm* Zi) 
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In this stage of the estimation procedure, the equation for the selection bias- 
corrected regression on those who work is 
Hi -aH +bHWi +cHY, +diZi +aXi +u, (22) 
The fitted wage is the instrumental variables measure of W and computed from 
A 
Wi = yXi , where the 
^ are the estimated parameters in Equation (2 1 
For our estimations in Section 6, we have adopted a simple model to estimate 
hours of work equation for both males and females where the spouse's effect on an 
individual's labour supply is mainly through his or her non-labour income. While we 
realise that this individual-based model may have some limitations (since one could 
possibly consider the couple's leisure as being complementary or the cross- substitution 
effect of the spouse's wage rate), this approach has the advantage of being relatively 
straightforward, its results are easy to interpret, and it does not require restrictions to 
ensure household equilibrium. In the literature, there are more complex approaches to 
model family making. However, there is no consensus on best to model family labour 
supply since models of this nature always involve some degree of trade-offs. 
5. TAXES AND LABOUR SUPPLY 
The basic labour supply model can be extended to incorporate taxes. From Equation (2), 
the budget constraint in the absence of taxes and transfers could be written as 
Y+ WH= C (23) 
With the imposition of taxes, the individual. bears a tax liability A, which is a function of 
property income Y and earnings E, the product of hours of work and wage rate. The 
budget constraint after taxes is 
Y+ WH- A(Y, WH) =C (24) 
The tax liability increases with property income and earnings. Hence, the first order 
conditions are given by 
8A/5 Y --7-: T> 
258 
CHAPTER 
6A/8E =- '7E 
MODELLING LABOUR SUPPLYWITH T4. v4 TION 
where T I, is the marginal tax rate on property income andTEis the marginal tax rate on 
earnings. Under normal circumstances, the marginal tax rate is assumed to lie between 0 
and 1, i. e. 0"Y, E "ý' I- 
In a progressive tax system, the rise in non-labour income and earnings will shift 
an individual into higher marginal tax brackets. The second order conditions are as 
follows: 
22 6 A18Y =- -cyy >0 
62 A/6E2 'UEE >0 
62 AIME -= 82 Al6E8Y-= 'CEYýý' 
0 
As an individual increases his hours of work, his tax liabilities will increase along with 
his earnings. The net earnings from an additional hour of work is given by 
(6E16H)-(6A16H) = (6E16H)-[(6A16E)(8E16H)] 
--::: W 'CJV: -- 0 (25) 
where co- (1_'ýE)W'Sthe after-tax or net real wage rate, which is the slope of the budget 
constraint and represents the opportunity cost of one hour of leisure. 
As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the concept of virtual income is widely used 
in empirical studies on taxation as a device for linearising the convex budget set. 
In 
formulating virtual income, let the net wage (o gives slope of the linearised 
budget 
constraint at the individual's labour supply maximum. The individual's adjusted property 
income y is implicitly defined by the following relationship: 
+ coH= C 
(26) 
C- (oH 




Since (o (1 -'IE)W 
Therefore, virtual income is 
Y-(A-'UEWH) 
MODELLiNG LA BO UR SUPPLYWITH T4, v 4 Tim, 
(27) 
whereTEWH is tax paid on earnings, A is tax liability, and C is consumption. 
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6. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We undertake several estimations on hours of work for both males and females. The 
baseline estimation is first performed in three stages for the whole sample of married 
couples within the 20-54 years age group. Next, alternative estimations are performed to 
determine the extent to which the results differ from the baseline estimations. The four 
categories of alternative estimations are: (a) hours of work without instrumental 
variables, (b) three stage estimation for those working between 25-60 hours a week, (c) 
pre-tax hours of work estimation, and (d) regressions by subgroups of occupation, 
education and employment category. 
1 Baseline Participation Equation 
The baseline model is estimated in three stages in order to derive the hours of 
work equation for males and females in the prime age group. In the first stage, the 
parameters for the participation equations 4 for males and females are derived using the 
probit estimation procedure. 
1.1 Male 
Potential work experience (EXPRC) is a measure of the number of years worked 
after leaving school or after the age 15, whichever comes later. This variable is estimated 
in its quadratic form, that is, experience and experience squared. For a graphic 
presentation of the two coefficients, the male participation equation in Table 7.6 is 
plotted in terms of its standard normal density function. As shown in Figure 7.2 and 
Figure 7.3, the likelihood of participation (which varies from 0 to 1) is on the vertical 
axis and different years of experience is on the horizontal axis. The mean values are used 
4 In the literature, the term 'labour supply equation' can either refer to the probability of participation 
equation or hours of work equation. To avoid confusion, we refrain from referring to the participation 
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for the other variables. In other words, the graph for 1984 shows the participation 
likelihood of a rural male head of household who had a non-labour income of RM3,300 
and lower secondary education. The plots for 1984 and 1992 show an inverted U shape, 
where the participation likelihood rises to a maximum around 15-17 years of experience 
before declining as a result of attrition and retirement from the labour market. 
Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 show the result of plotting the male participation 
against different levels of non-labour income after tax (NLAB) for 1984 and 1992, with 
the other explanatory variables evaluated at the mean. The non-labour income component 
is estimated using net non-labour income and its square root form. This graph is for a 
rural male head of household with 22.3 years of experience and lower secondary 
education. The male participation likelihood dips slightly as the annual non-labour 
income after tax rises to RM17,000-19,000. After this level, the likelihood of male 
participation is an increasing function of non-labour income. This means that for most of 
the non-labour income spectrum, a male is more likely to participate as his non-labour 
income increases. The working males with larger non-labour income are also those with 
income derived from property as well as working spouses, since the spouse's income is 
included in the calculation of his non-labour income. 
As shown in Table 7.6, the education dummies for primary (PRIM), lower 
secondary (LSEQ, upper secondary (USEQ and tertiary (TER) levels have positive 
signs, indicating that those with education are more likely to participate than the 
reference group, which is constituted of those without education. The participation 
likelihood tends to increase with years of education, except for those with primary 
education where the likelihood of participation is higher than those with secondary 
education. Since education may be viewed as an investment in human resource in which 
costs are incurred in the short run in return for higher benefits in the long run, there 
is 
greater opportunity cost for those with higher levels of education who are unemployed. 
The participation likelihood of males with primary education is higher than those with 
lower secondary education. One reason for this is that males with primary education are 
largely involved in agricultural, production and service-oriented occupations where 
little 
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TABLE 7.6 MALE PARTICIPATION EQUATION 
Probit 
1984 1992 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std Error 
Constant 1.8482 0.2900 1.8700 0.2942 
EXPRC 0.0708 0.0288 0.0471 0.0232 
EXPRC2 -0.0020 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0004 
NLAB 0.0518 0.0172 0.0293 0.0050 
NLABSQR -0.4496 0.0810 -0.2429 0.0437 
PFJM 0.3064 0.1146 0.5115 0.1025 
LSEC 0.2704 0.1349 0.4553 0.1160 
USEC 0.7525 0.1629 0.7371 0.1278 
TER 0.7087 0.1953 1.0919 0.1704 
URB * -0.125 8 0.0771 * -0.0533 0.0696 
Log Likelihood -675.61 - 830.87 
Chi-Squared 172.59 216.45 
Participation rate 97.5 97.5 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
technical and literacy skills are needed. In this case, the lack of education is no deterrence 
to participation. It is also possible that those who are engaged in agricultural, production 
and service-oriented occupations early in their lives either did not have the opportunity 
for education or saw no need to continue with their education. Males in urban areas 
(URB) are less likely to participate than their counterparts in rural areas, but these 
coefficients are not significant at the 5 per cent level. 
6.1.2 Female 
The age variable in its quadratic form is used in the participation function 
for 
females. When deriving the model, the cubic form was attempted but was found to be no 
better than the quadratic form. After controlling for other factors such as non-labour 
income, education, age of children and strata, the likelihood of female participation rises 
gradually with age, reaching a maximum at 39.5 years before 
declining thereafter. The 
graphs for 1984 and 1992, as shown in Figure 7.6 and Figure 
7.7, refer to rural female 
heads of household with lower secondary education and a non-labour 
income of 
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TABLE 7.7 FEMALE PARTICIPATION EQUATION 
Probit 
1984 1992 
Variable Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -1.9479 0.287ý_ -3.0891 0.2778 AGE 0.1424 0.0163 0.1897 0.0157 
AGE2 -0.0018 0.0002 -0.0024 0.0002 NLAB 0.0111 0.0022 0.0059 0.0020 
NLABSQR -0.2397 0.0237 -0.1560 0.0231 PRIM -0.1443 0.0393 * 0.0146 0.0407 
LSEC -0.1198 0.0549 * 0.0725 0.0502 
USEC 0.6963 0.0583 0.5864 0.0525 
TER 1.1984 0.0883 1.4381 0.0726 
Chl -0.3411 0.0336 -0.3953 0.0323 Ch2 -0.1324 0.0421 -0.2324 0.0396 
Ch3-5 -0.0529 0.0245 -0.1512 0.0232 
Ch6-1 1 -0.0619 0.0167 -0.0653 0.0149 
Ch 12-16 0.0329 0.0186 0.0144 0.0180 
Urban -0.2730 0.0316 -0.2039 0.0299 
Log-likelihood - 4966.2 -5863.3 
Chi-squared 911.0 1072.1 
Participation rate 38.4 39.7 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
The relationship between the likelihood of female participation and non-labour 
income follows a distinct U-shape (see Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9). Female participation 
likelihood declines rapidly as the net annual non-labour income rises to around 
RM 120,000 in 1984 and RM 170,000 in 1992. Assuming minimal property income for an 
average non-working female, these levels of non-labour income would correspond to a 
monthly salary of about RMI, 000-RMI, 400 for her husband, which place them within 
the middle income category. Female participation likelihood increases if the non-labour 
income falls below or increases above this level. Females with low non-labour income 
are more likely to work in order to supplement their family income. On the other hand, 
females with higher levels of non-labour income tend to have higher participation 
likelihood as well. The reason for this is that females with higher levels of non-labour 
income (which implies that their spouses earn high salaries, often as a result of better 
education) have greater incentive to work because they also tend to have better education 
and can command higher wages. In a society where education is linked with social status 
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and earning power, better educated women tend to marry husbands who have either an 
equivalent or higher educational attainment. 
As shown in Table 7.7, the coefficients of the education dummies for 1984 are 
negative for primary and lower secondary education and positive for upper secondary 
and tertiary education. In 1992, the coefficients for all the education dummies are 
positive though the coefficient for PRIM and LSEC are insignificant at the 5 per cent 
level. The likelihood of female participation increases at USEC and TER for both the 
years. The children dummies refer to women having at least a child at or below the age I 
(CHI), at the age 2 (CH2), as well as between ages 3-5 years (CH3_5), 6-11 years 
(CH6_1 1) and 12-16 years (CH12-16). As expected, young children have a strong 
disincentive effect on a woman's participation, especially for children below 5 years old. 
Children at this age make strong demands on their mother's time, care and attention. The 
disincentive effect becomes less pronounced with older children. In fact5 women with 
older children above the age of 12 years are more likely to work since children at these 
ages can help out with household chores. 
As with the males, the urban dummy for females has a negative sign, implying 
higher participation for rural females. The higher likelihood of female participation in the 
rural areas is because females in the rural areas are able to perform their household 
activities alongside working in the farm, which are often family owned. Unlike urban 
jobs, it is much harder to distinguish participation from non-participation in the case of 
agricultural occupations because of the greater degree of disguised unemployment and 
underemployment. In addition, the inflow of rural migrants to urban areas in search of 
jobs contribute to a higher rate of urban unemployment, and hence the lower 
participation likelihood for urban fernales. 
62 Instrumentingfor Wage and Virtual Income 
6.2.1 Baseline wage equation 
The wage equation is estimated as an instrument for the hours of work equation 
in order to overcome the problem of endogeneity. The dependent variable, net wage, is 
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expressed in log form, thereby giving a semi-logarithmic relationship to the model. The 
semi-log specification was found to be appropriate after trying out several model 
specifications in the initial stage of the regression runs. 
Two alternative sets of variables are used for the baseline wage equation. The 
first alternative (ALTI) assumes that unlike wage after tax which is clearly related to 
hours of work put in by an individual, gross wage rate and non-labour income are 
independent of the amount of hours worked. This is consistent with the view that in a 
competitive market for homogenous labour, individuals confront a fixed market wage 
offer. This assumption is implicit in the models by Flood and MaCurdy (1992) and 
Blomquist (1996) who used gross wage rate and non-labour income in some of their 
models to instrument for the net wage rate in Sweden. The independent variables in the 
baseline wage equation are wage, wage square root (WAGESQR), non-labour income 
(NLAB), non-labour income square root (NLABSQR), experience or age, and lamda to 
adjust for selection bias. 
In the second alternative (ALT2), we relax the exogeneity assumption for the 
instrumental variable estimators by excluding gross wage and non-labour income from 
the wage equation. This alternative uses socio-demographic variables as instruments, 
namely, potential work experience or age, potential work experience (or age) squared, 
education, occupation, and lamda. Unlike ALTI,, this alternative avoids using gross wage 
rate which may be affected by the errors made in measuring the amount of hours 
5 worked . 
It is interesting to note that Flood and MaCurdy (1992) and Blomquist (1996) 
who used the gross wage rate and non-labour income to instrument for the net wage rate 
in their models differed in opinion on the relative merits of the instruments. 
By using 
gross wage and non-labour income as instruments (as in our ALT I), 
Flood and MaCurdy 
were able to replicate the results obtained by using maximum-likelihood procedures. 
They argued that the 'high' positive value which was 
derived for the wage rate by 
5 The Alternative 2 wage equation parallels the functional form adopted 
by Mincer (1974) and Becker 
(1964) in the human capital earnings function which uses years of schooling and post-schooling 
experience. 
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estimators like IVI was due to the endogeneity of the gross wage rate and nonlabour 
income. They favoured an estimator like IV2 which takes care of both the endogeneity in 
the gross wage rate and nonlabour income as well as the endogeneity in net wage rates 
imposed by non-linear taxes. 
Blomquist, on the other hand, argued that it is difficult to test whether the gross 
wage rate and non-labour income were admissible instruments. However,, when gross 
wage rate and non-labour income were excluded from the model, his simulations showed 
that using socio-economic variables as instruments had a serious negative bias for the 
wage rate coefficient, especially for small samples. The small-sample bias arose because 
of the weak correlation between the instruments with the net wage rate. Blomquist 
confirmed Flood and MaCurdy's finding that the model with wage and non-labour 
income variables performed as well as the maximum likelihood method. In his Monte 
Carlo simulations, he found that the inclusion of wage and non-labour variables produced 
a small negative bias in the wage rate coefficient when there was a measurement error in 
the gross wage rate, which was calculated as labour income divided by hours of work. In 
addition, the estimator performed fairly well if the measurement error in the gross wage 
is additive (Blomquist, 1996: 403). In our regression estimates, we use both alternatives 
to ascertain if they produce significantly different results, either in terms of the 
coefficient estimates obtained or giving rise to a change of signs in the income and 
substitution effects. 
6.2.1.1 Male 
Results of the estimates on the instruments for net wages are given in Table 7.8. 
In Alternative I. the adjusted R squared statistics are very high and the F distribution 
statistics are very significant. Log net wage has a quadratic relationship with WAGE and 
WAGESQR and the very significant t-ratios suggest that wage and wage squared are 
good instruments for net wage, assuming that there is no problem with endogeneity. The 
coefficients for NLAB are negative and significant at the 5 per cent level for both the 
years. The coefficients for the AGE variable, which are used to control for the effect of 
age on wage, are negative, while the URB coefficients are positive. It appears that 
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TABLE 7.8 REDUCED FORm EQUATIONS FOR MALE NET WAGES 
Alternative I 
Dependent Variable: Ln Net Wage 
1984 1992 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coeffic-i-e-n-t-j Std. Error 
Constant -0.7916 0.0102 -0.8208 0.0093 
WAGE -0.6446 0.0005 -0.5753 0.0005 
WAGESQR 1.1867 0.0038 1.2267 0.0037 
NLAB -0.0017 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 
AGE -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0002 
URB 0.0219 0.0035 0.0217 0.0028 
Lamda 0.1609 0.0424 0.0609 0.0355 
F distribution 4109 5458 
Adj. R squared 0.974 0.976 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*) 
Alternative H 
Dependent Variable: Ln Net Wages 
1984 1992 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant 0.3871 0.0659 0.6073 0.0646 
EXPRC 0.0685 0.0055 0.0614 0.0052 
EXPRC2 -0.0012 0.0001 -0.0010 0.0001 
LSEC 0.2390 0.0217 0.2294 0.0202 
USEC 0.5939 0.0250 0.4845 0.0218 
TER 1.2487 0.0341 1.0213 0.0296 
SALE -0.2482 0.0285 -0.3126 0.0277 
SER -0.2558 0.0275 -0.3793 0.0269 
AGRI -0.5243 0.0280 -0.6272 
0.0257 
PROD -0.2640 0.0240 -0.3592 
0.0225 
Lamda 0.6293 0.2198 0.7030 0.2017 
F statistics 428 523.1 
Adj. R-squared 0.396 0.400 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*) 
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although urban males have a lower participation likelihood, those who are working have 
higher net wages than the rural males. The coefficient for selectivity adjustment 'k is 
significant in 1984 but not in 1992. The regression equations have highly significant F 
statistics and adjusted R squared. 
In Alternative 11, the three categories of variables used in the model are years of 
post-school work experience, levels of schooling and occupation. All the t-ratios and F 
statistics are significant at the 5 per cent level. The adjusted R squared statistics are 
moderately high where 40 per cent of the variance of log net wage can be explained by 
the variables in the regression. Experience is expressed in quadratic terms, that is, 
EXPRC and EXPRC2. Theoretically, this refers to potential experience and acts as a 
proxy for the acquisition of human capital. It seems to correspond with the assumption 
that investment in human capital declines linearly with time. 6 The inclusion of 
experience has been proposed by Mincer (1974) and is considered to be an appropriate 
proxy for estimating the returns to human capital (Willis and Rosen, 1979). 
Since the level of unemployment among Malaysian males is very low, there is 
little problem associated with using the experience variable for the males. EXPRC and 
EXPRC2 show the correct sign and are statistically significant. Net wage increases with 
years of experience and reaches the maximum at 28.5 years for 1984 and 30.7 years in 
1992!, 7 before declining (see Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11). The charts refer to an average 
male with lower secondary education in the reference group occupation. The reasons for 
the decline are physical deterioration in strength and health, and the vintage effects. 
Workers of an older cohort tend to be less in touch with the modem world and 
less 
amenable to acquire new knowledge and skills compared with those in younger cohorts. 
6 For the proof, see Fallon and Verry 0 988: 149-50). 
The maximum value of the wage function with respect to experience can 
be calculated from the 
derivatives of the function. For instance, the maximum for 1984 occurs at 
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Education measures the formal acquisition of human capital. In the regression, 
education dummy variables are used to capture the effect of the level of highest 
educational attainment on wages. This coefficient for each dummy variable reflects the 
return to each level of schooling compared with the reference category of those having 
primary or no education. The coefficients are positive and highly significant, which 
means that workers with higher education have a clear advantage over those with lower 
education in earning higher wages. The coefficients for those with lower secondary 
education are 23.9 per cent in 1984 and 22.9 per cent in 1992. This means that the return 
to lower secondary education is around 24 per cent higher than those with primary or no 
education. The return to upper secondary education is more than double that from lower 
secondary education, while the return to tertiary education is in turn double that from 
upper secondary education. The increasing returns to higher levels of education 
corresponds with the studies by Demery and Chesher (1993 on the Malaysian data. 8 
Whether the role of education is to augment productivity or used for screening out those 
with innate abilities, there is no doubt that employers pay a premium to those who are 
better educated. 
Occupation is an important factor accounting for the variation in earnings among 
workers. The coefficients for the occupational dummies show the net wages of workers 
in various occupational groups compared with the reference group, which comprises the 
professional, technical, managerial and clerical occupations. Compared with the 
reference group, those involved in sales, service and production occupations earn about 
25 per cent lower in 1984 and their relative wages were lower in 1992 by 31-38 per cent. 
Workers in agricultural occupations saw the worsening of their relative wage which 
declined from the level of 52 per cent of the reference group average wage in 1984 to 63 
8 This finding on Malaysia differs from Psacharopoulos (1984) who maintains that the private rate of 
return to education in developing countries is highest at the primary level and the 
interest of these 
countries are best served by improving the quality of primary education rather than making expensive 
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FD --EDUCED FORM EQUATIONS FOR FEMALE NET WAGES 
Alternative I 











Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
-0.0527 0.0312 -0.2612 0.0287 
0.0205 0.0024 -0.0192 0.0004 
0.5929 0.0090 0.7598 0.0051 
-0.0034 0.0006 -0.0008 0.0000 
0.0837 0.0067 0.0590 0.0031 
-0.0019 0.0005 0.0012 0.0005 
0.0194 0.0103 0.0096 0.0092 







Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*) 
Alternative H 
Dependent Variable: Ln Net Wages 
1984 1992 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -0.9663 0.2083 -1.3789 0.2511 
AGE 0.0915 0.0097 0.1064 0.0113 
AGE2 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0012 0.0001 
LSEC 0.2275 0.0323 0.2825 0.0302 
USEC 0.4637 0.0430 0.5957 0.0374 
TER 1.1621 0.0561 1.2286 0.0568 
SALE -0.7571 0.0383 -0.7407 0.0369 
SER -0.6473 0.0383 -0.6978 0.0374 
AGRI -0.8263 0.0394 -0.8984 0.0386 
PROD -0.5804 0.0388 -0.6034 0.0350 
Lamda 0.1632 0.0456 0.2855 0.0533 
F statistic 455.1 548.5 
Adj. R-squared 0.592 0.591 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
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per cent in 1992. The t-ratios for these variables and the coefficient for lamda for 1984 
and 1992 are significant at the 5 per cent level. 
6.2.1.2 Female 
The regression results of the two alternative specifications used for instrumenting 
net wages are given in Table 7.9. Under Alternative 1, the coefficients for WAGE, 
WAGESQR, NLAB, and NLABSQR are highly significant. The AGE coefficients for 
1984 and 1992 are significant at the 5 per cent level. The urban dummy variable 
indicates that the females in urban areas enjoy slightly higher wages than the rural 
females but these coefficients are not significant. 
The model specification for Alternative 11 for the females is similar to that for the 
males except that the age and age squared variables are used in the place of the 
experience and experience squared variables. The plots of female log net wage by age for 
1984 and 1992 are shown in Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.13. The charts refer to an average 
female with lower secondary education and engaged in the reference group occupation. 
Net wage rises gradually as age increases from 20 years to 41 years in 1984 (44 years in 
the case of 1992), before declining. The education variables show that the females 
receive wage premium for increasing levels of education. In fact, the female wage 
increments for education attainments above the primary level in 1992 are even greater 
than for the males. 
After controlling for age and education, the relative net wages received by 
females in the sales, service, and production occupations are equivalent to 60-75 per cent 
of the reference occupations average net wage. 
9 For females in the agricultural 
occupations, their average net wage are even lower at 80-90 per cent of the reference 
group wage. The worsening of the relative wages among occupations during 1984-92 is 
most marked for agricultural and service occupations. The coefficients on k are 
statistically significant which shows evidence of self selection. The adjusted R squared is 
59 per cent and the F statistic is highly significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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6.2.2 Virtual income 
Virtual income is the intercept of the linearised budget set at zero hours of work. 
Hall (1973), who was one of the first to use the technique to linearise the budget set, 
treated marginal tax rate and virtual income as exogenous. This can be a problem since 
virtual income is determined by the level of non-labour income as well as the net wage 
rate, which in turn depends on the hours worked and marginal tax rates. The linearised 
budget set is endogenous with respect to hours of work. 
Subsequent studies adopted several strategies to overcome this problem of 
endogeneity. Rosen (1976) and Hausman and Wise (1976) used the same level of hours 
of work for all individuals to derive the marginal tax rate in the construction of net wage 
rates and virtual incomes. Layard, Barton and Zabalza (1980) adopted the two-stage least 
squares approach. In the first stage, they regressed a dummy variable for taxpayers t on 
In W, V and Z. They then used the predicted t instead of the actual t to estimate the hours 
of work equation. The instrumental variables approach was used by Johnson and 
Pencavel (1982), who replaced the right-hand side variables of the hours of work 
equation with their corresponding predicted values from prior regressions on a set of 
exogenous variables. 
To be consistent with our approach in dealing with the endogeneity of net wages, 
we adopt a similar procedure to instrument for virtual income. In the regression equation, 
virtual income is regressed against gross wage and non-labour income assumed to be 
independent of the amount of hours worked. As shown in Table 7.10, the regression 
results of the virtual income equation are highly significant. The high adjusted R-squared 
in the regressions for males and females implies that the model came very close to 
explaining almost all of the variations in virtual income. 
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TABLE 7.10 REDUCED FORM EQUATIONS FOR VIRTUAL INCOME 





Variables Coefficient F Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant 0.4950 0.0394 0.6264 0.0334 
WAGE -0.0869 0.0033 -0.1366 0.0028 NLAB 0.8025 0.0038 0.9848 0.0011 
Lamda 3.8204 0.5455 -3.4768 0.1327 
F statistic 34157 54410 
Adj. R squared 0.940 0.995 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*) 
Female 


































Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
The fact that we are using WAGE, NLAB and lamda as instruments for virtual income as well 
as net wages (see Table 7.8 and Table 7.9) does not present an identification problem since the 
predicted values for virtual income will be a different linear combination of these variables 
from their contribution to the net wage equation. 
6.3 Baseline Hours Equation 
The hours equation adopts the simple functional form that is derived from an 
indirect utility function and may be written as 
Wi 
Vi +a'Zi +a' ao +a, In +a2 34 'ý' + F' i (28) 
where Hi is the ith person's hours of work, W, is the predicted wage rate, Vi is the 
predicted virtual income, Zi is a vector of additional control variables 
(such as age, 
experience, education, age and number of children, occupation, and strata), 
k is the 
inverse Mill's ratio, and Ej is the stochastic disturbance term. Since this equation 
includes 
the participating subset of the sample, the inverse Mills ratio must 
be included to correct 
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for selectivity bias. Accordingly, this equation incorporates the statistical control for self- 
selection into the labour force as well as exogeneity assumptions on the regressors, 
namely, wage after tax and virtual income, through the use of the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) instrumental variable procedure. 
The uncompensated wage effect and the substitution effect of a unit change in 
wage rate on hours worked have traditionally been presented in terms of elasticity. It is 
useful to present the regression results in this form to facilitate comparability with the 
other studies. The two elasticities can be computed as 




0 InWi Hi 
c9 In Hi aV Income elasticity =-2i (30) a InV, H, 
6.3.1 Male 
Estimation results of the hours of work equation for males under the two alternatives are 
presented in Table 7.11. To facilitate discussion, the baseline hours of work equation 
using Alternative I instrumental variables is denoted by BASE1 while the baseline 
estimate using Alternative 2 is denoted as BASE2. The two alternatives yield coefficients 
with roughly similar signs except for production workers. In the four regression 
estimations, the sign for the uncompensated wage effect is negative, while that for the 
income effect is positive. The negative sign for the uncompensated wage effect indicates 
a inverse relationship between hours worked and wages, while a positive income effect 
seems to be inconsistent with the assumption that leisure is a normal good. These two 
issues will be taken up later in Section 8 of this chapter. 
The difference in the estimates between BASEI and BASE2 indicates the range 
of values resulting from different instrumental variables assumptions. In 
1984 the 
coefficients for LWAGETAX are -7.2 under BASE I and -2.7 under BASE2, a 
difference 
of 4.5 hours per week. The difference in 1992 narrows to 3.2 hours per week. 
The effect 
of virtual income on male labour supply is negligible. Under BASE 
I estimates, an 
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TABLE 7.11 MALE HOURS OF WORK EQUATION 












Adj. R squared 
BASE] 
1984 1992 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std Error 
56.9760 0.5750 58.9770 0.5673 
-7.2022 0.2414 -5.7055 0.2223 
0.1615 0.0324 0.0237 0.0085 
-9.9790 0.9084 -10.3350 0.7735 
5.5599 0.5955 2.9060 0.5726 
2.6260 0.5671 2.0319 0.5577 
-10.5540 0.5666 -10.4640 0.5103 
-0.3315 0.4781 -0.3160 0.4438 
-8.0103 3.1900 -7.1365 2.7450 
250 237 
0.235 0.195 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*) 
All Hours - Alternative 2 
BASE2 
1984 1992 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant 49.1820 1.0930 52.5570 1.1970 
LWAGETAX -2.6884 0.5714 -2.4618 0.5720 
YVIR 0.0239 0.0338 0.0102 0.0086 
TEACH -11.1530 0.9490 -11.2040 0.7972 
SALE 7.7873 0.6735 4.8612 0.6648 
SER 5.1912 0.6590 4.2902 0.6711 
AGRI -6.6113 0.7725 -7.1400 0.7779 
PROD 2.4837 0.6009 2.1740 0.6053 
Lamda -0.4928 3.3280 -5.4266 
2.7970 
F statistic 189 194.6 
Adj. R-squared 0.188 0.165 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
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Male-Alt. 1 -0.157 -0.167 0.010 Male-Alt. 2 -0.059 -0.058 0.001 
Female-Alt. 1 -0.384 -0.455 0.071 
Female-Alt. 2 0.064 0.025 0.039 
1992 
Uncompensated Compensated Income Elasticity 
Wage Elasticity Wage Elasticity 
Male-Alt. 1 -0.120 -0.120 0.000 
Male-Alt. 2 -0.052 -0.052 * 0.000 
Female-Alt. 1 -0.228 -0.229 * 0.001 
Female-Alt. 2 -0.070 -0.070 0.000 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
increase of RM10,000 in virtual income will bring about an increase of 1.6 hours per 
week in 1984 but less than half an hour per week in 1992. The virtual income 
coefficients under BASE2 are no different from zero at the 5 per cent level for both 
years. 
Teachers work around 10 hours less per week than the reference occupational 
group, which comprises other professional and technical workers, 10 managers and 
administrators, and clerical workers. As mentioned earlier in Section 2.5, this arises 
because of the way teaching hours are calculated in the LFS, rather than an indication 
that teachers put in less hours of work. The other occupational group that registers less 
hours of work than the reference group is agricultural workers. They are estimated to 
work less than II hours Per week under BASE1 and 7 hours per week under BASE2. In 
contrast, sales and service workers tend to work longer hours per week under the two 
alternative estimations. The inverse Mill's ratio ?, is significant under BASEI but not 
under BASE2. 
10 Teachers are classified under the Professional and Technical Workers in the Dictionary of 
Occupational 
Classification but treated separately in the regression model. 
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TABLE 7.13 FEMALE HOURS OF WORK EQUATION 





Variables Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant 51.9390 1.3420 55.3110 1.1650 
LWAGETAX -6.0942 0.5807 -3.8500 0.3969 
YVIR 0.0968 0.0201 0.0013 0.0030 
CHI *-0.1290 0.6970 *-0.2204 0.6065 
CH2 0.7802 0.8156 *-0.5675 0.6959 
CH3_5 -1.2038 0.4479 -0.8720 0.3851 
TEACH -11.7310 1.3120 -12.8000 0.9095 
SALE 5.4632 1.1460 2.1653 0.9194 
SER 0.2789 1.0720 1.1342 0.8872 
AGRI -11.8760 1.0240 -15.0060 0.8795 
PROD -6.4433 1.0710 -5.1627 0.8147 
Lamda -3.3934 1.2550 -3.7242 1.0500 
F statistic 66.6 82.0 
Adj. R-squared 0.187 0.190 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
Alternative 2 
BASE2 
Constant 44.8890 2.9250 50.2610 2.7840 
LWAGETAX * -1.0258 1.7210 * -1.1878 1.2800 
YVIR 0.0540 0.0217 * 0.0002 0.0030 
CHI * -0.4504 0.7325 * -0.3137 0.6643 
CH2 0.6309 0.8305 * -0.5348 0.7122 
CH3 5 -1.5614 0.4535 -0.9255 
0.3974 
TEACH -15.173 1.3940 -13.7410 
0.9144 
SALE 9.2537 1.8840 4.5424 1.5090 
SER 3.0640 1.7400 0.8011 1.4840 
AGRI -7.0902 2.1270 -11.6600 
1.8520 
PROD -4.1081 1.6700 -3.4930 
1.3880 
Lamda -1.1782 1.4590 -2.2883 
1.3190 
F statistic 54.4 
74.1 
Adj. R-squared 0.158 0.175 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk 
(*). 
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As shown in Table 7.12, the uncompensated wage elasticities are low under both 
alternatives. They are -0.157 in 1984 and -0-120 in 1992 under BASEL When socio- 
demographic variables are used as instruments for. net wage for BASE2, the 
uncompensated wage elasticities become even more inelastic at around -0.05. The 
income elasticities are very small or zero under both alternatives. 
6.3.2 Female 
Table 7.13 shows the hours of work estimations under the two alternatives. The F 
statistics and adjusted R-squared for 1984 and 1992 are generally similar under the two 
alternative assumptions. The coefficients for LWAGETAX are significant under BASE1 
but not under BASE2. In the case of virtual income,, the estimated coefficients are 
significant but very small for 1984. The change in virtual income has to be very large for 
there to be some effect on female labour supply. For instance, the virtual income in 1984 
has to change by RM100,000 before registering a change of 10 hours per week for the 
females under ALTI and 5 hours per week under ALT2. In 1992 the change in female 
labour supply arising from a change in virtual income will not be significantly different 
from zero for both alternatives. 
It appears that while the presence of young children reduces the likelihood of 
female participation, they do not affect the working hours of mothers who choose to 
work. However, the coefficients are statistically insignificant and children between the 
ages of 3 to 5 years would only reduce the working hours of their mothers by one to one 
and a half hours per week. There appears to be a strong link between occupational groups 
and hours of work. Females in the teaching, agricultural, and production occupations 
generally work shorter hours per week than the reference occupational group, while 
females in the sales and service occupations work longer hours. The difference in hours 
of work between the two alternatives and for both the years can be substantial 
for 
teachers (12-15 hours), agricultural workers (7-15 hours), sales workers (2-9 hours), and 
production workers (3-6 hours). 
In terms of the elasticity estimates, the uncompensated wage elasticities 
for 
females under BASEI are -0.384 for 1984 and -0.228 for 1992, about twice as 
large as 
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the estimates for the males (see Table 7.12). The female uncompensated wage elasticities 
under BASE2 are insignificant for both years. The income elasticities are small in 1984 
and zero in 1992. 
6.3.3 Simultaneous equations and testfor exogeneiry 
Since three sets of instrumental variables are used in the three step procedure to 
address the problem of endogeneity of net wages and virtual income, it will be useful to 
test for exogeneity of the instruments. Smith and Blundell (1986) propose that a 
maximum likelihood procedure could be constructed for models with more than one 
regressions. We use the LIMDEP programme (Greene, 1992) to estimate the model with 
instrumental variables, which is: 
Yl * '-:: ßl'XI + 72Y2 + 71Y3 +---+ F-1 (Tobit) 
where 
Y2 ý 7C2'X2 + 62 
Y3 : --: 7C3 X3 + F13 
Smith and Blundell show that under the null hypothesis, this following procedure is 
asymptotically equivalent to a score, or Lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity. The 
hypothesis is tested by jointly testing the hypotheses that the slopes on the residuals are 
0. This test was applied for the hours of work equation with the two alternative 
instrumental variables (IV) for net wage, i. e. WAGEFITI and WAGEFIT2 and the IV for 
virtual income (YVIRFIT) for males and females in 1984 and 1992. As shown in Table 
7.14, the results of the test show that the hypotheses that there is no simultaneity for 
males cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance. In the case of females, the 
coefficient for WAGEFITI and WAGEFIT2 are significant for both years, but YVIRFIT 
is only significant for 1984 when coupled with WAGEFIT2. However, the insignificant 
statistics for YVIRFIT for females are related to the insignificant coefficients for virtual 
income under the two alternatives in 1992. 
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. -ii" r. rrt)r 
WAGEFIT2 -26.7440 1.3470 -15.7480 0.9468 
YVIRFIT 0.4545 0.2182 *0.2192 0.2371 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
6.4 Regression Procedures Using Different Assumptions 
The three stage estimation procedure above, or what is referred to as our 
'Baseline Estimation', incorporates techniques to control for self-selection as well as 
alternative exogeneity assumptions on the regressors, and is consistent with the 
techniques used in second generation labour supply research. For comparative purpose, 
it 
might be useful to undertake some estimations using a different set of assumptions 
in 
order to ascertain the extent to which selectivity adjustment and the 
instrumental 
variables make a difference in the final results. The alternative procedures performed are: 
(1) PROCIL Regress hours on wages and non-labour income of workers without 
selection bias adjustment and instrumental variables, as performed 
in 
Procedure 11 of First Generation labour supply research. Compared to the 
baseline estimation, this procedure is akin to taking a step 
back and making 
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WAGEFITI -43.2440 1.1240 -49.2420 1.0280 
YVIRFIT -0.2754 0.1291 -0.4234 0.1257 
WAGEFITI -19.2990 2.1560 -40.8270 1.7990 
YVIRFIT *0.1077 0.1208 *-0.1724 0.1326 
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the estimations without addressing the selection bias and endogeneity 
problems. 
(2) PROCIISA: Regress hours on wages and non-labour income of workers with 
selectivity adjustments but without use of instrumental variables. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the critique against Procedure 11 is that it suffers 
from selection bias as well as endogeneity. Accordingly, we perform the 
same regression but this time addressing the selection bias. The difference 
between the results of this alternative and the baseline estimates can be 
attributed to the problems of endogeneity and measurement. 
(3) RESHRI and RESHR2: Estimating the hours of work equation for those 
working between 25-60 hours with selectivity adjustment and adopting the 
two alternative instrumental variables procedures. The three-stage baseline 
estimation of labour supply equation parameters is performed for all 
reported working hours. Measurement errors in hours of work are 
transmitted to wage measurement. When a respondent reports long working 
hours for the week, either as a result of overtime work or the difficulty of 
estimating the number of hours worked for some occupations, this will 
result in lower estimated wage rate. On the other hand, if a respondent 
reports short working hours for the week, say in the case of bad weather or 
slack period for a contract worker, this will cause an upward bias in the 
estimated wage rate. Errors in reporting hours worked for the week are 
inevitably transmitted to the estimated wage rate, causing a spurious 
negative relationship between the hours worked and wage rate. This 
alternative estimation procedure removes from the sample those who report 
in working hours at the two ends of the hours spectrum which are more 
likely to be affected by misreporting. By limiting the analysis to those 
working between 25-60 hours per week, the sample covers the majority of 
the workers in regular jobs, namely, around 95 per cent of the working 
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males and 70 per cent of the working fernales. ' 1 The lower limit is set at 25 
hours rather than 30 hours so as not to exclude teachers from the sample. 
(4) PRETXSA and PRETXSAIV: Estimating pre-tax hours of work equation with 
selectivity adjustment. In the earlier sections, we estimate the labour supply 
equation parameters after controlling for taxes and using after-tax marginal 
wage rate and virtual income in the regression equations. We now take a step 
back by examining how the labour supply function changes before taxes are 
taken into account. In fact,, the bulk of the studies which estimate the 
parameters of the labour supply function do so without considering taxation. 
Comparison of the two sets of estimated parameters show the importance of 
taxes in influencing labour supply. The estimations are performed using two 
alternative procedures. The first alternative uses the probit estimation 
procedure to yield the participation equation parameters and derive the 
inverse Mill's ratio, which is then used to estimate the hours of work 
equation. This alternative may be affected by the endogeneity of wages to 
hours worked, but it is useftil for comparative purpose since it generates 
results which are somewhat parallel to those obtained from Procedure 11 with 
selection adjustment. In the second alternative, the three step procedure was 
performed, using the socio-demographic variables as instruments for gross 
wage. 
(5) PRETXSAIV and RPRETXSAIV. - The first procedure, PRETXSAIV, 
estimates pre-tax hours of work equation with selectivity adjustment and 
instrumental variables. This regression follows the three step procedure used 
in the baseline estimation procedure. The purpose of instrumenting for net 
wage is to address the endogeneity problem as well as remove the spurious 
II For example, in 1984 about 6 per cent of the males reported working 
less than 26 hours, while another 
10 per cent worked over 60 hours. The equivalent proportion of women working 
these hours are 18 per 
cent and 9 per cent, respectively. The frequency of respondents working 
less than 25 hours per week are 
highest among farmers, sales workers, transport equipment operators, waitress 
and cleaners, and 
building trades. Respondents who work more than 60 hours per week tend to 
be working proprietors, 
drivers, vendors, sales and shop assistants, cooks, maids and personal services 
workers, fishermen and 
farmers (see Table 7.26). 
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negative re ation between Hi and Wi should there be a random measurement 
error in Hi. The variables used to instrument for pre-tax wage are identical to 
those Alternative 11 of the baseline estimation. RPRETXSAIV follows the 
same estimation procedure as PRETXSAIV but is applied to the restricted 
sample of those working between 25-60 hours. 
6.4.1 Procedure H with and without selectivity adjustments 
The regression results for males and females using Procedure 11 (PROCII) 
correspond fairly closely to the three step procedure of the baseline estimations (see 
Table 7.15 and Table 7.16). The signs are in the same direction, although the coefficients 
for net wage and virtual income for both years and sexes are slightly lower than BASEI 
estimates but higher than BASE2 estimates. The elasticity estimates for both sexes are 
given in Table 7.17 and Table 7.18. The PROCII elasticities have the same signs as the 
baseline elasticities. The value of the elasticity estimates of Procedure 11 fall between the 
values of the two alternatives of the baseline estimates. In 1984 the male elasticities for 
the uncompensated wage effect under PROCII is -0.139, compared with -0.157 under 
BASEI and -0.059 under BASE2. The PROCII elasticity estimates for females are, 
however, closer to the elasticities obtained under BASEll than BASEL The income 
elasticities are very small and not significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. 
Since the compensated wage elasticity is calculated as a residual, where the income 
elasticity is close to zero the compensated wage elasticity will be very close to the value 
of the uncompensated wage elasticity. 
The next set of regressions are performed using Procedure II with selectivity 
adjustment (PROCIISA). The difference in estimates obtained from PROCII and 
PROCIISA can be attributed to the effect of selection bias. The inclusion of the 
selectivity adjustment has the effect of increasing the absolute value of the LWAGETAX 
coefficient, with the estimates for females showing much greater difference than the 
males. Given the very high male participation of 97.5 per cent compared with 
barely 40 
per cent for females, the correction for self-selection is considerably more 
important for 
the females than the males. 
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TABLE 7.15 SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FROM 
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS FOR MALES 
Hours of Work Equation 
1984 1992 
Coefficient ý -Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
BASE] 
LWAGETAX -7.2022 0.2414 -5.7055 0.2223 YVIR 0.1615 0.0324 0.0237 0.0085 
BASE2 
LWAGETAX -2.6884 0.5714 -2.4618 0.5720 YVIR * 0.0239 0.0338 * 0.0102 0.0086 
PROM 
LWAGETAX -6.5175 0.2171 -5.7116 0.2044 YVIR * 0.0575 0.0299 * 0.0142 0.0082 
PROM 
LWAGETAX -7.4766 0.2387 -6.2453 0.2200 
YVIR 0.0939 0.0314 0.0194 0.0085 
RESHRI 
LWAGETAX -2.7414 0.1639 -1.8633 0.1502 
YVIR 0.0619 0.0199 0.0081 0.0053 
RESHR2 
LWAGETAX -1.1814 0.3882 -1.6713 0.5087 
YVIR 0.0430 0.0198 0.0050 0.0052 
PRETXSA 
LWAGE -6.7270 0.2213 -5.8653 0.2073 
NLAB 0.1215 0.0256 0.0255 0.0083 
PREMAN 
LWAGE -2.2912 0.5689 -2.4024 0.5670 
NLAB -0.0311 0.0267 * 0.0045 0.0085 
RPRETXSAIV 
LWAGE -1.0584 0.3975 -1.6816 0.5103 
NLAB 0.0165 0.0159 * 0.0036 0.0051 
Notes: 1. Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
2. Besides the wage and non-labour income variables, the models include the 
following regressors: teachers (TEACH), sales workers (SALE), serv ice workers 
(SER), agricultural workers (AGRI), p roduction workers (PROD), and l amda. 
BASEI = Baseline Alt. 1; BASE2 = Baseline Alt. 2; PROCII = Procedure 11; 
PROCIISA = Procedure 11 with Selectivity; RESHRI = Restricted H ours Alt. 1; 
RESHR2 = Restricted Hours Alt. 2; PRETXSA = Pretax With Selectivity; 
PRETXSAIV = Pretax With Selectivit y and Instrumental Variables; RP RETXSAIV 
= Restricted Hours and Pretax With Selectivity and Instrumental Variab les. 
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TABLE 7.16 SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FROM 
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS FOR FEMALES 
Hours of Work Equation 
1984 1992 
Coefficient T -Std. Error Coefficient- I Std. Error 
BASE] 
LWAGETAX -6.0942 0.5807 -3.8500 0.3969 YVIR 0.0968 0.0201 0.0013 0.0030 
BASE2 
LWAGETAX -1.0258 1.7210 -1-1878 1.2800 YVIR 0.0540 0.0217 0.0002 0.0030 
PROCII 
LWAGETAX -4.3240 0.3629 -2.7966 0.2980 
YVIR 0.0710 0.0191 0.0011 0.0029 
PROCIISA 
LWAGETAX -7.0472 0.5533 -4.5626 0.3857 
YVIR 0.0911 0.0198 0.0011 0.0030 
RESHRI 
LWAGETAX -2.0715 0.3741 -1.259 0.2494 
YVIR 0.0350 0.0111 0.0013 0.0016 
RESHR2 
LWAGETAX -2.0887 0.9575 -1.7172 0.7653 
YVIR 0.0280 0.1157 *0.0009 0.0017 
PRETXSA 
LWAGE -4.3918 0.3631 -2.9194 0.3004 
NLAB 0.0740 0.0179 0.0018 0.0030 
PRETXSAIV 
LWAGE -0.6071 1.4840 -0.7546 1.0570 
NLAB 0.0439 0.0199 0.0023 0.0030 
RPRETXSAIV 
LWAGE -1.9705 0.9559 -1.4390 0.7070 
NLAB 0.0238 0.0105 0.0010 0.0016 
Notes: 
1. Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk 
2. Besides wage and non-labour income variables, the models include the 
following regressors: 
children up to I year old (CHI), children at age 2 years (CH2), children 
between the ages of 
3-5 years (CH3_5), teachers (TEACH), sales workers (SALE), service workers 
(SER), 
agricultural workers (AGRI), production workers (PROD), and 
lamda. 
289 
CHA P TER , MODELLiNG LABOUR SUPPL)'WjTH TA-v. 4 Tio. v 
TABLE 7.17 SUMMARY OF ELASTICITY ESTIMATES FROM 
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS FOR MALES 
Uncompensated Compensated Income 
Wage Elasticity Wage Elasticity Elasticity 
BASE] 
1984 -0.157 -0-167 0.010 
199-1 -0.120 -0.120 0.000 
BASE2 
1984 -0.059 -0-058 * 0.001 
1992 -0.052 -0.052 * 0.000 
PROCII 
1984 -0.139 -0.142 * 0.003 
1992 -0.117 -0.118 * 0.001 
PROCIISA 
1984 -0.164 -0.170 0.006 
1992 -0.132 -0.134 0.002 
RESHRI 
1984 -0.060 -0.064 0.004 
1992 -0.039 -0.040 0.001 
RESHR2 
1984 -0.025 -0.028 0.003 
1992 -0.035 -0.035 0.000 
PRETXSA 
1984 -0.147 -0.155 0.008 
199') -0.124 -0.126 0.002 
PRETXSAIV 
1984 -0.050 -0.048 -0.002 
1992 -0.050 -0.050 
0.000 
RPRETXSAIV 
1984 -0.023 -0.024 
* 0.001 
1992 -0.035 -0.035 
* 0.000 
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TABLE 7.18 SUMMARY OF ELASTICITY ESTIMATES FROM 
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS FOR FEMALES 
Uncompensated Compensated Income 
Wage Elasticity Wage Elasticity Elasticity 
BASE] 
1984 -0.384 -0.455 0.071 
1992 -0.228 -0.229 0.001 
BASE2 
1984 0.064 0.025 0.039 
1992 -0.070 -0.070 0.000 
PROM 
1984 -0.105 -0.105 0.000 
1992 -0.065 -0.065 0.000 
PROCIISA 
1984 -0.444 -0.511 0.066 
1992 -0.269 -0.270 0.001 
RESHRI 
1984 -0.131 -0.156 0.025 
1992 -0.074 -0.075 0.001 
RESHR2 
1984 -0.131 -0.151 0.020 
1992 -0.101 -0.101 0.000 
PRETXSA 
1984 -0.277 -0.378 0.101 
1992 -0.172 -0.173 0.001 
PRETXSAIV 
1984 -0.038 0.098 
0.060 
1992 -0.044 -0.044 
0.000 
RPRETXSAIV 
1984 -0.124 -0.141 
0.017 
1992 -0.084 -0.084 
0.000 
Note: Associated statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk 
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The difference in the size of coefficients generated by PROCIISA and the 
baseline estimates provide an indication on the effect of the two alternative instrumental 
NI'ariables on the estimates. The LWAGETAX coefficient estimates using instrumental 
variable adjustment under Alternative I are fairly close to the PROCIISA estimates 
compared with those obtained from Alternative 2, which are much lower in absolute 
terms. This can be expected given the very high correlation between LWAGETAX and 
the instruments in Alternative I compared to a much lower correlation between 
LWAGETAX and the instruments in Alternative 2. 
6.4.2 Restricting to 25-60 hours per week 
In the estimation of the labour supply equation, restricting the sample of workers 
to those working between 25-60 hours per week produces some interesting results. This 
procedure was done to remove those who are underemployed or those for whom it is 
difficult to estimate the hours worked because of the nature of their occupation or work 
performed during the survey week. The issue of extreme values in the hours worked as 
reported by the respondent is closely linked to the problem of hours misreporting which 
causes a spurious negative relationship between hours and wages. Between the two 
alternative instrumental variables used in the baseline estimations, Alternative 2 is 
probably much better in getting around the problem of measurement error than 
Alternative I which uses gross wage rate and gross wage rate squared as part of its 
instruments. Although the argument behind Alternative I instrumental variables is that 
the level of gross wage rate is quite independent of the hours worked by an individual 
taxpayer, yet the gross wage rate is not completely free from the effects of measurement 
error. 
The labour supply equations with restricted hours are estimated after adjusting for 
selectivity and applying the two alternative instrumental variables. Two features emerge 
from the estimates. First, the difference in the coefficients between RESHRI and 
RESHR2 is much smaller than those obtained from BASE1 and BASE2. Second, the 
coefficient estimates for the restricted hours are much closer to BASE2 rather than 
BASE1 estimates. In fact, one is tempted to say that the restricted hours estimates seem 
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to converge towards the BASE2 estimates, although the -estimates obtained from the 
former procedure are in some cases lower. 
6.4.3 Pre-tax estimations and effect of taxes on labour supply 
In the pre-tax estimations, we instrument for log wage which is considered to be 
endogenous to hours worked. The instrumental variables used are equivalent to 
Alternative 2 of log net wage equation which use socio-demographic variables as 
instruments. This instrument was tested for exogeneity using the following simultaneous 
equation model: 
YI* "":::: P I'X I+ 7Y2 + F- 1 (Tobit) 
Y2 : -": 7C2'X2 + F-2 
where x, is a vector of control variables, Y2 is the instrumented variable, and E; I and E; 2are 
stochastic disturbance terms. Exogeneity Of Y2 can be tested by a simple t-test of the 
2 hypothesis thatV = CY I 21CY2 = 0. The Tobit models are jointly estimated with the model 
for Y2- In the exogeneity tests for log wage using the instrumental variables, the 
coefficients for V obtained for males in 1984 and 1992 and females in 1984 are highly 
insignificant and no different from zero (see Table 7.19). Hence, the hypotheses that 
there are no simultaneity for the instrumented variables cannot be rejected at the 5 per 
cent level. 
By comparing the estimations before tax with those obtained after tax, we derive 
the magnitude of change in hours worked that are linked with the introduction of taxes. 
The comparison is performed on three sets of estimates that are methodologically 
equivalent. First, we compare PRETXSA with PROCIISA which had been adjusted 
for 
selectivity but not endogeneity. The notable difference occurs 
for the log-wage 
coefficient, while the change for virtual income coefficient 
is marginal. These 
regressions show that with taxes the labour supply for males change marginally 
by -0.7 
hours per week in 1984 and -0.4 hours per week in 1992. 
The equivalent change for 
females are -3.6 hours per week 
in 1984 and 0.4 hours per week in 1992. In other words, 
the uncompensated wage effect of a RMI wage change 
in 1984 gives rise to a change of 
4 minutes per week for the males and 10 minutes per week change 
for the females. 
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TABLE 7.19 EXOGENEITY TESTS FOR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
(Before Taxes) 
Male 
Cy 12 IC72 
2 
-0.0351 0.5825 0.9519 -0.00147 0.5803 0.9980 
Female 
(3 12 1ý32 
2 
-2.1790 2.4380 0.3741 -2.9530 1.4610 0.0461 
Next, we compare the estimates for BASE2 and PRETXSAIV, which have 
incorporated selectivity adjustment and instrumental variables. There is very little or no 
change at all in the hours of work per week with the introduction of taxes. The difference 
in the log-wage coefficient for the males were -0.4 in 1984 and 0 in 1992, while the 
change for the females were -0.6 in 1984 and 0.4 in 1992. The magnitude of changes in 
terms of hours worked per week is negligible for both sexes. In other words, following a 
wage increase of RMI in 1984, the difference in wage effect between the pre- and post- 
tax estimations is only 4 minutes per week for the males and 9 minutes per week for the 
females. 
For the third level of comparison, we consider effect of taxes on those working 
between 25-60 hours, that is, RESHR2 and RPRETXSAIV. The magnitude of the change 
in hours per week for is practically zero for males and females. To conclude, the three 
comparisons show that despite applying different assumptions to the estimation 
procedures, the influence of taxes on the estimate of labour supply function parameters 
appears to have marginal or negligible effect. 
7. REGRESSiON BY SUBGROUPS 
After estimating the parameters for the male and female 
labour supply equations for the 
whole sample as well as restricted hours under a variety of assumptions, we extend 
our 
estimation exercise to subgroups based on occupational categories and educational 
attainment, as well as for workers who are employees or under self 
employment. 
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Instrumental variables are used for LWAGETAX and YVIR. The instruments used for 
LWAGETAX follows the Alternative I formulation. In the earlier estimations., the hours 
of work equations generally show negative elasticities for the uncompensated as well as 
compensated wage effect. The elasticities for the income effect are positive. We wish to 
examine how far these signs apply if the regressions are based on the sample of 
subgroups. Are there particular subgroups in the Malaysian labour force where the signs 
of significant coefficients for LWAGETAX and YVIR are reversed and be more in line 
with the wage and income effects of the standard labour supply model? 
7.1 Occupation 
As shown in Table 7.20 and Table 7.21 , the coefficients of LWAGETAX 
for 
males and females are negative. In addition, the absolute values of the coefficients are 
larger in 1984 than 1992, with the exception of male workers in services and agricultural 
occupations and female workers in professional and technical occupations. The 
coefficient for female administrative and managerial workers may be smaller in 1984, 
but it is not statistically significant. The pattern where the coefficients for 1984 are larger 
in absolute values than those for 1992 is also evident in the earlier regressions. 
To examine the effect of the change in net wage on hours worked, we compute 
the uncompensated wage effect (8Hj16Wj) and income effect (6Hj16Vj) for the two years. 
The hours equation is written as 
H, =ao+ a, InW, + a V, +aZ, + a k+F, (31) 234i 
where Hi is the ith person's hours of work, W, is the predicted wage rate, 
Vi is the 
predicted virtual income, Zi is a vector of additional control variables 
(such as age, 
experience, education, age and number of children, occupation, and strata), and Ej 
is the 
stochastic disturbance term. From the Slutsky equation, the uncompensated wage effect 
and the substitution effect can be estimated in the following way: 
Uncompensated wage effect = 6Hj16 Wi =aI/ Wi (32) 
Income effect = 6Hj18 Vi = a2 (33) 
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TABLE 7.20 MALE WAGE AND VIRTUAL INCOME COEFFICIENTS BY 
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 1984 AND 1992 
1984 1992 
Coefficient StdError Coefficie-nt--T- Std. Error 
Professional and 
Technical 
LWAGETAX -6.1084 0.8347 -1.8806 0.6490 
YVIR 0.1694 0.0599 *0-00 15 0.0065 
Administrative and 
Managerial 
LWAGETAX -5.1256 0.9534 -4.0108 0.7306 
YVIR 0.0587 0.0462 -0.0232 0.0330 
Clerical 
LWAGETAX -8.4638 0.6162 -6.4189 0.6291 
YVIR -0.4999 0.0634 0.0023 0.0401 
Sales 
LWAGETAX -7.7851 0.8780 -5.9279 0.7596 
YVIR -0.0 180 0.1016 0.0188 0.0363 
Services 
LWAGETAX -12.9410 0.8738 -14.450 0.9612 
YVIR * -0.2534 0.1552 0.0880 0.1047 
Agricultural 
LWAGETAX -7.9314 0.5930 -9.2371 0.5664 
YVIR 0.4781 0.1976 * 0.1590 0.1384 
Production 
LWAGETAX -9.8491 0.4826 -6.4985 0.4058 
YVIR * 0.1357 0.0901 * 0.0455 0.0517 
Notes: 
1. Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk 
2. The basic specification includes the following regressors: log wage after tax (LWAGETAX), virtual 
income (YVIR), and dummies for primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary education. 
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TABLE 7.21 FEMALE WAGE AND VIRTUAL INCOME COEFFICIENTS BY 
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 1984 AND 1992 
Technical 
Std. Error 
LWAGETAX -6.1406 1.5550 -6.3139 1.2700 
YVIR * 0.1644 0.0522 * 0.0059 0.0304 
Administrative and 
Managerial 
LWAGETAX -1.5820 1.0350 -2.2120 0.8662 
YVIR 0.0382 0.0491 0.0155 0.0183 
Clerical 
LWAGETAX -4.0120 0.6842 -3.8329 0.4889 
YVIR 0.0201 0.0127 0.03594 0.0163 
Sales 
LWAGETAX -8.1354 2.1860 -6.6643 1.2950 
YVIR * 0.1064 0.0694 * 0.0007 0.0043 
Services 
LWAGETAX -14.6750 1.9890 -7.9656 1.3220 
YVIR 0.2006 0.1179 0.2597 0.0716 
Agricultural 
LWAGETAX -7.4246 1.4110 -4.8054 
1.3490 
YVIR * -0.1330 0.1330 * 0.1214 
0.1107 
Production 
LWAGETAX -3.7145 1.4240 -2.1554 
1.0070 
YVIR 0.0947 0.1275 0.0418 0.0613 
Notes: 
1. Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk 
2. The basic specification includes the following regressors: 
log wage after tax (LWAGETAX), 
virtual income (YVIR), and dummies for primary, 
lower secondary, upper secondary, and 
tertiary education. 
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In the discussion that follows, we will merely be examining the uncompensated 
wage effect by occupation and education which area shown in Table 7.22 and Table 7.25 
because the income effect is less interesting because they are generally insignificant. In 
1984, the uncompensated wage effects are strongest for males who are engaged in 
agriculture (-2.7), production (-2.8) and services (-3.3), while they are weakest for males 
who were administrative and managerial workers (-0.3) and professional and technical 
workers (-0.5). The calculated mean net wage rates for males are lowest for service 
workers (RM3.80), agricultural workers (RM2.90) and production workers (RM3.40) 
. and 
highest for managerial and administrative workers (RM 15.70) as well as professional 
and technical workers (RM1 1.80). This implies that workers in agriculture, production, 
and services occupations, which have much lower mean wage, increase their hours of 
work much more in response to a reduction in wage compared with males in the 
administrative, managerial, professional and technical occupations, who enjoy higher 
wage rates. 
Among the females, the negative uncompensated wage effects are strongest 
among occupations with the lowest paying jobs as well. In 1984, the uncompensated 
wage effects are strongest for female workers in sales (-7.0), services (-10.6) and 
agriculture (-12.3) and weakest for females in administrative and managerial occupations 
(417). The calculated mean net wage was RM9.20 per hour for female administrative 
and managerial workers in 1984 compared with less than RM1.30 per hour in sales, 
services and agricultural occupations. 
The uncompensated wage effects for 1992 for both sexes are below the 1984 
position, implying that changes in net wage in 1992 have a smaller effect on 
hours 
supplied compared with 1984. The only exception to the decline is males 
in agriculture 
which saw a slight increase in the uncompensated wage effect. 
The most dramatic 
decline are recorded by females in sales, services and agricultural occupations where 
the 
uncompensated wage effect in 1992 are less than half their values in 
1984. 
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TABLE 7.22 UNCOMPENSATED WAGE EFFECT BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 
1984 AND 1992 
Males Females 
1984 1992 1984 1992 
Professional and -0.51 -0.15 -1.19 -0.85 
Technical 
Administrative and -0.32 -0.21 -0.17 -0.17 
Managerial 
Clerical -1.53 -1.09 -1.01 -0.62 
Sales -1.70 -1.09 -7.00 -3.39 
Services -3.34 -3.29 -10.65 -4.30 
Agricultural -2.74 -3.08 -12.34 -6.33 
Production -2.83 -1.65 -2.23 -1.04 
Note: Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
7.2 Education 
A similar hours of work estimation procedure was conducted for workers 
categorised by levels of educational attainment. The wage and virtual income coefficients 
for males and females are given in Table 7.23 and Table 7.24. The uncompensated wage 
effect in absolute terms decreases with increasing level of education (see Table 7.25). 
In 
1984, the uncompensated wage effect for males was -3.92 for those without education 
compared with -0.39 with tertiary education. 
The range for females was larger, from - 
15.82 without education to -0.82 with tertiary education. 
As with the analyses for 
occupations, the uncompensated wage effect is larger 
for those with lower wage rates and 
the effect declines as wage rates increases. For every educational category 
the 
uncompensated wage effect is smaller in 1992 than 
it was in 1984. 
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TABLE 7.23 MALE WAGE AND VIRTUAL INCOME COEFFICIENTS BY 
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS, 1984 AND 1992 
1992 
Std. Error 
LWAGETAX -8.8134 1.134 -9.3667 1.046 YVIR * 0.3518 0.4180 * 0.1300 0.2309 
Primary 
LWAGETAX -9.4496 0.4176 -8.5072 0.4362 YVIR 0.0195 0.0903 * 0.0494 0.0332 
Lower Secondary 
LWAGETAX -9.8723 0.6290 -7.0836 0.5335 
YVIR -0.0955 0.0939 * 0.0939 0.0594 
Upper Secondary 
LWAGETAX -7.4668 0.5289 -5.9865 0.4919 
YVIR 0.1028 0.0477 * 0.0260 0.0376 
Tertiary 
LWAGETAX -5.8173 0.6842 -2.8017 0.4609 
YVIR 0.0787 0.0396 * 0.0052 0.0069 
Notes: 
1. Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk 
2. The basic specification includes the following regressors: log wage after tax 
(LWAGETAX), virtual income (YVIR), age, and dummies for sales, service, agricultural 
and production occupations. The regressions for upper secondary and tertiary education 
include a dummy for teachers. 
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TABLE 7.24 FEMALE WAGE AND VIRTUAL INCOME COEFFICIENTS BY 














Coefficient Std. Error 
-12.0330 1.6170 





-8.3178 1.1320 -4.6290 0.9104 
0.1395 0.0681 -0-0003 0.0034 
-6.2955 1.6610 -7.0262 1.0240 
* 0.1083 0.0867 0.1182 0.0429 
-4.7986 0.8438 -4.7372 0.6790 
0.0798 0.0243 0.0340 0.0267 
Tertiary 
LWAGETAX -7.8619 0.8565 -4.0090 0.5519 
YVIR 0.0424 0.0141 0.0327 0.0159 
Notes: 1. Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk (*). 
2. The basic specification includes the following regressors: LWAGETAX, YVIR, AGE or EXPRC, 
SALE, SER, AGRI, PROD, USEC, TER, TEACH. 
TABLE 7.25 UNCOMPENSATED WAGE EFFECT By EDUCATIONAL LEVELS, 
1984 AND 1992 
Male Female 
1984 1.992 1984 1992 
No Education -3.92 -3.62 -15.82 -8.37 
Primary -2.87 -2.50 -6.87 -3.37 
Lower Secondary -2.46 -1.59 -2.69 -2.58 
Upper Secondary -1.13 -0.93 -1.22 -0.99 
Tertiary -0.39 -0.20 -0.82 -0.37 
Notes: 1. Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk 
(*). 
2. The basic specification includes the following regressors: LWAGETAX, YVIR, AGE or EXPRC, 
SALE, SERV, AGRI, PROD, USEC, TER, and TEACH. 
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7.3 Employee and Seýf-Emplqyed 
The final set of hours of work equations were estimated for employee as well as 
for the self-employed and unpaid family workers using the three stage estimation 
procedure. The purpose of the exercise was to ascertain if this subgrouping of workers 
would make a difference to the signs in the coefficients. Although the magnitude of 
coefficients are generally greater for the self-employed and unpaid family workers than 
for employees, as Table 7.26 indicates the signs for LWAGETAX and YVIR remain 
similar to the results obtained from earlier estimations, and the uncompensated as well as 
the compensated wage elasticities are negative. 
8. DiscussioN 
In the preceding sections, we performed some baseline estimations using the second 
generation Procedure VIII three stage approach for married male and female heads of 
households within the 20-54 years age group. In addition, we carried out four categories 
of alternative estimations, namely, (a) hours of work without instrumental variables, (b) 
three stage estimation for those working between 25-60 hours a week, (c) pre-tax hours 
of work, and (d) regressions by occupation, education and employment categories. In 
these estimations,, two major features emerge. First, taxes are found to have very weak 
effects for the hours of work equation. This finding corresponds with other studies such 
as Koster (1967), MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990), and Mroz (1987). Therefore, the 
decision to treat labour supply as exogenous in Chapter 5 for the tax reform simulations 
can be supported by the findings in this chapter. 
Second, the uncompensated and the compensated wage effect estimates are found 
to be negative while the income effect estimates are positive for all estimates where the 
coefficients obtained are significant. These signs seem to be contrary to what is normally 
expected in the formal labour supply theory which states that the 
income effect is 
negative and the wage effect is positive. This need not necessarily 
be the case in 
empirical work though. 
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TABLE 7.26 WAGE AND VIRTUAL INCOME COEFFICIENTS FOR EMPLOYEES AND 




LWAGETAX -7.5671 0.3631 -5.0923 0.3347 YVIR 0.1388 0.0406 * 0.0148 0.0104 
Males Alt. 2 
LWAGETAX -1.8998 0.6325 -1.8493 0.6751 
YVIR 0.0165 0.0311 * 0.0050 0.0085 
Females Alt. I 
LWAGETAX -6.8467 0.7080 -3.9238 0.5188 
YVIR 0.0929 0.0212 0.0682 0.0165 
Females Alt. 2 
LWAGETAX -1.5257 1.3630 -1.4188 1.2140 
YVIR 0.0381 0.0188 0.0270 0.0153 
Self Employed and Unpaid Family Workers 
Std. Error 
LWAGETAX -7.6527 0.5820 -8.8869 0.5310 
YVIR * -0.0928 0.1163 -0.2305 0.0996 
Males Alt. 2 
LWAGETAX * -5.8745 3.247 -6.7690 2.9050 
YVIR * 0.0224 0.1179 * -0.1387 0.1019 
Females Alt. I 
LWAGETAX -9.0140 1.2490 -8.6090 0.9206 
YVIR 0.1098 0.0533 -0.7165 0.0038 
Females Alt. 2 
LWAGETAX 2.3890 9.7720 -16.1980 -2.2930 
YVIR 0.1416 0.0553 * -0.7114 0.0039 
Notes: 
1. Statistics are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an asterisk 
2. The coefficients are derived using the baseline estimation procedures and variables. 
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There are three aspects to our discussion. First, we cite other studies with similar 
results. Second, we explore some reasons why the results seem reasonable in the 
Malaysian context, and finally, we discuss the limitations. of data and model specification 
that could affect the regression results. 
1 Studies With Similar Results 
In some of the earlier studies in the United States based on data from the 1960 
Census of Population and the 1967 Survey of Economic -Opportunity, there are some 
evidence on the negatively- sloped labour supply curve. The slope of the male hours of 
work function was found to be more negative when the calculated wage rate was used 
than when an alternative wage rate variable, such as an instrumented wage rate was 
constructed (Bloch, 1973; DaVanzo, DeTray and Greenberg, 1973; Masters and 
Garfinkel, 1977; Borjas, 1980). Even after efforts were made to remove spurious 
correlation from the wage variable, most studies found a negative uncompensated own- 
wage elasticity of hours of work at sample means. Pencavel (1986) points out that the 
uncompensated wage elasticities for males can range between -0.15 and -0.09 for 
DaVanzo, DeTray and Greenberg (1973), -0.110 for Masters and Garfinkel (1977) and - 
0.156 for Ashenfelter and Heckman (1973). However, because of the strong negative 
income effect, in many cases the estimated compensated wage elasticities in these studies 
are positive. Evidently, this is not the case for Malaysia because from our estimations, 
the income effect is found to be either very low or insignificant. 
As for non-wage income, it is generally recognised that this variable is difficult to 
measure accurately. The different procedures used generate distinctly 
different estimates 
of the effect of non-wage income on hours of work. Pencavel (1986: 
63) argues that only 
16 of the 57 different coefficients presented in DaVanzo, DeTray and 
Greenberg's study 
are statistically significant, and of these 16 estimates, exactly one-half 
is positive and 
one-half is negative. Since the estimates on non-wage 
incomes vary so much and the 
uncompensated wage effect is typically estimated to 
be negative, it is not unusual for the 
substitution effect to be negative. 
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Among the more recent studies using the instrumental variables approach, Mroz 
(1987) initially obtained a negative uncompensated wage elasticity by using the OLS but 
which turns positive after he introduced instrumental variables for logged wage. In his 
estimate of taxes in the single worker model, the coefficients obtained for logged wage 
are negative for all the six specifications. As for non-wife income, the coefficients are 
negative for four of the specifications and positive when the labour market experience of 
females are used as instruments. The changing of signs are attributed to the different 
exogeneity assumptions used in the alternative specifications. In another study, Flood 
and MaCurdy (1992) obtained negative wage effect and positive income effect in one of 
their specifications but they attribute it to the endogeneity of the gross wage and income 
variables (and these variables squared) which are used as instruments for net wage. 
Blomquist (1996: 387) raised some doubts on this issue and argued that although it is 
difficult to test whether the gross wage rate and nonlabour income are admissible 
instruments, in his Monte Carlo simulations of hours of work for small samples, the 
instrumental variables using background variables show serious bias, especially in small 
samples, compared with those using gross wage rate and non-labour income. 
In our study, we have tried to address some of the concerns about endogeneity of 
net wage as well as measurement error of hours. While the absolute value of the 
coefficients for logged wage vary with the alternative specifications, the negative signs 
remain. Given the very small, and often insignificant, positive income effect, this implies 
that the substitution or the compensated wage effect (which is calculated as a residual) is 
negative. 
8.2 Are the Results Supportable? 
One can raise the question whether the signs obtained from the Malaysian data set 
seem reasonable given the socio-economic and institutional setting of 
Malaysia. A 
scatterplot analysis of hours of work by log net wage for males and 
females in 1984 is 
shown in Figure 7.14 and Figure 7.15. The charts show that there 
is a much wider spread 
of hours worked at lower wages than at higher wages. 
The line of best fit shows a 
negative relationship in both the cases. 
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FIGURE 7.14 PLOT OF HOURS OF WORK 
AND NET WAGES FOR MALES, 1984 
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FIGURE 7.15 PLOT OF HOURS OF WORK 
AND NET WAGES FOR FEMALES, 1984 
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The pattern is analytically clearer in Table 7.27, which shows the mean and 
standard deviation of hours worked by wage level. 12 It is clear from the table that both 
males and females work longer hours in 1992 than in 1984, especially for males who 
earn wages of RM6 and above and females who earn RM4 and above. This can be 
explained by the Malaysian economic context. In 1984 the economy, which was facing 
high unemployment, was at the start of a recession which peaked two years later. With 
the fall in demand, there was redundant labour and some manufacturing companies went 
as far as implementing voluntary reduction of work hours among the production workers 
in order to reduce the number of staff retrenchment. The economic situation in 1992 was 
quite a reverse. Since 1988 the economy had been growing rapidly at rates well above 8 
per cent per annum, and by 1992, not only did the country reached full employment, but 
there were reports of labour shortage in several sectors of the economy. Workers put in 
more hours of work to meet the demand from the economic boom. 
The second feature is that the mean hours worked are highest for those eaming 
the lowest wages, and the mean hours worked become successively lower as the wage 
level increases. In the case of males, there was a difference of 13-16 mean hours between 
the highest and lowest wage categories. This is a clear indication of the backward 
bending labour supply curve. In addition, the standard deviation is largest for those in the 
lowest wage category. This means that there is a wider spread of hours worked for those 
earning below RM2 per hour than in the other wage categories. Workers in the lowest 
wage category of less than RM2 include those are underemployed (below 30 hours per 
week), who are likely to be casual or part-time workers, and those who work very long 
hours exceeding 60 hours per week. While many other studies show that the male labour 
supply curve is slightly backward bending, the female schedule is found to be strongly 
12 It should be noted that this table has not controlled for the effect of non-labour income on hours of 
work, which after all is very small. 
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TABLE 7.28 WORKING MORE THAN 60 HOURS PER WEEK 
Male % Female % 
Working proprietors 18.3 Cooks, maids, and personal 24.0 
services 
Motor vehicle drivers 17.5 Sales and shop assistants 212.8 
Vendors 14.1 Vendors 8.9 
Security services 11.4 Working proprietors 18.8 
Fishermen 9.0 Farmers 11.4 
Others 29.7 Others 14.1 
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 
Source: Labour Force Survey, 1984 Total number: Males = 724 Females 372 
positively sloped. In this respect,, the results in our regressions coincide with the findings 
of Nakamura and Nakamura (198 1) who show that the uncompensated wage elasticities 
for females hours of work are negative. However, unlike Nakamura and Nakamura, our 
results show that female wage and income elasticities, though small, are still larger than 
those for the males. 
While workers would undoubtedly be motivated to put in more hours if they are 
offered higher wages in Malaysia, as is the case elsewhere, what could be the explanation 
of worker with lower wages putting in more hours per week? Firstly, the long hours of 
work occur mostly among the self-employed and unpaid family workers, casual workers, 
or those engaged in the informal sector activities. Workers in the formal sector would be 
bound by institutional working hours. In many cases, it is the nature of job which 
involves long working hours or requires a lot of waiting time since the completion of the 
task is dependent on the input of others. Table 7.28 shows the frequency of some of the 
occupations where individuals work over 60 hours in 1984. Many of them are also the 
low paying jobs. Working proprietors, sales and shop assistants, cooks and vendors work 
long hours because shops and stalls in Malaysia operate for much longer hours than, say, 
in Britain. Shops, stalls, and street vendors selling food maintain activities seven days a 
week. Motor vehicle drivers spend much of their time on the road, as well as making 
deliveries, waiting for the loading and unloading of goods, or merely waiting 
for their 
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services to be demanded. Maids and servants often live with their employers where their 
services would be provided during throughout the day. Fishermen who are out to sea 
would include the hours spent away from shore as their working hours. These workers 
are not paid on the hourly basis but on a monthly salary and/or on the number of tasks 
performed. In view of the long working hours and low earnings associated with these 
occupations, the calculated earnings per hour of the individuals in these occupations 
would be very low. 
Secondly, those with low wages and non-labour income will have to increase 
their hours of work in order to reach an income level that can meet their household 
consumption. Participation is typically high in a society without an unemployment 
benefit system since the option of either working for low wages or to remain unemployed 
and receive some benefit, is not open to individuals. The social norm dictates that all 
able-bodied adult males are expected to work and cannot depend on family ties for 
financial support beyond a certain length of time, unless under exceptional 
circumstances. Without a comprehensive income support programme which would raise 
family income to a certain subsistence level , it appears that those 
in the lower wage 
categories would maximise their hours of work, if there is a opportunity to do so, in order 
to reach their 'target' household income to meet their family financial obligations. 
Workers in these wage category tend to be those with little or no education and often 
work in occupations with little job security. They are largely self employed or engaged in 
'informal' sector activities. The added worker effect is also more evident among families 
with low income. As discussed in Section 6.1.2, women with low family income have a 
higher likelihood of participation. These women are engaged in part-time work, while 
still performing their household duties, in order to supplement their husbands' 
income. 
Those with higher wages tend to be better educated and have better 
job security. 
In addition, their hours of work tend to be institutionally 
determined. Government 
employees work between 8 a. m. to 4.15 p. m. on a five and the 
half working week, while 
office workers in the private sector work between 9 a. m. to 
5 p. m. on a five day week 
with shorter lunch hours. Workers on the highest wage rates 
have greater flexibility in 
their working time, which is reflected in the larger standard 
deviation in their hours of 
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work. This could also mean that there are some workers earning high wage rates who 
work shorter hours as well as long hours. In view of the hours of work pattern described, 
it is not surprising in the Malaysian labour market to encounter a backward bending 
curve which starts from the very lowest income levels, rather than the higher income 
levels as described in formal microeconomic theory. 
The assumption that leisure is a normal good, that is, higher income is related 
with increased demand for leisure and negatively related with hours of work, does not 
appear to be supported by the regression results. In any case, after controlling for net 
wages, the effect of non-labour income on hours of work is either very small or 
statistically insignificant. In the baseline regressions, the income elasticities for the males 
are practically zero except for Alternative I in 1984. For the females, there is a small 
positive income elasticities for 1984 and zero for 1992. There is a positive relationship, 
albeit small, between non-labour income and hours of work. One reason for this could be 
that individuals in the prime working groups are be keen to build up their wealth position 
for retirement. 
In the developed countries where the unemployed workers are paid a lump-sum 
unemployment benefit, one of the issues to be investigated is whether the size of the 
benefit is large enough for individuals to choose non-participation in preference to 
participation since they would reach a higher utility level from voluntary unemployment. 
The choice of the two alternatives would depend on the individual's marginal rate of 
substitution between income and leisure relative to the wage rate. Another line of enquiry 
is the case of a negative income tax which has been criticised by economists for its 
negative effect on work incentives. The effect of government transfer programmes 
introduce non-convexities in the budget line which could give rise to multiple tangencies 
and small changes in the wage or tax parameters can lead to large changes in desired 
hours of work. In addition, where movements between marginal tax brackets have 
significant tax implications, there is an issue of the clustering of individuals around the 
kinks on the budget line as a result of controlling their hours of work. To address this 
clustering, analysts introduce the optimisation error in their model specification on the 
argument that individuals cannot fine-tune their hours of work precisely. 
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These issues, though interesting and relevant in the developed countries context, 
are unimportant for countries, such as Malaysia. The first two issues are irrelevant 
because of the absence of unemployment benefit or negative income tax programmes. 
Regarding the third issue, there is little reason to believe that the number of individuals 
who try to locate at the kinks are significant enough to warrant attention. The proportion 
of taxpayers among those who work are small. Those who pay income taxes are in 
relatively low tax brackets, where the median tax bracket in 1992 was 12 per cent for 
both sexes. For the average taxpayer, it might not appear to be worth the trouble to limit 
the hours of work. The primary concern is really to raise their total income rather than to 
remain in a lower tax category by limiting hours of work. Furthermore, there is little 
scope for them to vary the hours of work in order to locate at the kink because the bulk of 
the income taxpayers are employees in the formal sector where the hours of work are 
institutionally determined. Among those who are engaged in business or are self 
employed, there must be other effective avenues of tax planning permitted under the 
Income Tax Act rather than limiting their hours of work. For the reasons above, we do 
not introduce the optimisation error in our model. 
8.3 Model Specification and Data Limitations 
In this chapter, we use the standard utility function to develop the models for 
participation, wages, and hours of work for heads of households. The regression analyses 
yield elasticity estimates for Malaysia, which could be compared to results of studies 
conducted elsewhere. One issue that could be raised is whether the standard utility 
function used for the model is flexible enough to accommodate the concept of 
households requiring at least a minimum income level to meet their consumption needs, 
which may be regarded as the fixed cost. For societies that do not 
have income support 
programmes, household members would have to work long 
hours or take up part-time 
work to supplement their household income in order to reach at 
least a 'target income' 
level to cover the fixed cost. This may require a reformulation of the utility 
function to 
capture the backward sloping supply curve of 
labour for households with low marginal 
wage rates. 
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One alternative formulation that could accommodate the backward bending 
labour supply curve is given in Blundell (1980), which we surnmarise below. The utility 
function of each household h is given by a strictly convex utility function, 
(4XIhIMIhý X2WM2hý -.., XrhIMrhl (34) 
where Xih is the quantity of good i consumed, and each deflator Mih measures the 
corresponding specific effect on utility of household composition. Let pi denote the price 
of good i and yh the income of household h, the cost function is given by 
Ch(Pq Uh) Ch(PlMlhý P2M2hý ... 5 PrMrh5 
Uh) (35) 
where ah(p) and b(p) are concave, linear homogeneous functions in p. In the model, the 
fixed cost ah(p) depend on household composition and a Cobb-Douglas is chosen for b(P) 
in order to lead to the linear expenditure system. If there is a single male worker in each 
family facing a marginal wage rate w and a linear budget constraint 
p'x + wl = wT+y y (36) 
where 1 is leisure time, T is the maximum time available, y is full income and y' is non- 
labour income. Labour supply is given by T-I=h. As suggested by Muellbauer (1980), 
the cost function in the form of equation (35) is as follows 
1-0 0 
Ch (Whý A Uh) = ah(P) + WAD) + b(p) Wh Uh (37) 
where 0<0 <1 and d(p) is homogenous of degree zero in prices. To simplify, 
Blundell 
specifies that 
d(p) =y, fl pi", 
i'Di = 0, Yl>O 
ii 
Pi 
Taking derivatives ofChwith respect to price, the expenditure equations 
for all i are as 
follows: 
PiXih: ":: Pi7iMih + Yl8iWh + (I-O)Pi(Y'h + 
(T-d(P))Wh-ah(P)) (38) 
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The labour supply equation corresponding to equation (38) is given by 
h=0 (a(p) - y') + (I - 0)(T - d(p)) (39) w 
which has the property of being backward sloping for y' < a(p). In other words, the 
labour supply curve is backward sloping when the non-labour income is less than the 
fixed cost. In the sample of households in his study, Blundell found that this condition is 
typically satisfied. 
The second issue is that the static labour supply model does not take into account 
life cycle considerations. ' 3 In a life cycle model, an individual can decide on the number 
of hours to supply to the market and the intensity of market participation can vary with 
age. Given his long-run values of wealth and his wage, he must decide on the optimal 
timing of hours and consumption, which vary over the life cycle. Therefore, there is a 
difficulty with regard to the standard practice in empirical labour supply studies of using 
an aggregate of all current period non-eamings income to estimate pure income effects. 
However, the available data do not permit any attempt to separate out these life-cycle 
considers to obtain wealth elasticities. 
The data source is also not rich enough to capture the ideal theoretical concepts 
that could be used to measure pure income effects. The problem of estimating the income 
slopes in empirical work is evident in other studies in the developed countries as well. As 
noted by Smith (1980: 166), 'The estimated income slopes were disappointing because 
the income variable either had the wrong sign (positive), implying that leisure was an 
inferior good, or it was sufficiently small so that compensated own-wage slopes in the 
labor supply equation remained negative. ' Among the reasons to explain these failures 
are the severe under-reporting of the income variable that leads to biased income 
coefficients and data on assets and liabilities are unavailable. That fact that reported 
property income constitutes a very small component (about I per cent) of the average 
13 
Card (1991) surveys the large literature regarding the allocation of working time over the 
life cycle. 
Most of the studies focus on estimating annual hours of work equations and use panel 
data sets. Wages 
include both current and future values. The majority of the available empirical evidence suggests a weak 
or even non-existent wage responsiveness of labour supply over the 
life cycle. 
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Malaysian household income indicates that there might be substantial under-reporting on 
this income source in the Household Income Survey. As a proposal, some effort could be 
made in Malaysia to collect better quality data on wage, hours of work, and non-wage 
income of households. 
9. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we attempt to estimate the hours of work equation with taxation for 
Malaysia using the combined data from the Labour Force Survey and the Household 
Income Survey collected by the Department of Statistics. Much of our understanding of 
post-tax labour supply functions are based on studies conducted in the developed 
countries, and very little empirical work has been done in developing countries. One of 
the most recent studies using a developing country data is conducted by Rochjadi and 
Leuthold for Indonesia. However, in using the CES direct utility function which 
constrains the income effect to be negative, they produced compensated wage elasticity 
estimates that are generally in conformity with the results obtained by many studies 
conducted in the developed countries. Other than the fact that it was the Indonesian data 
set that was analysed, there are no additional insights to be gained on the labour supply 
response from a developing country that does not have the welfare and benefit system of 
the developed countries. 
To avoid any preconceived notions on the shape of the labour supply curve, we 
use the 2SLS instrumental variable approach with selectivity adjustment in our 
estimations. There are three stages in the estimation process. In the first stage, we 
estimated the participation equation parameters. For the males, the participation 
likelihood is unimodal and an increasing function of non-labour income. Two alternative 
sets of instrumental variable estimators are used: the first uses gross wage and non-labour 
income as instruments, while the second relaxes the exogeneity assumption and uses 
socio-demographic variables as instruments. The estimated uncompensated wage 
elasticities for the males range from -0.12 (1984) to -0.16 (1992) under BASE 
I and -0.05 
under BASE2. For the females, the uncompensated wage elasticities under 
BASEI are 
-0.38 for 1984 and -0.23 
for 1992, while they are insignificant under BASE2. The 
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income elasticities estimated under BASEI for 1984 are 0.01 for males and 0.07 for 
females, while the income elasticities for 1992 are insignificant for both sexes. Using the 
Smith and Blundell maximum likelihood procedure to test for simultaneity, the results 
show that there is no problem of simultaneity for both the alternative instrumental 
variables. 
For comparative purpose, we perform some estimations using a different set of 
assumptions to ascertain the effects of selectivity adjustment, instrumental variables, 
restricted hours, and pre-tax wage and income variables on the results obtained in the 
baseline procedures. The inclusion of selectivity adjustment in the estimation procedure 
increases the absolute values of the LWAGETAX coefficient, with greater difference in 
absolute values for the female estimates. Given the much lower female participation, the 
correction for self-selection has greater effect on the uncompensated wage elasticity for 
the females than the males. Another alternative is to limit the estimations to those 
working between 25-60 hours per week since the extreme values in hours worked may be 
linked with hours misreporting which causes a spurious negative relationship between 
hours and wages. The coefficients for LWAGETAX and YVIR turn out to be smaller 
than those obtained under BASEI and come close to BASE2 estimates. 
Some estimations are performed for pre-tax labour supply equation and the 
results are compared with the post-tax labour supply equation. Comparison between the 
estimates from PRETXSAIV and BASE2, both of which have incorporated selectivity 
adjustments and instrumental variables, shows that there is very little or no change at all 
in the hours of work per week with the introduction of taxes. The magnitude of changes 
in terms of hours worked per week with the introduction of taxes is negligible for both 
sexes. The comparison is extended to those working between 25-60 hours per week and 
is found to be practically zero for males and females. From these estimates, the influence 
of taxes on the labour supply seem to be of second order or negligible effect. It appears 
that the decision to treat labour supply as exogenous in the CGE model in Chapter 5 is 
not an unreasonable assumption. 
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The final set of estimations are performed for -occupation and educational 
subgroups, as well for employees and self employed/own account workers. The income 
effect is found to be statistically insignificant for most cases. The uncompensated wage 
effect are strongest for workers in the agricultural, production and services occupations, 
while they are weakest for administrative and managerial workers, as well as 
professional and technical workers. The results show that in response to a positive 
change in wage, the occupations with lower mean wage would reduce more hours of 
work than those occupations with higher mean wage. The regressions by educational 
subgroups show that the uncompensated wage effect is inversely related to the level of 
education. Regarding the final set of regressions, the coefficients for LWAGETAX and 
YVIR are generally larger for the self-employed and unpaid family workers than for 
employees. For all the regression alternatives performed in this chapter, the estimated 
uncompensated wage effects are found to be negative and significant, while the income 
effects are positive and are very small or statistically insignificant. There has been no 
subgroup where the signs of significant coefficients for the wage and income effects are 
reversed. 
This chapter found that the male and female labour supply curves for Malaysia 
are backward bending, starting from the lowest wage and income levels. This raises two 
issues. First, this phenomenon could have been brought about by the absence of a 
comprehensive welfare and benefit system normally associated with a welfare state. 
Workers earning low wages would have to put in more hours in order to have an 
adequate amount of income or 'target income' to meet their household expenditure. 
These workers are also those who are either self-employed or engaged in 
informal sector 
activities in which the hours of work per week can vary widely. Workers who are on 
higher wage levels tend to be engaged in formal occupations which are 
bound by 
institutionally determined working hours, which are generally lower than those engaged 
in the low wage jobs. Second, there is the problem of separating out 
the pure income 
effects, particularly for workers at the higher income 
levels. In earlier studies conducted 
elsewhere, the negative income effect is large enough 
to give rise to a positive 
compensated wage elasticities. In the case of 
Malaysia, the under-reporting of the non- 
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earnings income and asset ownership could be partly responsible for the negligible 
income effects and the phenomenon of the backward-bending labour supply curves. 
319 
Chapter 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the implications of reforming the tax 
system of a developing country, using Malaysia as the case in our study. Accordingly, we 
briefly assessed the theoretical and empirical literature on tax reform, with special 
reference to the experiences of developing countries, and examined the transformation of 
Malaysia's fiscal and tax policies during the last 25 years. Since the analysis of a tax 
reform requires the identification of improvements over the current position, we 
performed a detailed analysis of the economic and tax structures of the status quo. 
Next, we analysed the effects of reforming Malaysia's tax system. First, we 
performed simulations of tax reform at the macroeconomic level using the computable 
general equilibrium model. In our simulations, we were interested to investigate which 
tax instruments could be used to enhance revenue at least cost to the macroeconomy and 
households, and how could the current tax structure be improved within a revenue- 
neutral context. Second, we used micro econometric techniques to examine the effect of 
taxation on Malaysia's labour supply. The question under consideration was what effect 
would income tax have on participation and labour supply. 
We now summarise briefly the findings from our study, followed 
by some 
suggestions on areas for further research. 
2. TAx REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Chapter 2 examines the goals of tax reform and the experiences of 
developing countries 
that have undertaken tax reforms in recent years. Some of the goals of a tax reform are 
revenue generation; promotion of growth, saving and 
investment; achievement of equity 
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and efficiency; and improvement of tax administration and tax compliance. Many 
developing countries have undertaken tax reforms in recent years. Some themes and 
lessons that emerged from the variety of tax reforms are as follows: 
1. Raising tax revenue is often the key objective of a tax reform, although in the 
short term, the reform can be designed to be revenue neutral. 
2. Some studies found that countries with lower taxes exhibit higher rates of 
growth, although the tax levels for all countries are rising in recent years. 
Studies to examine the effectiveness of incentives to encourage investments 
are still inconclusive, partly because of conceptual difficulties and data 
inadequacies. 
3. Under the equity goal, agencies such as the World Bank argue that user 
charges is an equitable as well as an efficient way to fund public expenditure. 
The other approach is the 'ability to pay' principle, in which people with equal 
capacity should pay the same and people with greater ability should pay more. 
For a more equitable tax system, a growing number of tax economists have 
advocated the shifting from income to consumption taxation. There is growing 
scepticism on the efficacy of the progressive tax structure to bring about 
income redistribution because of poor tax coverage and arbitrary enforcement 
in developing countries. Instead of designing a progressive tax structure to 
achieve greater equity, the strategy has now shifted to using taxes to raise 
revenue, which is then used for distributive spending. 
4. The design of an efficient tax system is often linked to the concepts of optimal 
commodity and optimal income taxation in theoretical tax literature. In 
practice, many recent tax reforms focused on achieving broader-based taxation 
at more uniform rates on the grounds that lower marginal tax rates reduce the 
distortions induced by high tax rates (Thirsk, 1991). 
5. Tax reform proposals must consider the institutional features and tax 
administration of each country. An important aspect often overlooked 
in tax 
reforms is the improvement of tax administration and tax compliance. 
It is 
important to keep the system as simple as possible for effective 
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implementation, especially for developing countries, which lack trained 
administrative personnel and resources as well as accounting sophistication of 
taxpayers. 
6. The tax reforms undertaken by many developing countries vary in scope, 
context, substance, and timing. The reforms can be comprehensive or partial, 
designed to raise revenue or to be revenue neutral, and their timing can be 
contemporaneous, phased or successive. 
7. The base of existing taxes should be broadened to enhance revenue. VAT is 
the preferred instrument for revenue enhancement, tax neutrality, vertical 
equity, and improving the collection of other taxes. 
8. Since the provision of special tax preferences often drains the national 
treasury, the potential gains of these preferences should be weighted against 
the potential losses in efficiency and revenue. The taxation of multinationals 
should be examined in terms of the tax regime of their home country, tax 
havens and conduit countries, and transfer pricing practices. 
3. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND FISCAL REFORM 
In Chapter 3, we examined the evolution of Malaysia's economy and the transformation 
of its fiscal policies during the last twenty five years. We analysed Malaysia's economic 
transformation in terms of four phases: (1) high economic growth and adoption of the 
New Economic Policy (1970-79); (2) economic boom with growing macro imbalances 
(1980-84); (3) policy reorientation and recession (1985-86); and (4) recovery and rapid 
growth (1987-95). 
At the start of the seventies, Malaysia's rapid economic growth was accompanied 
by an equally fast expansion of direct and indirect taxes, which provided 
the resources 
for the expansion in public sector programmes. From 29 percent 
in 1970, the share of 
public expenditure to GNP grew to 50 percent in 1980, with 
largest expenditure going to 
education, defence, infrastructure, agriculture and rural 
development. Physical and social 
infrastructure programmes were given priority to improve the 
life of the people and 
create the environment for economic growth and employment creation. 
During 1980-83, 
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the economy faced declining terms of trade, reduced export demand, and falling 
commodity prices. Anticipating a turnaround in the OECD economies, the government 
adopted a counter-cyclical fiscal policy and increased borrowing, which resulted in 
further deterioration of the budgetary deficit and foreign debt. 
In 1984, the policy of fiscal expansion was reversed. The government initiated 
expenditure cutback and rescheduling of projects, although programmes under the Nexý- 
Economic Policy were spared. The reduction in public expenditure coincided with the 
price collapse of Malaysia's major exports, and the economy sank into recession in 1985- 
86. Despite economic difficulties, the fiscal discipline policy stance was maintained 
throughout the recession, without resorting to prime pumping the economy. Operating 
expenditure was kept within one-quarter the size of GNP and allocations for development 
programmes were mainly directed towards social services, transport and 
communications. The government adopted further measures of fiscal policy reform, such 
as reducing the size and role of the public sector, better management and utilisation of 
public resources, greater economic liberalisation and deregulation of industry, and 
privatisation of public enterprises and utilities. At the same time, tax rates were reduced 
and increased tax exemptions, allowances and incentives were given to the private sector 
to promote investment. 
The period after 1987 was a phase of rapid economic growth with low inflation. 
Following economic recovery, public development programmes were reinstated, but the 
share of public expenditure to GNP was kept on a reducing trend. Private investment 
grew rapidly in response to the improved business environment and excellent growth 
prospects. The policy reorientation in the mid-1980s had a profound impact on 
Malaysia's economic management. Many of the fiscal and tax policies adopted since 
1984 continued to be applied into the nineties. In 1991 Malaysia adopted the Second 
Outline Perspective Plan and Vision 2020. These development policies have the 
following implications on the direction of future fiscal policies. 
1. Fiscal policies that promote efficiency, reduce price distortions, and 
have less 
negative impact on the poor would be adopted. 
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2. Public expenditure would be directed towards the areas offering the highest 
economic and social payoffs and the tax revenue would be raised with minimal 
costs to the economy. 
3. The government would have to place more emphasis on monitoring and 
regulating the standards of privatised services. 
4. There is a need to reform the tax system to establish a broad-based, equitable 
and neutral tax system. 
4. STRUCTURE AND TREND OF THE TAX SYSTEM 
After the discussion on economic transformation and fiscal reform, we then proceeded to 
examine the characteristics and trend of the tax system in Chapter 4. The Malaysian tax 
system was fairly productive in tax revenue and kept up with public expenditure 
requirements for most of the years under review. In 1990, tax revenue amounted to 20 
percent of GDP and 64 percent of total expenditure. The tax buoyancy estimates showed 
that during 1970-95 a growth of one percent in GDP was accompanied by 1.1 percent 
growth in total tax revenue. In terms of the ratio of tax revenue to GNP, Malaysia 
collected more taxes than the other countries in the region. 
There were two broad trends in the tax system. 
1. The main source of tax revenue had shifted from indirect taxes to direct taxes 
during the last twenty five years. 
2. The tax policy reforms undertaken in the mid-eighties had the effect of 
reducing the revenue contribution of some of the taxes. 
The changes in the tax rates since the mid- I 980s are as follows: 
1. The top marginal tax rate for personal income tax was reduced from 55 percent 
to 32 percent, while the lowest marginal tax rate was reduced from 6 percent to 
3 percent. 
2. Corporate tax rate fell from 50 percent to 30 percent, while the investment 
incentives were expanded. 
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3. For petroleum, the Second Generation Production Sharing Contracts were 
adopted to provide more favourable terms to the contractor. 
4. In the 1991 Budget, export duties on rubber, pepper and all minerals were 
ý11 abolished. 
5. The import duties for consumer products were also abolished or reduced in 
stages. 
Despite these rates reduction, they did not lead to public finance difficulties 
because the rapid economic growth after 1988 generated the required tax revenue, while 
the restrained public sector spending reduced the need for a rapid growth in tax revenue. 
However, there are several indications that a tax reform is needed to set in place a broad- 
based, equitable and neutral tax system, which facilitates tax administration and 
compliance, and generates revenue without creating distortions in the economy. 
Some findings from the analysis of personal income tax are as follows: 
1. There were 1.2 million taxpayers for personal income tax in 1990, of whom 
two-thirds were employees and one-third were sole-proprietors and partners. 
Furthermore, 54 percent of the taxpayers came from the lowest tax category 
and contributed only 8 percent of the income tax revenue. There could be 
efficiency gain in exempting those from the lowest tax categories and 
concentrating the efforts of the Department of the Inland Revenue on the 
'hard-to-tax' group. 
2. The comparison of Malaysia's marginal tax rates with neighbouring countries 
showed that Malaysian taxpayers faced the highest marginal tax rates 
in 1984 
and the highest tax brackets were reached very quickly. 
3. The comparison of Malaysia's marginal tax rates across time showed that the 
tax net in 1995 was wider than 1984. One reason for this 
is the problem of 
'bracket creep' where rising prices pushed income earners 
into higher tax 
categories over time. 
4. Individuals also reached the highest tax bracket faster in 1995 than a decade 
before. The progressivity in personal income tax had also increased for those 
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in the middle-income category, but remained unchanged for those in the top- 
income category. 
The marginal effective tax rates of the corporate sector were found to be 
significantly lower than the statutory rates. While the incentives might have the effect of 
attracting foreign investments to the country, they also contributed to an erosion of the 
tax base as well as biasing projects towards more capital-intensive techniques. There is 
potential for reducing or removing some of the incentives to make the tax system more 
efficient and less distortionary. 
The sales tax is an ad valorem single stage tax imposed at the import and 
manufacturing levels. The 'ring system', which allowed licensed firms to purchase and 
import tax-free all the inputs, was adopted to prevent tax cascading. In recent budgets, 
the service tax had been widened to include a wider range of services. The sales tax 
provides a wide scope for tax evasion, and is complex and difficult to administer. In 
addition, the ratio of goods and service tax to total revenue in Malaysia was lower than 
other countries within a similar income band. Despite the rapid growth of commercial 
activities and private consumption, the growth of sales and service taxes has been 
lacklustre. The adoption of VAT has the potential of modemising the tax system, 
broadening the tax base, and providing the government with an indirect tax handle to 
raise revenue with more fiscal neutrality and less economic distortions. 
The thesis performed tax buoyancy estimates and drew some of the following 
implications from them. 
1. The buoyancy estimates showed that an increase in GDP by I percent would 
be accompanied with an increase of 1.3 percent for direct taxes and 0.9 percent 
for indirect taxes. The low buoyancy of indirect taxes was the outcome of tax 
rate reductions and the declining importance of primary exports in the 
economy. In a tax reform, attention should be given to redress the low 
productivity of indirect taxes in revenue generation. 
2. The buoyancy coefficients for export duties and import duties were 0.05 and 
0.8, respectively. Since 1980, the contribution of export duties rapidly 
dwindled from 20 percent of tax revenue to a mere 2 percent in 1995. Duties 
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on many of the imports had been removed or reduced. One way to compensate 
for the decline of trade taxes and increase the tax productivity of indirect taxes 
is to adopt the value added tax. 
I The buoyancy of petroleum tax was estimated at 1.2. Petroleum tax provided 
the tax revenue base for the eighties. In view of the fluctuating oil price and 
production quotas, the tax reform in Malaysia should shift the tax burden to 
income and consumption taxes. 
4. The relatively low buoyancy of corporate tax of 1.0, despite the rapid growth in 
economy and the corporate sector, only serves to show that the wide range of 
tax exemption and incentives for the manufacturing sector had dampened 
revenue expansion more than was generally realised. 
5. MALAYSIAN TAx REFORM SIMULATIONS 
After gaining an insight into the economic performance, fiscal policy, and tax structure in 
Malaysia during the last twenty five years, we used the computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model in Chapter 5 to examine the effects of Malaysian tax reform on some key 
economic variables. They are real GDP aggregates, aggregate price movements, real 
wages, and real household aggregates. The counterfactual simulations addressed two 
questions: Which category of taxes would be the best instruments for raising 10 percent 
government revenue with minimal costs to the selected indicators? Could there be some 
efficiency gains from reforming the structure of direct and indirect taxes in a revenue- 
neutral tax context? 
To perform the analysis, the Malaysian CGE model was first calibrated on the 
Malaysian National Accounts and key variables, including tax revenue and public 
expenditure, from published data for 1990-95. In establishing the sectoral growth rates 
and macroeconomic framework for the period, we were guided by the Malaysian 
Second 
Outline Perspective Plan for 1991-2000. We then performed seven revenue-enhancing 
tax reform simulations and two revenue-neutral tax reform simulations 
for 1990-99, and 
compared the results against the baseline simulation. 
The simulation results and their policy implications are as follows: 
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I. Corporate tax, which in our simulation includes the contribution from 
petroleum tax, would be the best instrument to raise revenue without hurting 
households or negatively affecting GDP aggregates. In fact, the simulation 
shows that the effect of raising corporate tax on the two aggregates can be 
positive. 
2. If the revenue increase was to be derived from more than one tax source, then 
a good strategy would be raising revenue through the combination of corporate 
tax and non-commodity tax with VAT (VATIO). Income tax can also be used 
for revenue generation since it does not have a negative effect on real GDP; 
however, it does have the disadvantage of reducing real household disposable 
income and private consumption. 
3. It is possible to raise revenue from these three sources without the need to levy 
a large increase in their tax rates. For instance, one percent of government 
revenue in 1990 can be raised from a single tax source by increasing corporate 
tax by 3.5 percent, VAT 10 by 6.6 percent, or income tax by 8.2 percent. 
4. The revenue-neutral tax reform simulations showed that current tax structure 
can be improved and made more efficient. This could be realised by at least 
two reform options: (a) reducing personal income tax and increasing corporate 
tax, and (b) adopting VAT to replace the current sales and service taxes. Both 
these tax reform options would bring an improvement to the household 
income, consumption and savings. The adoption of VAT would also improve 
the levels of GDP and raise real wages for the workers. 
5. The MIER Tax Reform Group (1988) and Bardai (1993) proposed that the 
reduction of the Malaysian income tax rate and the adoption of VAT. Our 
simulations supported the two proposals, since they would be favourable to the 
selected indicators. We agreed with Bardai that corporate tax should not be 
reduced. Our simulations showed that the increase in corporate tax was not 
expected to bring negative effects for real household and GDP aggregates; on 
the contrary, it is expected to be beneficial for the economy. Some of the 
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actions to increase corporate tax revenue include rationalising the generous tax 
incentives offered to corporations. 
6. The shift from the sales and service taxes to VAT was expected to bring 
improvements to real household aggregates, as well as real GDP and private 
consumption. The simulation showed a slight effect in stimulating 
international trade, with some gain in net exports. The adoption of VAT in 
Malaysia was not foreseen to bring inflation. The GDP price deflator would 
rise by 2 percent throughout the decade, which suggests that there would be a 
once and for all shift in prices, without the acceleration of price changes. 
6. LITERATURE REvIEW ON LABOUR SUPPLY WITH TAXATION 
In considering a tax reform, a fundamental question is whether changes in taxes have an 
impact, if at all, on the individual's response towards participation and labour supply. 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 took up the analysis of estimating the parameters of labour 
supply with taxation at the micro level. Chapter 6 discussed the theoretical and empirical 
aspects of parameter estimation. The first generation research on labour supply 
encountered problems of how to treat missing wages for non-workers, model 
mis specification, and sample selection bias. The second generation research paid more 
attention to model specifications and estimation issues, although the results obtained 
from the improved procedures still showed the wide range of elasticity estimates that 
characterised first generation work. 
The parameter estimation of labour supply with taxation is further complicated by 
the non-linear budget set. In the case of a progressive tax system, the budget set is 
convex and piecewise-linear. With low income welfare programmes, the budget set is no 
longer strictly convex and multiple tangencies can result. The difficulty of estimating the 
labour supply parameters is finding the point of tangency on a curved budget set. 
Although many different functional forms have been adopted by various analysts, the 
two predominant approaches in the literature for labour supply with progressive taxation 
are: (a) pi ecewi se- linear budget constraint approach or the Hausman method, and (b) 
instrumental variable method. For both approaches, virtual income is used as a device to 




The Hausman method provides an elegant solution to the estimation of labour 
supply coefficients. It takes into account the linear segments and kinks on the after-tax 
budget set and admits randomness in hours of work arising from measurement error and 
variation in individual preference. The problem with this method is that it assumes 
perfect knowledge on the part of the analyst and the individual with respect to the entire 
budget constraint. Heckman (1983) argued that this procedure does not produce 
consistent estimates and may be less robust than the instrumental variable estimation 
procedure. Flood and MaCurdy (1992) used both approaches on the Swedish cross- 
section data and concluded that the instrumental-variable procedure offered a robust 
method for estimating the coefficients of the labour supply function. The instrumental 
variable approach overcomes the problems of endogeneity of the right-hand side 
variables as well as reverse causality. After considering methodological issues, the 
chapter discussed the empirical findings from studies on labour supply with taxation 
conducted in the developed and developing countries. 
7. MODELLING LABOUR SUPPLY WITH TAXATION 
Chapter 7 drew upon the experience of second generation work and used the instrumental 
variable approach to assess the importance of taxes in Malaysia's labour supply function. 
The analysis was based on the combined data from the Labour Force Survey and the 
Household Income Survey collected by the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
There were three stages in the estimation procedure: 
1. Participation Equation. The parameters of the participation function were 
estimated by using the standard probit likelihood function on both workers and 
non-workers. This estimation gave a measure of k so that it could be used to 
estimate the parameters of the wage equation in the next stage via selection 
bias-corrected regression. The variables used in the regression equation were 
experience (for males), age (for females), non-labour income, education 
attainment, strata, and age of children (for females). 
2. Wage Equation. In instrumenting for wage, two sets of variables were used. 
For the first alternative, the variables used were wage, non-labour income, 
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experience or age, and ý, to adjust for selection bias. The second alternative 
relaxed the exogeneity assumption for the instrumental variable estimators by 
excluding gross wage and non-labour income. Socio-demographic variables, 
such as experience or age, education, occupation, and ý, were used. Gross wage 
and non-labour income were used to instrument for virtual income. The tests 
for exogeneity showed that both sets of alternative instrumental variables for 
net wage and virtual income were valid instruments. 
3. Hours of Work Equation. The variables used to estimate this equation include 
the instrument for wage rate, virtual income, and a vector of additional control 
variables, such as age or experience, education, age and number of children, 
occupation, strata, and /k. 
The baseline estimations on hours of work for both males and females was 
performed for the whole sample of married couples within the 20-54 years age group. 
Next, four alternative estimations were performed to determine the extent to which the 
results differed from the baseline estimations. The four categories of alternative 
estimations were: (a) hours of work without instrumental variables, (b) three stage 
estimation for those working between 25-60 hours a week, (c) pre-tax hours of work 
estimation, and (d) regressions by subgroups of occupation, education and employment 
category. 
The estimations yielded two main conclusions. 
1. Taxes were found to have a weak effect on labour supply response. 
Comparison between the effects on labour supply of wages before and after 
taxes showed that the magnitude of changes in hours worked per week was 
negligible for both sexes. The wage effect of RMI in 1984 was only 4 minutes 
per week for the males and 9 minutes per week for the females. This finding 
corresponds with other studies such as Koster (1967), MaCurdy, Green and 
Paarsch (1990), and Mroz (1987). 
2. The uncompensated and the compensated wage effect estimates were found to 
be negative, while the income effect estimates were positive for all estimates 
where the coefficients obtained were significant. These signs seemed to be 
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contrary to what is normally expected in formal labour supply theory where 
the wage effect is positive and the income effect is negative. 
There were some previous studies which also found a negative uncompensated 
wage elasticity of hours of work, even after efforts to remove spurious correlation from 
the wage variable. Since some of these studies. estimated a strong negative income effect. 
this resulted in the estimated compensated wage elasticities becoming positive. This was 
not the case for Malaysia because the income effect was found to be either very low or 
insignificant. It is generally recognised that non-wage income is difficult to measure. 
Since the estimates on non-wage incomes varied so much and the uncompensated wage 
effect was typically negative, it was possible for studies to show a negative substitution 
effect. 
We argued that the results above seem reasonable given the socio-economic and 
institutional setting of Malaysia. In addition, there are the limitations of data and model 
specification that could have affected the regression results. 
1. An examination of the survey data showed that there was a much wider spread 
of hours worked at lower wages than at higher wages. In addition, the labour 
supply curve in Malaysia was backward bending, starting from the lowest 
wage level. 
2. While workers are generally expected to put in more hours if offered higher 
wage rates, there are some reasons why workers with lower wage in Malaysia 
put in more hours per week. One reason was the nature of the jobs with 
low 
wage rates which involved long working hours or required a lot of waiting 
time. There was also the related problem of errors in calculating the wage rates 
for jobs with long working hours, though the regressions on restricted 
hours 
would partly address this issue. 
3. Individuals with low income would have to increase their hours of work 
in 
order to reach an income level that could meet their 
household consumption 
needs. In a society without unemployment 
benefit or low income support, 
workers would maximise their hours of work, 
if there is an opportunity to do 
so, in order to have higher income. The added worker effect 




the Participation equation, where women with low family income have a 
higher participation likelihood. On the other hand, those earning higher 
income tended to be better educated and worked in more secure jobs, where 
the working hours were often institutionally determined. Estimations by 
subgroups (occupation, education, and employment category) showed that the 
wage effect is strongest among those with least education,, manual or 
agricultural labour, and own-account workers. 
4. In developed countries, it is relevant to consider whether the size of the 
benefits is large enough for individuals to choose non-participation in 
preference to participation and whether working individuals would limit their 
hours of work to locate at the kinks on the non-convex budget line brought 
about by transfer programmes. These issues are not directly relevant for 
countries, such as Malaysia. First is the absence of unemployment benefit or 
negative income tax programmes. Second, the taxpayers are small in 
proportion and the majority are in relatively low tax brackets. Their primary 
concern is really to raise their total income even if that means paying slightly 
more taxes, rather than to remain in a lower tax category by limiting hours of 
work. 
5. The assumption that leisure is a normal good, that is, higher income is related 
with increased demand for leisure and negatively related with hours of work, 
does not appear to be supported by the regression results. After controlling for 
net wages, the effect of non-labour income on hours of work is either very 
small and positive, or statistically insignificant. One reason for this could be 
that individuals in prime working groups are keen to build up their wealth 
position for retirement or as a safeguard against involuntary unemployment. In 
addition, females with higher levels of non-labour income (which implied that 
their spouses earned high salaries, often as a result of better education) have 
greater incentive to work because they tend to be better educated and could 
command higher wages. However, there are other explanations for the 
4 perverse' income effect. 
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6. The model used in the analysis was the standard utility function. This 
functional form may not be flexible enough to accommodate the concept of 
households requiring at least a minimum income level to meet their 
consumption needs. The second issue is that the static labour supply model 
does not take into account life cycle considerations of an individual's long-run 
values of wealth and wage and the timing of hours and consumption. 
Therefore, there is a difficulty with the standard practice of using current 
period non-earnings income to estimate pure income effects. Finally, the data 
source may not be rich enough to capture the ideal theoretical concepts that 
could be used to measure pure income effects, which could account for the 
estimated income slopes having 'wrong signs' in empirical work. Income 
surveys typically have problems with under-reporting of non-labour income. 
8. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The thesis has brought to light some interesting findings as well as some additional areas 
of research which we were not able to pursue given the focus and resource constraints of 
our research. Below are some related topics for future research that could build on and 
extend the work of this research. 
1. Study the impact of tax incentives on the effective tax rates faced by investors, 
on the composition of overall investment, and on the substitution of the factors 
of production. This is important for policy making since the 
lack of knowledge 
in these areas can lead to indiscriminate granting of tax incentives that erode 
the tax base, without promoting the desired mix of investment. 
2. Examine the extent of under-reporting of income and tax evasion of personal 
income tax. This study should be linked to proposals on how the institutional 
arrangements governing tax administration and tax compliance can 
be 
strengthened in Ma aysia. 
3. Use the Malaysian micro-macro model to examine the impact of tax reform on 
income distribution among households. This would require some 
reprogramming of the model in order 
for this analysis to be possible. 
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4. Although this is the first attempt to estimate the Malaysian labour supply 
function parameters using the combined data from the Labour Force Survey 
and the Household Income Survey, it is felt that the estimations can be 
strengthened with improved data on wage rates, hours of work, and non-labour 
income. It would be necessary to collaborate with the Department of Statistics 
to collect these information in their surveys. These data would not only be 
useful for labour supply analytical work, but also be used for planning and 
policy making as well. 
5. Re-estimate the labour supply function parameters using a formulation that 




For some insight into the model we provide a brief description of the model structure. 
More details about the model structure are found in Demery et. al (1992) and Harrigan 
(1996) on which the following presentation is based. 
PRODUCER DECISIONS 
Except for Public Services and Dwellings, the demand for all variable factors of 
production, including intermediate commodity inputs and different categories of labour, 
are obtained by maximising producer profit or minimising producer cost subject to multi- 
level technology constraints. A fixed coefficient technology is employed in the 
production of Public Services output. The net output for Dwellings is equated with 
imputed rent, calculated as the product of user cost of housing and the beginning of the 
period stock of private dwellings. 
There are three layers for the multi-level technology tree in each sector. Activity 
gross output is modelled as a CES function of an aggregate intermediate input and value- 
added. The aggregate intermediate input is an aggregate of composite commodities 
which are Armington aggregates of domestic and imported commodities. Value-added is 
produced with a CES technology combining composite labour and capital, and composite 
labour is a CES aggregation of professional and skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
occupational categories. 
Type I Problem. - At all levels of the production hierarchy, other than the value- 
added level, the factor demand and associated price functions are derived from solving 
the following profit maximisation problem: 
maxp. y-w. x-r. z s. t. y=fces, cdl(x, z) 
X, Z 
where Y is 'output', x and z are 'inputs', p is the price of output, w 
is the cost per unit of 
the first input, and r is the cost per unit of the second input. CES is constant elasticity of 
substitution production function and CD is Cobb Douglas production 
function. The 
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where cy is a substitution elasticity, cc's are the share parameters, and A is the 
productivity of the available technology. Solution of the profit maximisation problems 
subject to CES and CD production function restrictions yields the following factor 
demand expressions: 
cr a 
(X2*P fces X= 
[(", P] 
y and zI. y 
wr 
fc dX =a. 
p 
.. y and z -a). 
p. 
y wr 
In view of the variable factors and constant returns to scale assumed for the model, the 
problem above implies a constant marginal (=average) cost. In full equilibrium, the price 
of output is equal to marginal cost. This enables the market clearing prices to be derived 
directly from the representative firm's unrestricted CES and Cobb-Douglas cost 
functions. Substitution of the expressions for factor demands into their parent production 
functions yield the following expressions for price (=rnarginal cost): 
1 
1 -cy cr 1 1-G pces p= 
lai w+ (X2 .r 
pcd p= [A. a. (I - a)]-'. w'. r'-' 
The model occasionally use the inverted forms of these unrestricted cost 
functions, say in the case where 'law of one price' (LOP) option in a goods market is 










A PPENDIx I MODEL STRUCTURE 
ipcd w= [A. (x. (l - u)]Ct. r Cc PCC 
C, 
Type H Problem: M4 applies this problem exclusively at the value-added level of 
the production function. The Type 11 problem could accommodate the possibility of 
imperfect competition in the goods market and the presence of adjustment costs of 
changing output. The structure of the problem is as follows: 
maxp. y - w. n 
0* Ay 2 
11, p 2 ly 
s. t. y=ý gces, gcd 1 (n, k); y=1P1-x Oýý0; i: ýý- 1y1: ýg00 e p 
In this problem, labour, n, is the only variable input, while capital input, k, is 
fixed over the period of solution, ly is output (value-added) lagged one period, p' is the 
price a firm expects other firms to charge, and x is a demand scale variable, and the 
parameter 7 is the price elasticity of demand with sign reversal. In the symmetric 
e equilibrium, p=P. The solution of Type 11 problem gives the following expressions for 
the factor demand equations: 
cr ý'. a -(cr -1) 
fces n 
AY 













is the profit maximising mark-up Of Price over marginal cost. For an interior maximum 
for the representative firm, marginal revenue equals marginal cost, and with constant 
price elasticity,, price is proportional to marginal revenue. Accordingly, 
in full 
equilibrium the price can be inferred by substituting the profit maximising 
factor demand 
equations back into the underlying production functions to yield the 
following associated 
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The supply schedules could be obtained by inverting the restricted cost ftinctions: 
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The associated cost functions of the model are: 
Price of imported intermediate goods pjm.,, = pxwi - er - markup 
Price of domestic intermediate goods 
Domestic commodity price 
Domestic commodity price 
Price of intermediate aggregate 
Price of value added 
Price of value added 
Price of composite intermediate goods 
Nominal wage 
pjdji =pxi - markup 
px, =pc es(pji, pvi) I ioLOP 
px, = pxwi - erli E=- LOP 
pji =pces(pjjji) 
pvi = rpces(wi, vai, ki[t-, ]) 
I io-LOP 
pvi = ipces(pji, pxi) I icLOP 
pjj, i =parm(pjdji, pjmji) 
wi = pces(w, j) 
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where pces is an unrestricted CES cost function; rpces is a restricted CES cost function. 
ipces is an inverted, unrestricted CES cost function; parm is an Armington price 
function; the index LOP denotes sectors where the law of one price operates; pxw is the 
exogenous world commodity price in foreign currency units; er is the nominal effective 
exchange rate; px is the domestic commodity price; pv is the price of value-added; pj is 
the price of the intermediate aggregate; w is the nominal wage; va is quantity value- 
added; k is the capital stock; pjd is the price of domestic intermediate commodities, and 
pjm is the price of imported intermediate commodities (both in purchaser' prices). 
The last equation allows wages paid to identical labour categories in different 
sectors to vary. The purchasers' prices of domestic commodities sold to different uses are 
calculated as mark-ups on px in exactly the same way as pjd. The index n is used to 
identify different labour categories, and mark-up is used where goods or factor prices are 
marked-up over factor cost or their cif price. The time subscripts have been dropped 
except where lagged (beginning of the period) quantities or prices enter into the 
determination of a variable. 
The factor demand relationships of the model are: 
Aggregate intermediate input ji =fces(pxi, pji, xi) 
Value added 
Value added 
Composite intermediate commodities 
Composite labour 
Labour by skill 
Domestic output sold to intermediate uses 
Imported output sold to intermediate uses 
vai =ftes(pxi, pvi, xi) 
I io- LOP 
vai = irces(pvi, wi, kip-1) 
I ic LOP 
jý, j =fces(pjjj. i, pji, ji) 
ni =ftd(wi, pvai, vai) 
nnni : --fces(Wni, wi, ni) 
jdji = arm(pjdji, pjmji, jj,. i) 
jmj, = arm(pjmji, pidji, jj*j. i) 
where fces is a CES factor demand equation; irpces is an 
inverted, restricted CES cost 
function, and arm is an Armington demand function; px is the 
domestic commodity 
price; pj is the price of the intermediate aggregate; pjd 
is the price of domestic 
intermediate commodities; pjj is the price of composite 
intermediate commodities; pjm is 
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the price of imported intermediate commodities; pv is the price of value-added; it, is 
nominal wage; LOP denotes sectors where the law of one price operates; x is gross 
output; j is the aggregate intermediate input; jj are composite intermediate commodities; 
. 
jd is domestic output sold to intermediate uses; jm is imported output sold to 
intermediate uses; n is composite labour; nn is labour by skill; k is capital stock; and va is 
quantity value-added. 
FACTOR AND INSTITUTIONAL INCOMES 
Factor incomes are calculated as the product of factor prices (before taxes and 
subsidies) and the stocks of factor inputs employed, summed over all activities. 
Operating surplus is determined residually after subtracting gross emoluments from 
nominal value-added. The aggregate operating surplus of the economy is then distributed 
between its different institutional transactors. 
Household disposable income is calculated as: 
Yh : -- wage- taxes + transfers + asset income + unincorporated business income 
Transfers include the unrequited transfers from overseas residents, while asset income is 
the product of lagged (beginning of period) stocks and lagged interest rates, so that asset 
income is received only after transactors have held stocks for one period. Although not 
shown, asset revaluations are accommodated in the calculation of all incomes. 
Corporate net income is calculated as: 
operating surplus + transfers + asset income - taxes 
Government income is derived principally from taxes, but the government 
has 
claims on the operating surplus of those activities in which 
it invests. Government asset 
income is typically negative and represents service payments on outstanding public 
sector debt. The computation of taxes and transfers 
in M4 is highly disaggregated. 
Income taxes received by government are separately calculated 
by transactor and indirect 
taxes are disaggregated by transactor and commodity end uses. 






Consumption. Aggregate household consumption expenditure is modelled as a 
function of household disposable income, private sector no-human wealth, and the bank 
deposit rate as follows: 
ot 0. yoEi . WJGC2 /I [/-I] - expl-oý 3 Jd] 
where c is nominal consumption, wl is (beginning of the period) nominal wealth, and id 
is the bank deposit rate. Aggregate nominal consumption expenditure is spread over 
ýwants' via the linear expenditure system. A 'wants aggregation matrix' and Armington 
demand equations are then applied to derive domestic and imported commodity 
demands. 
Investment. Investment demands are translated into demands for commodities via 
a capital aggregation matrix (B) and split into their domestic and imported components 
using Armington relationships. Private investment demand in all but land-based activity 
is a function of Tobin's q (q), which is defined as the ratio of the marginal revenue 
product of capital to its user cost, net of taxes and gross of subsidies. The demand 
equation used is a follows: 
iai = (a, + g,. q, oi ). (kii, -, I. y j) 
which ensures that in the steady-state (q=l) private capital grows at the target steady- 
state rate, g. In this expression, 6 is the physical depreciation rate in sector i; k is the 
capital stock; y is the share of private capital in the total (beginning of the period) capital 
stock of the sector, and q is Tobin's q. In land-based activities, investment 
demands, and 
hence capital accumulation, are determined exogenously. Exogenous 
investments by 
government and public corporations are added to private 
investment before the 
translation from activity to commodity demands. Public corporations 
'target' investment 
demands are uniformly adjusted by the factor z (which is an endogenous variable) 
to 
satisfy the public sector debt constraint. 
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Exports. The demand for exports are as follows: 
Pio 
y i. pexi exi = 
pwxi *er 2- 
YTýß" li « LOP 
ex. = xi - jjd, - cd id -- Ii gi li EELOP 
J 
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where pex is the purchasers' price of exports; pwx is world price of the commodity; er is 
nominal effective exchange rate; and YW is an index of world demand for commodity i. 
In law of one price markets, exports adjust residually to clear goods markets. 
Savings and Financial Surpluses. The savings of each transactor is defined as the 
difference between their total income from all sources (including asset income) less their 
current account expenditure. Savings of the household sector is: 
Sh ::::::::: Yh -C 
and for government is 
g : --Yg -9 
where c is household consumption, g is total recurrent expenditure on goods and 
services. Total recurrent government expenditure is largely determined through 
government's exogenous decisions about employment and wages in the public sector. 
Recurrent expenditure (in real terms) adjusts passively to accommodate the supply of 
output of Public Services. The financial surplus of each transactor is equal to their 
savings less their capital account expenditure. 
Poqfolio Selection. The government sets fixed growth paths for the money and 
bond stocks, and its residual funding needs are then satisfied through overseas 
borrowing. This is given by 
fsg + wkg-dM - dB = er - d)Dg' 
where wk are working capital demands by government, dM is the change in the money 
stock (currency), dB is the change in the market value of the bond stock, and er. dFD*9 is 
the change in the stock of foreign currency denominated public sector debt. 
343 
PPENDix I MODEL STRUCTURE 













where D are interest bearing deposits, B is bonds, E is equity, FA * are net foreign assets 
in foreign currency units; id is the bank deposit rate; ib is the market return on bonds; ie 
is the return on equity; iw is the exogenous world nominal interest rate, and ýr' is the 
expected depreciation of the effective exchange rate. 
For debtor sectors, the corresponding portfolio selection equations are: 
Li 
E ie 
er - FD* iw+er 
-(A + wk All 
where L are loans, il is the loan rate, er is the nominal effective exchange rate, and ýr is 
the change in the exchange rate. 
Material Balances. In each sector, the total output demanded equals total output 
supplied in each period: 
x=+ cd + id + ex + gi Ij e- LOP jd. ji iii 
where jd is intermediate demand, cd is consumption demand, id is investment demand, 
and g is government demand. In the market for Public Services, government recurrent 
expenditure on goods adjusts to satisfy material balances for given supply, and in the 
Dwellings market, the demand for housing is automatically equated with imputed rent. 
Labour Market Closure. In all labour markets except the market for unskilled 
non-agricultural labour, wages (w,, ) adjust to equate the demand and supply of 
labour in 
each period. In the non-land based, unskilled labour market the rate of wage change 
is 
related to expected consumption goods price inflation, excess 
demand for labour, and a 
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trend capturing productivity growth. Hence in those markets that clear, the equation is 
given as: 
nrue,, ) nn, 
where 1f is the labour force and nrue is the (exogenous) natural rate of unemployment. In 
the non-land based market for unskilled labour, we have: 
dlnw,, =00 +Odlncpi'-02 In - 
ue, ) 
nrue,, ) 
where ue is the actual unemployment rate and cpi is the consumer price index. 
Other Intrinsic Dynamics. The capital stock in each activity is depreciated in each 
period and augmented by lagged investment: 
kil, l = kil, 6) + (iai[, + iag +4. ia'c ,) -11 ip-11 iti- 
where k is capital stock, g is government, and pc is public corporations. Private sector, 
non-human wealth is defined in nominal units as the value of the capital stock owned by 
the private sector, plus outside money plus the private sector housing stock less net 
foreign indebtedness (net of government debt). Technical progress occurs at the value- 
added level of each sector's production function and is labour augmenting (Harrod 
neutral), but with variable rates across activities. 
Expectations of change in consumer price inflation and of the nominal exchange 
rate are adaptive and are of the usual fonn: 
7r /+I - 7t =k 7c - 
(Cpit-l 
- 7T I 
der_ ýre ýr, '+, - ýr, L : -- 7er ' 
er, -, 





Agricultural Workers Mkt clearing 
Professsional and Skilled Workers Mkt clearing 
Serni- Skilled Workers Mkt clearing 
Unskilled Workers Mkt clearing 
Goods Market 
Commodity Market Mark- Up Scale 
Export Agriculture Perfect 
Other Agriculture Perfect 
Forestry Perfect 
Mining Perfect 
Resource Manufacturing Perfect 
Traded Manufacturing Perfect 
Domestic Manufacturing Perfect 
Private Services Perfect 
Oil and Gas Perfect 
Utilities na 1.000 1.000 
Construction Perfect 
Commodity Quota World Price 
Export Agriculture na on 
Oil on always 
Forestry on on 
Asset Market 
Bond rate variable 
Lending rate variable 
Exchange rate managed float 
Debt constraint passive 
Expectations 
Exchange Rate Expectations PA 0.200 
Parameter 
Cost of Borrowing 0.000 
Inflationary Expectations 0.200 
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Gross Output Technology 
Activity Technology Subs. Elas 
Export Agriculture ces 0.250 
Other Agriculture ces 0.250 
Forestry ces 0.250 
Mining ces 0.250 
Resource Manufacturing ces 0.250 
Traded Manufacturing ces 0.250 
Domestic Manufacturing ces 0.250 
Private Services ces 0.250 
Oil and Gas ces 0.250 
Utilities ces 0.250 
Construction ces 0.250 
Value Added Technology 
Activity Technology P. Adj. Subs. Elas 
Export Agriculture ces 0.00 0.750 
Other Agriculture ces 0.00 0.750 
Forestry ces 0.00 0.750 
Mining ces 0.00 0.250 
Resource Manufacturing ces 0.00 0.500 
Traded Manufacturing ces 0.00 0.500 
Domestic Manufacturing ces 0.00 0.500 
Private Services ces 0.00 0.750 
Oil and Gas ces 0.00 0.250 
Utilities ces 0.00 0.250 
Construction ces 0.00 0.750 
Intermediate Goods 'Technology' 
Activity Technology Subs. Elas 
Export Agriculture ces 0.250 
Other Agriculture ces 0.250 
Forestry ces 0.250 
Mining ces 0.250 
Resource Manufacturing ces 0.250 
Traded Manufacturing ces 0.250 
Domestic Manufacturing ces 0.250 
Private Services ces 0.250 
Oil and Gas ces 
0.250 
Utilities ces 0.250 
Construction ces 0.250 
347 
A PPENDIX 2 MODEL SPECIFICA TIONS 
Composite Labour 'Technology' 
A ctivity Technology Subs. Elas 
Export Agriculture ces 0.500 
Other Agriculture ces 0.500 
Forestry ces 0.500 
Mining ces 0.500 
Resource Manufacturing ces 0.250 
Traded Manufacturing ces 0.250 
Domestic Manufacturing ces 0.250 
Private Services ces 0.500 
Oil and Gas ces 0.500 
Utilities ces 0.500 
Construction ces 0.250 
Technical Progress Function 
Activity Form Rate 
Export Agriculture harrod 0.000 
Other Agriculture harrod 0.000 
Forestry harrod 0.000 
Mining harrod 0.000 
Resource Manufacturing harrod 0.000 
Traded Manufacturing harrod 0.000 
Domestic Manufacturing harrod 0.000 
Private Services harrod 0.000 
Oil and Gas harrod 0.000 
Utilities harrod 0.000 
Construction harrod 0.000 
Imports - Intermediate Goods 
Commodity Form Price Elas 
Export Agriculture competitive 10.00 
Other Agriculture competitive 0.75 
Forestry competitive 10.00 
Mining competitive 0.50 
Resource Manufacturing competitive 0.50 
Traded Manufacturing competitive 0.75 
Domestic Manufacturing competitive 0.50 
Private Services competitive 0.75 
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Imports - Consumption Goods 
Commodity Form Price Elas 
Export Agriculture competitive 10.00 
Other Agriculture competitive 1.50 
Forestry competitive 10.00 
Mining competitive 1.50 
Resource Manufacturing competitive 1.50 
Traded Manufacturing competitive 1.50 
Domestic Manufacturing competitive 1.50 
Private Services competitive 2.00 
Imports - Investment Goods 
Commodity Form Price Elas 
Export Agriculture competitive 10.00 
Other Agriculture competitive 0.50 
Forestry competitive 10.00 
Mining competitive 0.50 
Resource Manufacturing competitive 0.50 
Traded Manufacturing competitive 1.25 
Domestic Manufacturing competitive 1.25 
Private Services competitive 0.75 
Exports 
Commodity Price Elas Demand El 
Export Agriculture passive 
Other Agriculture 2.000 1.000 
Forestry passive 
Mining 2.000 1.000 
Resource Manufacturing 5.000 1.000 
Traded Manufacturing 10.000 1.000 
Domestic Manufacturing 2.000 1.000 
Private Services 2.000 1.000 
Oil passive 
Aggregate Consumption 
Elasticity to consume from labour income 
0.900 
Elasticity to consume from wealth 
0.100 
Elasticity to consume from Govt. debt 
0.000 
Semi-elasticity on real interest rate -0.010 
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Wants Demands 


















Activity Steady-State Growth 
Export Agriculture 0.030 
Other Agriculture 0.030 
Forestry 0.000 
Mining 0.000 
Resource Manufacturing 0.090 
Traded Manufacturing 0.120 
Domestic Manufacturing 0.105 
Private Services 0.091 
Oil and Gas 0.040 
Construction 0.071 
Supply 
Elasticity on Tobin's q 
0.100 
Ag/N Ag population share relative wage elasticity 0.100 
Ag/N Ag population share job probability elasticity 0.100 
Usk/Sk population share relative wage elasticity 0.000 
Usk/Sk population share job probability elasticity 0.000 
Sk/Prof population share relative wage elasticity 0.000 
Sk/Prof population share job probability elasticity 0.000 
Notes: 1. The Frisch parameter is the reciprocal of the elasticity of the marginal utility of expenditure 
with respect to expenditure. It is used in the Stone-Geary expenditure system. 
2. Under Tobin's q fonnulation, activities' demand for physical capital is an increasing function 
of the gap between the marginal product of capital and its user cost, which together determine 
profit. If Tobin's q is activated, this means that there will be a tendency for capital resources to 
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Finance: Households 
Loan elasticity wrt consumption 0.750 
Loan elasticity wrt unincorporate income 0.150 
Loan elasticity wrt capital exp: 0.100 
Loan elasticity wrt loan rate 0.0001 
Elasticity of EPF withdrawals 1.000 
Assets 




Bank-Other Financial Institutions 






Asset elasticity wrt nominal output 





















Elasticity asset demands wrt expenditure 
Elasticity wrt the asset rate 
Share Ceiling 
Money-Non Money 1.000 
OFI-Other 1.000 
Ceiling on bank share of loans 1.00 
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Finance: Non-Financial Public Enterprises 
Share Ceiling Response 
Foreign-Equity 1.000 200.00 
Working capital equity wrt output 1.000 
Bond share in total assets 0.947 
Finance: Employees Provident Fund 
Mark-up for loan rate 1.375 
Share Ceiling Response 
Equity-Non Equity 1.000 50.00 
Disc Bond/Other 1.000 50.00 
Finance: Banks 
Mark-up for loan rate 1.309 
Deposit/Loan Ratio 0.820 
Assets Share Ceiling Response 
Equity-Non Equity 1.000 50.00 
Equity: Foreign/Domestic 1.000 200.00 
Oth Domestic/Other Foreign 1.000 50.00 
Liabilities 
Equity-Non Equity 1.000 50.00 
Other Domestic/Other Foreign 1.000 200.00 
Finance: Other Financial Institutions 









Bank-Employees Provident Fund 
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